FINANCE AND ECONOMICS: "Global finance: Lifelines; A special section on the crisis looks at prospects for the global economy, individual countries and markets. It begins with the tricky job of saving the financial system," The Economist, 11 October 2008.
FINANCE AND ECONOMICS: "Fiscal implications: Deep pockets; State backstops work best if banks are small and borrow at home," The Economist, 11 October 2008.
FINANCE AND ECONOMICS: "The world economy: Bad, or worse; At best, the world economy is on the brink of recession," The Economist, 11 October 2008.
SPECIAL REPORT: "When fortune frowned: A special report on the world economy," by Zanny Minton, The Economist, 11 October 2008.
The first article ("Lifelines") puts the subprime in perspective, as in the world's financial crises, as we move deeper into this globalization era, grow in dimension and thus impact.
So the U.S. S&L crisis rings in at about a quarter-trillion, but it spreads over an entire decade (1986-1995), while Japan's never-ending backing crisis (the entire frickin' 90s!) goes almost $800b. The rapid-fire Asian flu (98-99) goes about $400 billion, but it's so concentrated. The subprime weighs in at only $600 billion bank losses. The difference is the additional 800 billion estimated in non-bank losses, something the other banking crises didn't have, because the debt instruments weren't farmed out to non-bank entities like the credit-default swaps were--and therein lies the real danger, according to most.
So yeah, a global SEC does seem called for, given the general level of chicanery (a Wall Street constant, especially expected in an a frontier-integrating age) and how it was peddled across markets to power the current contagion dynamic.
The "Deep pockets" article shows debt and deposits as a percent of GDP, and the gist here is that public and bank debt outpaces deposits for most established Old Core economies, with Britain and Switzerland looking healthiest and the US totals looking relatively small by comparison because only commercial bank data is cited.
Point: the over-leveraging is hardly an America-unique sin.
The "Bad, or worse" chart shows how emerging economies, advanced economies and the world as a whole move in total synchronization, indicating there is no Old Core-New Core "decoupling," something many experts were predicting for months and which I observed in this blog many times with real delight, hoping to see the solution dynamic in that rise of the New Core.
But alas, we've got a ways to go, it would seem, before China's domestic market will occupy it's own great counterweight space.
Moving on to the special report, one chart shows how much oil has fallen, but that--in relative terms, food prices still remain high relative to the recent past.
Another shows another non-decoupling dynamic: Old Core and New Core and world inflation rates rise and fall in almost exact synchronicity, with the Old Core registering around 4% now, the world clocking in at about 6%, and New Core economies at about 8%.
A truly scary slide titled, "Globalisation reigns," show total foreign assets and liabilities as % of GDP. New Core and Gap economies come in at about 200%, but that's nada compared to the Old Core at about 450%, reflecting how much more intertwined with globalization are they in financial terms.
Here's an unexpected one: household debt as a % of disposable income. German at 100%, the US at about 130%, and Britain (go figure) at about 175%.
Here's a truly perspective-providing chart entitled "Been there, done that": the proportion of countries suffering a banking crisis (based on a total of--get this!--251 banking panics since 1800). What you see on the chart is nothing until about 1810, then spikes to as high as 5% through 1830. 1840 until 1860 you see spikes (like regular heartbeats) in the 2-3% range. 1860 to 1880, back up to 5%, and then down to the lower rate for the rest of the century, with one big exception around 1890, when it jumps to 15%. Back to 5% around turn of the century, then big spikes through 1940 in the 15% range, save for the Great Depression, which jacks it up to about 22%.
Then it all subsides in bifurcated post-WWII era, with barely a heartbeat to notice until the late 1970s, and then it gets very different as globalization kicks in: a rising series of spikes that grows to just over 10% in the mid-1990s (one assumes it reflects the Asian Flu, Russia's default, the LTCM debacle, etc.).
And then it drops to almost zero--a distinct plunge across the last years of the century right to now.
Of course, the 2008 situation will be a huge spike. How big? IMF studies say the Anglo-Saxon economies suffer the most in these panics, because the lending tends to exaggerate the cycles. Hence the damage to our modern, matured model of economic management.
Two charts underscore the argument of way too much speculation on commodities in the past few years, as all that extra money chased more exotic futures instruments: 1) the notional amounts outstanding of over-the-counter commodity derivatives grew from about $1T in 04 to almost $9T last year; and 2) the turnover of exchange-traded commodity contracts (flipping, essentially) grew from a long-term historical norm of about 100m (not sure what 100m means here--is it the actual number?) to over 400m, suggesting that people were trading these contracts like crazy.
Chart I liked was developing countries forex reserves: jumping from $1T in 1999 to $5.5T in 08. To me, this was the implicit Marshall Plan-like transfer of funds to emerging markets, accomplished by the Old Core's--but especially America's--super-consumption.
That will be ending now, so if some experts call that Bretton-Woods II, then we now head to BW-III.
Isn't this so much more fun--okay, maybe logical--than discussing which "world war" we're in?
Interesting add says FDI into Japan increases 5-fold since 1999, to $15B. Nice sign.
Excellent sense of proportions here: Assets under management, 2013 forecast: mutual funds at about $58T, pension funds at almost $50T, insurance assets at about $35T, Asian sovereign funds at about $8T, petrodollars (Mideast and Russian SWFs) at a bit less, maybe $7T, and those dastardly hedge funds at maybe $2T.
So maybe the hedge funds and SWFs won't be running the world too soon.
All in all, that's the coolest collection of charts I've ever seen in a special report.