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Entries in Middle East (104)

9:11AM

WPR's The New Rules: "War-Gaming Egypt's Future"

Over the weekend, Wikistrat -- a Tel Aviv-based technology start-up for which I serve as chief analyst -- gathered a group of Israeli and U.S. geostrategists, myself included, to take part in an online scenario-generating drill in response to the ongoing protests in Egypt. Our goal was to work up four feasible pathway trees along which events could develop -- two favorable to the Egyptian people, two favorable to the Egyptian regime -- and then present them online to interested parties for feedback and voting. The exercise was an attempt to harness the Web 2.0's wisdom of the crowd for strategic forecasting.

Here are the four scenarios we came up with:

Read the entire article at World Politics Review.

9:06AM

The Politics Blog: "10 Lessons from the Revolution in Egypt... So Far"

This weekend, while Cairo was burning and Hosni Mubarak struggled to maintain power, I was in a kind of virtual Vulcan mind meld with a network of regional experts for my day job at Wikistrat, a Tel Aviv-based online scenario-modeling firm, ginning up ideas of what might come next for Egypt: Does the big man step down? Or do the people win? Does it all happen very fast, or way too slow? They're not easy questions to answer, and what happens in the next day or so will be crucial. But based on that weekend of analysis — and quite a bit of time spent in Egypt, including close interactions with the military there — a clearer picture is starting to emerge.

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

9:00AM

Scenario Dynamics Grid voting results at Wikistrat's Egyptian war room (updated 0900 EST Mon)

UPDATE NOTE:  FOR MY RECORDS/CURIOSITY, I'M TRACKING HOW THINGS SHIFT OR STAY STEADY AS THE VOTES POUR IN.  I SHIFT ORDERING AS ONE SCENARIO MOVES UP OR DOWN.  STRIKE-OUT PREVIOUS TOTALS KEPT TO GIVE YOU SENSE OF MOMENTUM (FIRST CUT THIS MORNING, SO WE'RE TALKING COURSE OF DAY)

The voting tally so far, which naturally changes as more votes come in.  You get access to the latest totals when you go and vote. Realize this vote will have a Middle East bias, meaning more locals than outsiders. Then again, who gets these things more right than the locals, yes?

Again, if the votes don't add up, it's because the page kept updating as I punched them in and I'm just going with these.

 

Unfolding Pathways

  • Military's tightening grip (42%) (39%) (36%) (37%)
  • Mubarak's many slips (16%) (19%) (23%) (24%)
  • Protests' explosive rip (33%) (30%) (22%) (21%)
  • Movement's steady drip (9%) (13%) (16%) (19%) (18%)

My upshot:  Fast and furious, with a military play eventually.

UPDATE: "Rip" scenario falling into third place, so less expectation of speed and more of Mubarak-dumped-by-military feeling.

Regime Response

  • Big man steps down (40%) (39%) (41%) (38%) (37%)
  • (Next military) man up! (26%) (22%)  (31%) (32%) (34%)
  • Systemic crack down (26%) (32%) (19%) (21%) 
  • Oppositions leaders hunted down (9%) (7%) (9%)

My upshot:  Expectation that Mubarak must go, but that systemic response will follow to reestablish some control once he's thrown to wolves.  Amazing to me:  just days ago most US experts on Egypt said the security system would hold (as in, hunt them down).

UPDATE:  Falling "crack down" and rising "military man" solution, but Mubarak going holds steady.

US Response

  • "Too preliminary to take a stand" (47%) (51%) (54%) (53%)
  • "Let me be the first to shake your hand!" (24%)  (23%) (22%) (21%)
  • "I'm with the Band" (of Netizens) (21%) (17%)  (20%) (21%)
  • Stand by your man! (9%) (7%) (5%)

My upshot:  Standing by Mubarak too incredible, so US hanging back and then embracing new (probably interim) authority figure is expected.

UPDATE: Rising verdict on US inaction.

Regional Responses

  • Frantic firewalling (35%) (34%) (39%) (36%)
  • Head-in-sand stalling (23%) (24%)  (25%) (23%)  (26%)
  • Dominoes keep falling (21%) (22%) (23%) (23%) (22%)
  • Tehran comes calling (21%) (20%) (19%) (16%) 

My upshot:  Expectations that now any further vulnerable regimes truly harden out of fear.

UPDATE:  Very steady.  More a downstream bit, so makes sense.

Global Responses

  • "Who lost Egypt?" (42%) (43%) (42%) (39%)
  • "We are all Egyptians now!" (28%) (26%) (28%) (29%)
  • "Let my people go!" (28%) (26%) (25%) (28%)
  • "Boycott Pharaoh's cotton (2%) (6%) (5%) (4%)

My upshot: Almost nobody sees this dragging out long enough for sanctions, just the opposite.

UPDATE:  Similar to regional.  Although I remain amazed that the regret statement is persistently highest.  Suggests the system's nerves outweigh its hopes.

Tipping Points

  • Viennese sausage-making (40%) (45%)
  • "Murderers row" press conference (35%) (31%) (26%) (24%) (26%)
  • That iconic photo of ElBaradei on a tank (19%) (17%) (21%) (22%) (21%)
  • First UN sanctions against newest "rogue regime" (7%) (9%)

My upshot:  International arbitrage most likely outcome, but with military buy-in (military is large, powerful and popular, as the Scenario Dynamics Grid notes)

UPDATE:  Rising combo of negotiated deal + ElBaradei, with military-in-front scenario declining.

Exit Glidepath

  • Think Turkey, now (35%) (39%) (43%) (49%) (53%)
  • Think Pakistan, anytime (23%) (22%) (32%) (27%) (24%)
  • Think Iran, 1979 (23%) (24%)  (12%) (13%) (14%)
  • Think China, 1989 (19%) (15%) (14%) (11%) (10%

My upshot: Mubarak's China model moment has passed (too little, too late), and there's more fear of a Pakistan or Iran path (in aggregate) than the more stable Turkish one.  If I'm Israeli, I guess I'm not particularly enamored with any of that.

UPDATE:  To me, the most interesting shifts, as Turkey rises (to me, hopeful sign), as does Pakistan (scarier), but Iran dropping (and that's scariest to me).

 

1:21PM

Live interviews at Vantage Point (Oracle Broadcasting) and Backbone Radio - Jan 30, 1900 and 2100 EST

I will be interviewed on Egypt Crisis as well as our War-Room and Wikistrat in general this evening at Vantage Point and Backbone Radio

Live over the Internet here:

 

 

From the Backbone site:

Backbone Radio: Egypt update, Jan 30, 2011

I’m pleased to let you know that during the 7 PM hour of this evening’s show, we’ll be joined by global strategy expert and best-selling author Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett to discuss events in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as the possible impact of these events on other nations, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel.

You can read Dr. Barnett’s remarkable bio HERE and I encourage readers of these pages and listeners to Backbone Radio to visit www.wikistrat.com/war-room for ongoing strategic simulation by geostrategists headed by Dr. Barnett, looking at developments in Egypt. (Wikistrat subscribers get deeper access…)

More details of the “War Room” in THIS press release.

As always, please join me by listening to (and calling in to) this week’s Backbone Radio program from 5 PM to 8 PM on 710 AM KNUS in Denver and 1460 AM KZNT in Colorado Springs.

If you’re not in range of the radio waves, you should be able to listen to the show online by clicking HERE.

 

10:18PM

Wikistrat planning weekend scenario exercise on Egyptian's "Angry Friday" VERTICAL SHOCK with network of experts

Setting up our version of a war room on Egypt.  

We should have a basic available-to-anyone summary page up hopefully by Saturday afternoon, with drill-downs saved for subscribers.

Til then:

After Mubarak, will Egypt face a void? 

BY TIM LISTER, 29 JAN 2011

QUOTES:

Thomas P. Barnett of forecasting group Wikistrat put it more colorfully: "Let me give you the four scariest words I can't pronounce in Arabic: Egypt after Hosni Mubarak" . . . 

In any event, says Barnett -- formerly a professor at the U.S. Navy War College -- events in Egypt and Tunisia show that the "Islamist narrative" to explain the woes of the Arab world is being challenged by a maturing and well-educated youth movement whose expectations of a better life have been dashed by economic stagnation and a stifling political atmosphere . . . 


Barnett, chief analyst at Wikistrat, says Mubarak's best -- and perhaps only -- option may now be to announce an "exit date" to take the sting out of the protests, organize an orderly transition to fresh elections and hand authority to a caretaker Cabinet that could focus on growing the economy . . .

Read full piece here.

 

The New Rules: The Battle for Islam's Soul (Jan 2011)

Beginning with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the West has viewed the Middle East and North Africa primarily through the lens of radical fundamentalist political movements. That perspective has narrowed our strategic vision ever since, conflating Shiite with Sunni, evangelicals with fundamentalists, Persians with Arabs, Islamists with autocrats, and so on. But recent events in Tunisia and Algeria remind us that the vast bulk of history's revolutions are fueled by economics, not politics. In this, the struggle for Islam's soul is no different than that of any other civilization in this age of globalization's rapid expansion . . .

Read the whole column at World Politics Review.

 

Who Should Worry About the Tunisia Fallout, Really? (Jan 2011)

4. Egypt's modern "pharaoh" should worry.

Last time I was in Egypt, I heard the same lament from every young man I came across: "I can't get married because I can't get a job!" You want to brew a revolution? There's no faster way than keeping young men from getting their just desserts, if you know what I mean. Put them off long enough, and some will resort to a strap-on — you know, the kind that allegedly wins you 72 virgins in the afterlife. And president pharoah Hosni Mubarak's latest offer to his public is... 8-percent economic growth for the foreseeable future. Now that's downright China-like, if he can keep his promises — and fast . . . 

Read the full post at Esquire's The Politics Blog

 

Four scary words: Egypt after Hosni Mubarak (2008)

Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak's "emergency rule" is deep into its third decade, with modernizing son Gamal teed up as the pharaoh-in-waiting. While Gamal's efforts to open up Egypt's state-heavy economy have progressed nicely the past few years, so has Mubarak the Elder's repression of all political opponents, yielding the Arab world's most ardent impression of the Chinese model of development.

But with the global recession now reaching down deeply into emerging markets, serious cracks emerge in the Mubarak regime's facade. Unemployment is - unofficially - somewhere north of 30 percent. Worse, it's highly concentrated among youth, whose demographic bulge currently generates 800,000 new job seekers every year.

Ask young Egyptian men, as I did repeatedly on a trip, what their biggest worry is, and they'll tell you it's the inability to find a job that earns enough to enable marriage - a terrible sign in a society becoming more religiously conservative.

At 83, Hosni Mubarak is an unhealthy dictator who's achieved a stranglehold on virtually every aspect of Egyptian life, creating an immense undercurrent of popular resentment. While Washington focuses on Iran's reach for nukes and its upcoming presidential election, Egypt is more likely to be plunged into domestic political crisis on President-Elect Barack Obama's watch . .  .

Read more: Thomas P.M. Barnett's Globlogization - Scripps Howard News Service column - Four scary words: Egypt after Hosni Mubarak 

 

Egypt:  The Country to Watch, Esquire, October 2006

Let me give you the four scariest words I can't pronounce in Arabic: Egypt after Hosni Mubarak.

Osama picked the time (9/11), and Bush picked the venue (Iraq), but this fight between radical Islam and globalization's integrating forces was preordained the day Deng Xiaoping set in motion China's economic rise almost three decades ago. You can't rapidly add billions of new capitalists to the global economy and pretend the Islamic Middle East will remain queerly disconnected forever, somehow fire-walled from that borglike assimilation.

And so, while resistance may be ultimately futile, it will be bloody as hell in the meantime, with Cairo--not Tehran--likely to become the next big flash point in this Long War . . . 

Read the entire piece here.

12:08PM

WPR's The New Rules: "The Battle for Islam's Soul"

Beginning with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the West has viewed the Middle East and North Africa primarily through the lens of radical fundamentalist political movements. That perspective has narrowed our strategic vision ever since, conflating Shiite with Sunni, evangelicals with fundamentalists, Persians with Arabs, Islamists with autocrats, and so on. But recent events in Tunisia and Algeria remind us that the vast bulk of history's revolutions are fueled by economics, not politics. In this, the struggle for Islam's soul is no different than that of any other civilization in this age of globalization's rapid expansion.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

8:23AM

Esquire's Politics Blog: Who Should Worry About the Tunisia Fallout, Really?

Details of the downfall of Tunisia's longtime strong man Zein el-Abidine Ben Ali are familiar enough: The spark that triggers the street-level explosion of social anger (a young man, hassled by the government for his pathetic gray-market activities, decides Plan B is to set himself on fire); the frantic government attempts at crackdown (close school!); only to be followed by the offering of sacrificial lambs (take my minister — please!); and, finally, the embarrassing departure of the big man himself. At this point, the rump government is throwing anything it can into the angry fire, hoping it will burn itself out. And the "unity" government doesn't seem to be doing much better.

With any such revolution (color this one green — as in money, despite all the Iran-esque web chatter), there is the temptation to read into it all sorts of larger meaning. This time around, I think the best route is simply to note which parties — outside of Tunisia — should be made supremely nervous by the unfolding events. With the possible exception of Crazy Qaddafi....

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.



 

9:44AM

WPR's The New Rules: U.S. Defense Cuts a Step in the Right Direction

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates unveiled his much-anticipated budget cuts last Thursday, signaling the beginning of the end of the decade-long splurge in military spending triggered by Sept. 11. Gates presented the package of cuts as being the biggest possible given the current international security landscape, warning that any deeper reductions could prove "potentially calamitous." Frankly, I find that statement hard to swallow.

REad the entire column at World Politics Review.

8:59AM

WPR's The New Rules: A Wish List for the New Year

To kick off 2011, I thought I'd put together my top-10 international affairs wish list for the year, going from left to right on my wall map. But like Spinal Tap, only better, my list goes to 12:

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

8:08PM

WPR's The New Rules: Qatar World Cup a Return on Investment

 

The decision by FIFA, soccer's world governing body, to award the 2022 World Cup to Qatar was momentous on many levels, but historic on one key score: Never before has a global sporting event of such stature been awarded to a country so clearly stuck in a "bad neighborhood" like the Persian Gulf, where the potential for large-scale regional war between now and 2022 is far from theoretical. FIFA's decision was bold alright, but it also signals the international community's growing faith in what Gulf Cooperation Council countries like Qatar have achieved in promoting economic and network connectivity with the outside world. You could say that the 2022 World Cup is globalization's way of returning the favor.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

10:00AM

WPR's The New Rules: Globalization, Air Hubs and the City of Tomorrow

H.G. Wells’ futuristic 1933 classic, “The Shape of Things of Come,” predicted a post-apocalyptic world in which humanity’s recovery would depend on the airplane as the primary mechanism for both travel and political rule -- the benevolent “dictatorship of the air.”  The book reflected Wells’ prescient fears of catastrophic world war and his faith in technology’s capacity to tame mankind’s worst instincts.  

A book due out in March entitled, “Aerotropolis: The Way We’ll Live Next,” is the closest thing to a real-world vision to rival that of Wells. The book, written by journalist Greg Lindsay, is based on the visionary ideas of business professor John Kasarda, a latter-day Wells who dreams of building future cities around airports instead of the other way around.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

12:01AM

The Politics Blog: America in Yemen: The Perfect War We've Been Waiting for?

Before the ink could dry, it seemed like the secret war had already begun. Just a couple of toner cartridges haplessly headed for American synagogues, and suddenly the headlines are shouting it: TIME TO GET SERIOUS ABOUT YEMEN and OUR INVOLVEMENT IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE LONG-TERM. I suppose that's what it's come to in this country these days — that, as soon as an obscure Al Qaeda offshoot in Yemen claims responsibility for some UPS packages in Chicago, Americans assume we have another all-encompassing, mega-expensive affair on our not-so-bloody hands. Because when it comes to nation-building, the United States doesn't do anything small and beautiful anymore.

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

12:01AM

Why I don't worry about A2/AD (the PG version)

Pair of FT stories.

First is front-pager on how the U.S. defense industry is cleaning up on sales to PG Sunni states worried about Iran's reach for the bomb, with jets, radar and missile defense orders leading the way. While the short term fear is plain enough:  a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran could trigger Iran's retaliations against whomever and they want to be ready. But longer term, we have dueling anti-access, area-denial strategies, with our local allies buying what we're selling: ways to penetrate Iran's alleged A2/AD capacity (mostly fixated on US naval assets in the Gulf) and ways to set up competing versions of their own.

Point being, I'm not a big believer in A2/AD working as a peacetime influencer.  When the Sovs made that effort with us during the Cold War, it was all about the actual fight, and didn't add anything to Soviet ability to freak anybody out and thus influence them.  The nukes they fielded did plenty of that.

Iran won't be getting to any serious nuke total for a very long time, and they're unlikely to make it very high without suffering some debilitating fight with its regional neighbors, so their version of A2/AD (the short version is to say anything that puts our carriers at serious and doesn't allow us to park off your coast and do sorties to our hearts' content) logically presents more ambition (i.e., they really hope to cover some of their own vulnerabilities here).  But deliver any serious peacetime influence? Ain't going to happen. Too tight a space and too many enemies with money to spend and a big friend to make the sales. Plus, no matter what we put in the Gulf, we can reach out with long-range bombers and pretty much do what we want with Iran, from all sorts of distant and untouchable friendly bases.

So what great lord-it-over-them influence does Iran get with its A2/AD and nuke efforts?  Nothing really.  The regional balancing is natural enough and there's no superpower standing behind Iran ready to bail it out if the fight really does come.  Plus (reference 2), a nakedly assertive Iran (i.e., when it's anti-Israeli, aren't-we-Muslims-in-this-all-together rhetoric is stripped away) only buys its co-religionists throughout the region a lot more persecution.  

So Iran's local influence goes down and ours goes up--A2/AD denied.

And it happens in such a nice way for our defense industry facing lower acquisitions back home.  Honestly, it's made to order--unless you're hoping to use the whole A2/AD to get the Pentagon to buy your gear back here. Because the more we arm up our friends, Nixon Doctrine style (shoe not being on Iran's foot this time), the less assets we need to keep in region and the more likely it is that, if we so choose, we'll rain iron from significant, out-of-touch distances.

12:05AM

The one-and-a-half state solution continues to emerge

image here

We're seeing this same story again and again over recent months: Israel is internally conflicted on how to make peace with Palestine in general and clearly has plenty of reason to resist any accommodation with Hamas in Gaza, and yet, a viable state and partner continues to emerge in the West Bank:

Rather than cursing the Israeli occupation, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank executive, has shifted the focus to building up the Palestinian state. Fayyad's government has improved security -- as Israeli army generals have acknowledged -- and the rule of law while also introducing far-reaching reforms in education, health and the economy. In its annual report on assistance to the Palestinian people, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development estimates that gross domestic product in the occupied territories rose 6.8 percent in 2009. The recently unveiled second-year phase of this plan is titled "home stretch to freedom."

Palestinians have launched a public relations campaign, "I am a partner," aimed at the Israeli public. Featuring key Palestinian negotiators, it seeks to debunk the myth that there are no peace partners on the Palestinian side.

Geographically split states just don't work--outside of federated, networked America, that is.  At some point, it just seems to make sense that Israel will cut some deal with the WB and reduce its Palestinian problem to just Gaza.  The West Bank, by most accounts, is doing everything possible to make this an inevitability through internal development that'll need just some reasonable accommodation from Israel to make it far more robust.

So the question becomes, What does it take for Israel to split that difference for good?  Forget the big outline. Just tell me how this thing works in the WB.

12:02AM

Connectivity creates boom market in outlier fatwas in Saudi Arabia

Too many opinionated, helping hands in the Kingdom, according to this WAPO story.

The details:

Abdullah has tried to curtail some of the powers of conservatives, including the religious scholars, and taken cautious steps to improve the situations of women and of Shiite Muslims, a religious minority in Saudi Arabia.

In June, however, the Saudi public was startled by a fatwa advocating that women breast-feed unrelated men to establish "maternal relations" and thus get around the Islamic prohibition on the mixing of the sexes. A few months earlier, another scholar had urged the killing of anyone who facilitated the mixing of men and women in workplaces and universities.

Those are extreme examples of a torrent of rulings on all aspects of life by Saudi scholars making the most of their recently acquired access to much wider audiences.

"Fatwas have become a huge problem, especially after satellite TV and the Internet," said Hamza al-Mozaini, a liberal newspaper columnist. "It has become something like a business for religious scholars, and they race to outdo each other."

As with any sudden onset of connectivity, the crazies quickly predominate--largely discrediting themselves in their aggregate nonsense. But the fear market is likewise there early on, so the King is right to move on this.

12:01AM

Chart of the Day: the growing problem of Saudi joblessness

FT story on growing domestic backlash to the guest worker economy there:

When a survey by HSBC bank revealed that expatriates working in Saudi Arabia were among the world's wealthiest, with disposable incomes allowing them to buy luxuries such as yachts, many citizens of the kingdom were furious.

Newspaper columnists, readers and social media users lamented the money that they believed foreigners were skimming off Saudis, portraying expatriates as wallowing in luxury while the country struggles with unemployment.

"We are not surprised,  Foreigners control all retail business, grocery stores . . . They are given facilities and priority, killing all job prospects for Saudis," wrote Rashid al-Fawazan in Riyadh, a newspaper.  "Nine million foreigners are bleeding the country dry.  We don't even have real industry which forces investors to train our young people."

Lot of hype here, as most guest workers early about $150--a month! (must be toy yachts), but here's a $375b economy, the biggest in the Arab world, and it still has official unemployment of 10-11 percent (I would bet the underemployment is far larger).

Two-thirds of Saudis are under 30, indicative of the larger demographic wave working its way into its working years all across the Middle East and North Africa, where the standard prediction is the need for job creation on the scale of 100m jobs over the next two decades.

Meaning . . . this is just the tip of the social unrest iceberg--unless the job creation follows.

The youth bulge of the Middle East inevitably becomes the middle-age bulge of the Middle East, meaning a lot of certain types of behaviors (crime, terror, restlessness) should naturally go down IF the job creation absorbs those numbers.  Saudi Arabia shoots itself in the foot by having two labor rule sets:  one for Saudis (hard to fire, for example) and one for foreigners.  Then there's the issue of unrealistic expectations among new Saudi college graduates, who feel they deserve a management slot from the get-go.  The entitlement mindset going back to the original oil booms persists, say observers.  And let's not forget the ban on women and men working together--a huge obstacle.

As one local banker/economist put it:  "How can you create jobs for Saudis if they do not want to join the private sector, and the private sector does not want them?"

The gov keeps telling the private sector to hire more Saudis, but it seems to be unrealistic in its expectations, given the lack of social change and accompanying rule-sets.  Abdullah needs to pick up the pace.

12:04AM

Perfectly fine to arm up the Sunnis

WSJ front-pager on US selling $30B worth of F-15s to the Saudis, albeit lacking features that Israel opposes.

I'm not a fan of Saudi Arabia, even as I wish King Abdullah (and his reforms) a much longer life, but frankly, I'd sell the Saudis whatever they want in whatever amounts they want, because, once Iran gets the bomb, the Saudis will be sorely tempted to follow suit.  So the more cool we keep them in the short run, the better.

The Saudis are never going to attack Israel and wouldn't find any utility in letting others do the same.  They've grown beyond such dynamics, so why not arm them and everybody else in the region to the teeth, so as to make clear to Tehran how they gain nothing in military influence by achieving the bomb.

I still await the argument that proves how nukes ever got anybody anything--other than safe harbor from attack by other great powers.  About the best case you can make is that Ike signaled his willingness to go all the way on Korea, convincing the Soviet bloc to avoid escalation.  But even there, you're talking about a bad thing being prevented more than any victory won or influence cemented. 

All Iran does by getting the bomb is to make itself Israel's strategic equal in the region, logically triggering bilateral talks once the brinkmanship gets tiresome (less for them than for interested great powers).  To the extent that Turkey and the Saudis step into that dynamic on their own, I see less danger in proliferation and more safety in a truly regional strategic security architecture.

But meanwhile, we balance appropriately.

12:01AM

Blast from my past: "The Country To Watch: Egypt" (2006)

 

[No. 042] The Country To Watch: Egypt

by Thomas P.M. Barnett

 

"The Esquire 100," Esquire, October 2006, p. 177.

 

Bush should have co-opted Ahmadinejad, not cornered him. His proxy war with Israel only strengthens him. Meanwhile, "moderate" Arab dictators like Mubarek see their lives flashing before them.

Let me give you the four scariest words I can't pronounce in Arabic: Egypt after Hosni Mubarak.

Osama picked the time (9/11), and Bush picked the venue (Iraq), but this fight between radical Islam and globalization's integrating forces was preordained the day Deng Xiaoping set in motion China's economic rise almost three decades ago. You can't rapidly add billions of new capitalists to the global economy and pretend the Islamic Middle East will remain queerly disconnected forever, somehow fire-walled from that borglike assimilation.

And so, while resistance may be ultimately futile, it will be bloody as hell in the meantime, with Cairo--not Tehran--likely to become the next big flash point in this Long War.

Mubarak's "emergency rule" dictatorship is deep into its third decade, making him one of Egypt's most durable pharaohs. His succession plan is clear: Son Gamal tries to replicate Beijing's model of economic reform, forestalling political reform.

In other words, connect to the global economy to avoid connecting to your own people: bread before circuses, my friends.

The problem? Another political force is connecting to the restive Egyptian people, and it's the Muslim Brotherhood, otherwise known as Al Qaeda 1.0. By hardwiring themselves into the goodwill of the masses through highly effective social-welfare nets, the Brotherhood is retracing the electoral pathway to power blazed by Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon: hearts and minds first, blood and guts later.

So it's basically a race: Gamal's quest for foreign direct investment and the jobs it generates versus the Brotherhood's quest for the political support of average Egyptians tired of lives led in quiet desperation.

Who will win? I'm betting another "olive tree" fight breaks out long before any Egyptian "Lexus" goes to market. Gamal's economic reforms are slowly working, but it's likely a case of too little too late.

If the Muslim Brotherhood were to achieve power in Egypt, Israel's demise would once again become the overt unifying principle for governments in the region. That would mean, by George, that all Bush's Big Bang really accomplished was to return the Middle East to 1973.

So much for all those Nobels.

The difference this time? It still may be our blood, but it's mostly Asia's oil (and gas) now. You pit East versus West in a flat world, and you've just made Osama the fulcrum for a new cold war.

Sound incredible? It isn't, because the more likely scenario is that Mubarak the Elder dies before Mubarak the Younger can turn himself into Egypt's Deng Xiaoping, yielding a Tiananmen Souk that lights up the country pronto with the Brotherhood's prodding. And since these students will be hoisting pictures of Osama instead of a makeshift Goddess of Democracy, Bush's successor is likely to find himself (or herself) facing an unbelievably bad choice in the largest Arab country.

Would America intervene militarily to preserve Gamal's faltering rule, making good on all the strategic promises implied by the $50 billion in aid to Egyptian regimes since 1975? Or would we throw up our hands at that point, write Tel Aviv a blank check, and hope that this twenty-first-century Masada can hold out in a Middle East where Iran has the bomb?

Let me tell you something you don't want to hear: The smart money inside the Pentagon is betting any future president will choose to draw the next line in the sand at the Nile's banks rather than alongside Israel's security fences going up in Gaza and the West Bank.

And once we cross that Rubicon into Africa . . . buddy, there ain't no turning back in this Long War.

And success in the Long War (so named by the generals) will not be signaled by less violence but by a geographic shift in its center of gravity. Drive Al Qaeda & Co. out of the Middle East and it will be forced into its current strategic rear of choice--Africa.

Africa is where Al Qaeda hides its money, guns, recruits, training camps--and its future. Africa will be the last great stand in this Long War, where all those impossibly straight borders once drawn by colonial masters will inevitably be made squiggly again by globalization's cultural reformatting process.

Now this fight heads south . . . and yes, the Long War will be even uglier there.

12:03AM

The Gap is Asia's to shrink economically

image here

Bloomberg Businessweek with goofy title (Really?  The new silk road doesn't lead to the U.S.?  Wow!  I would have expected otherwise, given our geographic position on the planet.)

All this piece confirms is that the economic integration and development of the Gap will be done primarily by the New Core--not the Old.  That's something I've argued for many years now.  It just makes sense:  the last in, the next integration begin.  Think of it as a staircase:  the higher up you are in the production chain, the less sense it makes for you to be the primary agent of slotting in those who come immediately behind you.

So Europe slotted in North America way back when, then we did the same to Asia and the ABCs of Latin America, and now they do the same to the Gap.

As one expert is quoted in the piece, "We saw the same phenomenon with American and European companies 100 years ago."

Yes, this all means more competition for markets and resources for companies across the Core, but the best of the Old Core's companies will clean up nicely--like a Caterpillar.

A good byproduct:  as the New Core-Gap trade explodes, more of it will be done in currencies other than dollars and euros, and that's a good disciplining pressure on the Old Core--especially the US.

12:06AM

Iran's devastating achievement creates its own regional balancing act

This story writes itself.

Elliott Abrams in the WSJ noting how both US and Israeli relationships with Arab neighbors of Iran are much improved with each step Tehran takes toward nuclear weapons capacity:

Who will stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program, the Arabs wonder; they place no faith in endless negotiations between earnest Western diplomats and the clever Persians.

Israel is the enemy of their enemy, Iran. Now, the usual description of Arab-Israeli relations as "hostile" or "belligerent" is giving way to a more complex picture. 

Once begun, the Big Bang is never done.  We topple the Taliban and Saddam, and Iran must reach for protection.  That protection creates its own backlash, and so it goes.  No going back.  The speeding up of history: speeding the killing, speeding the threats, speeding up the dynamics.  Top-down solutions emerging after decades of wasted bottom-up efforts to forge the perfect peace plan.  Nukes clarify the mind all right.

And we are all better off for that scary journey.