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Entries from August 1, 2004 - August 31, 2004

9:14AM

C-SPAN to broadcast THE BRIEF twice over Labor Day weekend

C-SPAN to broadcast THE BRIEF twice over Labor Day weekend (Saturday, Sept 4 at 8pm EST and again 11:03pm EST!

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 31 August 2004

Quick note to relay the good news: Brian Lamb keeps his promise to me from last April and C-SPAN will indeed air the brief at prime time (Saturday
night the 4th of September at 8pm and a repeat 11:03pm (EST). This version is the one I gave at the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces at National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington DC on 2
June 2004. It is the mega-version of the brief, meaning pretty much all the
big slides I've used over the years.

This was how I descriBed">bed my performance back then in my daily blog:


Just finished lunch following my all-morning presentation of the max current
brief (54 slides-usually do about 30). I started at 8:40 am and went straight to 10:15, then a 10-minute break for the audience, then 10:25 to 11:10, followed by 20 minutes of Q&A from the audience (current study body and faculty of ICAF). Audience of about 200 in beautiful hall with lots of wood grain, wonderful well-lit stage, and instead of usual screen, a wall of integrated video monitors.

I ran the brief off the hall's system and it behaved quite well. Sound effects came through beautifully and I wore a clip-on mike, so I could roam the stage at will. I tried to move as slowly as possible, so the CSPAN main camera could track me. The second camera filmed me some, some the monitor and did crowd reaction shots. CSPAN techs said later that they felt the capture was great-especially the brief.

My performance was solid, but not spectacular, but my hosts were very happy. I flubBed">bed a few one-liners. My mouth was a bit out of sorts at various
points-perhaps fatigue.

Anyway, it's over and in the can.


It will be interesting to see how the material holds up almost three months
later. It will also be interesting to see if I get the same bounce from this pair of broadcasts that I got from the three showings of Book Notes last Memorial Day weekend. If you remember, that's pretty much how I got my one-week showing on the New York Times Bestseller List. Will similar things happen this time? I doubt it. But I do expect some interesting horizontal scenarios to emerge. Right now, I'm fielding a load of interesting briefing offers from all over the Intelligence Community. I think that's largely a result of the 9/11 Commission report coming out, but also because of my recently established senior advising roles at both Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command. Add in the election and the usual ramping up of transition conferences and workshops (either for a new admininstration or a second Bush one), and it's gonna be a great fall to have a big book full of big ideas out there and circulating. These broadcasts could propel PNM into new heights, not so much in terms of sales but more so in terms of influence inside the Beltway.

Then there is the college book-buying market . . ..

Anyway, it'll be a real thrill to watch (always a bit painful at first as I hate the pitch of my voice, but then I get used to it (so many ear surgeries later, I have a very odd sense of my own voice, but then again, so do most people even without all the eardrum reconstruction work). I plan on getting some really good beer (perhaps Tsing Tao, which I now have a taste for), a Tombstone (adding anchovies), and maybe sardines with crackers and Port Wine cheese spread. Yes, I'm going all out to celebrate, and with that much funky fish stuff, I may well be celebrating alone.

So for all of you who've been waiting (like me) for this thing to finally happen--enjoy it for all it's worth. I will definitely plan on getting the CD myself, if only as a Marketing">marketing tool.

BTW, Brian Lamb is shutting down Book Notes after many years. Seems he wants to have a show with fewer restrictions on who he interviews (very tight rule set on Book Notes: only book authors and only once in their lifetimes--no repeats). Realizing what an amazing run that show has had, I now feel even more priviliged that I got to appeat on it before it closed. Suffice it to say, Mr. Lamb remains a revered figure in my career to date. He's wielded an interesting form of power with that show all these years, and he used it very wisely, me thinks.

4:25AM

I ditched my cap at the bottom

August 15, 2004


. . . Harder still was the jaunt down, primarily because many of the steps are about 50% higher than your average stair step, and each step came at its own particular length and height, meaning you had to watch your step constantly. If the road up was a heart stress test, then the road down was a joint test. I ditched my cap at the bottom, because a near-continuous stream of sweat was pouring off the tip of the bill by the time I hit bottom. Naturally, I paid 40 yuan to have my name and date engraved on a brass plaque suitable for hanging. You bust your balls like that in the heat and humidity and you want a trophy, damn it!




5:27AM

A final clearing of the decks before leaving for China

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 7 August 2004

Gonna keep this quick because I gotta clean the house one last time this afternoon. Then I promised the kids (whom I wonít see for three weeks!) that weíd hit the beach one last time before our last Saturday night movie at home for a while.

This blog is just to announce the posting of a series of documents:


The draft text for the cover of the paperback version for PNM, which I received from Putnam for comment last week (very exciting!)

A review I wrote for ìThe Journal of Cold War Studiesî of my old mentor Adam Ulamís republished autobiography

A Russian-language version of the original Esquire article just posted on a Russian academic journal site

A German-language version of the original Esquire article that was reprinted several times in Germany over the course of the last 12 months.


Each of these documents can be found as subsequent posts here.

5:20AM

Draft text for cover of paperback version of PNM coming out in 2005!

Clearly, the most important words that appear on the cover are the first four, because that phrase is what gets you shelf space as a paperback, plus a whole lot more promotion when the book comes out. My commentary follows:


Imprint/Month/Year: 5/05 BERKLEY TRADE

Title/Author: THE PENTAGONíS NEW MAP/THOMAS P.M. BARNETT

[FRONT COVER:]


New York Times Bestseller


The Pentagonís New Map

War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century


ìShould be as instrumental for executive leaders as Friedmanís The Lexus and the Olive Tree.îóDr. Paul B. Davis, national security expert, Washington, D.C.


ìShould be read not only by policy makers and pundits, but by anyone who wants to understand how the world works in the Age of Terror.îóSherri Goodman, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense


Thomas P.M. Barnett


[SPINE:]

New York Times Bestseller

The Pentagonís New Map

War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

Thomas P.M. Barnett


[BACK COVER:]


ìProvocativeÖBarnett has a record as a savvy prognosticator.îóBusiness Week


Since the end of the Cold War, America has searched for a new theory to explain how this seemingly chaotic world actually works. Gone is the clash of superpowersóbut replaced by what?


In The Pentagonís New Map, Thomas Barnett provides a cutting-edge approach to globalization that combines security, economic, political, and cultural factors to do no less than predict and explain the nature of war and peace in the twenty-first century. Building on the works of Thomas Friedman and Francis Fukuyama, and then taking a leap beyond, this book offers much-needed hope at a crucial yet uncertain time in history.


ìHis book uses an easy, conversational language that instructs rather than condescends Ö Ö.Barnettís call for action rises above partisan politics because it tugs at us as humans, not as liberals or conservatives, or as free-traders or isolationists. He criticizes and praises Republican and Democratic administrations alike. In an era of political firestorms set off by one-sided tell-all books from government insiders, this is particularly welcome.îó Fort Worth Star-Telegram


ìGives us a good starting point to make sense out of the random, chaotic, perplexing, swift-moving events and also gives us a positive road map toward a more peaceful, prosperous and hopeful future.îó Washington Times


ìHe may turn out to be one of the most important strategic thinkers of our time.îó USNews.com


PAGE NUMBERS: hc copy

www.thomaspmbarnett.com

www.penguin.com

[PRICE/CATEGORY]


[COVER 3:]


[ART: AUTHOR PHOTO]


Thomas P.M. Barnett is a senior strategic researcher and professor at the U.S. Naval War College. From October 2001 to June 2003, he served as Assistant for Strategic Futures, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Before that, he directed the NewRulesSets.Project, in partnership with Cantor Fitzgerald, to draw new ìmapsî of power and influence in the world economy; directed the Year 2000 International Security Dimension Project; and served as a project director for the Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Public Research. In December 2002, Esquire named him ìThe Strategistî for a special edition titled ìThe Best and the Brightest,î and followed that in March 2003 with his article ìThe Pentagonís New Map.î Barnett has written for several other publications, including The New York Times and The Washington Post. A Harvard Ph.D. in political science, he lives in Portsmouth, Rhode Island.


[FRONT SALES ñ page 1 of 3]



Praise for The Pentagonís New Map and Thomas P.M. Barnett


ìA truly bold vision for American foreign policy in the next century.îó The Hill


ìMy own sense is that Barnett is on to something, and probably something really big. George W. Bush has not given us a scenario of how the war on terrorism will be fought over the years, and how we can sense whether we are following the right path and are on the road to success. Thomas BarnettÖgives us a better map of the struggle ahead.îóMichael Barone, USNews.com


ìBarnett [is] a key figure in the debate currently raging about what the modern military should look like.îó The Wall Street Journal


ìOne of the most thoughtful and original thinkers that this generation of national security analysts has produced.îóJohn Petersen, President, The Arlington Institute


ìBarnett writes well, and one of the bookís most compelling aspects is its description of the negotiating, infighting, and backbiting required to get a hearing for unconventional ideas in the national security establishment.îó Publishers Weekly


ìSuggests some bold, even revolutionary changes in our military structure and in the dispersion and utilization of our forcesÖBarnettís compelling assertions are worthy of strong consideration and are sure to provoke controversy.îó Booklist


continuedÖ


[FRONT SALES p. 2 of 3]



ìProvocativeÖSome will attack Mr. Barnettís ideas because they portend much change and threaten existing interests. Others will ask why we should care about what happens in the Gap. September 11 answered them.îóRep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.), Washington Times


ìIdeological hawks may not take kindly to parts of The Pentagonís New Map. Barnett exposes petty insecurities and political maneuvers that have hampered the Defense Departmentís view of the world, and he pulls no punches when it comes to analyzing President Bushís post-war strategies in Iraq. But those who believe we never should have gone to war in Iraq in the first place wonít find a sympathetic viewpoint here, either.îó Fort Worth Star-Telegram


ìIn many respects, the book is brilliant and innovative. It offers a persuasive analysis of the post-9/11 world as well as policy prescriptions flowing from that analysisÖhe is an entertaining writer and offers many interesting insights into the workings of the bureaucracy and the travails of those who would seek to transform its workingsÖDespite attempts to caricature Barnett as a warmonger because he endorsed the war in Iraq, the fact is that he is optimistic about the blessings of ëconnectivityí and globalizationóindeed he is extremely close in outlook to [Francis] Fukuyama. He believes that globalization can create prosperity anywhere only if it creates prosperity everywhere.îó National Review


ìYou will be amazed at the lightbulbs that will go off in your own mind as you read his work.îóDr. Peter Schoettle, Senior Staff, Center for Public Policy Education, The Brookings Institution


[FRONT SALES ñ page 3of 3]


ìBarnettís work is a tour de force. I have never seen such a persuasive presentation linking defense policy and globalization analyses.îóRobert Orr, Vice-President and Washington Director, Council on Foreign Relations


ìWhatever side of the debate you are on, this book is a must read. Barnett is one of the rare thinkers who combine the scholarship, energy, and imagination to put forward a truly ënew paradigm.íîóAsif M. Shakh, President and CEO, International Resources Group Ltd.


ìDr. Barnettís work puts him in the same class as the great and powerful minds that crafted Americaís post-World War II strategy and created the institutions that brought stability and prosperity to the Free World.îóVice-Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski (ret.)


ìIf you are an investor, an executive, or a citizenómeaning everyoneóyou need to understand this worldview.îóWilliam J. Raduchel, Ph.D., former CTO, AOL Time Warner, and former chief strategy officer, Sun Microsystems


ìToo rarely does it happen that someone writes a book that so crystallizes a major argument that it becomes a focal point in a broader debate. Those who would either support or criticize the administration must address its elements if they are to participate productively in the debate.îóDr. Donald C.F. Daniel, Professor, Security Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University


COMMENTARY: A certain amount of the blurbs are retreads, but they grabbed everything really sharp that they could from the reviews that came out (e.g., Thornberry, Barone, Wall Street Journal, National Review, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Booklist, Publishersí Weekly, The Hill). The only one missing that I could think of was Business Week, but there must not have been a great quote from that otherwise very positive review. No word on how many they plan to print or the price, but still, itís very exciting to read through this stuff so many months in advance. Makes me feel like I might ìearn outî my advance before I die!

5:11AM

My review of Adam Ulamís autobiography in the Journal of Cold War Studies

This is really the first serious book review I have ever done. I was happy to be asked, since Adam meant so much to me as a person and mentor. I wrote it last fall. My commentary follows:

To access the PDF file of the review, click here.

COMMENTARY: I may have written something a bit too personal for some peopleís taste, but I couldnít think of any other way to write it. I didnít like having to take Adamís family and friends to task for so inserting themselves in the text, plus detailing his final hours and days. I guess I just think they could have found a more measured and tasteful way to put down their remembrances of the man. Having lost my Dad this year, I understand what drives people to want to speak out in memory of a dead relative. I just think they shouldnít have used his autobiography as their pulpitódidnít seem right to me.

4:47AM

The German-language version of the PNM Esquire article of March 03

The first German publication to translate and reprint the article was Bl‰tter f¸r deutsche und internationale Politik, which ran the piece under the title, ìDie neue Weltkarte des Pentagon,î in its May 2003 issue. The piece was subsequently reprinted in excerpt form (meaning they dropped a few paras here and there) in Frankfurter Rundshau (as a single full-page article in that newspaper on 25 June 03) and the German government publication Bundeszentrale f¸r politische Bildung in its Fall 03 issue). Amazingly, I got paid for all three! Here is the full text from the Bl‰tter edition, with commentary to follow:


Die neue Landkarte des Pentagon

Mit einer Liste k¸nftiger Konfliktherde

Und Interventionspunkte

Von Thomas P. M. Barnett

Monate vor der ñ in diesem Fr¸hjahr gleichzeitig amerikanisch und deutsch erschienenen ñ Buchausgabe stellten die ÑBl‰tter" Robert Kagans viel zitierten Essay ÑPower and Weakness" in eigener ‹bersetzung vor, um das deutsche Publikum im O-ton mit dem vertraut zu machen, was nach Auffassung des amerikanischen Neokonservatismus die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa auseinander treibt. (10/2002) Eine breite Debatte folgte. Und Monate vor Kreigsbeginn war in den Dezember-ÑBl‰ttern" der Schl¸sseltext von Ronald D. Asmus und Kenneth M. Pollack ¸ber die ÑTranformation des Mittleren Ostens" zu lesen. Nach der Besetzung des Irak fragt sich die Welt: ÑWho next? Where next?" Thomas P.M. Barnett, Professor am U.S. Naval War College und seit September 2001 Berater von Verteidigungsminister Rumsfeld, nimmt bei der Beantwortung dieser Fragen kein Blatt vor den Mund. In ÑEsquire" stellte er im M‰rz ÑThe Petnagon's New Map" vor. Mit der freundlichen Genehmigung des Verfassers bringen wir seine Landkarte k¸nftiger Kriege nebst persˆnlicher Liste potentieller Interventionspunkte der deutschen ÷ffentlichkeit zur Kenntnis. ñD. Red.

Als die Vereinigten Staaten am Persischen Golf abermals in den Krieg zogen, ging es nicht darum, eine alte Rechnung zu begleichen, oder einfach um die zwangsweise Beseitigung illegaler Waffen und eine Abwechslung im Kampf gegen den Terror. Dieser Krieg markiert einen historischen Wendepunkt ñ den Moment, in dem Washington von der strategischen Sicherheit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung tats‰chlich Besitz ergreift.

Aus diesem Grund ist die ˆffentliche Debatte ¸ber diesen Krieg so wichtig. Sie zwingt die Amerikaner, sich auf das neue Sicherheits-Paradigma einzustellen, das, wie ich finde, dieses Zeitalter charakterisiert: Disconnectedness defines danger- nicht eingebunden zu sein, bedeutet Gefahr. Saddam Husseins Unrechtsregime war auf gef‰hrliche Weise
(selbst-)isoliert von der im Prozess der Globalisierung befindlichen Welt, von ihrem Regel-Kanon, ihren Normen und all jenen Bindungen, die L‰nder in wechselseitiger Abh‰ngigkeit miteinander verkn¸pfen.

Das Problem der meisten Globalisierungsdebatten besteht darin, dass zu viele Experten diesen Prozess in ein bin‰res Raster zw‰ngen: Entweder ist die Globalisierung groflartig und reiflt den Planeten mit, oder sie ist Schrecken erregend und schadet den Menschen allenthalben. Keine der beiden Auffassungen trifft die Sache wirklich. Die Globalisierung als historischer Vorgang ist ganz einfach zu grofl und zu komplex f¸r solche Pauschalurteile. Diese neue Welt muss vielmehr danach bestimmt werden, wo die Globalisierung tats‰chlich Wurzeln geschlagen hat und wo nicht.

Zeigen Sie mir, wo die Globalisierung reich ist an Netzwerk-Verbindungen, finanziellen Transaktionen, wo es liberale Medien gibt und kollektive Sicherheit herrscht, und ich werde Ihnen Regionen mit stabilen Regierungen und steigendem Lebensstandard zeigen, wo die Zahl der Suizod-Toten diejenige der Mordopfer ¸bersteigt. Diese Teile der Welt nenne ich den Funktionierenden Kern (Functioning Core), kurz Kern. Zeigen Sie mir dagegen, wo die Globalisierung sp‰rlich ausf‰llt oder vollst‰ndig fehlt, zeige ich Ihnen Regionen, die unter repressiven Regimen leiden, mit verbreiteter Armut und Krankheit, routinem‰fligem Massenmord und ñ am allerwichtigsten ñ mit chronischen Konflikten, in denen die kommende Generation globaler Terroristen herangezogen wird. Diese Teile der Welt bezeichne ich als Nichtintegrierte L¸cke [Non-Intergrating Gap], kurz L¸cke.

Das ÑOzonlochì der Globalisierung mag vor dem 11. September 2001 aufler Sichtweite gewesen und nicht beachtet worden sein, aber seither l‰sst es sich schwerlich ¸bersehen. Die Reichweite der Globalisierung zu messen, ist keine Schulaufgabe f¸r achtzehnj‰hrige Marineinfanteristen. Wo also soll die n‰chste Runde von Ausw‰rtsspielen des US-Milit‰rs stattfinden? Das Muster, das sich nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges herausgesch‰lt hat, legt eine einfache Antwort nahe: in der L¸cke.

Ich unterst¸tze den Krieg im Irak nicht einfach deshalb, weil Saddam ein stalinistischer Mˆrder ist, bereit, jeden zu tˆten, um an der Macht zu bleiben, oder weil sein Regime ¸ber die Jahre eindeutig terroristische Netzwerke gefˆrdert hat. Der wahre Grund besteht darin, dass das aus diesem Krieg erwachsende langfristige milit‰rische Engagement Amerika letztlich dazu zwingen wird, sich mit der L¸cke insgesamt als einem strategisch bedrohlichen Umfeld auseinanderzusetzen.

Den meisten L‰nder f‰llt es durchaus nicht leicht, sich an den im Werden begriffenen globalen Regelsatz der Demokratie, der Transparenz und des freien Handels anzupassen, was die meisten Amerikaner nur schwer verstehen kˆnnen. Wir neigen dazu zu vergessen, wie schwer es war, die Vereinigten Staaten all die Jahre zusammenzuhalten und dabei unsere eigenen konkurrierenden Regelwerke immer wieder miteinander in Einklang zu bringen ñ w‰hrend eines B¸rgerkrieges, einer Weltwirtschaftskrise und der langen, bis heute fortdauernden K‰mpfe um Gleichberechtigung der Rassen und Geschlechter. Was die meisten Staaten betrifft, geht unsere Erwartung, dass sie rasch die sehr amerikanisch anmutenden Regeln der Globalisierung ¸bernehmen kˆnnten, an der Realit‰t vorbei.

Aber Vorsicht mit solch darwinistischem Pessimismus! Wenn man sich n‰mlich f¸r die Globalisierung als eine Art Zwangsamerikanisierung entschuldigt, ist es nur ein kleiner Schritt dahin, aufgrund rassischer oder kultureller Kriterien zu unterstellen, dass Ñdiese Leute niemals so wie wirì sein werden. Vor gerade mal zehn Jahren wollten die meisten Fachleute das bedauernswerte Russland abschreiben, als seien Slawen sozusagen aus genetischen Gr¸nden unf‰hig zu Demokratie und Kapitalismus. ƒhnliche Argumente schwangen bei den China-Bashings der 90er Jahre mit, und heute finden wir sie in den Debatten, ob es machbar sei, einem Irak nach Saddam die Demokratie zu verordnen ñ eine Art ÑMuslime sind vom Marsì-Argument.

Wie also kˆnnen wir unterscheiden zwischen denen, die es im Globalisierungs-Kern wirklich schaffen und denen, die in der L¸ck gefangen bleiben? Und wie dauerhaft ist diese Trennlinie?

Vor dem Hintergrund, dass sich die Grenze zwischen Kern und L¸cke permanent verschiebt, mˆchte ich darauf hinweisen, dass die Richtung der Ver‰nderung kritischer ist als deren Grad. Sicher, Peking wird nach wie vor von einer ÑKommunistischen Parteiì regiert, deren ideologische Formel aus 30 Prozent Marxismus-Leninismus und 70 Prozent Mafia besteht, aber China ist der Welthandelsorganisation WTO beigetreten. Und das wiegt auf lange Sicht viel schwerer, wenn es um die dauerhafte Sicherung des Kern-Status geht. Warum? Weil es China zwingt, seine internen Regeln denen der Globalisierung anzugleichen ñ Bankwesen, Zˆlle, Urheberrecht, Umwelt-Standards. Nat¸rlich ist eine solche Angleichung an die sich entwickelnden Globalisierungsregeln keine Erfolgsgarantie. Wie Argentinien und Brasilien k¸rzlich erfahren mussten, bedeutet Regelkonformit‰t (im Fall Argentinien allerdings eingeschr‰nkt) keineswegs, gegen Panik, Schwindelgesch‰fte oder Rezession gefeit zu sein. Es heiflt nicht, dass dir nichts mehr passieren kann. Ebensowenig verwandeln sich all die Armen von jetzt auf gleich in eine stabile Mittelschicht. Sich auf die Globalisierung einzulassen f¸hrt allerdings im Laufe der Zeit zu einer Steigerung des Lebensstandards.

Unterm Strich ist es also immer mˆglich, vom ñ Globalisierung genannten ñ Wagen zu fallen. Passiert das, folgt ein Blutvergieflen. Und, sofern man Gl¸ck hat: amerikanische Truppen.

ÑKernì und ÑL¸ckeì

Welche Teile der Welt funktionieren derzeit? Nordamerika, viele L‰nder S¸damerikas, die Europ‰ische Union, Putins Russland, Japan und die prosperierenden ÷konomien Asiens (in erster Linie China und Indien), Australien, Neuseeland und S¸dafrika, zusammen knapp vier Milliarden der sechs Milliarden umfassenden Weltbevˆlkerung.

Wer bleibt dabei in der L¸cke h‰ngen? Ich kˆnnte es mir einfach machen und Ñalle anderenì sagen, aber ich will etwas tiefer gehen und begr¸nden, warum ich meine, dass die L¸cke langfristig mehr bedroht als nur unsere Brieftasche oder unser Gewissen.

Wenn wir die milit‰rischen Reaktionen der Vereinigten Staaten seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges auf einer Karte einzeichnen, dann konzentrieren sie sich ganz ¸berwiegend auf Weltgegenden, die nicht zum wachsenden Globalisierungs-Kern z‰hlen ñ n‰mlich die karibischen Inseln, fast ganz Afrika, den Balkan, den Kaukasus, Zentralasien, den Nahen Osten und grofle Teile S¸dwestasiens. Das sind praktisch die verbleibenden zwei Milliarden. Die meisten weisen eine demographische Schieflage mit einer ganz ¸berwiegend jungen Bevˆlkerung auf und werden unter den Weltbank-Kategorien f¸r Niedrigeinkommen (weniger als 3 000 US-Dollar j‰hrlich) gef¸hrt.

Ziehen wir eine Linie um die Mehrzahl dieser milit‰rischen Einsatzorte, haben wir im Grunde genommen die Nichtintegrierte L¸cke kartographiert. Bei diesem simplen Verfahren finden sich manche in der falschen Umgebung wieder: das in der L¸cke isolierte Israel, das im Kern dahintreibende Nordkorea oder die Philippinen, die zwischen beiden Seiten schwanken. In Anbetracht der Daten l‰sst sich allerdings kaum die grundlegende Logik des Bildes leugnen: Verliert ein Land gegen die Globalisierung oder weist es viele der Globalisierungsfortschritte zur¸ck, besteht eine ungleich grˆflere Chance, dass die Vereinigten Staaten irgendwann Truppen dorthin entsenden werden. Umgekehrt gilt: Funktioniert ein Land halbwegs im Rahmen der Globalisierung, dann sehen wir in der Regel keine Veranlassung, unsere Truppen zu schicken, um f¸r Ordnung zu sorgen oder eine Bedrohung zu beseitigen.

Jedweden Ort, der im letzten Jahrzehnt nicht Ziel einer amerikanischen Milit‰rintervention war, als Ñfunktionierend innerhalb der Globalisierungì zu definieren (und umgekehrt), mag manchen tautologisch anmuten. Aber man sollte etwas weiter denken: Seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges ist dieses Land noch stets davon ausgegangen, dass die wahren Bedrohungen seiner Sicherheit von L‰ndern mit ann‰hernd gleicher Grˆfle, ‰hnlichen Entwicklungsstand und ungef‰hr gleichem Wohlstand ausgehen, mit anderen Worten: von Groflm‰chten wie wir selbst. W‰hrend des Kalten Krieges war die Sowjetunion die andere Groflmacht. Als die grofle rote Maschine in den fr¸hen 90er Jahren ihren Geist aufgab, flirteten wir mit Bedenken ¸ber ein vereinigtes Europa oder ein b‰renstarkes Japan, und in j¸ngster Zeit treibt uns zuweilen die Unruhe ¸ber ein aufstrebendes China um.

Interessant an diesen Szenarien ist die Annahme, dass nur ein fortgeschrittener Staat uns wirklich gef‰hrlich werden kˆnnte. Und der Rest der Welt? Jene nicht so weit entwickelten Gegenden firmierten in den milit‰rischen Planungen lange Zeit als die ÑWeniger Betroffenenì, was bedeutete, dass unsere auf die Bedrohung durch eine Groflmacht ausgelegte milit‰rische Kapazit‰t auch f¸r beliebige kleinere Konflikte ausreichen w¸rde, mit denen wir uns in der eher r¸ckst‰ndigen Welt gegebenenfalls zu befassen h‰tten.

Der 11. September liefl diese Annahme platzen. Schliefllich wurden wir nicht von einer Nation oder einer Armee angegriffen, sondern ñ in den Worten von Thomas Friedman ñ von einer Gruppe extrem motivierter Einzelk‰mpfer, die entschlossen waren, f¸r ihre Sache zu sterben. Der 11. September lˆste eine Systemstˆrung aus, die unsere Regierung (das neue Department of Homeland Security), unsere Wirtschaft (die de facto-Sicherheitssteuer, die wir alle bezahlen) und sogar unsere Gesellschaft (Wink in die Kamera! ) anhaltend ver‰ndert. Zudem begann der globale Krieg gegen den Terrorismus, das Prisma, durch das die Administration inzwischen jede bilaterale Sicherheitsbeziehung betrachtet, die wir rund um die Welt unterhalten.

Die Angriffe des 11. September taten dem amerikanischen Sicherheitsestablishment einen groflen Gefallen, indem sie uns von den abstrakten Planungen zuk¸nftiger High-Tech-Kriege gegen ebenb¸rtige M‰chte (neer peers) abzogen und uns auf die hier und jetzt bestehenden Gef‰hrdungen der Weltordnung verwiesen. Dabei gerieten die Trennlinien zwischen Kern und L¸cke ins Scheinwerferlicht, und, noch wichtiger, der Umdenkungsprozess liefl die Beschaffenheit des Bedrohungsumfeldes deutlich hervortreten. Bin Laden und Al Qaida sind eindeutig Produkte der L¸cke ñ deren gewalttr‰chtigste Antwort an den Kern. Sie f¸hren uns vor Augen, wie es um unsere Versuche bestellt ist, Sicherheit in diese rechtsfreien Gebiete zu exportieren (nicht sehr gut), und welche Staaten sie von der Globalisierung abkoppeln wollen (jeden L¸cken-Staat mit einem betr‰chtlichen muslimischen Bevˆlkerungsanteil, insbesondere Saudi-Arabien), um zu einer Definition guten Lebens zur¸ckzukehren, die eher dem 7. Jahrhundert entstammt.

Nimmt man dies als Botschaft Osamas und kombiniert sie mit der Liste unserer milit‰rischen Interventionen in den letzten zehn Jahren, ergibt sich daraus ein einfacher Regelsatz in Sachen Sicherheit: Je weniger ein Land an der Globalisierung teilhat, desto eher wird es eine milit‰rische Intervention der Vereinigten Staaten heraufbeschwˆren. Daher hatte Al Qaida seine Basis zuerst im Sudan und anschlieflend in Afghanistan, zwei der abgekoppeltsten L‰nder der Welt. Gleiches gilt f¸r jene Orte, die US-Sondereinsatzkr‰fte zuletzt ins Visier genommen haben: Nordwest-Pakistan, Somalia, Jemen ñ das Ende der Welt, was die Globalisierung betrifft.

Ebenso wichtig wie Ñsie dort zu kriegen, wo sie lebenì ist es, der F‰higkeit dieser terroristischen Netzwerke zu begegnen, sich Zugang zum Kern ¸ber die ÑSaumstaatenì zu verschaffen, die entlang der blutigen Grenzen der L¸cke liegen. Welche Staaten sind das? Mexiko, Brasilien, S¸dafrika, Marokko, Algerien, Griechenland, die T¸rkei, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, die Philippinen und Indonesien kommen einem sofort in den Sinn. Aber die USA sind nicht das einzige Kern-Land, das sich mit diesem Problem auseinandersetzt. Russland hat im Kaukasus seinen eigenen Krieg gegen den Terrorismus, China widmete sich zuletzt energischer seiner westlichen Grenzregion, und Australien wurde j¸ngst durch den Bombenanschlag auf Bali aufgeschreckt (oder doch eher eingesch¸chtert?).

Wenn wir eine Minute innehalten und uns vergegenw‰rtigen, was diese neue Weltkarte bedeutet, dann sollte die nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Vereinigten Staaten folgendermaflen aussehen: 1. St‰rkung des Kern-Immunsystems als Antwort auf grundlegende Stˆrungen analog zum 11. September; 2. Bef‰higung der Saumstaaten, eine Brandmauer gegen die schlimmsten Exportartikel der L¸ck wie Terror, Drogen und Seuchen zu errichten, und, am allerwichtigsten, 3. Verkleinerung der L¸cke. Ich pl‰diere wohlgemerkt nicht blofl daf¸r, die L¸cke im Auge zu behalten. Die reflexartige Reaktion vieler Amerikaner auf den 11. September besteht darin zu sagen: ÑSchluss mit der Abh‰ngigkeit von fremdem ÷l, dann brauchen wir uns mit diesen Leuten nicht mehr abzugeben.ì Die diesem Traum zugrundeliegende reichlich naive Annahme besteht darin, dass eine weitere Reduzierung der ohnehin sp‰rlichen Bezugspunkte zwischen L¸cke und Kern das ganze f¸r uns auf Dauer weniger gef‰hrlich machen w¸rde. Den Nahen und Mittleren Osten in ein Zentralafrika zu verwandeln, schafft keine bessere Welt f¸r meine Kinder. Wir kˆnnen diese Leute nicht einfach wegw¸nschen.

Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten ist der perfekte Ort um loszulegen. In einer Region, in der die Quellen der Unsicherheit nicht zwischen Staaten liegen, sondern innerhalb derselben, kann Diplomatie nicht funktionieren. Das Schlimmste dort ist der vollst‰ndige Mangel an persˆnlicher Freiheit, der den grˆflten Teil der Bevˆlkerung und insbesondere die Jugend zu einem ausweglosen Leben verdammt. Einige Staaten wie Qatar oder Jordanien sind reif f¸r Perestroika-artige Spr¸nge in eine bessere politische Zukunft, dank junger politischer F¸hrer, die die Unabwendbarkeit solcher Ver‰nderungen sehen. Auch Iran wartet darauf, dass ein Gorbatschow vorbeikommt ñ wenn er nicht schon da ist. Was steht dem Wandel im Wege? Angst. Angst vor einer Auflˆsung der Tradition. Angst vor dem Missfallen der Mullahs. Angst davor, f¸r einen Ñschlechtenì oder gar Ñverr‰terischenì Muslim-Staat gehalten zu werden. Angst, das Ziel radikaler Gruppen und terroristischer Netzwerke zu werden. In allererster Linie aber die Angst, von allen Seiten attackiert zu werden, weil man anders ist ñ die Angst, in Israels Situation zu geraten.

Der Nahe und Mittlere Osten waren lange Zeit ein Eldorado f¸r Tyrannen, von denen sich ein jeder erpicht zeigte, den jeweils Schw‰cheren aufs Korn zu nehmen. Israel besteht nach wie vor, weil es ñ leider Gottes ñ zu einem der h‰rtesten Akteure der Gegend geworden ist. Das einzige, was dieses unwirtliche Umfeld ver‰ndern und die Schleusentore f¸r einen Wandel ˆffnen kˆnnte, ist, dass eine ausw‰rtige Macht hereinkommt und den Vollzeit-Leviathan spielt. Die Absetzung von Saddam, dem Chef-Tyrannen der Region, wird die Vereinigten Staaten zwingen, diese Rolle weitaus intensiver auszuf¸llen als in den letzten paar Jahrzehnten, in erster Linie weil der Irak das Jugoslawien des Mittleren Osten ist ñ wo die Zivilisationen sich ¸berschneiden, was historisch betrachtet eine Diktatur erforderte, um Frieden zu halten. Wie das beim Babysitten nun mal so ist - dieser Job hat es ganz besonders in sich und d¸rfte unsere langwierigen Bem¸hungen in Nachkriegs-Deutschland und -]apan im Nachhinein ziemlich simpel erscheinen lassen.

Aber es ist das richtige Vorgehen und der richtige Zeitpunkt, und wir sind das einzige Land, das dazu im Stande ist. Ohne Sicherheit kann die Freiheit im Nahen und Mittleren Osten nicht gedeihen, und Sicherheit ist der wirkungsvollste ˆffentliche Exportartikel unseres Landes. Ich meine nicht Waffenexporte, sondern grunds‰tzlich die Aufmerksamkeit, die unsere Streitkr‰fte dem Potential einer jeder Region f¸r Massengewalt widmen. Wir sind als einzige Nation der Erde in der Lage, nachhaltig Sicherheit zu exportieren, und wir haben diesbez¸glich eine groflartige Erfolgsgeschichte.

Zeigen Sie mir einen Teil der Welt, wo der Frieden sicher ist, und ich zeige Ihnen enge oder sich vertiefende Bindungen zwischen den dortigen Streitkr‰ften und dem US-Milit‰r. Zeigen Sie mir Regionen, in denen ein grofler Krieg undenkbar ist, und ich zeige Ihnen permanente US-Milit‰rbasen und langfristige Sicherheitsb¸ndnisse. Zeigen Sie mir die umfangreichsten Investitionskonzentrationen der Weltwirtschaft, und ich zeige Ihnen zwei Regionen, Europa und Japan, die unsere Besatzungspolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wieder aufbaute.

Dieses Land hat ¸ber ein halbes Jahrhundert erfolgreich Sicherheit in den Alten Kern der Globalisierung (Westeuropa, Nordostasien) exportiert und, nach unserem Patzer in Vietnam, ein gutes Vierteljahrhundert in den sich herausbildenden Neuen Kern (das sich entwickelnde Asien). Aber entsprechende Anstrengungen unsererseits waren im Mittleren Osten inkonsequent, und in Afrika fanden sie praktisch nicht statt. Solange wir nicht mit der systematischen, auf Dauer angelegten Ausfuhr von Sicherheit in die L¸cke beginnen, solange wird die L¸cke in Form von Terrorismus und anderen Ersch¸tterungen zunehmend in den Kern exportieren, was sie qu‰lt.

Nat¸rlich bedarf es einiges mehr als den Sicherheitsexport der Vereinigten Staaten, um die L¸cke zu verkleinern. Afrika beispielsweise braucht entschieden mehr Hilfe, als der Kern in der Vergangenheit geleistet hat, und die Integration der L¸cke h‰ngt letztlich st‰rker von privaten Investitionen ab als von dem, was der ˆffentliche Sektor des Kerns geben kann. Aber am Anfang muss Sicherheit stehen, weil freie M‰rkte und Demokratie bei Dauerkonflikten nicht florieren.

Eine solche Anstrengung zu unternehmen bedeutet, unser Milit‰restablishment so umzuformen, dass es der Herausforderung, der wir gegen¸ber stehen, spiegelbildlich entspricht. Dar¸ber sollte man nachdenken. Ein Weltkrieg ist nicht in Sicht, vor allem weil unser riesiges Nukleararsenal einen solchen Krieg undenkbar macht ñ f¸r jeden. Klassische Kriege zwischen Staaten sind inzwischen selten geworden. Wenn also die Vereinigten Staaten dabei sind, ihre Streitkr‰fte zu Ñtransformierenì, um den Bedrohungen von morgen zu begegnen, wie sollte das Ergebnis aussehen? Meines Erachtens m¸ssen wir Feuer mit Feuer bek‰mpfen. Und wenn wir in einer Welt leben, in der es immer mehr extrem motivierte Einzelk‰mpfer gibt, schicken wir ein Milit‰r aus extrem motivierten Einzelk‰mpfern ins Feld.

Das kˆnnte nach zus‰tzlicher Verantwortung f¸r die ohnehin schon ¸berlasteten Streitkr‰fte klingen, aber das ist die falsche Betrachtungsweise, weil es sich hier um Probleme des Erfolgs handelt ñ nicht des Versagens. Der fortgesetzte Erfolg Amerikas bei der Abschreckung eines globalen Krieges und bei der ‹berwindung zwischenstaatlicher Kriege erlaubt es uns, uns mit den viel schwierigeren subnationalen Konflikten und den gef‰hrlichen transnationalen Akteuren zu befassen, die wie Pilze aus dem Boden schieflen. Ich weifl, dass die meisten Amerikaner das nicht hˆren wollen, aber genau dort liegen die wirklichen Schlachtfelder des Krieges gegen den Terrorismus. W¸rden gesch¸tzte Wohnbezirke und Mietpolizisten ausreichen, w‰re der 11. September niemals passiert.

Die Geschichte ist voll von Wendepunkten wie jenem schrecklichen Tag, aber sie bietet keine R¸ck-Wendepunkte. Wir ignorieren die Existenz der L¸cke auf eigenes Risiko, weil sie nicht verschwinden wird, bis wir als Nation die Herausforderung annehmen, die Globalisierung wirklich global zu machen.

Where next?óDie Liste mˆglicher Interventionen*:

1. Haiti. Versuche der Nationenbildung in den 1990er Jahren verliefen entt‰uschend. Seit ungef‰hr einem Jahrhundert gehen wir immer wieder nach Haiti, und wir werden erneut reingehen, wenn bei der n‰chsten Krise einmal mehr boat people ins Land kommen.

2. Kolumbien. Das Land ist in mehrere St¸cke zerbrochen; einerseits die gesetzlosen Teile, mit Privatarmeen, Rebellen, Rauschgiftmafia, auf der anderen Seite die Regierung, die allesamt das Gebiet in die Mache nehmen. Nach wie vor flieflen Drogen. Verbindungen zwischen Drogenkartellen und Rebellen entwickelten sich im Laufe der Jahre, und heute wissen wir auch von Verbindungen zum internationalen Terrorismus. Wir sind involviert, versprechen mehr und kommen nicht weiter. St¸ckweises Vorgehen funktioniert absolut nicht.

3. Brasilien und Argentinien. Beide auf der Kippe zwischen L¸cke und Funktionierendem Kern. Beide lieflen sich in den 90er Jahren voll und ganz auf das Globalisierungs-Spiel ein, und beide f¸hlen sich jetzt get‰uscht. Die Gefahr ist grofl, vom Wagen zu fallen und einen selbstzerstˆrerischen Weg nach links- oder rechtsauflen einzuschlagen. Von einer milit‰rischen Bedrohung kann keine Rede sein, aufler gegen ihre eigenen Demokratien (die R¸ckkehr der Gener‰le). Die s¸damerikanische Allianz MERCOSUR versucht, sich ihre eigene Wirklichkeit zu schnitzen, w‰hrend Washington sich f¸r den freien Handel ins Zeug legt, sich aber bisher nur auf Vereinbarungen mit Chile verst‰ndigen konnte und darauf, das Land in eine erweiterte NAFTA zu holen. Werden Brasilien und Argentinien selbst daf¸r sorgen, dass sie auflen vor bleiben, und das dann ¸belnehmen? Amazonas-Region ein riesiges, unregierbares Gebiet in Brasilien, wo zudem die Umweltzerstˆrung immer grˆflere Ausmafle annimmt. Wird sich die Welt ausreichend Sorgen machen um einzugreifen?

4. Fr¸heres Jugoslawien. W‰hrend der meisten Zeit des letzten Jahrzehnts stand es als K¸rzel f¸r die Unf‰higkeit Europas, geschlossen zu handeln, nicht einmal in seinem eigenen Hinterhof. Wird ein langer Babysitterjob f¸r den Westen werden.

5. Kongo und Ruanda/Burundi. Zwischen zwei und drei Millionen Opfer all jener K‰mpfe in Zentralafrika w‰hrend des letzten Jahrzehnts. Um wieviel schrecklicher muss es noch werden, bevor wir versuchen, zumindest irgendetwas zu tun? Weitere drei Millionen Tote? Kongo ist ein Aas-Staat ñ weder ganz tot noch wirklich am Leben, aber jeder bedient sich an ihm. Obendrein gibt es AIDS.

6. Angola. Hat niemals wirklich seinen fortw‰hrenden B¸rgerkrieg (1,5 Millionen Tote in den letzten 25 Jahren) gelˆst. Im Grunde im Konflikt mit sich selbst seit Mitte der 70er, als das portugiesische ÑReichì zerfiel. Lebenserwartung schon jetzt unter 40!

7. S¸dafrika. Das einzig funktionierende Kern-Land in Afrika, aber es steht auf der Kippe. Viele Bef¸rchtungen, dass S¸dafrika Einfallstor f¸r Terrornetzwerke ist, die versuchen, sich durch die Hintert¸r Zugang zum Kern zu verschaffen. Endemische Verbrechensrate als grˆflte Bedrohung der Sicherheit. Obendrein gibt es AIDS.

8. Israel-Pal‰stina. Terror wird nicht abflauen ñ es gibt keine kommende Generation im Westjordanland, die etwas anderes wollte als noch mehr Gewalt. Jetzt hochgezogene Mauer wird die Berliner Mauer des 21. Jahrhunderts sein. Mˆglicherweise werden ausw‰rtige M‰chte beschlieflen, f¸r Sicherheit zu sorgen, indem sie beide Seiten auseinanderhalten (diese Scheidung w¸rde sehr schmerzlich werden). Immer besteht Gefahr, dass jemand (ein verzweifelter Saddam?) es darauf anlegt, Israel mit Massenvernichtungswaffen in die Luft zu jagen und damit den Gegenschlag auszulˆsen, zu dem wir alle Isael f¸r f‰hig halten.

9. Saudi-Arabien. Die ÑSollen-sie-doch-Kuchen-essenì-Mentalit‰t der kˆniglichen Mafia kˆnnte innere Instabilit‰t nach sich ziehen, die gewaltsam zum Ausbruch kommt. Schutzgelder an Terroristen zu zahlen, um sie sich vom Leib zu halten, kˆnnte desgleichen scheitern, so dass auch Gefahr von auflen droht. Eine riesige junge Bevˆlkerung mit wenig Zukunftsaussichten und eine herrschende Elite, deren Haupteinnahmequelle ein Langzeit-Gut von abnehmendem Wert ist. Und doch wird die Bedeutung des ÷ls f¸r die Welt bis weit in die Zukunft hinein so grofl sein, dass die Vereinigten Staaten diesen Ort niemals wirklich sausen lassen werden, koste es was es wolle.

10. Irak. Eine Frage des Wann und Wie, nicht des Ob. Danach gibt es einen gigantischen Reha-Job. Werden ein Sicherheits-Regime f¸r die ganze Region aufbauen m¸ssen.

11. Somalia. Chronisches Fehlen einer Regierung. Chronische Unterern‰hrung. Chronisches Problem des Einsickerns terroristischer Netzwerke. Wir gingen mit Marines und Spezialkr‰ften hinein und desillusioniert wieder heraus ñ in den 90er Jahren das Vietnam des kleinen Mannes. Der Druck wird enorm sein, niemals dorthin zur¸ckzugehen.

12. Iran. Konterrevolution hat begonnen. Diesmal wollen die Studenten die Mullahs rauswerfen. Iran mˆchte mit den Vereinigten Staaten Freundschaft schlieflen, aber Wiederaufstieg der Fundamentalisten kˆnnte der Preis sein, den wir f¸r Irakinvasion zahlen. Die Mullahs unterst¸tzen den Terror, und sie wollen Massenvernichtungswaffen. Macht sie das zu einem unausweichlichen Ziel, wenn F‰lle Irak und Nordkorea gelˆst sind?

13. Afghanistan. Gesetzloser, gewaltt‰tiger Ort schon bevor die Taliban die B¸hne betraten und begannen, das Land ins 7. Jahrhundert zur¸ckzubefˆrdern (eine kurze Reise). Regierung an Al Qaida verschleudert. Riesige Drogenquelle (Heroin). Inzwischen sitzen die Vereinigten Staaten dort f¸r l‰ngere Zeit fest, um fanatische Terroristen/Rebellen auszumerzen, die sich zum Bleiben entschlossen haben.

14. Pakistan. Es besteht immer die Gefahr, dass sie die Bombe, die sie besitzen, im Konflikt mit Indien aus Schw‰che einsetzen (knapp davor am 13. Dezember 2001 nach der Attacke von Neu Dehli [dem Versuch der Erst¸rmung des indischen Parlaments]). Aus Sorge, Pakistan kˆnnte in die H‰nde radikaler Muslims fallen, entschlossen wir uns, Hardliner-Milit‰rs zu st¸tzen, denen wir nicht wirklich trauen. Eindeutig Al Qaida-infiziert. War auf dem besten Weg, von den Vereinigten Staaten zum Schurkenstaat erkl‰rt zu werden, bis der 11. September uns zu neuerlicher Kooperation zwang. Pakistan scheint nicht viel von seinem eigenen Territorium zu kontrollieren.

15. Nordkorea. Dabei, sich Massenvernichtungswaffen zu beschaffen. Bizarres Verhalten Pjˆngjangs in j¸ngster Zeit (Eingest‰ndnis, Entf¸hrungen begangen zu haben, gebrochene Versprechen bez¸glich Atomwaffen, Verschiffung von Waffen an Orte, wo wir das nicht dulden, und sich dabei erwischen lassen, Unterzeichnung von Vereinbarungen mit Japan, die den Beginn einer neuen ƒra zu signalisieren scheinen, die Ausrufung einer neuen Wirtschaftszone an der Grenze zu China) l‰sst vermuten, dass das Land Krisen provozieren will (wie ein Psychatrie-Patient). Wir leben in der Furcht vor Kims Gˆtterd‰mmerungs-Szenario (er ist durchgeknallt). Bevˆlkerung heruntergekommen ñ wieviel mehr kann sie aushalten? Vielleicht, nach Irak, der n‰chste Fall.

16. Indonesien. ‹bliche ƒngste vor einem Zerfall und der Ñweltgrˆflten muslimischen Bevˆlkerungì. Opfer der wirtschaftlichen Krise in Asien (es wurde regelrecht aus dem Rennen geworfen). Wie wir herausgefunden haben: Tummelplatz f¸r Terrornetzwerke.

Neue/Anschluss suchende Mitglieder des Kerns, die im kommenden Jahr verloren gehen kˆnnten

17. China. Viele Wettk‰mpfe mit sich selbst ausgetragen, um die Zahl der unprofitablen staatlichen Unternehmen zu reduzieren, ohne allzu grofle Arbeitslosigkeit auszulˆsen, zudem Probleme mit wachsendem Energiebedarf und einhergehender Umweltverschmutzung, schliefllich Rentenkrise aufgrund immer ‰lter werdender Bevˆlkerung. Neue Generation von F¸hrern steht im Verdacht, phantasielose Technokraten zu sein ñ grofle Frage, ob sie ihrer Aufgabe gewachsen sind. F¸hrt keines dieser Groflprobleme zu internationaler Instabilit‰t, bleibt stets die Sorge, dafl die Kommunistische Partei nicht einfach so von der Bildfl‰che ververschwindet, indem sie mehr politische Freiheiten gew‰hrt, und dass der Punkt kommen kˆnnte, wo den Massen die ˆkonomische Freiheit nicht mehr reicht. Die KPCh ist ziemlich korrupt und ein Parasit des Landes, aber sie hat in Peking nach wie vor das Sagen. Armee scheint sich mehr und mehr von Gesellschaft und Realit‰t zu entfernen, konzentriert sich kurzsichtigerweise zunehmend darauf, in den Vereinigten Staaten eine Bedrohung zu sehen, weil die ihrer Bedrohung Taiwans entgegenstehen, Taiwan, welches der einzig verbleibende Z¸ndfunke sein kˆnnte. Und dann gibt es da AIDS.

18. Russland. Putin hat langen Weg vor sich in seiner Diktatur des Rechts; Mafia und R‰uberbarone verf¸gen nach wie vor ¸ber zuviel Macht. Tschetschenien und das Nahe Ausland im Allgemeinen werden Moskau Zuflucht zur Gewalt suchen lassen, aber die wird sich im groflen und ganzen auf die Fˆderation beschr‰nken. Dass USA F¸hler nach Zentralasien ausstrecken, kˆnnte Testfall werden ñ eine Beziehung, die verderben kann, wenn sie nicht von vornherein richtig gehandhabt wird. Russland hat zu viele interne Probleme (Finanzschw‰che, Umweltzerstˆrung usw.) und ist zu sehr von Energieexporten abh‰ngig, um sich sicher f¸hlen zu kˆnnen (bedeutet die R¸ckkehr des Irak ins Gesch‰ft das Ende dieser goldenen Gans?). Und dann gibt es da AIDS.

19. Indien. An erster Stelle steht immer die Gefahr des Atomkrieges mit Pakistan. Eine Stufe tiefer wird es durch Kaschmir in einen Streit mit Pakistan gezogen, wobei jetzt auch die Vereinigten Staaten in einem Mafle betroffen sind, wie niemals vor dem Antiterrorkrieg. Indien ist Mikrokosmos der Globalisierung: High Tech, extreme Armut, Inseln der Entwicklung, Spannungen zwischen Kulturen/Zivilisationen/Religionen etc. Es ist zu grofl, um erfolgreich zu sein, und zu grofl, um zu scheitern. Will bedeutender, verantwortlicher Milit‰rfaktor in Region sein, starker Freund der Vereinigten Staaten, und sucht verweifelt, mit China in Sachen Entwicklung gleichzuziehen (der selbstverordnete Erfolgsdruck ist enorm). Und dann gibt es da AIDS.

* Handicapping the Gap nennt Thomas Barnett die nachstehende Liste potentieller Krisen- und Interventionsschaupl‰tze oder, in seinen Worten, ÑMeine Liste der f¸r die Welt bedeutsamen Konflikte in den 1990ern, heute und morgen, beginnend in unserem eigenen Hinterhof". ñInteressant klingt in diesem Zusammenhand der folgende Auszug aus einem ZDF-Interview mit Colin Power anl‰sslich seines Blitzbesuchs bei der NATO in Br¸ssel am 3. April diesen Jahres. Gefragt, ob nach den strengen Verwarnungen Syriens und des Iran durch Verteidigungsminister Rumsfeld diese beiden L‰nder ÑNein, es gibt keine Liste. In Europa ist die Vorstellung verbreitet, es g‰be da so eine Liste von Feinden, bei denen wir in einer festgelegten Reihenfolge ñ einer nach dem anderen ñ einmarschieren w¸rden. Das ist nicht so. Der Pr‰sident hat deutlich gemacht, dass er ¸ber vielerlei Mˆglichkeiten verf¸gt, mit Regimes fertig zu werden, die, wie wir meinen, internationale Standards nicht einhalten. Manchmal sind politische Maflnahmen angemessen, manchmal wirtschaftliche, manchmal der Einsatz unserer Aufkl‰rungsmittel. Und manchmal ist der Einsatz milit‰rischer Gewalt angebracht. Aber wir halten nicht etwa Ausschau nach Kriegen, in die wir ziehen kˆnnten." (Eigene ‹bersetzung nach dem vom US-Auflenministerium am 4.4.2003 verˆffentlichten Wortlaut) ñ D. Red.


COMMENTARY: Whatís most interesting is the sidebar commentary by the Editors, especially about the infamous ìListeî! It has amazed me how much of a controversial figure I have become in Germany solely on the basis of that one article. They completely lump me in with the ìNeokonservatismusî movement in the U.S., and Iím just Kraut enough to get upzet!

4:21AM

Making the Foreign Affairs Bestseller List for July 2004

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 6 August 2004

Friday was another chaotic day of preparation for China. Much of the problem was caused by a power outage at the college that morning, which simultaneously freed up my schedule while making it real hard for me to get anything done.

Much of the day was spent making sure I wasnít leaving any time bombs on my speaking schedule that would detonate upon my return in September. The rest of the time was spent getting my hardware all together and tested to make sure I could take notes via my Handspring, transfer that to my laptop, and then send that via a high-speed connection. I also tested transferring digital photos from my camera to the laptop for safekeeping and sending via email while on the road. So now I feel ready to blog whatever happens during this 3-week roadtrip.

Friday night was spent repacking the various bags my wife and I are carrying to China. Itís complex, because we have to have everything in hand to deal with a third passenger once we get baby, to include a car seat that can be used in planes (we donít believe in simply having kids sit on your lap while flying).

So, amidst all that running around, plus one last mowing of the lawn, you can imagine how neat it was to come across word from Foreign Affairs that I made the bestseller list there for the fourth consecutive monthóor basically every month that PNM has been in the market. Given my slippage from #6 in June to #13 in August, this may be my last month, but if it is, itís been a nice ride given how many books are out there right now analyzing U.S. foreign policy. I still maintain that there is nothing in spots ahead of me (#1-12) that purports to be a serious grand strategy for the U.S. right now, so I still feel like #1 in that department.

If this is my last month on the list, then I have come full circle

∑ April = #11

∑ May = #4

∑ June = #6

∑ July = #13.

I was awfully happy to make April, since my book only came out on the 26th of that month. While I donít expect to stay on for August, I do hold out hope for more sales perhaps as the school year commences. I am getting a lot of emails from students whoíve read the book and plan on spreading the word next year in school, so who knows? There may have been some of that buying going on in July, because by my calculation, it looked as though Fergusonís ìColossusî was beating me in the online rankings on B&N and Amazon for most of the month, but Ferguson wasnít on the FA list this month, suggesting Iím getting sales that arenít accounted for in the online rankings, which are only a fragment of what goes on out there in the various markets.

My drop in this monthís list is pretty much caused by new books, and that makes sense. I fell 7 places and there are 5 new books ahead of me. I fell the other two places due to Huntington finally catching me and Bodanskyís book moving up. Hereís the complete list, found at www.foreignaffairs.org/book/bestsellers.


The top-selling hardcover books on American foreign policy and international affairs. Rankings are based on national sales at Barnes & Noble stores and Barnes & Noble.com.

POSTED AUGUST 5, 2004

1 Imperial Hubris by Anonymous (Brassey's), new this month

2 Running on Empty by Peter G. Peterson (Farrar, Straus & Giroux), new

3 Plan of Attack by Bob Woodward (Simon & Schuster), #1 last month

4 Against All Enemies by Richard A. Clarke (Free Press), #2

5 House of Bush, House of Saud by Craig Unger (Scribner), #4

6 How Soccer Explains the World by Franklin Foer (HarperCollins), new

7 The Connection by Stephen F. Hayes (HarperCollins), #3

8 America the Vulnerable by Stephen Flynn (HarperCollins) new

9 A Pretext for War by James Bamford (Random House) #5

10 Secret History of the Iraq War by Yossef Bodansky (HarperCollins), #10

11 The Interrogators by Chris Mackey & Greg Miller (Little, Brown), new

12 Who Are We? By Samuel P. Huntington (Simon & Schuster), #7

13 The Pentagon's New Map by Thomas P.M. Barnett (Putnam Publishing Group), #6

14 Ghost Wars by Steve Coll (Penguin Press), #8

15 The End of Oil by Paul Roberts (Houghton Mifflin), #11

The bestseller list is published monthly by Foreign Affairs magazine. Rankings are based on national sales at Barnes & Noble stores and Barnes & Noble.com in July 2004.

4:07AM

No mood to turn the other cheek

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 5 August 2004

Crappy pair of flights home; one in a plane so small I had a ìwindows seatîómeaning one window on each side! And that after showing up at Norfolk Airport at 0500 for a United flight to Dulles that became an 0830 USAirways flight through Laguardia.

Iím crabby, Iím tired, Iím a bit incoherent and Iíve got about 72 hours to get ready for three weeks in China! (Thank God my wife bought everythingóincluding the luggageóand forced me to pack it all last weekend).

Then I stumble into my office after driving from the airport and bump into this email:


From: "Leon, Michael (O-5)"

To: tom@thomaspmbarnett.com

Subject: The Pentagons New Map

Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2004 09:52:46 +0400

Mr. Barnett,

Your book, "The Pentagons New Map" was sent to one of the Naval Captains here in Baghdad and once I picked it I was not able to put it down. Occasionally discuss your concepts of Core/Gap with a high ranking Iraqi official who is extremely intrigued about your work!

Yesterday I was conversing with an Arab woman who stated the number one priority for Iraq is "electricity and water, then fixing the sewer system so it would stop backing up into the households". I had emphasized the importance of "security" and she stated, "We need jobs, there is security in jobs, Iraqis would not think about fighting against the coalition forces when they are working, this leads to greater security within this country."

If possible would like to order and autographed copy of your book?

Sincerely,

Michael A. Leon

LTC, TCLiaison Officer, MNSTC-I-J3 Ops Center

Baghdad, Iraq


All I gotta say is, smart little old lady Mikeís got there!

So yeah, that picks me up and gets me through the day, which ends with a two-hour meeting I could barely stay awake through.

And yet, being that out of sorts makes this a perfect night to catch up on my Amazon reviews. Yes, I clipped a slew of articles today but Iím too damn tired to do anything about them. I think Iím done doing articles until after China. Between here and wheels up itís just going to be getting the last things out the door, getting the various attics organized, and then, come Sunday, itís Chinablog for three weeks straight!

[pause while I try to remember what day it is]

You know, today in a meeting an official from Raytheon was talking about a speech I gave at a conference in the spring and I had no idea of what the man was talking about in terms of location, timing, etc. Itís all beginning to blur, so maybe now really is the time to reboot in China, connect with Number 2 Daughter, and discover a whole new world.

But first, the Amazons:

∑ Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 1 of 4)

∑ Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 2 of 4)

∑ Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 3 of 4)

∑ Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 4 of 4)

4:06AM

Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 1 of 4)

By George!

5 out of 5 stars

A Must Read!, August 2, 2004

Reviewer: Michael Bussio


Professor Tom Barnett's book, "The Pentagon's New Map" is a must read for historians, economist, businessmen and women, media superstars and those journalists not of the super star status, educators and ordinary, everyday American citizens.


After the Second World War George F. Kennan, a Russia specialist in President Truman's State Department proposed and assisted in molding a new American Foreign Policy for this nation. It was known as the Containment Policy. The policy was set in place from 1945 until the 1990's when the Soviet Empire collapsed. Throughout the 1990's however American Foreign Policy, what there was of it, drifted aimlessly with no visionary at its helm. However, one lone (and he is not so alone since there are many of us here in the hinter land of America who strongly support his views and vision) spoke out, wrote and power-pointed his way to the attention of the Bush Administration. His name is Tom Barnett and he is the George Kennan of the 21st Century.


Barnett's vision is of a world where war is obsolete, "where dictators fear for their lives. . .where the world's great armies no longer plan great wars but instead focus on stopping bad individuals from doing bad things. . ." Barnett sees a world in which America's definition of the big threat has downshifted progressively from an `evil empire' to `evil states' to `evil leaders' This is not Alice In Wonderland stuff. He means what he says and his is convincing. This vision can be attained if the United States has the political will and the perseverance to see what needs to be done, done.


Barnett's goal and the goal we should all embrace is to, as he puts it, ". . .nothing less than a revolution in how the Pentagon thinks about war and peace in the 21st Century." Simply put Barnett encourages the Defense Department of the United States to take a greater responsibility in connecting those nations and peoples disconnected from the Global Community. This can be done by preemptive strikes as seen in Iraq to remove a tyrant and give the Iraqis the chance to join the Global Economy or as a cop on the beat, so-to-speak as in the Balkans and Liberia, there to keep the peace so those nations can begin to connect to the Global Community.


It is imperative that those countries and regions not of the World Community, Gap nations as Barnett refers to them, areas where all the terror, oppression, denial of basic human rights, lack of education, lack of infrastructure, are located. It is where all the problems that plague the Earth originate from. It is the region that needs to be connected to the Global Economy. It is in those regions that the U.S. must concentrate its efforts militarily, economically and politically, whether than means a preemptive strike to remove people like Kim Jon IL, the dictator of North Korea and the man responsible for murdering nearly 3 million of his own people, half a holocaust, while the world stood by and did nothing or merely using American clout in the Global market place to give economically a helping hand to a country slowly making its way into the community of nations.


Barnett has pointed the way. However, time is of the essence. We can not wait for people like Bin Laden or nations like Iran to get their hands on some very nasty weapons before we move. We must act now.


COMMENTARY: I gotta admit it: I really hate it whenever I hear people write that Sam Huntingtonís ìClash of Civilizationsî article in Foreign Affairs in the early 1990s is the real ìX Articleî of the 21st Century, because it ainít. One, the diagnosis is way off base. Two, the old ìsome will simply never ëgetí globalization is fundamentally a racist argument, even though I know Sam doesnít mean that. Finally, as much of a genius as that man is, he offers no grand strategy in the piece. But you see, because I wrote my baby in Esquire, that article can never be the ìX Article.î No way, not with some beautiful babe on the cover. So yeah! I feel it when I get a review like this. I jump out of my chair and do the big punching-the-air jab!


Give me five!

5 out of 5 stars (no data on ìfound this helpful?î)

Explaining US politics in a compelling way, July 26, 2004

Reviewer: M. Schokker "m_schokker" (Europe)


According to the title one could think this book is all about war and military but that would be a wrong conclusion. The subtitle describes it much better; it is all about "war and peace in the twenty-first century". The book does this on a very positive and upbeat fashion, it is not about worries about the future, but it tries to paint an ideal world worth creating.


The writer has worked as a Pentagon annalist and during this book he gives us insight in the world of the Pentagon. But this is not at all what this book is about. The book is mostly about how we should see the importance of globalization. The writer sees globalization as a way, how all people in the world get access to security and prosperity. Everywhere the globalization fails there is trouble for the people and eventually also for the rest of us. Because this comes down to the notion to see globalization as willingness to work together and have a lot of common interest. It is then easy to see, that the nation who do not want to share in a common interest and do not want to work together are most likely hostile to us.


The main theme of the book is that the world is divided by countries that are able to work together and hence are part of globalization and countries that do not function well and hence are offline of globalization. The first are part of the core states and the later are located in the gap. The core offers the people living in it, security, the good life and peace but the states in the gap cannot provide for all of these. Hence our main task as core states is to let the core grow and the gap shrink. This for the better of human kind, because the core offers a better life for people and the gap is a security risk for the core. The map that shows the world divided between the core and gap, is what the title represents: The Pentagons new map.


The book makes a large case for this vision and also describes how the military of the core states should work together and should be used. The compelling thing about this positive vision on the world and its future is that the writer succeeded in it by describing it free of direct reference to (Western) culture. Because of this, the vision could possible have more appeal to people across cultures. If US policy is modeled in this way, it can have great appeal to people in all countries around the world. Hence, it could be a way to help other cultures to take the step to embrace the good life.


The weak part of the book however, is also its lack of recognition of these cultural clashes. By not recognizing the pervasiveness of cultural differences between people, it seems to breathe the air of ignorant multiculturalism. This is to bad because that does undermine his strong case, that the western way of working together by trade (AKA globalization) is an enhancement for human kind that all cultures in the world can profit from. But never the less, this book is very much worth reading and I highly recommend it.


COMMENTARY: I like that this guy picks up on the fact that the book, despite the title, is really all about globalization first and foremost. He also appreciates the civilization-neutral language I use to describe my future worth creating, so heís a fairly sophisticated reader. The charge about ignoring cultural clashes I find a bit odd, because I basically describe al Qaedaís resistance to globalization in this manner quite vividly, but I guess what heís going for here is the notion that even after you disconnect the disconnectors, there will still be underlying clashes of culture as globalization spreads. Maybe he wanted a hugs-and-kisses definition from me about how I would make that all better, but I think Iím pretty clear in the text that globalization simply changes any society far more than that society can hope to change globalization in return. So I donít feel like I am weak on that point in the book, just that I stipulate it rather badly and then move on, which is disturbing to a lot of people.



Jack Reed, not Jack Ryan!

5 out of 5 stars

A military . . . with a heart., July 21, 2004

Reviewer: John Jacobs "Pen for Hire" (Tequesta, FL United States)


Although brilliant (named one of Esquire's 'Best and Brightest' for 2002), Thomas Barnett occasionally keeps his ego in check by reviewing his September 2001 calendar for appointments at the top of World Trade Center One. No, he didn't predict 9/11, but as early as 1996 he outlined the new nature of 21st century war characterized by the attacks.


In his book, 'The Pentagon's New Map', Barnett proposes a revolutionary strategy for meeting the fundamental changes in modern war. He suggests a 'bifurcated' military, which is actually two militaries: one for large pounding wars, and the other for routine peacekeeping maintenance.


He likens teaching this strategy at the Pentagon (populated mostly by 'Cold Worriers' still stuck in an outmoded mindset) to teaching football to soccer players. It's that revolutionary.


For the rest of us, though, it's a piece of cake -- Barnett's straightforward style makes for the painless absorption of ideas. Unexpected similes, sometimes referencing Gen-X popular culture, both illuminate his ideas and stimulate the mind. Mantra-style repetition serves well to clarify important concepts. And finally, his material, highly polished from having delivered it repeatedly as a brief, is peppered with supporting data and compelling examples.


He begins with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which causes the Pentagon an identity crisis. So carried away by its momentum against a 'near-peer' enemy superpower, it mistakenly picks China out of the line-up, and begins strategizing right away on how to defend Taiwan's burgeoning democracy.


In the vacuum left by the Soviets, Barnett asks, why conjure up a near-peer enemy? Why not use our now-unmatched military might to end wars and export peace? His great idea is to 'reach for a future worth creating' by fully extending our national interest to include the entire world -- not imperialistically, mind you -- but guided by our democratic and capitalist ideals. 'We the people,' he writes 'needs to become we the planet.'


Barnett's professed Catholic faith shows as compassion and humanity in his description of life in globalization's 'Gap' -- those countries sidelined by the globalization trends of the 1990s. Life in the Gap is Hobbesian (nasty, brutish, and short), and data backs him up: countries disconnected from the global economy experience diminished life expectancy, overpopulation, and low incomes. The Gap is 'where the wild things are.' Anything can happen. Like ethnic cleansing by chainsaw (Sudan).


The 'Core', on the other hand, is relatively peaceful and stable. These countries experience lowered birth rates, longer lives, and higher incomes. They are more educated, have more opportunities, are governed by elected leaders, and obey the rule of law. By drawing a circle around the Gap's nation-states, roughly demarking both the Core and the Gap, we have our new enemy, large enough for Congress to approve big budget line items. We have 'The Pentagon's New Map,' and salvation for the military.


Even if we don't care about the poor quality of life in the Gap, Barnett argues, exporting connectedness and inclusion will create new consumers for our economy, as well as "drain the swamp" of vitriolic hatred, the likes of which caused 9/11, and which is primarily based on their exclusion. Should we not wish to improve the daily lot of those "with their noses pressed to the glass," Barnett concludes, there are still good selfish reasons to reconnect these states to the global economy.


The brilliance of the book is in its idyllic world vision, which introduces an interesting blend of patriotic internationalism ('Globalization is this country's gift to history'). Although its progressive ideals are slightly muted (maybe because compassion and humanity are not the Pentagon's stated ideals), don't be surprised if you end up hoping that Barnett's bright futuristic vision redefines our nation's military for a long time to come.


COMMENTARY: Overall, a pretty slick review. I appreciate how he appreciates the lively tone and accessible delivery of the text, because we put a lot of effort into that. I also like that he points out the self-interest argument for shrinking the Gap, because his last para makes me sound awfully idealisticólike a capitalist Jack Reed. So a nice balance.



Bitch slapped for 4 stars!

11 of 16 people found the following review helpful

4 out of 5 stars

Young Man, Narrowly Read, Has Big Idea with Few Details, July 14, 2004

Reviewer: Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States)


This is another of those books that started as an article and should have stayed there. The author, who appears to be either unfamiliar with or unwilling to credit works from earlier decades as well as more recently that present ideas similar to and often superior to his, has essentially three good ideas that can be summed up as follows:


Idea #1: World can be divided into a Functioning Core and a Non-Integrating Gap. The disconnected gap is bad for business (risky) and the US military can protect its budget by getting into the business of exporting security so that Wall Street can do more business safely.


Idea #2: Connectivity or disconnectedness are the essential means of defining and influencing which countries are able to move into the Functioning Core and which remain in the Non-Integrating Gap [too state-centric for my taste, but a good point--my 1990's call for Digital Marshal Plan remains valid.]


Idea #3: Economic relationships have replaced military power as the essential attribute of relations among nations--for example, we cannot deal with China as a military power without first having a comprehensive economic strategy and economic tools with which to influence them.


There are many points where I agree with the author, and I give him credit for thinking of all of this on his own, without much attention to decadeís worth of scholarship and informed professional opinion in the military journals. He is absolutely correct to note that we cannot fence the Gap, we must stabilize it. Of course, Joe Nye and Max Manwaring and Mark Palmer and Bob Oakley and Jonathan Schell, to name just 5 of the 470+ national security authors have made important points along these lines, but their work is not integrated here. This is one massive Op-Ed that should have remained an article.


The author has irritated me with his low-key but obvious assumption that he is the first to break out of the box and "get it." On page 63 he goes on at length with the view that America has lacked visionaries, and the implication that he is the first to come forward. Not true. From John Boyd to Chuck Spinney to Bill Lind to GI Wilson to Mike Wylie we have had many visionaries, but the military-industrial complex has always seen them as threats. We tend to dismiss and shoot our visionaries, and I am truly glad that the author's personal relations with Cebrowski and a few others--as well as his fortunate association with a couple of naval think-forward endeavors--has given him some running room.

There is actually little of substance in this book. The article has been expanded, not with substance, but rather with very long descriptions of this young man's engagement in the process of the Pentagon and the process of strategic reflection. His discussions of the many forums that he found boring if not hostile to free thinking are excellent, and that aspect of the book takes it to four stars where it might normally have only received three.


Two weaknesses of the book, perhaps associated with the author's urgent need to "stay inside the wire" in order to keep his job:


1) All his brilliance leads to just two forces being recommended: the "big stick" force and the "baton-stick" (constabulary) force. In fact, were he more familiar with the literature, he would have understood that from diverse points we are all converging on four forces after next: Big War, Small War including White Hat/Police Ops, Peace War, and Cyber-Economic War. Inter-agency strategy, inter-agency budgeting, and inter-agency operations, with a joint inter-agency C4I corps under military direction, are the urgently needed next step.


2) The author is delusional when describing and praising our operational excellence in defeating well-armed enemies. Were he more familiar with the after action reports from Iraq, particularly those done by the Army War College (clearly on a different planet from the Navel War College), he would understand that Iraqi incompetence was the foremost factor in our success, especially when Rumsfeld insisted on throwing out the sequence of force plans and sending us in light and out of balance. He also ignores the vulnerability of complex systems and relies much too heavily on University of Maryland and CIA unclassified publications that are completely out of step with European conflict studies and other arduously collected ground truths about the extent of state and sub-state war and violence.


I disagree with his concluding recommendations that place Africa last on the list of those areas to be saved. His overall recommendations are simplistic, focusing on the standard litany for Pentagon go-alongs: Iraq, Korea, Iran, Colombia, Middle East, China, Asian NATO, Latin American NATO, Africa.


I note with interest his use of the term, "the military-market link." I believe this refers to an assumption, matured by the author in the course of his Wall Street wargames, and certainly acceptable to the neo-conservatives, to wit, that the U.S. military exists to export security so America can do business. I would draw the reader's attention to Marine Corps General Butler's book, "War as a Racket", and his strong objection to having spent his career as an "enforcer" for US corporations.


I do want to end with a note of deep sympathy for the author. On the one hand, he overcame a period of time when his sanity was questioned by ignorant Admirals and other "lesser included" Captains of limited intellect. On other he is trapped in a system that does not like iconoclasts but rewards those who innovate on the margins. His book is most useful in describing this environment, where people who rely on secrets are completely out of touch with reality, and service chiefs focus on protecting their budgets rather than accomplishing (or even defining) their mission. He appears to have discovered the Catholic mafia within the naval services, and his several references throughout the book lend weight to my belief that we need to do religious counter-intelligence within the government.


COMMENTARY: Talk about the green-eyed disease! And I mean that in more ways than one. You have to suspect a former Marine here, given the references, and clearly someone whoís own brilliance in cracking my entire code years before I did (ìI was breaking out of the box when you were still trying to bust outta your diapers!î) has left him bitter about his lack of recognition for his deeds. When he gives us his laundry-list categorization scheme for war, he pretty much reveals himself as someone who has spent a lot of time working the same territory, hence the resentment at (apparently) not including him in my footnotes. To his credit, though, he fights through the envy and gives me four stars, largely because I capture the insider game of the Pentagon (that he knows so well from experience). Talk about wearing it on your sleeve!



The code cracked

2 of 3 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

the current model explained, July 12, 2004

Reviewer: A reader


This book sets out the current model of the world that our government is operating under. It is laid out clearly and argued persuasively. Whether or not you buy this model, you cannot get a clearer explanation of why we went into Iraq, why the Taliban think that MSF is part of an American conspiracy, and just where this entire thing is likely to go. You really should read this one.


COMMENTARY: Pretty basic, saying this book is a useful guide. He loses me on the ìMSFî reference.



Reads the paper differently

3 of 5 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

The Pentagon's New Map, July 10, 2004

Reviewer: Harold C. Trescott (Cedarburg, WI USA)


If you frequently watch cable news and read the daily newspapers looking for insight concerning world events, you're missing something important - a comprehensive perspective. Thomas Barnett has given us just such an overview. At last I feel like I truly understand what is going on in this world and how it will affect our future. This is a must read, a very important work.


COMMENTARY: If you have to go short, this is about as good as it gets. I love it when people say they look at the news in an entirely differently way after reading the book or seeing the brief. That is exactly what Iím going for with the average readeróa clear sense of empowerment.

4:05AM

Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 2 of 4)

Somebodyís taken Philosophy 101 . . .

4 of 9 people found the following review helpful

2 out of 5 stars

Read Hegel Instead, July 8, 2004

Reviewer: Frank Prest (Portland, OR USA)


Mr. Barnett displays an ability to think big and he's not afraid to make bold statements and predictions. This is what drew me to purchase and read "The Pentagon's New Map" in the first place. I have no doubt that Mr. Barnett has dedicated his professional life to the achievement of the noble and mostly realistic notion that correct choices by the US government can bring about "a future worth creating" across the globe. I found the book to be tedious however.


First, it is too long. My guess is that it should be no more than half its actual length. Mr. Barnett uses up 100 pages to make the point that pentagon planning in particular and US foreign policy in general were in sad shape after the end of the cold war. It certainly wouldn't take much to convince me that after nearly 50 years in which the cold war defined US policy across the globe, it was going to take time to re-tool.


Secondly, there is a notable lack of supporting information to support the ideas and predictions brought forth in the text. I think the idea is "I'll tell you how smart I am and then you won't have to worry about facts". This makes the book tend to read like any number of business books that promote "thinking outside the box" or searching for the "killer app". Too clinical, no human touches.


Lastly, the author tirelessly portrays the world in terms of "gaps" between the enlightened globalists and the deprived regionals. I found this to be annoying after a while. The modern philosopher, Hegel, might find the whole structure of the arguments a bit derivative of his notion of "dialectics" as well.


Two stars because of the author's "courage of his convictions" and an interesting look inside the "think tank culture" of the beltway.


COMMENTARY: This guy clearly reads for just the high concept, so he found the personal narrative off-putting. As for a lack of data, thatís nonsense. I give a large amount of supporting data all over the dial. What he wants, I think, is a lot of background theory and citations of smaller ideas to build my bigger ones. Given the Hegel reference and everything else, I think he wanted something closer to Fukuyama and Huntington than what he found here, which wasóby designócloser to Thomas Friedman.



Looking for hope in all the right places

1 of 2 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

Finally some clarity, hope, and optimism, July 8, 2004

Reviewer: Robert Meyers (Ithaca, NY)


Mr. Barnett's book is a welcome breath of fresh air. Free from partisan rants and cheap ideological jabs, he presents a very solid case for a dramatic change in American (and indeed world) foreign policy. This book uses an insider's understanding of the Pentagon and US government to help the reader understand exactly why we were caught so off-balance by 9/11 and why it took such a massive shock to initiate change. However, Mr. Barnett's main scope is global, allowing him to observe certain trends in population, technology, and energy consumption which provide rock-solid support for his conclusions. He is not a dangerous ideologue who advocates the 'Americanization' of the world, but a man who is firmly grounded in reality and wants to see the benefits of the industrialized world spread to the impoverished--while keeping them and their cultures intact. It is a breathtakingly optimistic view of the future, one that I sincerely hope comes true.


COMMENTARY: Again, this one is very gratifying, because both Putnam and myself felt that the optimism of the book would be its main selling point in a market currently glutted with pessimism and fear-mongering.



Globalization at a barrel of the gun

0 of 2 people found the following review helpful

3 out of 5 stars

A very bloody, savage path to peace, July 8, 2004

Reviewer: Sho J. Morimoto "aresdracon" (Washington, DC)


Dr. Thomas Barnett, former CNA and OSD analyst and currently professor at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote the Pentagonís New Map with the general public in mind. Lamenting that the Pentagon and State Department have intentionally isolated themselves from global political realities, Barnett argues that the United States needs a new grand strategy that recognizes the country's historic role as the "linchpin to the entire process [of globalization]." Basically, nuclear deterrence, U.S. military supremacy and economic interdependence have ended any possibility of war between major powers. The first two conditions remain true throughout the world. However, economic interdependence, or "connectedness," only exists among states connected to the global economy (i.e. the "Functional Core"), so the rest of the world (i.e. the "Non-Integrating Gap") still perceives some potential for benefit in engaging in mass violence (e.g. maintaining absolute, personal control over a population by forcibly isolating it from global norms on democracy). The best way to secure perpetual world peace, then, is to eliminate "disconnectedness" by connecting the Gap members to the global economy (a.k.a. "shrinking the Gap"), making all three conditions of permanent peace apply to the entire world.


Barnett puts forth three goals for the U.S. government in order to achieve this "future worth creating." First, the U.S. and the rest of the Core must shore up internal defenses and crisis management systems to minimize the attacks that will surely come from the Gap's worst actors as they feel threatened by U.S. policies aimed at eradicating disconnectedness and eroding their hold over disconnected populations. The Core must do so without causing too much friction within the Core or hindering globalization's advance. Second, the Core must stop the worst of the Gap's exports (e.g. terrorism, diseases, drugs, human and arms trafficking, etc.) from entering the Core but again without slowing down globalization. Third, the U.S. must commit to exporting security to the worst flashpoints in the Gap while aggressively promoting globalization.


For this purpose, Barnett prescribes a bifurcation of the U.S. military. While nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence will maintain security in the Core, the U.S. still needs a "System Administrator" force that will underwrite security both for the Core and members of the Gap that are in the process of integrating into the global economy. The other force will play the preemptive, hard-hitting Leviathan in the Gap, where the rules of engagement differ from the rest of the world because there are no real rules. Once an intervention has finished surgically removing the proponents of disconnectedness in a given state, the Sys Admin force will quickly replace the Leviathan to reconstruct the state and connect it to the Core. In this manner, with the Middle East as the starting point, the U.S. and its allies will eliminate the Gap.


Though refreshingly simple in its explanation of the relationship between international security and globalization, Barnett's book suffers from several problems of style and logic. I found it hard to dig up the most important points of his thesis because of his tendency to use half the pages in the book to congratulate himself on his past achievements or complain about people who do not see things his way. He could have spent that space for proving some of the claims he makes without furnishing the evidence. He sounds condescending sometimes by making assertions about globalization (e.g. it inevitably leads to bliss) and security (e.g. the U.S. can surgically take out all the bad actors while leaving the targeted countries relatively untouched) without facts to back them up. We're all supposed to take his word because all his claims are "no-brainers." Anybody who disagrees is either a fear-monger or an idiot. I'm not quite sure whether Barnett is an optimistic idealist or an overzealous crusader.


Labels aside, he does provide a vision of the future that tries to make sense of all the military operations we are currently undergoing. Instead of a war on terror that does not seem to have a foreseeable end state, we have a war on countries that do not open themselves up to democracy, good governance and free market economy. I share his belief that our nation and the international community can bring greater peace and prosperity to the entire world in the future. I just can't accept that the path towards that peace must be a series of bloody wars initiated on terms set by a few in Washington. That definitely is not a "future worth creating."


COMMENTARY: Another guy looking for pure high concept and resenting the personal narrative as superficial and self-congratulatory. As for the lack of evidence he cites, I didnít try to make this a book that defends globalization on an economic level. There are plenty of other books out there that do that. My quoting a bunch of them wouldnít make my argument any better, because itís doubtful I would convince any already committed anti-globalist to move off their dime. Then again, he could have read his way through my 35 pages of footnotes. It would have been interesting to hear his alternatives, but I think this is a guy who keeps reading books hoping one will convince him that globalization is a good thing, andóalasóhe did not find that book here.



I thank you, my mother thanks you, my father thanks you, my . . .

2 of 4 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

A new Kennan, July 4, 2004

Reviewer: Eric Lee (Toronto, Ontario, CANADA)


I think Barnett does us a great service by explaining in clear language that the old rules no longer apply, and that new thinking is needed. The 21st century is shaping up to be far more complex and interesting than some Pentagon planners with their fossilized mindset realize (and Carnes Lord, Barnett's colleague at the Naval War College, typifies this kind of old thinking). Globalization, economic self-interests and economic interdependence, domestic political evolution - none of these are important to some of the folks at the Defense Dept who continue to look at the world as a one-dimensional chessboard, with monoliths pitted against monoliths in a zero-sum game (as in the Cold War). Barnett's vision is realistic, highly analytical and well-informed. This book is partially autobiographical and is a little confusing at times (I wish he would separate his own life in an appendix perhaps). But still it makes very good reading. Barnett is a new Kennan for America, only this time with a totally new vision expressed in terms which would be surprising to Kennan. The same brilliance though.


COMMENTARY: Personal narrative didnít work for this guy, but I sealed the deal with the high-concept material on being the next Kennan, so what to complain about?



Organizational man

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

illuminates new world, June 28, 2004

Reviewer: "oracle007" (Bowling Green, KY United States)


This book explains the post cold war world. It illuminates the reasoning behind the current US foreign policy and it cuts through the election year political rhetoric. Very helpful reading, organizes known facts.


COMMENTARY: Geez, youíd think heíd get a bit more excited about a 5-star review. I feel like he might say the same things about a well-designed phone book!



Jíaccuse! Mr. War-monger!

5 of 30 people found the following review helpful

1 out of 5 stars

A Nasty Book by a Dangerous Ideologue, June 20, 2004

Reviewer: A reader


The book argues that the cultures of 2 billion people living in the "disconnected" societies of what he calls "the Gap" must be fundamentally changed essentially through Americanization. Should these countries not become "globalized" the United States is justified in seeing them as potential sources of terrorist attacks. "In sum, the United States needs to play System Administrator to globalization's continued functioning and advance, periodically waging war across the Gap as its de facto Leviathan" (p. 369). He sees these wars stretching across generations as the U.S. changes the world through cultural but also military force. The Iraq war is merely first in a long sequence of invasions that Thomas P M Barnett finds fully justified. A nasty book by a dangerous ideologue.


COMMENTARY: You just know this must be Dennis Kucinich. ìA reader,î come on! Clearly someone who buys the ìperpetual warî argument and simply ignored the historical data I put out that suggests this fear is hugely overblown.

4:04AM

Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 3 of 4)

Barnett the synthesizer

5 of 10 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

Should be part of the national debate! June 17, 2004

Reviewer: A reader


Quite the thought provoking book. Does get to the heart of the rising threats to the West. Also, in an amazing synthesis, Barnett connects the main Left Wing and Right Wing arguments about the 'root causes' of terror.


His solutions also encompass the Left/Right arguments: Fruit and Fist. Connect the disconnected in the global marketplace and let them reap the fruit. . ..as well as bring the fist down on those tyrants who are keeping their people apart from the global community.


I wish he had explored more the opportunities for more nations to be part of the 'fist'. While he's correct that the US is the only nation currently capable to providing global security, that doesn't mean we can't encourage others to develop their capabilities (he seems to dismiss the EU and China as secondary military powers)


If I have one critique it is in style. Too much jargon. Could have been written in simpler prose and thus accessible to a larger public. The contents of this book should be part of the national debate.


COMMENTARY: Alright, so I like this ìreaderî better! Actually, the bit about jargon seems more a function of this personís vocabulary than anything else. I had to correct about 10 spelling errors in the text before reposting. But thatís quibbling. Whatís nice is that the ìreaderî (okay, my aunt if you must know) sees the middle-ground arguments for what they aspire to be, a mixing of left and right that tries to be inclusive.



Book my flight to Oslo please!

6 of 9 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

Nobel Prize for Barnett, June 11, 2004

Reviewer: Ben A. Green (Scotia, NY USA)


Thomas Barnett's analysis, which seems right on to me, attempts to show us the way to permanent world peace. It may take a long time and a lot of money, but it could take the world to a new place.


And the key to this permanent world peace is the establishment of economic prosperity EVERYWHERE, even sub-Saharan Africa. To get there, however, we have to make globalization safe for everybody, one nation at a time. The key to motivating a nation to join the global prosperity is connectedness -- internet, satellite TV, and world trade.


Read baldphil's review of the book for more details, but best of all READ THIS BOOK. It will be talked about for a long time.


COMMENTARY: To me, this guy gets the most important message of the book, one that I am very proud to be associated with: making globalization truly global. A vision that demands sacrifice requires a very happy ending. To me, that is one, and Ben agrees.



Check please!

14 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

5 out of 5 stars

A 21st Century Marshall Plan, June 10, 2004

Reviewer: "baldphil" (Los Angeles, CA United States)


In "The Pentagon's New Map,î Thomas Barnett presents a revolutionary new doctrine for foreign policy, which, if adopted, would be as dramatic a shift in America's international role as the Monroe Doctrine or the Marshall Plan. Briefly stated, the United States military should make the integration of developing countries into the world system its highest strategic priority.


Barnett employs a mild bait and switch tactic to get to his main point. The bait is a map of the world with a compelling new feature: a closed loop around the portion of the world that produces almost all of the world's instability. The loop surrounds the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Africa, Southeast Asia and the Andean region. This area is called the 'Non-Integrating Gap' (or just 'Gap'), and the rest of the world is called the "Integrating Core" (or just 'Core'). These terms reflect the basic difference between these two regions-the Core is connected politically, economically and militarily, whereas the Gap is disconnected in all of these ways. The map's validity is reinforced by plotting all US military interventions since the end of the Cold War. Of course, almost all fall within the Gap.


But the main thrust of Barnett's argument-the switch-is the idea that the military must stop fighting wars "within the context of war" and begin fighting wars "within the context of everything else"; that is, in the context of civilian life. Barnett does well the make this phrase awkward; if it were easier to say, demagogues would tear it apart as a new incarnation of "nation building". "War in the context of everything else" is actually more ambitious than nation building. It basically requires dividing the military into two distinct parts. Army #1 would be the traditional force, made up of a few large, expensive pieces of super high-tech equipment, similar to our current force. In a war, it would go in first, guns a-blazing, and kill most of the bad guys, along with a few others. Army #2 would look like a hybrid of the Coast Guard and the Peace Corps on steroids. It would employ a large number of small, inexpensive pieces (e.g. lots of ships resembling Coast Guard cutters), as well as police forces and other civilian-style personnel units. It would follow Army #1, and basically show those bush league natives how it's done in the Show.


The truly revolutionary nature of this doctrine is summed up when Barnett states, "There is no exiting the Gap, only shrinking it." This means WE CAN NEVER LEAVE, until countries develop economically and politically. Exit strategies have gone the way of the Dodo.


And what's the rationale for all this? What's the reason Barnett gives to take a perfectly good military and chop it in two? Surely the reason must be global terrorism, right?


WRONG!!!


Barnett's reasoning instead subordinates war to market forces. He presents four crucial entities whose flow dominates the current process of Globalization: security, people, energy, and investment.


Security: In Barnett's scheme, the U.S. military is merely the most important exporter of security based upon global demand for its services. Indeed, considered on a global scale, the U.S. military is the only viable exporter of these services. Everything else depends on America's global security guarantee.


People: The population in the Core is aging rapidly, meaning that Core countries will require a huge influx of younger people to maintain enough of a workforce to keep pension systems afloat. These young people will all come from Gap countries, but this emigration will be politically unpalatable unless security is assured.


Energy: China and India are growing at phenomenal rates economically. They will consume huge amounts of Mideast oil and gas, possibly becoming more dependent on them than the United States. I need not mention how essential security is in this regard.


Investment: Gap countries will require a safe business environment if they are to attract the immense amount of capital required to raise living standards. Improved living standards are, of course, the only true guarantor of long-term security.


And what if we don't do what Barnett says? In 2050, Grandma won't be able to afford the gas required to go pick up her medicines, which is just as well, since the bankrupt Medicare system won't be able to pay for them. This assumes that she is lucky enough to have a doctor when there are only a few workers for every pensioner. Meanwhile, a perfectly well trained doctor in Gappistan will not be able to emigrate to the U.S. because Gappistan is a disease ridden, terrorist infested dump. He will, of course, be unemployed, since Gappistan lacks the capital to build hospitals.


What if we do follow Barnett's prescriptions? I wasn't so clear on that, but strains of "We are the World" spontaneously come to mind. Everyone loves each other, all Grandmas are properly taken care of by (formerly) third world doctors, and the Gap is criss-crossed with shimmering lanes of well-trafficked concrete. The only costs are perpetual low-grade war, and thousands of U.S. troops permanently scattered across Africa, Central Asia and the Andes.


I can't wait.


COMMENTARY: Baldphil apparently likes his coffee black and his truth unvarnished. Heís one of those guys who wants the bad news up front and then heís happy to move ahead, because he feels he has a firm grip on the task ahead. I tried to write the book in enough of a ìrealistî fashion to accommodate people like baldphil, and apparently it worked.



Another hater of my life story

11 of 23 people found the following review helpful

1 out of 5 stars

needles for thought in a wind-bag haystack, June 9, 2004

Reviewer: A reader


The good thing about this book is that the author has some exciting and insightful ideas about the future of the world (nothing trivial here!) and what America needs to do to cope, especially the Pentagon. There are some fascinating data on world economics and demographics as well as entertaining insights on the world of government operations and bureaucracy.


Unfortunately, these nuggets are almost buried in a turgid writing style, relentless self-promotion and bragging, and almost limitless mountains of jargon. Fundamentally, I decided this book is really about the author and how right he is about things; this almost swamps the enjoyable parts of the book, which have to be looked for and dug out of the verbiage. Overall: save your money and read the lengthy reviews here on Amazon.


COMMENTARY: We knew weíd alienate some with the personal narrative, but we felt we probably wouldnít win those readers anyway with the ideas alone, and it was more important to win readers who needed to be reassured about who I am to buy into the entire vision. To write only to the high-concept audience is to put your book quickly into the remainder bins at bookstores. Do you notice how the really negative reviews are never appreciated by a majority of readers?



Brilliant + flawed = brawed

14 of 19 people found the following review helpful

3 out of 5 stars

Brilliant new paradigm, but flawed., June 7, 2004

Reviewer: Greg Peterson (Hawaii USA)


Thomas Barnett presents a new paradigm through which to view our current struggles. The author describes the world as being divided between those nations that are connected and part of the globalization process (the Functioning Core) and those disconnected from globalization, (the Non-Integrating Gap). The cause for conflict in the near to mid term future will not be between great powers such as the U.S., Europe, China and Russia. Rather conflict will occur because of the problems associated with the disconnectedness that is in the Gap. As the author sees it the difference between the Core and the Gap is the Core plays by rule sets that are known, understood and obeyed by all the players. These rule sets include the WTO, GATT, NATO, and the IMF to name a few. As a result of playing by these rules a nation becomes integrated into globalization and the Core. The GAP does not recognize or play by the same rules and as a result does not enjoy the benefits of globalization and remains disconnected to the advancement of mankind.


The solution to the problems in the Gap according to Mr. Barnett is for the Gap to become integrated into the globalization process and eventually become part of the Core. This is achieved by the U.S exporting security into the Gap to allow those nations to become stable enough to adopt and play by the accepted rule sets. The author observes the U.S. must play the Leviathan in the Hobbesian world of the Gap to force the forces of disconnectedness to play by the rules. True security for the U.S. and the Core as a whole lies in integrating the Gap into the accepted rule sets so the Gap does not continue to export terror and instability across the globe.


The authorís analysis and description of the two groups and what separates them is first rate in its logic and demonstrates that the author has given this a great deal of scholarly thought. His solution is also well thought out and if you listen to policy statements put out by the U.S. government you will see that his work has gained influence in certain circles.


However I feel the author has glossed over and conveniently ignored certain factors in his analysis.


1) The author does not take fully into account culture. For him itís ìall about the economy stupid.î He briefly touches upon some of the cultural difficulties that some cultures have with the globalization process but then more or less just wishes them away. As he sees it as soon as people see the benefits of globalization they will whole-heartedly embrace it and forget about all they previously held dear. I fear that this is unrealistic and smacks against human nature.


2) He disregards any threats posed by other nations that are in the Core and especially holds for contempt those who view China as a threat. Mr. Barnett feels that our military should focus on the threats from the Gap and not worry about a threat from China, as it is unlikely we will fight them as they become more integrated into the Core. He recommends wholesale changes in military force structure to reflect this belief. I concur that war with China is unlikely but that is in part because our military outclasses theirs and they know it. If our military cannot be perceived as being able to defeat theirs the equation could change. Peace can be maintained through strength.


3) He assumes a rational actor model with all the leaders and actors in the Core and does not account for nationalism.


4) He states that the U.S. will not become the ìGlobocopî but yet fully endorses the idea of the U.S. becoming the Leviathan in the Gap and intervening and enforcing the rules as needed. Isnít enforcing the rules the job of a policeman?


5) He states that this is not a ìclash of culturesî but yet talks about changing the role of women, beliefs in individual freedoms and forms of government in the Gap. All these beliefs are based on a nationís culture and how it sees how the world should function. So if we are to change these beliefs we are in essence changing their culture to look more like ours. If this isnít a ìclashî I donít know what is.


All in all this book is well thought out and worth the time in reading. Unfortunately I feel the author ignores human nature and culture to the detriment of the overall concept.


COMMENTARY: A good summation of all the usual criticisms of the book. Basically the State Department review. As a former regional studies scholar, you take it all in stride. Yes, I am open to all these criticisms, but I deal with all of them in the book directly and basically say that while there is some truth in them, the overall labels simply do not stick in my mind. For some, though, those labels stick just fine. Overall, a smart review that sees the value in the book while deftly summarizing all the usual criticisms.



No comments

4 of 13 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

Even a seamless argument has seams. . ., June 7, 2004

Reviewer: "johnny_zucchini" (Houston, TX United States)


My head is spinning. We can't be "the world's cop" is now "we are the unilateral perpetual world's cop" 'cause, well darn it, because we're good and we can be. The necessity for a "compelling national interest" has been ditched for "the world is our global beat and our boys and girls in camo are off to the inevitable rescue via pinpoint death." We don't want to get involved in "nation building" goes poof and now "nation building" is to become our rather obsessive hand off to the always-ready-to-help" world, on their tab, thank you very much. The Cold War is over, but Marxist/socialist states with not-long-for-the-world dictators, and even nation states with working democracies that dare to elect a lefty and express even mild defiance to the US, seem to remain morsels on his war platter, and there is no apparent means by which they can remove themselves: not so much perpetual war as an unavoidable, inexorable march toward war despite any mounting evidence to the contrary, Act (aw shoot, pick a big number.)


But why care? Even if the military should mess up left and right and all over the place, what can the world do? Any expression of defiance, especially withdrawal from the world scene, is evil disconnectedness, and we can just Toby Keith the evil bad boys and nobody can do anything about it. Seamless - compassionate violent intervention for the lonely. But I agree 100% that disconnectness is bad for people.


Somebody, please put some Kryptonite in Professor Barnett's Wheaties. His Captain Kirk act may be as insufferable as the excellent original, and he has turned my imaginings of all Pentagon briefings into similar camp classics. How did I miss the Borg becoming a service branch?


But I loved the book. It is thought provoking and Professor Barnett's ultimate goal, something I call " permanent peace though perpetually victorious war" cannot be dismissed because he offers not only peace, but quality of life, too - to the survivors, of course. His snappy jingoisms are a riot. I didn't think they could be equaled until my inner child talked me into renting "Starship Troopers 2: Hero of the Federation-SP.", and the writers of that everlasting war tome chopped Professor Barnett off at the knees before the tarnish could form on his war-jingo trophy. But hey, you can't be the champ forever.


Or can you?


All in all, an excellent and highly informative read with loads of surprises, including serious ones. The future is important, and Professor Barnett is a likely, slightly 911-tipsy Architect. Gotta go; bugs to kill.


COMMENTARY: What can I say about Johnny that hasnít already been thought by anyone who ever read one of his many postings on my weblog? Two words: no comments.

4:03AM

Reviewing the Reviews: The Amazon Tribe (Part 4 of 4)

Gets the challenge

8 of 13 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 stars

Vision and Responsibility, June 6, 2004

Reviewer: Jim Smith (Brookline, MA USA)


This is an exceptionally well written book. This author presents a vision for our world as it moves into the early stages of the 21st Century. As the United States of America faces the responsibility of being the strongest military power within our global community of nations, we must address that responsibility with sensibility and with clear articulated vision. We know we can win wars, as the author notes, but we are not a nation of "excellence" when it comes to the next steps - development of stability, peace, and economic strength for those countries that are in disarray. He refers to the "Connected and the Disconnected" areas of our world, which comprise the new map. The "disconnected" are the "disadvantaged", both in terms of economics as well as human rights, safety, health, food, shelter, self-governance, freedom, education, economic development, and other important basics of living that we in the USA cherish and assume as essential, as well as normal. The containment of the groups, whom the author refers to as the "rouges", is an important step - but not enough. If the strategy of our national defense system included the creation of a competent and efficient "systems administrator" capability to its fullest, we could be the key peace insurers for the world. This will assist the developmental processes required for the "disconnected" and "disadvantages" to eventually become a part of the larger global community. In other words, the author is suggesting strongly, which he supports with the presentation of extensive data that we who are the "haves" must protect and provide for the "have-nots." This does not mean our "taking over" those who "have-not!" It does mean that we are responsible to be proactive in the removal of the infectious, as well as contagious "bacteria" that contaminates the well-being of those members of the community. However, removal and containment of these isolationistic "bacteria" or "rouges" is just a minor first step. The larger steps and most responsible ones are to insure the on-going well-being of the people and their nation in order that they can thrive. In the end, this will mean the greater durability and health of the entire globe.


The author is suggesting, and has been for almost two decades, to the US governmental agencies (such as DoD) and the economic leaders of our country some specific strategies on how this can be fully and successfully implemented. There will be differences among us who explore this publication as to some of the author's suggestions. However, whether we agree totally or not with the author's specifics - especially in the containment and removal of the "rouges", the message that we all need to hear is that we in America are one member of a larger membered community. And, we must care for all members of the larger community in the same way that we care for ourselves. The author is suggesting and maps out possibilities of how this can be done. Furthermore, the author is suggesting quite emphatically that it is doable.


For us as readers of Dr. Barnett's work, we are left considering whether we have the "guts" to support this vision and to be proactive responsible citizens as respected members of this global community we desire to keep alive and well.


COMMENTARY: Clearly, the book answered this guyís mail. He was looking for something that would give him hope plus a desire for action, and he found it in PNM. He is the perfect reader, in many ways.



You canít ignore this book

12 of 13 people found the following review helpful

4 out of 5 stars

Thought provoking analysis, June 2, 2004

Reviewer: Charles Miller (San Jose, CA USA)


Whether you agree with it or not, Barnett's analysis of the current security structure of the United States, and how it should change, will irrevocably affect the way you will think about this subject. The strategic structure Barnett posits is based on his map of the world which divides countries between the Functioning Core and the Non-Integrating Gap. The Core includes North America, Europe, Russia, China, Japan, India, parts of South America, South Africa, and Australia. The Non-Integrating Gap includes those countries we normally think of as being in the third world. The Core is economically developed, offers personal freedom to its inhabitants, and is highly connected with the rest of the Core. The Gap is non-connected, poor, experiences little personal freedom, and has a number of "bad guy" rulers who make trouble for the Core.


Barnett's thesis is that the US should prepare for a twenty-first century mission of "shrinking the gap". Unfortunately, he finds us ill-prepared to do so. He points out that our military still has the cold war focus of preparing to engage a "near peer" foe using massed high tech weaponry. What is needed instead is a dual-mission force that can fight actions like Afghanistan and Iraq by applying overwhelming force against relatively unsophisticated foes, as well as provide the nation building expertise now woefully missing in Iraq.


Barnett is a Pentagon think tank type who has worked with Wall Street financial analysts to project what the security environment will be in this century. He concentrates on four flows: money, energy, population, and security. He sees the US as an exporter of security to the rest of the world. By the judicious application of force (read: get rid of Saddam, Kim Jong Il, and the ayatollahs) he believes the US can create a world in which poverty is decreased, personal freedom is increased, and connectivity serves as a ballast against disruptions of order.


A subtext of the book is Barnett's recounting of how policy is made in the Pentagon and how analysts vie for the "killer brief" as a path to influence and promotion. I seriously doubt that anyone will agree with all, or even most, of what Barnett presents. However, there is little doubt that his ideas are shaping the debate, and informed citizens would do well to acquaint themselves with them.


COMMENTARY: Hard to complain. Almost sounds like a publicist writing itís so complimentary and slick.



So he read the WSJ profile . . .

7 of 38 people found the following review helpful

1 out of 5 stars

Dr Strangeglove, Power Point, and "disconnec t", June 1, 2004

Reviewer: L. F Sherman "dikw" (Wiscasset, ME United States) - See all my reviews


Dr. Strangeglove meets Power Point in a world where we are the only major Power and finds world conquest necessary because our economy (necessary to support the military) may run low on gas.


The thoughts are interesting and dangerous reminding one of how some of our Generals wanted to fight with Hitler to defeat Communism and after the war wanted to Nuke the H-ll out of the Soviets before they became powerful. Now we need new excuses (states "disconnected"; Islam and Green Peril; Terrorist/pirates; oil security). The "disconnect" of states outside pervasive internet and satellite TV webs are totalitarian and offensive to us. They do not participate in the world economy on our terms (as Freidman would mourn they have no MacDonalds either. If ever there was terror because "they don't like our way of life" this is it -- but our terror against them.


Intellectually not convincing, morally reprehensible - no wonder they like him at the Pentagon and in the Board Rooms of what once was a democratic country that inspired others rather than dominated them.


COMMENTARY: This kind of review really comes off like someone whoís read other reviews and decided to chime in. There is nothing in this review that suggests he actually read the book, just that he hates globalization and believes the U.S. is a dominating force in global affairs. Fine and dandy.



The perfect compliment to Mr. Sherman

10 of 43 people found the following review helpful

5 out of 5 starts

Good wording. Hmmm. . ., June 1, 2004

Reviewer: DoTheRightThing (RightThingTown, Earth)


This is a darn good book because of the great ways the words are strung together in that, uhm, that really good way. Yeah, that good way! So I am bestowing on it five stars because that is exactly what it deserves. I deem it so!


Dumb review, huh? But no dumber than a great many you can find on am4zon. The problem, as Iíve just demonstrated, is that any nut (present company excepted! :-) can write just about any inane thing they want about a book on am4zon, and if it doesnít fall miles outside some vague and inadequate ìguidelines,î the staff typically refuses to remove it despite complaints from readers, authors, and publishers.

If it werenít for our admission that this is a bogus review, it would likely stay up permanently!


Here on am4zon you can find one line reviews, meaningless reviews, reviews that say things like, ìI didnít read it, but someone said it sucked,î and generally clueless reviews that make you wonder what on earth the reviewer was thinking in actually posting publicly such total nonsense.


These grossly ill-informed reviews affect sales (a wash for the site as some of these reviews are positive but equally silly), authorsí and publishersí reputations, and the quality of information available to book buyers. But the site doesnít care, and its unwillingness to remove even the most absurd reviews means they stay. This is why there was the recent scandal wherein it was learned that many authors had countered ridiculous bad reviews with their own anonymous reviews of their own works. (Could you blame them for being deceptive on a site that the N.Y. Times reported to have accepted payments from publishers to ìplaceî their books near the top of the siteís ìbest sellerî list?)


Clearly, am4zon needs to improve the policies and methods by which it administers reviews. Please join me in getting this message out in your own reviews. Sadly, nothing else seems to get the attention of the staff here.


This ìreviewî should be no reflection on the book listed on this page. We suspect the author would support this effort to reform am4zonís review policies.


COMMENTARY: Amen brother!



Barnett explains all

32 of 40 people found the following review helpful

4 out of 5 stars

What he writes explains a lot, May 31, 2004

Reviewer: A reader


I saw his interview 5/30/04 on C-SPAN, and then tracked down the book. I am a retired military officer who could not understand why our country's leadership was taking us in the direction they are. It is against the very basis of our constitution we all swore to uphold and defend.


This book explains a great deal about why we are heading in the direction we are. Barnett articulates the world's hot spots, and why he thinks we should be a global aggressor-to connect those third world unconnected regimes with our society.


If nothing else, it helps explain what our leaders are thinking and doing. While morally we may question what is the purpose of invading other countries, this book explains the theory well, and for the first time I understand what we are doing.


God help us all if the current political leaders truly believe that they can alter the world by conquering those disconnected countries. If there is one book to read to get an understanding of our position in the world, and what our political leaders are doing killing others and destroying our Army in the process, this is the book to read.


COMMENTARY: He knows better now and heís even more scared. Fair enough. Big thing is he knows better now. Disagreeing is just fine.


Neener neener neener!

34 of 52 people found the following review helpful

1 out of 5 stars

Whatever he assumes is true; whatever others do is a myth, May 26, 2004

Reviewer: Chris Griffith (New York, NY)


The author is obviously a sharp guy, but he should've paid better attention to an old professor of his (and mine) Richard Pipes. Pipes never assumed away inconvenient facts or scenarios, as Barnett seems to do on every page.


To cite one example, Barnett plainly holds in utter contempt those Pentagon thinkers who believe the PRC will pose a strategic problem for the US. He assumes that an improved standard of living for tens of millions of coastal Chinese will inevitably lead to China's integration into the "Core functional" group of states. But did the fact that the UK and France were Imperial Germany's largest trading partners prevent WWI? And what happens when China's bubble bursts and all those hundreds of millions of poor rural folk get restive? A diversionary war, perhaps? Wouldn't be the first time a failing state tried that tactic. Now, to postulate a threat from the PRC in the medium-to-long term isn't the same as saying the Pentagon should plan solely for a Great Power conflict with China at the expense of attending to other force structure needs. But, in Barnett's world, his in-house rivals at the Puzzle Palace who worry China might move on Taiwan are simply trapped in a Cold War mindset.


Further, Barnett totally ignores the EU. Will it collapse? I think so, but he refrains from comment. If it doesn't, will it ever build a legit military force? Again, no comment. And what about South America? Sure, the larger economies are becoming more integrated into global capital markets. But nationalism is on the upswing, and, frankly, even the healthier economies there aren't doing too well.


Another blithe assumption Barnett makes is that migration from Gap (3rd World) states to Core states is inevitable and the US should just lie back and enjoy it. To that, I say, consult Sam Huntington's latest work.



He's correct on the primacy of the Indo-American relationship. And does bother to address Columbia's problems (albeit briefly).


Overall, though, this tome is unworthy of its author's esteemed credentials. It is little more than simplistic economic determinism coated with a thin veneer of legalistic happy-talk. Barnett often castigates his intellectual opponents in the defense establishment (to whom this book seems to be addressed, and which probably accounts for its snarky, know-it-all tone) as the irredeemable pessimists, but his "trade & modem" elixir will no more cure deep-seated cultural, geographic, religious, nationalistic, and power rivalries than two Tylenol will cure a brain tumor.


COMMENTARY: Maybe Mr. Harvard should write his own book! Seems like a bad case of crimson-eyed jealousy. How dare I write this superficial book when I should have written something truly academic that no one but the Harvard-types of the world would have bothered to read. Really, professor, have you no shame? This is the classic form of critique that I myself learned at Harvard: find tiny bits you can claim the author ìcompletely ignoredî and then crap all over the book as a whole. This guy drank deep at the fountain of wisdom that is Harvard.

4:02AM

Barnett goes to China

Dateline: Holiday Inn Select at Norfolk VA, 4 August 2004

Second day at Joint Forces Command, which sees me introduced for the first time as a JFCOM Senior Concept Developer, which is pretty cool. I give a 90-minute version to a room of about 50 senior officers, followed by a solid 15 of Q&A. The response was very positive, but not surprising, since this was a conference to explore the ìback half,î or Sys Admin force and thatís a huge portion of my message.

After lunch with a select group of officers and civilians, including the senior on-site US Agency for International Development liaison, I headed over to Joint Staff College nearby where a class on transformation was being taught by my host on this trip, the always slick and fascinating Shane Deichman, Chief Devilís Advocate and head of the Warfighting Lab in J-9. As it so happened, the class that week was reading my two Esquire articles and discussing them, so having me sit in and participate was fairly interesting. About 30 officers in all, a bit more junior than Iím used to, but not surprisingly a fairly flexible bunch. Why? They were the last crew educated for the Cold War, but theyíve spent their entire careers jumping around the world dealing with crisis after crisis and intervention after intervention. As one guy put it, ìOur entire careers have been about expecting the unexpected, so weíre getting pretty used to it.î

Later, in the afternoon, I got confirmation from China that my little exercise in one-man diplomacy is a go in Beijing. My host for the two days is Prof. Yu Keping, Director of the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics and the Center for Chinese Government Innovations, both located at Beijing University. Dr. Yu has set up two talks for me, and has assured me theyíll be ready with a projector for my PowerPoint (Iím taking the laptop to blog the trip real-time):


∑ The first talk will be on Wednesday, August 11 in the morning (we touch down at 9pm the night before, so I should be a bit diceyóthus testing my claim that Iíve done the brief so many times I could recite it in my sleep!). The audience, according to Prof. Yu, will be ìa small group of senior experts at the China Reform Forum.î That one sounds very interesting, to say the least.

∑ The second talk will be on Thursday, August 12, at 1000 in the morning. I will lecture a group of about 30 scholars at the China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics.


In both venues, I will be very eager to hear about how the Theory of Peacefully Rising China impacts the national security structure of China, and hopefully thereby learn how the evolution of our national security establishment can be shaped to facilitate that change. In short, Iíve decided to start having my own foreign policy.

Yes, yes, I know itís ambitious in the extreme, but what the hell, say I, the neocons are keeping a very low profile right now, and Powell is his usual invisible self, so with the election keeping the Democrats so vague on everything of any meaning, itís a good time for someone bold like myself to take the reins and see what I can do.

Hmm. Did I mention I plan on seeing ìThe Manchurian Candidateî tonight?

Todayís catch (again, no Times here to be had in Norfolk!). After talking as much as I did today, I ainít got a lot of gas left, so itíll be short and sweet:

Democrats are loaded for elephants


ìCourting the Kerry Republicans,î by Marie Cocco, Washington Post, 4 Aug, p. A19.

ìNo signs of a cease-fire in written war on Bush: Five more major releases coming before election,î by Bob Minzesheimer, USA Today, 4 Aug, p. 6D.

ìEuropeís Choice,î by Victor David Hanson, Wall Street Journal, 4 Aug, p. A12.

ìGeneral Malaise,î by Eliot A. Cohen, WSJ, 4 Aug, p. A12.


Most of what the military does and suffers flies under the radar


ìWhereís Rumsfeld?î by Harold Meyerson, WP, 4 Aug, p. A19.

ìAs Ranks Dwindle In a Reserve Unit, Armyís Woes Mount: After Tours in Two War Zones, Many in 110th Are Fed Up; Tough Sell for Recruiters,î by Greg Jaffe, WSJ, 4 Aug, p. A1.


Filing under naÔve


ìPhantom Legions For Iraq,î by Jim Hoagland, WP, 4 Aug, p. A19.

ì$1.9 Billion of Iraqís Money Goes to U.S. Contractors,î by Ariana Eunjung Cha, WP, 4 Aug, p. A1.

3:54AM

Democrats are loaded for elephants

ìCourting the Kerry Republicans,î by Marie Cocco, Washington Post, 4 Aug, p. A19.

ìNo signs of a cease-fire in written war on Bush: Five more major releases coming before election,î by Bob Minzesheimer, USA Today, 4 Aug, p. 6D.

ìEuropeís Choice,î by Victor David Hanson, Wall Street Journal, 4 Aug, p. A12.

ìGeneral Malaise,î by Eliot A. Cohen, WSJ, 4 Aug, p. A12.

You know damn well there ainít no such thing as Bush Democrats, because even those of us that supported the President in the GWOT and two wars it has so far spawned havenít emerged from those collective experiences convinced that Kerry could do a worse job of it. So when the environment, tax-cuts, etc. are all tossed in on top, and I start thinking about who Dick Cheney would pick as a Supreme Court judge, thereís not a lot of inner drive to be found for moving me toward Bush.

On the other hand, the notion of Kerry Republicans seems a whole lot less far-fetched, because there are more than a few GOPers who feel betrayed by this administrationís performance. I think what Bush may end up regretting most is the Medicare prescription drug package, which has vehemently pissed off just about every elder Iíve ever met, known, or even been within hearing distance of. Lots of those elders would naturally vote Republican, but the soreness on that issue is deep, Deep, DEEP!

Meanwhile, the expected right-wing assault on Kerry is looking fairly tame to the truly nasty one mounted by the left-wing on Bush. With the Dems firing 3-4 shots for every one the Reps get off, you gotta worry about Bushís chances if youíre a supporter.

To me, when I see staunch Republicans like Hanson and Cohen whining on not about Kerry per se, but people who like him (Europeans and retired military flags, respectively), thatís a bad sign for Bush. Losers get attacked directly, whereas winners typically have the values of their supporters attacked.

Then again, doesnít Hanson just whine on about everyone all the time? What a cranky old bastard he is.

3:52AM

Most of what the military does and suffers flies under the radar

ìWhereís Rumsfeld?î by Harold Meyerson, Washington Post, 4 Aug, p. A19.

ìAs Ranks Dwindle In a Reserve Unit, Armyís Woes Mount: After Tours in Two War Zones, Many in 110th Are Fed Up; Tough Sell for Recruiters,î by Greg Jaffe, WSJ, 4 Aug, p. A1.

Harold Meyerson whines on (yes, it seems like everyone is whining in the papers today) about how Rumsfeld and the neocons are off the TV right now, like itís some big conspiracy to hide Iraq from the American public. We actually lost several more soldiers there in July than in June, but because of the handoff, Meyerson surmises, no one seems to be noticing anymore.

Trust me, the families notice, just like they always do in military towns all across America. People want to portray American military activity all over the Gap right now as unprecedented. It really isnít that different than the heavy load that was shouldered by U.S. troops across the entire 1990s, itís just becoming dangerous in the GWOT, but thereís not a lot of surprise in that. They killed almost 3k Americans on 9/11, so upwards of 1k combat deaths in two wars and a vast host of counter-terror ops elsewhere in the three years sense canít be much of a shock to anyone with their head screwed on straightóunless we were simply expected to swallow that mass murder like some infinitely clever crime instead of an act of war.

The media fascination with U.S. military activities across the Gap will come and go over the coming years, dictated by an endlessly competing list of ìnews events,î like the current presidential election. But the effort of our troops will be day-in and day-out.

When you visit the force generator that is JFCOM (Our Area of Responsibility is the future,î they will tell you), you canít help but be deeply impressed by the sense of dedication and duty of this mighty institution. Good stuff happens, bad stuff happens, but this military never stops getting smarter, or better prepared, or learning from its mistakes, or planning for the next thing ëround the bend. Youíre never more proud to be around these guys and gals than when things go south. Why? Because they never pack it in. They just continue to believe and perform.

These two days at JFCOM have left me feeling very confident about where this military is going and what itís capable of doing in coming yearsóno matter who gets elected in the fall. These people are just that good.

3:50AM

Filing under naÔve

ìPhantom Legions For Iraq,î by Jim Hoagland, Washington Post, 4 Aug, p. A19.

ì$1.9 Billion of Iraqís Money Goes to U.S. Contractors,î by Ariana Eunjung Cha, WP, 4 Aug, p. A1.

Jim Hoagland writes with some incredulity about how the House of Saud seeks to influence U.S. presidential elections.

Can you imagine?

I canít remember the United States ever trying to influence other nationsí national elections before. Really, how dare they?

I mean, just because weíre the worldís sole military superpower, does it make sense that countries all over the world are keenly interested in who gets elected President here? Enough so theyíd try to do something about it?

God! I just must be so naÔve!

Like when I was working for the U.S. Agency for International Development in the 1990s and I realized that many of the contracts USAID gave out for development projects in failed states around the world actually went to U.S. firms!

Again, really, how dare they?

Certainly, any failed state must possess a host of well-run companies capable of running large-scale development projects, right? Wasnít Iraq just loaded with them after all those years of Saddamís rule?

The story on Halliburton is not that they won big contracts, because they are an industry leader. Nor is the story that they got those contracts without competition. When the U.S. Government wants deals cut fast, they do that all the time.

Whatís the issue on Halliburton is whether or not they did a good job. If they did, then all these criticisms are meaningless. And if they didnít, then all these criticisms are still meaningless, because the real point here is that the U.S. Government and ANY contractors it used in Sys Admin ops need to get a whole lot more efficient in their efforts than was demonstrated so far in Iraq.

The focus on process here is wrong, the focus on performance is dead on. But the answers we come up with canít be about labeling Halliburton the devil, but instead need to be about how weíre going to organize the Defense Department to handle the Sys Admin jobs of the futureóand yes, there will be plenty of them no matter what happens with Iraq or Bush-Cheney.

7:17PM

A day spent at the head of the table at JFCOM

Dateline: Holiday Inn Select, Military Highway, Norfolk VA, 3 August 2004

Got in late last night to Norfolk, thanks to the five-hour delay at Dulles due to weather. Nothing seemed to work for me yesterday, as United Express lost my bag for 24 hours so I got to go an extra day in my clothes today. Luckily, I was clad in all these ìtravel clothesî that Vonne has me trying out for China, or microfiber stuff thatís pretty much made to be worn for days on end without washing. Wonít test the theory too hard though. While I could get away with ìNewport casualî today at Joint Forces Command, tomorrow I keynote a conference on Security Transition and Reconstruction Operations, or STRO. See! And you thought Sys Admin Force sounded clunky!

Then again, if youíre involved in just a small operation of this sort, you could dub it STRO-lite.

Today was a weird sort of treat for me: non-stop command briefings that read me into all the experimentation going on in the J-9 directorate at JFCOM. J-9 is basically in charge of imagining the future force, so if JFCOM is the center of the uniform militaryís transformation efforts, then J-9 is the ground zero. The briefs ranged from fairly standard to downright fascinating (e.g., the official joint lessons learned effort on Operation Iraqi Freedom). Since I was an audience of one surrounded by about a half-dozen senior officers and/or contractors throughout, I got to ask all the questions I wanted, and was encouraged to pontificate at will. Weird for me, since Iím used to always standing up all the time in such meetings, and performing instead of being scrutinized for reactions. But you have to like a room where you enter to find half the guys holding a copy of your book, waiting for autographs, and the other half set to give you VIP-style briefings (their preferred term being Thought Leader for people such as myself, which sure beats Hot-House Flower or Lily of the Valley).

This day was a long-awaited tryout of sorts that was requested by the commander of JFCOM, Adm. Ed Giambastiani. I briefed the admiral and his senior flags back last fall, and theyíve been trying to get me back ever since. I was all set to come on 1 April, but then my dadís funeral interrupted, so it took far longer than either side wanted. But with the book thing now largely behind me, setting myself up as a Senior Concept Developer to JFCOM (a largely honorific title for me since Iím already DoD and thus wonít be paid as a contractor would) goes along nicely with my membership in the Strategistsí Working Group on the GWOT for Special Operations Command. Now, if I can just get Central Command to grant me some cool title, Iíll be officially titled in the three uniformed clubs that really matter right now in terms of military transformation: JFCOM, SOCOM and CENTCOM. In short, Iíve basically been given all the official entry I need to plead my case for the Leviathan-Sys Admin concepts with all the key players in the fieldóhaving done my thing in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Again to all those reviews that said my ideas werenít practical enough for serious consideration as policyóFoo on you! The simple reality is that PNM got me the invites to all three venues, which only provesóI guessóthat I know more about military grand strategy than the reviewers at Publishers Weekly.

Hmm, not exactly a high bar on that one.

Anyway, while I wonít take Michael OíHanlon advise to ìdeclare victoryî any time soon, I feel more and more optimistic that there are many allies to be had in this grand bureaucratic struggle, and I met more than a few of them today.

Yes, yes, theyíll have to pry my policy prescriptions from my cold dead fingers!

On to the news (no Times today) and then I want to catch ìThe Villageî at a local multiplex before it gets too late.

And yes, I have spoken to my webmaster about getting the article I mentioned in yesterdayís main blog up on my site. I am straining poor Critt with my megablogs as of late, so some patience is in order.

Todayís catch:

Who is Osamaís candidate for president?


ìBush endorses idea of intelligence czar: ëWe are a nation in danger,í he says,î by Judy Keen, USA Today, 3 Aug, p. 1A.

ìKerry criticizes Bushís pace in war on terror: Compaires his own ideas with those of 9/11 Commission,î by Jill Lawrence, USA, 3 Aug, p. 2A.

ìSecurity Alert as Double-Edged Sword: Some Democrats See Terror Issue As Tool Of Partisan Politics; Crying Worlf?" By Jackie Calmes and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 3 Aug, p. A4.

ìKerry Acting Out of Necessity In Tackling the Terrorism Issue,î by John F. Harris, Washington Post, 3 Aug, p. A9.


The new normalcy raises its ugly head


ìAfter Warnings, Getting Back to Business,î by Ben White, WP, 3 Aug, p. E1.

ìWorkers stay positive, arrive at jobs as usual,î by Rick Hampson, USA, 3 Aug, p. 3A.

ìAttack Threats Cast Shadow On Forecasts,î by Nell Henderson, WP, 3 Aug, p. E1.

ìHuge net cast in terrorist search: Employee lists and thousands of delivery logs to be reviewed,î by Kevin Johnson and John Diamond, USA, 3 Aug, p. 3A.

"Preparing for the Terror Alert: Latest Warning Underscores How Little Many Have Done; The Case for Text Messaging,î by Andrea Petersen and Jesse Drucker, WSJ, 3 Aug, p. D1.


Crossing a line in Iraq


ìChurch Bombings Outrage Iraqis of All Faiths: Neighbors Express a Sense of Collective Injury,î by Pamela Constable, WP, 3 Aug, p. A1.


Civilian Sys Admin forces donít get medals or respect


ìCivilian Jobs in Iraq Pay Well but, Wives Find, Not in Respect: Halliburton, Others Help Out, But Spouses Learn They Must Do for Themselves,î by Jonathan Fig, WSJ, 3 Aug, p. A1.


The China-to-be sees a future worth creating


ìChina: Collision Course?î by Thomas A. Metzger, Hoover Digest 2004 (No. 3), found at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/043/toc043.html.

7:10PM

Who is Osamaís candidate for president?

ìBush endorses idea of intelligence czar: ëWe are a nation in danger,í he says,î by Judy Keen, USA Today, 3 Aug, p. 1A.

ìKerry criticizes Bushís pace in war on terror: Compaires his own ideas with those of 9/11 Commission,î by Jill Lawrence, USA, 3 Aug, p. 2A.

ìSecurity Alert as Double-Edged Sword: Some Democrats See Terror Issue As Tool Of Partisan Politics; Crying Worlf?" By Jackie Calmes and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 3 Aug, p. A4.

ìKerry Acting Out of Necessity In Tackling the Terrorism Issue,î by John F. Harris, Washington Post, 3 Aug, p. A9.

The latest and very specific terrorist alert seems plenty real and plenty warranted, but it does raise a troubling question that both campaign staffs have apparently considered at length: the question of what a major terrorist strike would do to the election.

It seems the Bush camp decided a while back that it would be dangerous to run a campaign too heavy on national security, especially when the economy was picking up. But then Kerry comes out swinging so hard on the subject at his convention, only to see what should have been a substantial bounce in the polls simply not materialize on that basis (i.e., heavy on war, light on Bush bashing).

So now it seems the Bush camp is feeling awfully strong on defense, and is far less concerned about appearing to run on that basis. Even Kerryís camp admits that any attack will inevitably favor the incumbent in a rally-around-the-flag push. Knowing how al Qaeda has pushed the notion of tipping elections in its grand strategy to get the West out of the Middle East (having proved it could do so in Spain), you have to wonder whether or not all this talk/response/election dynamics isnít whetting their appetite to strike. Osama and his crew seem to make no secret of their sense that a Bush win is good for them, believing as they do that a second Bush Administration will only isolate America more in the worldís eyes.

But that may be a fantasy wish on their part. The correction is coming in U.S. national security strategy, no matter who gets elected, and a Bush not facing another election may be a wild card that al Qaeda may soon regret.

If I were Bush I would run hard on the terror war, because heís proven he can absorb the 9/11 Commissionís report with little damage to his standing, co-opting those proposals he wants and ignoring the restóby and large. Nothing particularly new or wrong in that. Presidents have been cherry-picking recommendations from blue-ribbon panels forever, and no amount of John Kerry saying ìI said it earlier!î is going to steal any of Bushís thunder on the subject.

7:08PM

The new normalcy raises its ugly head

ìAfter Warnings, Getting Back to Business,î by Ben White, Washington Post 3 Aug, p. E1.

ìWorkers stay positive, arrive at jobs as usual,î by Rick Hampson, USA, 3 Aug, p. 3A.

ìAttack Threats Cast Shadow On Forecasts,î by Nell Henderson, WP, 3 Aug, p. E1.

ìHuge net cast in terrorist search: Employee lists and thousands of delivery logs to be reviewed,î by Kevin Johnson and John Diamond, USA, 3 Aug, p. 3A.

ìPreparing for the Terror Alert: Latest Warning Underscores How Little Many Have Done; The Case for Text Messaging,î by Andrea Petersen and Jesse Drucker, Wall Street Journal, 3 Aug, p. D1.

How would you like to gain access to your place of work by having to walk past scary looking guys holding automatic weapons and wearing helmets and sunglasses?

Come to think of it, I do that every day.

Then again, I enter a military base when I go to work. But if I did it on Wall Street, or saw those guns on the Metro in DC, that would leave an impression even on me. You simply canít breeze past a killing weapon like that and feel more secure in the process. I remember being surrounded by hordes of Indian special forces guys all clad in black ninja outfits in Mumbai in the spring of 2001, when I was there for the big International Fleet Review. My treat was to spend a lot of time within armís reach of Indiaís President and Prime Minister, and I gotta tell you, being surrounded by that many guys with automatic weapons didnít make me feel very secure (donít even get me started on the roof-top sharpshooters). In fact, what I mostly felt was a sense of being too close to very dangerous objectsómeaning the Indian leaders. It was like they wore this giant target on their backs that said: ìWe have a real history of assassinating our leaders in this country!î I couldnít help feeling like if something happened, Iíd end up as this tiny little footnote in Indian political historyóyou know, the obscure American official whose head got blown off when the bomb killed the PM.

But thatís how life has been lived in India for quite some time, so people donít think about it that much there, just like in Israel, or certain European countries. But itís definitely a new normalcy thatís hard for most Americans to get used to.

I watched Steven Spielbergís ì1941î last weekend with my kids, and it reminded me how easily Americans can get their undies in a twist. The comedy was based on some real events, and obviously those events were exaggerated for comic effect, but it reminded me how much Americans like to get wound up. Hell, just walk into a grocery store along the Atlantic coast when a hurricane is comingóitís absolutely nutty to watch people stock up on toilet paper, milk and bread like somehow weíll see none of those things ever again in the After Time. Hell, we just plain like to be scared.

But there are real economic and social costs to all that fear. We may be fighting a war of attrition with al Qaeda, but theyíre fighting a war of exhaustion with us. This guy has given his life over to living in a cave, so we better not plan on his type getting worn out too soon. But thatís why I say this war has to be about something bigger and betteróa real happy ending. Fear is exhausting, whereas building a future worth creating is something that animates people.

Have I taken any great precautions since 9/11? No. I prefer a different route, dedicating my life and career to something positive. Thatís why Iím sitting here typing away in my hotel room after 9 hours of meetings today. I want to build something, not firewall it. Like anybody else, I want to leave a better world for my kids.

7:06PM

Crossing a line in Iraq

ìChurch Bombings Outrage Iraqis of All Faiths: Neighbors Express a Sense of Collective Injury,î by Pamela Constable, Washington Post 3 Aug, p. A1.

Burning African-American churches was a huge mistake for the terrorist group that was the Klu Klux Klan in America. No matter how they tried to rationalize it, the KKK crossed a line that simply offended any believer, no matter what the faith. The insurgency in Iraq made a huge mistake by targeting Christian churches there. They terrorized a few, but alienated far more. The U.S. occupation had about six months of grace following the topping of Saddam. You have to wonder if the insurgency that erupted big-time early this year is nearing the end of a similar grace period. After a while, the outrage outranks everything.