It's now in Mark's hands

DATELINE: Twin Cities, MN, 28 December 2005

Got up this morn and wrote from 0800 until 1430, adding 6k to the already large Esquire article's text. In the end, I pass 13.5k to Warren.

I hope he was joking when he said space for only 4k was reserved. There was an amazing amount of material (500 pages of notes and transcripts) I did not use, writing only what I felt was essential to cover the five main characters of the piece (Abizaid, Schoomaker, Wallace, Mattis and Petraeus). In the end, I feel I have a unique piece that no one else has written.

If I had turned it over to anyone but Warren, I'd be freaked right now, but he is a very special talent.

Still, great to have that monkey off my back. Once first draft is out of me, I consider hard work done. Fiddling on text is, to me, just plain fun when the editor is as super as Mark.

Now several days of family time.

Brain lock!

Dateline: In the minivan on the road to Wisconsin, 27 December 2005

Added another 5,000 words to the Esquire article today, experiencing brain freeze in the car at 4pm (perhaps it was trying to type in a moving car for three hours that triggered the migraine-like headache).

Will finish tomorrow morn at my Mom's, before heading out to Twin Cities with Mom along. So noon tomorrow is drop-dead for me on the first draft.

Enjoyed the radio time with Larry Kudlow last night quite a bit. Went 60 instead of the planned 30, filling up the entire 9-10 pm EST slot, sharing the second half with Rowan Scarborough, who was good.

Afterwards, Kudlow came on the line to personally thank me, which was nice (and often never happens on many a radio show). I told him I liked his TV show a lot better now that that Cramer is gone. He promised (before that bit of suck-up) to have me on his TV show sometime soon. We shall see. I told him about my new work with Enterra and he seemed intrigued, so we shall see.

Juggling, juggling

Dateline: In the apartment, Indy, 26 December 2005

Back from Terre Haute family Xmas celebration today with elder son. Spend afternoon working the Esquire piece. Get 2500 words and then talk a bunch with Mark Warren.

Now, halfway through Kudlow appearance. Supposed to be only 30 minutes, but now I'm staying around for 9:30-10:00 p.m. EST slot too, with Wash Times' Rowan Scarborough joining in.

Good, but hungry. Owe Kevin dinner!

Merry Christmas

Dateline: in the Shire, Indy, 23 December 2005

Survived the vertical vacation, and experienced some humbling vertical limits at around 10,000 feet on the La Luz trail ascending to Sandia crest with two oldest kids and baby Vonne Mei on my back (plus the supplies backpack on my chest after Em and Kev got too tired carrying it).

I will never disrespect the notion of altitude sickness again. The last kilometer was an ascent of about 50 stories, and we were pausing every 50 yards. Scary to have to shallow breathe so rapidly to avoid passing out. Kids took to it better than I did, as it's just so counter-intuitive.

All in all it was six-and-a-half hours to go 7.3 miles and ascend 3,600 feet from 7,000 to 10,600 at the crest. Factor in that we were sleeping at about 5,200 in our B&B, and we basically doubled our elevation in about eight hours.

We made the crest just before sunset, by design. Our legs were like lead the last couple of miles, but Em and Kev amazed me by their fortitude. Only trick with Vonne Mei was keeping her warm, but we were very well geared up, and the trail map was superb.

Still, carrying the 60 pounds fore and aft just about wasted me. Hadn't felt like that since US Marine Corps marathon in 1991. Same emotion response: in first couple of hours after completion, I couldn't think back on the event without wanting to cry, which is humbling. It's the only two times in my life where I've felt that weird mix of physical and emotional exhaustion.

Fortunately, the kids never seemed to get anywhere near that, thanks to my decision to carry all the weight for the last five hours. While I was laying on floor on ranger station at crest, trying to recover, they were dancing around the cafe, drinking hot chocolate and chasing Vonne Mei around.

Simply put, I'm not a kid any more.

But what vistas! You can look up at the Sandias from Albuquerque and you will never see what we saw climbing La Luz, the last four miles in snow after starting out in the desert!

Some of the views we took in were otherwordly, like outta the Lord of the Rings (we decided I was Gandalf, Em was Legolas, Kev was Aragorn and Vonne Mei was the Ring Bearer). I will never forget that day, it was that amazing.

But I was hurting for a good 48 hours after. I could still feel my legs shaking a couple of days later — again, almost like a marathon run.

Anyway, now back and working the Esquire article on the Army and Marines. Have 500 pages of transcript (27 interviews) and notes I'm working my way through now. I may be writing as early as tomorrow but doubt it. Still, I must finish first draft by 27th or Warren will kill me. Issue started shipping out to printer's already, that's how late I am working this one. But hell, I just got all the interviews back from the transcribers yesterday, so the delay was unavoidable.

But it will make for a busy Xmas. Good thing I got Vonne something very nice!

Monday, December 26: Larry Kudlow to interview Tom on the John Batchelor radio program

Larry Kudlow, host of CNBC's "Kudlow & Company," is filling in for John Batchelor's nightly radio program on December 26 and 27 (9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. EST). You can tune in the evening of Monday, December 26 when he will interview Tom.

You can read more about the John Batchelor radio program here: http://www.johnbatchelorshow.com/.

You can read more about Larry Kudlow here: http://www.kudlow.com/.

Monday, December 26: Larry Kudlow to interview Tom on the John Batchelor radio program

Larry Kudlow, host of CNBC's "Kudlow & Company," is filling in for John Batchelor's nightly radio program on December 26 and 27 (9:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. EST). You can tune in the evening of Monday, December 26 when he will interview Tom.

You can read more about the John Batchelor radio program here: http://www.johnbatchelorshow.com/.

You can read more about Larry Kudlow here: http://www.kudlow.com/.

The vertical vacation

Albuquerque and New Mexico are proving to be a wonderful escape function.

So far climbed around various national monuments (volcanoes, ice caves, mountains, and--today--one fantastic wind-carved canyon outta some Indy Jones movie).

Tomorrow we climb the Sandias. Hoping the great weather holds (50's, dry, no wind, few clouds).

Not losing any weight though. Too much good Mexican (and NM) food.

Great B&B though. Way cool SW architecture.

Only low-light: backing over my high-end, kid-carrier backpack.

Good news? That's one tough f--kin' backpack!

"Blueprint for Action" makes Foreign Affairs bestseller list for year 2005

Exciting to see this come over the "wire," especially since my second book arrived so late in the year (hard to see how BFA got 8 weeks in for sales given the timing of this announcement).

Kind of weird to see BFA instead of PNM, since Vol. I spent four months (Jan-Apr) on the list while BFA spent only two (Nov-Dec), but there it is.

Nice to see BFA recognized this way. Figure PNM would have made any 2004 year-end list, since it scored 7 months on the list, but Foreign Affairs began the list in March 2004, so I guess they were waiting for a full year to do the end-of-year list.

So this is a nice end-of-year bit of recognition for Vol. II. Gives me hope that I can sell somebody on Vol. III.

Here is the complete "top 20" list of hardcover bestsellers on American foreign policy and international affairs for 2005, based on Jan-Dec sales at Barnes & Noble:

INTL. INTELLIGENCE

'Foreign Affairs' lists best-sellers

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 (UPI) -- Thomas L. Friedman's "The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century" has been named the top-selling book in Foreign Affairs' first-ever best-seller list.

The listing is the first ranking compiled by Foreign Affairs, the prestigious bimonthly journal published by the Council on Foreign Relations, in conjunction with Barnes & Noble booksellers.

The list ranks the 20 top-selling books on American foreign policy and international affairs. It includes the text of each book review as written in Foreign Affairs.

The first best-seller list from the house journal of the U.S. foreign policy establishment is as follows:

1. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century Thomas L. Friedman (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)

2. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed Jared Diamond (Viking)

3. China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World Ted C. Fishman (Scribner)

4. The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror Natan Sharansky (PublicAffairs)

5. 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (W.W. Norton & Company; Barnes & Noble Books)

6. The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq George Packer (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)

7. Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground Robert D. Kaplan (Random House)

8. First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan Gary C. Schroen (Presidio Press)

9. Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Secret Saudi-U.S. Connection Gerald L. Posner (Random House)

10. The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy T.R. Reid (Penguin Press)

11. Three Billion New Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East Clyde Prestowitz (Basic Books)

12. The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics Without God George Weigel (Basic Books)

13. Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War Anthony Shadid (Henry Holt and Company)

14. The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair Martin Meredith (PublicAffairs)

15. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power David J. Rothkopf (PublicAffairs)

16. America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies George Friedman (Doubleday)

17. Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating Thomas P.M. Barnett (Putnam)

18. John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics Richard Parker (Farrar, Straus and Giroux)

19. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War Andrew Bacevich (Oxford University Press)

20. The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can Be Resolved Alan Dershowitz (John Wiley and Sons)

© Copyright 2005 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Here is the link to the list: http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20051215-051645-8397r.

Disappearing act

Dateline: In the Shire, Indy, 16 December 2005

Leaving on a jet plane, won't say when I'll be back again.

Heading out with family to desert Southwest for week at B&B, and expect to stay busy climbing mountains, visiting ghost towns, etc.

When we get back, it's a scary crash on the Esquire piece on the Army and Marines (got my last phone interview today just before we leave for the airport: the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Ops) as Xmas looms, plus a quick one-day into DC for a joint appearance with Steve. Holidays will see us travel by car as far as Minnesota and back.

Meanwhile, my new personal assistant Steff will be moving the site to a safer and better locale, we'll rethink the newsletter format to make it easier for us to assemble, and we'll relaunch the blog and (perhaps) the newsletter early in the new year.

Til then, it's been fun typing away. Enjoy the holidays. Pray for loved ones in-theater (we'll be praying hard for my two nephews in Iraq), and remember how lucky we are to live in this country.

All my best,

Tom Barnett

Bono's not the bonehead on Africa

Paul Theroux whines on with the righteousness of the development crowd zealot who knows that most of it has been a huge waste and yet he's so damn pissed that someone else is arguing for a change that suggests the world recognizes that all that past effort was largely a colossal waste of time and effort and money.

So begins the bitch session:

December 15, 2005
Op-Ed Contributor
The Rock Star's Burden
By PAUL THEROUX

Hale'iwa, Hawaii



THERE are probably more annoying things than being hectored about African development by a wealthy Irish rock star in a cowboy hat, but I can't think of one at the moment. If Christmas, season of sob stories, has turned me into Scrooge, I recognize the Dickensian counterpart of Paul Hewson - who calls himself "Bono" - as Mrs. Jellyby in "Bleak House" ...

It seems to have been Africa's fate to become a theater of empty talk and public gestures. But the impression that Africa is fatally troubled and can be saved only by outside help - not to mention celebrities and charity concerts - is a destructive and misleading conceit. Those of us who committed ourselves to being Peace Corps teachers in rural Malawi more than 40 years ago are dismayed by what we see on our return visits and by all the news that has been reported recently from that unlucky, drought-stricken country. But we are more appalled by most of the proposed solutions.

I am not speaking of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, AIDS education or affordable drugs. Nor am I speaking of small-scale, closely watched efforts like the Malawi Children's Village. I am speaking of the "more money" platform: the notion that what Africa needs is more prestige projects, volunteer labor and debt relief. We should know better by now. I would not send private money to a charity, or foreign aid to a government, unless every dollar was accounted for - and this never happens. Dumping more money in the same old way is not only wasteful, but stupid and harmful; it is also ignoring some obvious points ...

Africa is a lovely place - much lovelier, more peaceful and more resilient and, if not prosperous, innately more self-sufficient than it is usually portrayed. But because Africa seems unfinished and so different from the rest of the world, a landscape on which a person can sketch a new personality, it attracts mythomaniacs, people who wish to convince the world of their worth. Such people come in all forms and they loom large. White celebrities busy-bodying in Africa loom especially large. Watching Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie recently in Ethiopia, cuddling African children and lecturing the world on charity, the image that immediately sprang to my mind was Tarzan and Jane.

Bono, in his role as Mrs. Jellyby in a 10-gallon hat, not only believes that he has the solution to Africa's ills, he is also shouting so loud that other people seem to trust his answers ...

Had Bono looked closely at Malawi he would have seen an earlier incarnation of his own Ireland. Both countries were characterized for centuries by famine, religious strife, infighting, unruly families, hubristic clan chiefs, malnutrition, failed crops, ancient orthodoxies, dental problems and fickle weather ...

A recent World Bank study has confirmed that the emigration to the West of skilled people from small to medium-sized countries in Africa has been disastrous.

Africa has no real shortage of capable people - or even of money. The patronizing attention of donors has done violence to Africa's belief in itself, but even in the absence of responsible leadership, Africans themselves have proven how resilient they can be - something they never get credit for. Again, Ireland may be the model for an answer. After centuries of wishing themselves onto other countries, the Irish found that education, rational government, people staying put, and simple diligence could turn Ireland from an economic basket case into a prosperous nation. In a word - are you listening, Mr. Hewson? - the Irish have proved that there is something to be said for staying home.

So what exactly is Mr. Theroux's counterpoint in this cartoonishly simplistic representation of what Bono seeks to do? Beats the shit outta me.

Are we supposed to make people stay in Malawi? Is that the answer?

Other than bitching about Bono, there is nothing here except a famous name and 800-plus words of empty carping. Talk about living on one's fame.

But quite the whine ...

The long fight demands flexibility in definitions--especially from the commander-in-chief

Here's the piece from the WP:

In Four Speeches, Two Answers on War's End
As Bush Tries to Recast Debate, Definitions of Victory and Iraqi Security Diverge

By Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, December 15, 2005; A01

As President Bush wrapped up a series of speeches on the war yesterday, he once again gave a clear answer to when U.S. troops would come home from Iraq: "We will not leave until victory has been achieved."

And he also gave this clear answer to when U.S. troops would come home from Iraq: "As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down."

What he did not do was reconcile those two ideas. Will U.S. soldiers withdraw from Iraq only after the insurgency has been vanquished? Or will they withdraw when Iraqi security forces become adequately trained to take over the battle themselves? Or somewhere in between?

For Bush, the four speeches delivered over the past two weeks represented a determined effort to reshape the angry debate at home over the war, presenting a more sober picture of the situation while highlighting the progress he sees exemplified in today's election of a new, full-fledged Iraqi parliament. At the same time, according to analysts, he carefully calibrated his rhetoric to give him maximum flexibility in determining ultimately just what will constitute victory.

The vow to "settle for nothing less than complete victory" satisfies Bush's desire to project Churchillian resolve, a strategy in keeping with White House theory that public support for a war depends on whether Americans believe they will win. The "stand up, stand down" formulation, by contrast, is intended to signal that the United States will not remain forever enmeshed in a bloody overseas conflict fueled by sectarian enmity.

The twin messages stem from a conclusion by White House advisers that they needed to counter the growing calls to begin pulling out of Iraq, or at least set a timetable for doing so. As Bush has noted, war against an amorphous enemy does not end in a surrender "on the deck of the USS Missouri," as with Japan in 1945. And so deciding the terms of victory becomes as much a political equation as a military one...

The full piece is found at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/14/AR2005121402417_pf.html

The press always wants a quick and easy answer to the question: Who wins and when does it happen? Either the U.S. is winning or the enemy is winning, and it has to be done by Tuesday. If Bush speaks to the long fight and says we'll always pursue victory even as it takes years and decades to unfold, then he must be speaking illogically. The Second World War should have been over by 1943. The Cold War should have ended in 1953. If the GWOT isn't done by 2005, then we've lost and we must retreat from the world.

We lost over 20k in Iwo Jima and we won. If we lose 2k-plus in almost three years in Iraq, then we must be losing.

Where are the wise men? Hell, where are the journalists with any sense of history?

The backlash against the Leviathan's bottomless spending pit

Quite the editorial today from the NYT. By overreaching on the budget, the Big War crowd is getting revealed for what it is: operationally tone deaf and strategically myopic.

No other comment needed since I've already vented on this subject many times in this space. Good to see the Times catch up to Esquire. Hell, it's just good to realize that the editorial staff reads Esquire.

My favorite lines (and there are so many that basically replicate my slightly polemic piece in the November issue):

Soldiers Versus Defense Contractors
Published: December 15, 2005
New York Times

... After the Pentagon's spending orgy over the past five years, there is plenty of scope for cutting, without weakening America's defenses - but only if the cuts come out of the most costly and least needed Air Force and Navy weapons programs, not from the money required to replenish and re-equip the Army and Marine ground forces that have been worn down by Iraq.

Alleviating the dangerous strain on America's overstretched, underrested and increasingly taxed land-based forces must be the Pentagon's highest priority for the next five years ...

Very few critics of the military's spending priorities want the United States to relinquish its current dominance in the skies and on the seas. But in a world where no rival military powers are remotely capable of challenging America, that dominance can be preserved without loading every new plane and ship with every conceivable technological marvel, whether or not it is relevant to the military mission at hand.

Much of the astounding 41 percent increase in military spending over the past five years has gone toward hugely expensive air and sea combat systems - and this in an era when America's toughest battles are being fought on land against foes that have no known air force or navy ...

The Air Force and the Navy can play only secondary roles in wars like Iraq. Their spending plans are increasingly oriented toward the possibility of future military conflict with China. That is not totally absurd. China's military planning is increasingly oriented toward the possibility of future conflict with the United States, like, for example, a clash over the Taiwan Strait. But war with China is a remote, unlikely and avoidable contingency. It should not dominate current military spending--especially if China is simply being used as an excuse to justify expensive equipment the Pentagon wants to buy. Given the huge lead the United States now holds in air and sea technology, the Navy and Air Force can be re-equipped with everything they really need at a more realistic and affordable pace.

... in a world of finite resources, excessive spending on the wrong weapons comes at the expense of real military needs, like building up America's ground forces. Surely $2.3 trillion over the next five years, allocated wisely, ought to be enough to provide for all of America's military needs in all likely combat contingencies. It would be scandalous to spend that kind of money and still come up short in real wars like Iraq.

The full piece is found at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/15/opinion/15thu1.html

A star is born

My daughter Em competes in state finals today of "We the People" competition whereby teams of kids debate the Constitution.

Her school doesn't place out of the 12 in the finals, but her individual team, focusing on federalism v. antifederalism, scores highest in the state in their category, so an individual win.

My baby does her daddy proud--big time. She pulls out case after case, argues Lincoln's abuses in the Civil War and compares the tradeoffs to the Patriot Act.

When I think back to the personal wars waged a dozen years ago, this is what I imagined back then would make it all worthwhile.

Expecting the Chinese to be Chinese

The Chinese crack down on a rural protest. People are killed.

The local provincial government detains/arrests the commander involved, according to the law, they claim.

Meanwhile, Beijing tries to suppress all media on the subject.

How many minds are the Chinese on this one? As many as you care to name. We are watching a slow-motion revolution from within. Not pretty. Plenty of setbacks and leaps forward. Awkward as hell.

Here's the opening from the usually fine Howard French:

Beijing Casts Net of Silence Over Protest

By HOWARD W. FRENCH

Published: December 14, 2005

New York Times

SHANGHAI, Dec. 13 - One week after the police violently suppressed a demonstration against the construction of a power plant in China, leaving as many as 20 people dead, an overwhelming majority of the Chinese public still knows nothing of the event.

In the wake of the biggest use of armed force against civilians since the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, Chinese officials have used a variety of techniques - from barring reports in most newspapers outside the immediate region to banning place names and other keywords associated with the event from major Internet search engines, like Google - to prevent news of the deaths from spreading.

Beijing's handling of news about the incident, which was widely reported internationally, provides a revealing picture of the government's ambitions to control the flow of information to its citizens, and of the increasingly sophisticated techniques - a combination of old-fashioned authoritarian methods and the latest Internet technologies - that it uses to keep people in the dark.

The government's first response was to impose a news blackout, apparently banning all Chinese news media from reporting the Dec. 6 confrontation. It was not until Saturday, four days later, with foreign news reports proliferating, that the official New China News Agency released the first Chinese account.

According to that report, more than 300 armed villagers in the southern town of Dongzhou "assaulted the police." Only two-thirds of the way into the article did it say that three villagers had been killed and eight others injured when "the police were forced to open fire in alarm."

But even that account was not widely circulated, and it was highly at odds with the stories told by villagers, who in several days of often detailed interviews insisted that 20 or more people had been killed by automatic weapons fire and that at least 40 were still missing.

The government's version, like a report the next day in which authorities announced the arrest of a commander who had been in charge of the police crackdown, was largely restricted to newspapers in Guangdong Province ...

See the full story here: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/international/asia/14china.html

The actual text of DoD 3000

Upon further reflection and the realization that it's a public doc, here it is in full:

NUMBER 3000.05
November 28, 2005

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

References:

(a) Sections 113 and 153 of title 10, United States Code

(b) Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, March 2004

(c) DoD Directive 1322.18, ìMilitary Training,î September 3, 2004

(d) DoD Directive 8910.1-M, ìDoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements,î June 30, 1998

1. PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. Future DoD policy will address these areas and provide guidance on the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoDís role in each.

1.2. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a) and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b).

1.3. Supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this Directive as listed at web site http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the ìDoD Componentsî).

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability operations tasks include helping:

4.3.1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;

4.3.2. Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and

4.3.3. Develop representative governmental institutions.

4.4. Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations (hereafter referred to as ìInternational Organizationsî), U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations (hereafter referred to as ìNGOsî), and private sector individuals and for-profit companies (hereafter referred to as ìPrivate Sectorî).

4.5. Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams.

4.5.1. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.

4.5.2. Participation in such teams shall be open to representatives from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector with relevant skills and expertise.

4.6. Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.

4.7. The Department of Defense shall develop greater means to help build other countriesí security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.

4.8. Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

4.8.1. Exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies.

4.8.2. Integrated with U.S. Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction and developed when lawful and consistent with security requirements and the Secretary of Defenseís guidance, in coordination with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

4.9. The Department of Defense shall support indigenous persons or groups ñ political, religious, educational, and media ñ promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, who oppose extremism and the murder of civilians.

4.10. DoD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements, taking into account other priorities.

4.11. Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.

4.12. Information shall be shared with U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and the members of the Private Sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal requirements.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.1.1. Develop stability operations policy options for the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of Stateís Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (hereafter referred to as ìS/CRSî) or any successor organization.

5.1.3. Represent the Secretary of Defense in discussions on stability operations policy and strategy with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, including S/CRS, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.1.4. Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities and recommend priorities to the Secretary of Defense.

5.1.5. Submit a semiannual stability operations report to the Secretary of Defense, developed in coordination with responsible DoD Components. This report shall:

5.1.5.1. Identify tasks necessary to ensure the Department of Defense implements the responsibilities prescribed in this Directive; and

5.1.5.2. Evaluate the Department of Defenseís progress in implementing this Directive using the measures of effectiveness directed herein.

5.1.6. Develop a list of countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military engagement in stability operations in consultation with relevant DoD Components and U.S. Departments and Agencies. This list shall be submitted semiannually to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.1.7. Ensure stability operations are incorporated into the strategic policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans the Secretary of Defense provides to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to Section 153 of reference (a).

5.1.8. Create a stability operations center to coordinate stability operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.

5.1.9. Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector while adequately protecting classified information and intelligence sources and methods, in coordination with relevant DoD and non-DoD entities (such as the Director of National Intelligence).

5.1.10. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.1.6. through 5.1.9.

5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) shall:

5.2.1. Ensure DoD intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are developed to support stability operations, in coordination with relevant U.S. Government intelligence entities and DoD Components.

5.2.2. Ensure the availability of suitable intelligence and counterintelligence resources for stability operations, including the ability to rapidly stimulate intelligence gathering and assign appropriately skilled intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to such missions.

5.2.3. Support the Combatant Commandersí development of intelligence support plans and intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.2.4. Ensure intelligence career paths attract and retain the quantity and quality of skilled intelligence personnel required for stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).

5.2.5. Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the relevant Combatant Commanders, and members of the U.S. intelligence community to ensure the effective use and employment of intelligence activities and resources in stability operations.

5.2.6. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.2.1. through 5.2.5., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall:

5.3.1. Identify personnel and training requirements for stability operations and evaluate DoD progress in developing forces to meet those requirements, according to DoD Directive 1322.18 (reference (c)).

5.3.2. Develop a joint and combined stability operation training policy that promotes interoperability with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Develop methods to recruit, select, and assign current and former DoD personnel with relevant skills for service in stability operations assignments, and recommend necessary changes to laws, authorities, and regulations related thereto.

5.3.4. Develop opportunities for DoD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by:

5.3.4.1. Undertaking tours of duty in other U.S. Departments and Agencies, International Organizations, and NGOs;

5.3.4.2. Participating in non-DoD education and training programs relevant to stability operations; and

5.3.4.3. Learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies.

5.3.5. Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations.

5.3.6. Identify personnel with skills required to support intelligence campaign plans, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Combatant Commanders.

5.3.7. Ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet military and civilian health requirements in stability operations.

5.3.8. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.3.1. through 5.3.7., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) shall:

5.4.1. Ensure research, development, and acquisition programs provide the Department of Defense with robust stability operations capabilities compatible with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, and International Organizations.

5.4.2. Streamline acquisition processes for science, technology, and products used in stability operations by encouraging acquisition planning and the training of DoD personnel in rapid acquisition processes.

5.4.3. Ensure stability operations capabilities are a key focus of the Defense Science and Technology planning, programming, and budgeting process, including the ability to identify pre-conflict indicators of instability and collect information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, and non-military security forces.

5.4.4. Ensure logistics support policies, procedures, and products are in place to support stability operations.

5.4.5. Identify technologies available through the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, and off-the-shelf Private Sector programs that could bolster U.S. stability operations capabilities and direct those technologies into rapid demonstration, experimentation, and fielding.

5.4.6. Ensure oversight of contracts in stability operations and ensure U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly.

5.4.7. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.4.1. through 5.4.6., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller shall:

5.5.1. Ensure the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process addresses resource requirements for stability operations

5.5.2. Institutionalize procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, goods, and services, with appropriate accountability safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed in foreign countries in support of stability operations.

5.5.3. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.5.1. and 5.5.2., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall:

5.6.1. Ensure Defense Information School activities support stability operations training and education for DoD public affairs professionals.

5.6.2. Design and articulate DoD visual information requirements to support stability operations.

5.6.3. Ensure American Forces Information Service activities support stability operations.

5.6.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.6.1. through 5.6.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration shall:

5.7.1. Ensure effective information exchange and communications among the DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector involved in stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(AT&L).

5.7.2. Develop processes that shorten the acquisition period for communications capabilities, including in-country indigenous capabilities, in coordination with the USD(AT&L).

5.7.3. Assist the USD(AT&L) in nominating science and technologies for information exchange and communications that support stability operations into rapid demonstration, experiment, and fielding.

5.7.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.7.1. through 5.7.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.8. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.8.1. Identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development.

5.8.2. Develop stability operations joint doctrine in consultation with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.8.3. Support the USD(P) and appropriate U.S. Departments and Agencies through participation in U.S. Government and multinational stability operations planning processes.

5.8.4. Provide annual training guidance that addresses stability operations capabilities and analyze training results.

5.8.5. Develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

5.8.6. Ensure instructors and students from other U.S. Departments and Agencies are able to attend DoD schools to receive or provide instruction on stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R).

5.8.7. Ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

5.8.8. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.8.1. through 5.8.7. and report on force readiness for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P).

5.9. The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.9.1. Designate an appropriate military officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations to ensure proper emphasis is given to preparing for stability operations. The Joint Force Coordinating Authority for Stability Operations shall:

5.9.1.1. Identify stability operations requirements.

5.9.1.2. Incorporate stability operations into military training, exercises, and planning, including intelligence campaign plans and intelligence support plans.

5.9.1.3. Engage relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P).

5.9.2. Conduct intelligence campaign planning for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(I). These intelligence campaign plans shall be tested and shall include, at a minimum:

5.9.2.1. Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships, non-military security forces, infrastructure, sanitation and health structure, munitions facilities, border controls, and customs processes.

5.9.2.2. Requirements for the order of battle, open source data, and numbers of personnel with appropriate language and cultural skills and proficiency levels.

5.9.2.3. Means to meet these requirements by specifying particular national and DoD intelligence capabilities.



5.9.3. Submit stability operations ideas and issues to Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), for further exploration as part of the joint experimentation program.



5.9.4. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.9.1. through 5.9.3., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.10. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

5.10.1. Explore new stability operations concepts and capabilities as part of the joint concept development and experimentation program, in coordination with the USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.10.2. Develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams described in paragraph 4.5. including their composition, manning, and sourcing, in coordination with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.

5.10.3. Establish, design, and conduct experiments to identify innovative ideas for stability operations, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.10.4. Support Combatant Commander stability operations training and ensure forces assigned to USJFCOM are trained for stability operations.

5.10.5. Gather and disseminate lessons-learned from stability operations.

5.10.6. Participate in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure stability operations requirements are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate.

5.10.7. Participate in the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation planning process to ensure stability operations requirements are supported by Joint Test and Evaluations (JT&Es) programs. Recommend sponsors for JT&Es as appropriate.

5.10.8. Develop Joint Public Affairs capabilities for stability operations.

5.10.9. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.10.1. through 5.10.8., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.11. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(P), shall each:

5.11.1. Appoint a senior officer to lead stability operations initiatives.

5.11.2. Develop stability operations capabilities.

5.11.3. Ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.11.4. Ensure Foreign Area Officer, Enlisted Regional Specialist, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Engineer, and Psychological Operations programs develop the quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations.

5.11.5. Support stability operations joint concept development, experimentation, and capability development.

5.11.6. Ensure research, development, and acquisition programs address stability operations capabilities and are integrated, in coordination with the USD(AT&L).

5.11.7. Support interagency requests for personnel and assistance to bolster the capabilities of U.S. Departments and Agencies to prepare for and conduct stability operations as appropriate, in coordination with the USD(P).

5.11.8. Ensure Public Affairs programs effectively support stability operations.

5.11.9. Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraphs 5.11.1. through 5.11.8., in coordination with the USD(P).

5.12. The Heads of the DoD Components with responsibilities assigned in this Directive shall provide semiannual reports to the USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the relevant measures of effectiveness identified in this Directive.

6. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The reporting requirements in this Directive have been assigned a Report Control Symbol

DD-POL(SA)2207 according to DoD 8910.1-M (reference (d)).

7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

[signed Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense]

This is some serious history. Inconceivable just a few months ago, reality today.

Remember, all truth goes through three stages: ridicule, opposition, then treated as self-evident.

Getting pretty self-evident, huh?

The new DOD SysAdmin directive

Worth reading.

Not surprisingly, the shops in the Pentagon most responsible for this historic directive are the same ones pulling me and Steve DeAngelis in for talks and collaboration. Enterra's uniquely positioned to do some greater good on this subject, and we're aiming high.

And yes, I've signed quite a few books (both volumes) in these places. But again, less influence than accuracy. Plenty of smart people trying to do the right thing across the dial. Jeb Nadaner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, is a prime example. VERY impressive guy doing God's work for humanity and America. OSD has a very different feel now that Feith and Wolfowitz are gone. Edelman and England are supremely more practical AND far more visionary guys.

You pack in the Wallace's, Mattis's and Petraeus's (each has a small army of admirers and acolytes) in the ground forces, and I'm telling you, stuff is going to get done over the next three years--very big stuff.

So many experts act like only Al Qaeda can respond quickly and adapt. The best stories are not getting told, although I have my ambition for the March piece in Esquire.

So watch as things unfold. I'll do my best to catalogue here, but I set my sights a tad bit lower for the blog in 2006, because I sense the historical opportunity and it's too much to take lightly.

Of course, we aim to influence some, but enable more, through thought leadership and the rule-set automation and modeling capacities that Enterra brings to bear. Our only problem? We are so far out there, this is a sale that takes tons of F2F. It really does get close to rocket science.

But DeAngelis is relentless, working his most prized investors no less or more harder than he does the stranger who sits down next to him at a conference. Guy has only one speed: do it! Tough standard to match but good leadership skill. Fortunately, a very kind soul underneath, so he's fun to be around.

But I'm sucking up, which happens after whirlwind tours with the man . . .

But frankly, that's the real joy of what I'm doing right now: meeting such impressive people regularly and getting the chance to work with them.

Al Qaeda never had a chance.

Oh yes, the directive is found here: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm. You can choose PDF or RTF.

The eagle has landed

Dateline: on the couch in the Shire, Indy, 13 December 2005

Where did I leave me last?

Had a fun night with Jerry and Vonne Mei in the nice Cincy hotel Saturday night. Ordered room service and Jerry was flabbergasted by having food show up at the door.

Sunday on the way home from Cincy my spouse suggested my increasing crabbiness was probably a sinus infection coming on after my cold of last week. So very correct.

Good news was that our new healthcare system has a great immediate care over the weekends. So I take the babe and make the stop and get the Amoxy and I am covered for the trip.

Flight from Indy to Midway during snow storm on Southwest.... Ring any bells. Better outcome for us, but stuck at Midway through most of the Packer-Lions Sunday night game. So very frequent flier: at the airport bar nursing beers and eating chili til they turn me out. Pack not far behind at half. I miss the great win by flying to BWI, arriving at 0030.

My Air National Guard handlers never manage to find me, so I cab it into Baltimore. At the Renaissance, they keep asking me if I'm "Frank Barnett." No reservation for Tom.

It's now 0130. Try the local Marriotts and one a few blocks away has a room, but the Renaissance manager takes pity and give me the huge living room of a gigantic exec suite overlooking the harbor. They wheel in the queen and I'm out at 0200.

Up at 0800 and once clothed, I navigate to find the Air National Guard senior leadership conference registration. I need to get a photo ID. Amazingly, they have several dozen handlers in the reg room, but no one showed up at the airport last night and no one at any hotel has my reservation.

But I take the picture and then I'm shunted by a handler backstage in this enormous ballroom. The kind of set up is one with lots of black curtains hiding a host of backstage gear and geeks.

They were so ready for me but I was pretty wobbly. About 6 antibiotics in and I'm still very foggy, careful not to turn my head so fast.

But the Mac checks out fine and I glance at my watch: 1000 and I'm onstage at 1030. Just enough time to run three blocks to the Hyatt and the Budget location there. I check in and get a key. Now 1020 and I run to the vators to get up to 3. Car isn't there as promised. Now 1023 and I'm back at the desk. Manager now walks me to 2 and we find the car.

Dash out of parking garage and over three blocks to valet parking at Renaissance. Run upstairs to 3rd deck and find that US Air Force Chief of Staff went long on Q&A, so I have until 1045.

So I get geared up with coffee and water. Room must hold well over 1k. Kind of set up you see for big IT company gigs.

At 1050 the MC (a one-star) tries to quell them. Finally at 1055 his intro is over and I step around curtain corner and am on very large stage with my clicker and clip-on. Clip-on works like a dream, but clicker has a weird delay, so I'm wandering a bit on this large stage, blinded by a long bank of lights that makes the wide crowd (about 60 yards spread) seem like an abstraction.

But diving in, it goes well. Responses are strong, laughs come fast, and I get into the groove. I finish the BFA brief at 55 slides in just under 50 minutes.

I handle about 5 questions and then get wonderful eagle statue, made in China (natch).

Quick wave to applauding crowd and I'm behind the stage with handler. Grab bags, hit head, and down to front entrance. Handler gets car and I tip the driver. I have no idea if anyone pays for the parking because I'm gone with pre-printed directions from the valet in my hand.

I have 120 minutes to get to the Pentagon to brief the new Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, a Cheney man by the name of Eric Edelman.

I'm on 295 and cruising. I hit the Pentagon Mall parking garage at 1310 and head into Macy's looking for the head, knowing well where it is found (not my first time at Macy's).

Steve DeAngelis shows up at 1330 and we walk the tunnel over to the PNT. Just in time to start the show at 1400 for about 10 assembled. Various titles. I go 60 and then 30 on Q&A.

Then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Ops (Jed Nadaner) runs us to his office for a cramped conference room full of young staffers. It's one of those classic inside PNT rooms when you end up showing on the long wall with everyone crammed in on the other side of the long table.

I go about 35 and then we go 55 on Q&A. Pretty intense. They know my stuff well and go long on all sorts of deep theory and real-world questions. Frankly, they stump me more than once, but Steve executes several nice saves.

Then off with Nadaner for a good chat in his office. Steve handles more of that. At this point I'm hurting. I had almost passed out a couple of times from dizziness in Baltimore, and by this point I'd been performing for several hours.

Ah, but the fun does not end!

Back to Mandarin Oriental to check in.

Steve wants a beer in the lobby. I have two.

Then a couple of key Enterra financial backers show up. We chat, do dinner, and then I'm pulled, by interest and desire, into a late-night business meeting at the Ritz Carlton at Tysons that runs til way past 2300. Welcome to my world, says Steve.

More beverages (of all kinds) than I wanted over the course of a long day (I wisely alternate between diuretics and hydrating liquids), but as always with Steve, it's an education from the ground up, so worth the time.

We're back at the Mandarin sometime past midnight.

I need to meet Steve at 0630, so it's an hour to prep the clothes and the bags. I order a wakeup and room service coffee.

Down for the count, I'm in reasonable shape when the call comes.

Steve and I head to Crystal City and the Hyatt. We work the joint brief for a while, and then he kicks off the Association for Enterprise Integration (AFEI) conference as MC. I read papers to catch up across the morning while Steve dashes off to another business meeting. He returns just before noon and we do the joint presentation in a swift 45 minutes.

Good feedback, despite both of us being (as usual) too critical of our own performances. But that's what keeps us trying harder.

Steve dashes off to another meeting, promising to return to wrap up MC duties at the end of the conference (yet another amazing exhaustingly day for the big Energizer Bunny that is Steve), but I mercifully bail into my rental, drive to BWI, catch some Japanese, and then fly home on sked on SWA.

Home with the family, I get to coax Vonne Mei into sleeping, get my ass kicked by Jerry on Mario Party 7, watch a few weird anime vids online with Em, and watch Kev navigate a couple of Kong levels.

Tomorrow I start reviewing the Army and Marine interviews (about two dozen in all) to get my head together to write the Esquire piece. It will have to wait until after next week's family vacation.

The head's feeling better.

I got plenty of blog posts done on the flight home. Funny, but I hadn't given a damn about such writing for about a week, and then I felt I had something to say on the flight home today, so again it flows.

Here's the catch-up effort:

■ China's fifth column in Africa? The deuce you say, general!

■ SysAdmin: the videogame

■ Getting reasonably realistic about the long war

■ Iraqiana: keeping it real

■ The revolution has begun in China--from below

■ The revolution has begun in Asia--from above

■ Malaysia: Islam's leading "lead goose"

■ House of Saud prepares for the end of days

■ America's shame is New Core's gain

■ Doha's unlikely alliance

SysAdmin: the videogame

■"Virtual Manuevers: Games Are Gaining Ground, But How Far Can They Go?" by Sandra I. Erwin, National Defense, December 2005, p. 44.

Interesting article about new videogames that work the SysAdmin function on an individual-training level. One's funded by DARPA and it's called "Stability Operations: Winning the Peace." It's modeled loosely on SimCity and Tropico. Players get to role-play commanders and "are exposed to the political, military, economic, social and intelligence levers they can pull in a particular situation, while they learn the consequences of their actions."

Remember when I spoke in Canada last winter at a big defense conference and some Canadian officer said somebody should write a great book or make a great movie about peacekeeping to inspire young people to join their military? Well, I told them then that their best bet was a videogame, if they wanted to attract the right age range.

So much for my staying much ahead of the curve on that one. Just goes to show you how fast the market can provide if properly incentivized.

Gamer expert says the military likes either table-tops or huge live exercises, so there's a gap at this level of training. True, but getting less so. Still, no question that military wants to embrace such technologies. As one Joint Forces command guy put it in the piece, they're just very picky on the details. Fine and good.

Interesting though that videogames lag in the same places where the services' lessons learned lag, as do their own live training: more in the interagency and multinational and non-governmental and inter-governmental cooperation. As the gamer expert put it here: "There is no good technology to train interagency interoperability and interaction."

Based on our performance in the real Iraq, it would seem that the games reflect reality all too well.

China's fifth column in Africa? The deuce you say, general!

■"NATO Chief Worries About China," by Sandra I. Erwin and Harold Kennedy, National Defense, December 2005, p. 10.

Jim Jones, USMC 4-star head of European Command, is a smart guy, but he comes off a bit clueless in this piece (then again, you never know how they quote you, as I have learned time and time again Ö).

Still, this bit points out the strangely lopsided, actually asymmetric way that the Pentagon tends to argue regarding China. I mean, why do military generals think it's their job to talk about China's economic penetration of global markets as if it's something they can do ANYTHING about?

Jones says "It's beyond question that China is the most aggressive country economically in Africa."

Hmm, "aggressive" is an interesting choice of words for a general who's country just invaded the world's second-biggest oil reserve. So China is pushing hard for economic relations with sleazy dictatorships like Saudi Arab--uh, no, that would be the U.S. China has to make do with skimpy Sudan.

Oh well, when you're going to go sleazy, do it big time.

Jones oddly enough digs his own hole by quoting an African diplomat thusly: "We love the United States. You're always telling us what we should do. Now, China is giving us the things that you say we need."

Such as . . . . free scholarships, and lotsa aid and infrastructural investment.

Jones says, "It's something we have to worry about."

Hmmm.

Or maybe we just locate the labor where the problem is, general?

If this is the level of strategic thinking, then we're not even on the game board.

Iraqiana: keeping it real

■"Key Iraqi see loose alliance as future: Shiite leader's vision at odds with others'," by Rick Jervis, USA Today, 12 December 2005, p. 1A.

■"Hollywood's Crude Cliches," op-ed by Richard Cohen, Washington Post, 13 December 2005, p. A27.

■"China and India Jointly Pursue Syrian Oil Assets: Alliance Marks New Tack By Former Energy Rivals; A Threat to Western Firms?" by Shai Oster and John Larkin, Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2005, p. A17.

I said it many times before and I stick with it: we're heading for a loose federation of three mini-states in Iraq. The pretend colonial creation of a state yields, in their near-term, to a tripartite solution. Kurds want it. Shiites want it. Sunnis better get used to it.

The bribe (shared oil revenue) has been offered: take it or leave, Mr. Triangle.

We don't stay to fight terrorists (throw those in as the bargain). No, we stay to enforce an emerging peace between three states that would otherwise go to direct war. This is global policing and peacekeeping at its best. It keeps the Big Bang's effects still alive in the region, providing whatever impetus remains for progress on pluralism (more importantly in the economic realm than the political one).

And it shows that it was never about the oil.

Listen to Richard Cohen's brilliant riff on the George Clooney paranoid thriller "Syriana" (reminding us all what a stunning brilliant columnist he often is):

A movie does not have to stick to the facts.

Still, if it is going to say anything, then it ought to say something smart and timely. But, the cynicism of "Syriana" is out of time and place, a homage to John le Carre, who himself is dated. To read George Packer's "The Assassin's Gate" is to be reminded that the Iraq war is not the product of oil avarice, or CIA evil, but of a surfeit of altruism, a naÔve compulsion to do good. That entire collection of neo- and retro-conservatives--George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and particularly Paul Wolfowitz--made war not for oil or for empire but to end the horror of Saddam Hussein and, yes, reorder the Middle East.

They were inept. They were duplicitous. They were awesomely incompetent, and, in the case of Bush, they were monumentally ignorant and incurious, but they did not give a damn for oil or empire. This is why so many liberals, myself included, originally supported the war. It engaged us emotionally. It seemed Ö well, right--a just cause.

It would be nice if Hollywood understood that. It would be nice if those who agree with Hollywood--who think, as [director and screenwriter] Gaghan does, that this is a brave, speaking-truth-to-power movie when it's really just an outdated clichÈ--could release their fervid grip on old-left bromides about Big Oil, Big Business, Big Government and the inherent evil of George Bush, and come up with something new and relevant. I say that become something new and relevant is desperately needed. Neoconservatism crashed and burned in Iraq, but liberalism never even showed up. The left's criticism of the war from the very start was too often a porridge of inanities about oil or empire or Halliburton--or isolationism by another name. It was childish and ultimately ineffective. The war came and Bush was re-elected. How's that for a clean whiff?

Meanwhile, who's pursuing Syriana's oil nakedly?

Why China and India, of course, in collusion no less, as they begin to realize their growing collective buyer's clout in the marketplace.

That's how pathetically off-target George Clooney's movie is.

Of course, I will see it anyway, cause I really like George Clooney and because I enjoy a good yarn.