Clarification from military Mideast watcher on Iran's Expediency Council

Got this email from a nice major who often sends me stuff:
†† One minor point of clarification, the Council for Determining the Expediency of the Islamic Order (CDE) headed by Rafsanjani is not a new body. It was created in 1988 by Ayat Allah Khomeni to arbitrate disputes between the hardline Guardians Council and the popularly elected Majles (Parliament). The CDE also advises the Supreme Leader (Khameni) on political, scientific, and economic matters through a "think tank" called the Center for Strategic Research (also headed by Rafsanjani). The former President Khatami was recently given membership in the CSR.
†
Khameni has expanded the CDE's powers and given it oversight over all three branches of government (under his guidance of course). The Cabinet and Majles are upset by this and a rift among the hardliners is developing.
Excellent information, for which I am most grateful.
So the "newness" of the Expediency Council since the last election is that it now mediates and oversees not just the mullahs-parliament relationship, but now also the parliament-cabinet and cabinet-mullahs relationships, bringing the cabinet under its wing. Clearly, the mullahs feared the outcome of the election would be a shift too far in the direction of the hardliners under the new president, and so moved the reformist (and losing presidential candidate Rafsanjani) into the post of head of this council. If you analogize the mullahs to the Supreme Court, the Parliament to our Congress, and the Cabinet to the Executive Branch, then the Expediency Council becomes the Supreme Leader's way of making sure the fights between the three branches don't get out of control, meaning no one gets too far out of line.
Fascinating huh? Ahmadinejad the hardliner gets elected. You'd think the mullahs would rejoice, but the Supreme Leader puts him on a leash, and then hands that leash to the reformist (Rafsanjani) whom Ahmadinejad just defeated in the election.
Imagine how pissed off that makes him get. Then imagine how he feels when Rafsanjani starts talking about being more realistic and less inflammatory about their nuclear program, suggesting the government should be more willing to negotiate.
Then Ahmadinejad takes the opportunity of the annual Death-to-Israel day to declare (big surprise) that he wants death to Israel. It's a calculated trick, of course, that brings plenty of condemnation from abroad and soothing words from Rafsanjani.
As my major noted, there are clearly internal rifts developing in Iran. My point is, why aren't we engaging them on this in order to exploit them?
Instead, Condi says no direct talks, leaving Ahmadinejad to play the world like a guitar with calculated outbursts like this, knowing as he does how this inflames Israel's supporters in the U.S., considered a powerful lobby in DC.
This is the oldest trick in the book: work up a vocal interest group in the U.S. and on that basis win a standoff with the Americans instead of any serious negotiations which, obviously, Ahmadinejad hopes to avoid.
Can't be a hardliner if you negotiate, so to remain a hardliner, duck negotiations by employing inflammatory words that do unto your enemy what you fear he will do unto you: divide you from within and conquer on that basis.
Can I get a "duh" from the State Department?
All right, the bow-tie crowd probably knows this reality better than most and I'm sure they're frustrated at having their hands tied so by the White House. I know for a fact than many in the military are certainly frustrated by this. Hell, even Bush has complained publicly about the lack of leverage. So why do we stick with this Castro-like approach that plays into the hands of the hardliners?
Lack of imagination, pure and simple.
Lack of imagination is the hallmark of realism. Realists know what they know, and they're happy with that.
As my Dad liked to joke, "You read that in a book somewhere?"
Realists read security and history and military books like crazy. What they don't read enough is the Wall Street Journal.