We need to head toward Israeli screening

ARTICLE: The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother, By Cathal Kelly, (Toronto) Star, Dec 30 2009

NeoTrad Librarian sends this link in and writes:

We have theater and the illusion of security, the Israelis can't afford theater and have actual security. Also BTW, who is the head of the TSA? No one, Sen. De Mint has blocked the nominee over whether unions will be allowed.

Tom says:

Israel's way of pursuing airport security has long been the gold standard--in more ways than one.

Inevitably, we head more toward it without ever quite achieving it, primarily because of the cost and the impossibility of replicating that mini-verse rule set on a global basis.

Pot, kettle

POST: Obama and Bush partisans now argue about terrorist attack, by David Jackson, The Oval, Dec 31, 2009

This part, you have to admit, is pretty funny: the guys who allowed the biggest terror attack on US soil bitching at Obama for a near miss.

Have you no memory, sir?

Comment upgrade: even deeper on China in Afghanistan

In response to Deep dive on China's Afghan copper FDI, Brian B wrote:

Thomas, I've read your book "Great Powers" and what Im about to say is not advancing the policy for a need for another great enemy (China). That being said, as much as it disturbs me to see China free ride off of an unsuspecting US - I say unsuspecting because Im not sure that US mil-pol opperations in the Gap had an intended consequence to allow China to move in - and implement a "SimCity" policy in the Gap, Chinese actions might have an unintended consequence on their long term military policy. The greater the Chinese presence in the Gap, the more they begin to owne the problems of the region. This might force the Chinese military hand, or COIN strategy. If the Chinese fail in their attempts to control the regions they are invested in with a weak military response, what can the world expect to happen? To ensure the progress of glabalization, does the US step in and assist or should the US sit and see what develops internally in China due to ineffective military response? I can probably answer my own question due the amount of message control the CCP has, but nevertheless, ineffective military campaigns can delegitimize governments. So, is it really in the US's best interest to allow China to free ride and also, if and when the US pulls out of the region, is it in the best interest of the US to support Chinese security measures in the Gap? If so, how does this help advance the level of economic liberalization needed in China to perpetuate the economics of globalization?

Tom replied (in two comments):

That is the crux of conundrum: we can't make the Gap stable merely by virtue of our pol-mil efforts (our economic ties are frankly weak), so we need the dovetailing of the Chinese network-economic integration. Left to their own devices, they will do that badly--and they know it and fear it. But they also don't feel the confidence to try things abroad that would elicit the "wrong" thinking back home.

What is the solution?

A Chinese leadership that recognizes the compelling reasons to clean up their act abroad while taking in hand the consequences of more political liberalization at home. And that's one generation of leadership (the 6th) away, meaning we navigate a tough decade ahead (unless the upcoming 5th Gen surprises in a good way).

Ideally, we'd hold the fort, so to speak, in the Gap for the next decade, but as the financial crisis revealed, we're pretty much tapped, as is our traditional slate of allies.

That means the key thing of this decade is working on a reorientation of our alliances from the tired, aging West to the restive, rising East, because therein we find the natural partners for frontier integration and further expansion of globalization--even if their top leaders don't yet realize or are too scared to confront this emerging reality.

That is a tricky course for us: demonstrating our continuing utility as an ally yet likewise signaling the limits of our strength--a very FDR-like balancing act with a much poorer hand than FDR had but with a magnificently more benign international environment (only peon threats, really, and no one coming close to our military power and the willingness/experience to use).

So there's good and bad, a tricky decade ahead, and a premium placed on careful, calculated, visionary US leadership. I see Obama being good on the careful and calculated, but I don't yet see any real vision--except the brain dead "get-rid-of-nukes," "smart" sanctions (oh my, replacing the dumb ones, yes), "smart" power (ditto rhetorical nonsense) and so on.

Also, to answer your last question: Anything we do to secure globalization's advance helps China to liberalize by keeping them on track toward more integration globally and regionally, more income growth, and more effort devoted to uplifting the still 700m or so rural/outskirts/interior poor. We forget that huge burden all the time, seeing only the booming coast (almost no one visits the interior, but it is a very different place), and we underestimate intense Chinese fears of the country coming apart being haves and have nots (not a global threat, but definitely a state-based one in key pillars--i.e., the BRICs).

Deep dive on China's Afghan copper FDI

ARTICLE: China Willing to Spend Big on Afghan Commerce, By MICHAEL WINES, New York Times, December 29, 2009

Latest story on the Chinese FDI in copper in Afghanistan (favorite subject here on the blog).

The basic contrast is incisive enough, suggesting the limited liability partnership (silent) that I've long described as existing between us and China across the Gap:

While the United States spends hundreds of billions of dollars fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda here, China is securing raw material for its voracious economy. The world's superpower is focused on security. Its fastest rising competitor concentrates on commerce.

Now, you can feel ripped off, or you can rethink the incentive structure you've unwittingly walked into.

Or you can engage in the predictable catty bitching:

S. Frederick Starr, the chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, an independent research organization in Washington, said that skeptics might wonder whether Washington and NATO had conducted "an unacknowledged preparatory phase for the Chinese economic penetration of Afghanistan."

"We do the heavy lifting," he said. "And they pick the fruit."

Wah! Wah! Grow up and realize there's a world beyond "geo-politics."

The pattern has been around for a while, a secret to no one, even as our MSM now just seems to be picking up the theme:

An Odd Global Pairing

Afghanistan is not the only place where the United States and China find themselves so oddly juxtaposed in the post-9/11 world. China is investing more in extracting Iraqi oil than American companies are. It has reached long-term arrangements to buy gas from Iran, even as the government there comes under the threat of Western sanctions for its nuclear program. China has also become a dominant investor in Pakistan and volatile parts of Africa.

It's only odd when you don't realize the frontier-integration period we're in as a result of globalization's significant and continuing expansion. We have the tendency to think nothing happens before the pol-mil situation is perfected, when it's the econ-network dynamics that drive the connectivity, resulting in new security challenges and a paucity of rules (the politics).

Impossible! We say. This amounts to nation-building that ignores the politics!:

China Metallurgical Group, often called M.C.C., will build a 400-megawatt generating plant to power both the copper mine and blackout-prone Kabul. M.C.C. will dig a new coal mine to feed the plant's generators. It will build a smelter to refine copper ore, and a railroad to carry coal to the power plant and copper back to China. If the terms of its contract are to be believed, M.C.C. will also build schools, roads, even mosques for the Afghans.

The sweeping agreement has some experts rubbing their eyes in disbelief. "It's almost as if the Chinese promised too much," said one international expert who, like some others interviewed, refused to be identified for fear of alienating the Afghans or the Chinese.

But even if elements of the agreement fall through, the Chinese have already positioned themselves as generous, eager partners of the Afghan government and long-term players in the country's future. All without firing a shot.

Imagine that! Promising too much in nation-building. Thank God we never do that.

But here's your COIN 101, staring you in the face:

Nurzaman Stanikzai was a mujahedeen in the 1980s, using American-supplied arms to help drive the Red Army from his homeland. Today he is a contractor for M.C.C., building the Aynak mine's electric fence, blast wall, workers' dormitories and a
road to Kabul.

"The Chinese are much wiser. When we went to talk to the local people, they wore civilian clothing, and they were very friendly," he said recently during a long chat in his Kabul apartment. "The Americans -- not as good. When they come there, they have their uniforms, their rifles and such, and they are not as friendly."

So Mattis is still right: it's jobs! Jobs! Jobs!

Now for the serious self-awareness:

American troops do not, in a narrow sense, protect the Chinese. The United States Army stations about 2,000 troops in Logar Province, where Aynak is located. But an Army spokesman said they generally patrolled well south of the mine area and had not provided direct security for Chinese investors or mine workers.

The Afghan National Police, which does protect the mine, was largely built and trained with American money. The 1,500 guards the police have posted in and around Aynak are special recruits not drawn from the main force, according to Maj. Gen. Sayed Kamal, who heads the National Police.

But the conclusion is inescapable: American troops have helped make Afghanistan safe for Chinese investment.

I try not to say "duh!" But what did you think would happen? An onrush of American investors, given our position in the global economy? Or does it make eminent sense for a rising China to show up?

Again, you can be stunned by this realization, or you can start re-thinking your alliances, my theme for the entire "Noughties."

So who cares about how it gets done, when the real point is getting the development on track:

Had an American company won Aynak, some Afghans noted wryly, critics inevitably would have accused the United States of waging war to seize the country's mineral wealth. Moreover, if China succeeds in developing Aynak and generating revenue for the Kabul government, that helps achieve an American goal.

"To the extent that the Chinese bring Afghanistan up to speed and start paying a billion dollars a year in royalties," a Western government official who has followed the Aynak project said, "that would mean that Afghanistan is on a firmer ground to start paying for its own security."

Again, the natural complimentarity of interests stares us in the face:

The United States views Southwest Asia mostly as a security threat. China sees it as an opportunity.

So why be surprised the Chinese continue to free ride when we're so intent on leading the pol-mil show? Why should they pay for anything they're going to have to live with anyway, with no input from them?

Meanwhile, the practicality of the Chinese is putting our economic nation-building projects to shame:

With government money and backing behind them, China's state-run giants take risks in places that even the largest private behemoths will not tolerate, and they can add sweeteners -- from railroads to mosques -- that ordinary mining firms are ill equipped to provide.

"The Chinese have sort of raised the bar. They've taken it beyond the scope of just an extractive operation," the Western official said. "The Chinese are willing to step up and take a long-term strategic approach. If it takes 5 or 10 years, at least they have a beachhead."

Are the Chinese overreaching? Let's just say that, with connectivity comes learning, and the curve is getting steep for the Chinese as well.

But the opportunity is clearly there for the U.S. to positively influence the evolution, because it's not all hunky-dory with the Chinese firms, whose opacity hides much that is arguably quite negative:

The wild card, of course, is that no outsiders can know how much of China's Aynak venture is in fact brilliant strategy, and how much is merely a potentially ruinous business deal by an overzealous corporation. Beijing's corporate strategy is as opaque as it is overwhelming.

China Metallurgical, a Fortune Global 500 company that has so many subsidiaries that they are mostly identified by numbers, is a signal example. The corporation reports to the top level of the Chinese government. Big foreign investments like the one at Aynak require blessing at an equally high level. M.C.C. has huge and productive investments around the world.

Yet hardly all those ventures are successes. An M.C.C. copper mine in Pakistan is widely said to have serious environmental problems. A Pakistan lead mine has been dogged by conflict, including a suicide bombing that killed 29; residents accuse the company's Chinese work force of stealing local jobs. In Papua New Guinea, 14 Chinese workers at an M.C.C. nickel mine were injured in May in a pitched battle with local people who rioted over what they called intolerable working conditions.

That bid in 2006 for the iron mine in Gabon? Four years after C.M.E.C. struck its deal, the bargain appears to be unwinding over hints of corruption and global objections to a dam that would destroy Kongou Falls, one of central Africa's most treasured waterfalls.

I have these talks with Chinese extractive companies. Get down the chain a bit and reach the "younger" guys, meaning mid-level and my age, and you quickly encounter the realization that Chinese companies are not playing this as smartly as they should or can or must. But up on top? It's just the bulldozer approach, with bribery and over-promising a common tool. The younger guys know they'll be stuck with the resulting reality, and so are highly interested in discussing more clever approaches, but the resistance up top--for now--remains overwhelming.

It's much the same story on our side in the pol-mil establishment: get down low enough and you'll find the officers and officials who realize full well we should be upping our cooperation with the Chinese across the board. But above them sit those who want it all: the US runs all COIN with minimal input by outsiders (meaning anyone not in our command chain) and the US retains the option of planning for and buying for big-war scenarios that involve the same nations we need to shift toward in terms of broadening our global COIN ops.

A bitch, I know. But the sad truth is that there is always a generational change aspect to this. Took a long time to get the institutions to move toward COIN/small wars/what I call SysAdmin. Internationalizing that comes slowly enough because it will take a far longer time to reorient our alliances from sole reliance on the traditional West (NATO) to unconventional cooperation with the rising East. But until that evolution unfolds, expect to read a lot more articles like this.

As an editorial note: awesome article full of great writing and reporting.

(Thanks: Jarrod Myrick and Jack Ryan)

The Map's logic still holds (and applies to Yemen)

EDITORIAL: How to fight al-Qaeda's offshoot in Yemen, Washington Post, December 30, 2009

Very sensible bit of analysis from WAPO's editorial board, referencing my recent post about splitting the difference on the Xmas attack (between hyping too much and discounting too much).

Also some nice ground truth details.

But the larger "Map" logic still holds: invariably, events drag us into nearly every failed state in one form or another. Imperial conspiracy to some, geographic reality of globalization's limits to others.

Stunningly excellent piece of analysis on Iran sanctions

ARTICLE: Against the Green, By Nader Mousavizadeh, The New Republic, December 23, 2009

ARTICLE: As standoff with Iran continues, U.S. prepares targeted sanctions, By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, December 30, 2009

I quote the end at length:

The fracturing of the Islamic Republic's traditional elite, and the persistence and power of Iran's democratic awakening six months later, make clear that a regime change is under way in Iran--one that is indigenous, sustainable, democratic in spirit, and peaceful in its means. It is the most promising development in the broader Middle East in the past quarter-century. Rather than being viewed as a sideshow, the uprising should be at the core of every policy decision regarding Iran. Western leaders should ask themselves just one question whenever faced with a new set of measures toward Iran: Will they help or hurt the Green Movement?

For all the concern about a fitful and still highly vulnerable nuclear program, a far greater prize is now in sight: a freer society and an accountable government under the rule of law. An opportunity now exists to encourage the evolution of a democratic Iran--through careful, calibrated, and principled policies that refuse to be baited by the crude and bellicose behavior of a usurper president. The premise of Obama's initial engagement approach seemed to reflect an understanding of this extraordinary potential. The question now is whether the shift to a policy of pressure, threats, and further isolation will trade the promise of transformative change for the illusion of a security arrangement with a regime built on an edifice of enmity with the West.

The past six months have made three things quite clear: The regime is unlikely to compromise meaningfully on the nuclear issue, at least not within an acceptable timeframe; it is not going to relax its repression of the domestic opposition; and it is not going to temper its hostile rhetoric toward Israel. Seen through this prism of an implacable regime confronting an unprecedented movement for Iranian modernity and moderation, defaulting to an unimaginative policy singularly focused on non-proliferation may turn out to be a historic mistake. One need not be uniquely expert on Chinese or Russian foreign policy to appreciate that the Western desperation for their support in the councils of global opinion is a veritable Christmas tree of strategic bargaining, with ever higher costs to be extracted from Washington. One does not have to spend long studying the new landscape of global options available to rogue states such as Iran in forging alliances of convenience with rising powers such as Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia to understand that effective isolation in the 21st century is illusory.

In the coming weeks and months, a new Iran may be won or lost. Before being led down a fateful, and strategically barren, path of sanctions and threats focused exclusively on the nuclear program, Obama might wish to consider the question of Iran worthy of a high-level strategic review of its own. He might ask his advisors if a predictable set of tortured Security Council negotiations in February will achieve anything but a further divided international community and an accelerated nuclear program in Tehran. He could probe the possibility of providing Israel with additional security guarantees robust enough to dissuade it from a calamitous strike on Iran. He can press his intelligence agencies to develop further ways to disable and delay the nuclear program through even more creative covert operations. He should ask for a set of credible containment options built around a box of red lines within which the process of democratic reform would have time and space to take irreversible hold. And he might ask himself whom he'd rather greet at the White House in the first visit of an Iranian president since the Islamic revolution: a standard bearer of the Green Movement of 2009 or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Been struggling myself to express just this, but this guy nails it on the head and with great eloquence. I totally covet the piece. It is as clearheadedly strategic as it comes. Contrast it to the woefully myopic bit from Kuperman on how the ONLY option left is bombing Iran.

Just amazingly sensible throughout. Print and put it next to your computer as you continue to read all the idiotic shit "experts" put out on Iran regularly.

This guy can write!

The Somalia scenario awaits its 9/11-like tie-in

U.S. NEWS: "Charges Link U.S. Recruits to Somalia," by Evan Perez, Wall Street Journal, 24 November 2009.

Eight men facing federal charges of financing U.S. immigrants from Somalia to join Al Shabab, the Islamist insurgency there.

Of course, one must assume, if there's financing from a one-way flow from the U.S. to Somalia, then maybe operatives can be financed for direct action here.

So, it's "inconceivable" that we'd ever get deeply involved in Somalia again.

Until something happens over here that really pisses us off.

The Economist weighs in on Obama's re-balancing act

LEADERS: "The quiet American: Is Barack Obama's diplomacy subtle and strategic, or weak and naïve? The world is about to find out," The Economist, 28 November 2009.

We are told that the Obama-is-weak camp is growing and the Obama-is-clever camp is weakening.

The usual bit about Obama is kinder to our rivals and enemies than to our friends.

Funny how we're supposed to clean up our act after Bush-Cheney and stop acting like paranoid babies all the time, but we're still supposed to stroke our useless friends non-stop as part of our rehabilitation.

How about the West stop being such pussies night and day and join the rebalancing effort with less whining?

We are the sole superpower who can't locate a decent counterparty on any big issue. China hides as much as possible. India does a bit better, but often remains unrealistically prickly. The Europeans, as usual, can be counted upon for this one-sixth effort while demanding one-for-one leadership rights. Russia's back to bellybutton staring. Only Brazil and Turkey show any strategic vision and chutzpah, which immediately raises our suspicions.

It is truly a sad cast of characters. We are adjusting to reality. We simply find no takers--or we discount those who actually try (Brasilia, Ankara).

There are no partners in this world--just pretenders.

At least the mag gets this right:

[Obama] is right that American power is circumscribed. But the European Union is not fit to help him police the world. China, India and Russia are not willing . . . That leaves Mr Obama with a burden to shoulder on his own.

Thanks a million for the pep talk. Now go back to talking amongst yourselves.

O'Grady on Bolivia

OPINION: "The End of Bolivian Democracy," by Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Wall Street Journal, 23 November 2009.

An accurate depiction:

A dictatorship that fosters the production and distribution of cocaine is not apt to enjoy a positive international image. But when that same government cloaks itself in the language of social justice, with a special emphasis on the enfranchisement of indigenous people, it wins world-wide acclaim.

This is Bolivia, which in two weeks will hold elections for president and both houses of congress. The government of President Evo Morales will spin the event as a great moment in South American democracy. In fact, it will mark the official end of what's left of Bolivian liberty after four years of Morales rule.

The rest of the column is the best short history of the Morales phenom I've yet seen in print.

The gist: in 2003 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada elected president and proposes a big LNG deal with Chile. The rad left says he's giving away the national treasure and launches strikes and protests. This coincides with coca growers' movement led by Morales, which joins in. President threatens mil crackdown and gets State Dept on his back (sound familiar?), promising to cut all aid. Lozada resigns under pressure and Morales wins in special election. Once in, Morales starts going after previous officials and makes sweeping changes to legislature and judiciary. Any opposition met the sharp end of a stick wielded by street gangs (very Chavez and very fascist, if you know your German history, but fascism was a big draw in South America in that time frame--to FDR's great worry). Morales' party tries to rewrite constitution but fails on seat-packing of legislature needed to pull it off. Then Morales calls special assembly to military garrison, locks out opposition with military, and makes some new rules happen, later using mobs to scare the Senate into ratifying them (they surrounded the parliament building and threatened violence). The new rules create a special class of citizen (pure Indian blood) and give them special seats in the legislature. With this next election, Morales is expected to push even harder for the new constitution, which should make him invulnerable--according to the classic Chavez script.

The end:

Mr. Morales is South America's latest dictator, but he is not the ideological communist that many fear. He's more akin to a mob boss, having risen to power by promising to protect the cocoa business. Now he has the capacity to do it.

Under his rule, coca cultivation is legal and he collects a licensing fee from all farmers, whose harvests are sole through a centralized market. MAS [Morales' party] official also regular cocaine production and trafficking which now reaches down to the household level.

The booming business has made Mr. Morales popular. He may hate the U.S. and freedom but one thing is for sure: He understands markets.

The longer we hold off on decriminalizing (where O'Grady and I would surely part ways), the more we'll see populist governments (so called) in South American reformulate themselves as de facto narco-states to take advantage of the illegal premium. Decriminalize cocaine and Morales has bupkes, but until then, we are creating our own monsters in the region.

Tom's most read columns on WPR

WPR reports that they were (for 2009):

+ Clinton's Blueprint for a Multi-Partner World

+ Why America's War on Drugs Will Wane

Let's not center our lives on terrorists

POST: Bruce Schneier on TSA Absurdity and the Need for Resilience, By Jeffrey Goldberg, 29 Dec 2009

Nice explanation of the sort of common sense we need to apply to the problem.

Townsend, Bush's homeland security adviser, was on CNN yesterday saying that we should figure out terrorists' plans beforehand and then put the special security procedures in place versus applying them retroactively. Wow, that sure would be nice, and after another big bong hit I might think it was actually possible. But do I want to make anti-terrorism the central fact of my existence? Does it make sense to offer these peon enemies the gift of symmetry?

Or do we simply continue pushing behind the one big force that will make them all irrelevant in the end--aka, globalization? Fortress America or f--k-em-up with social revolution through connectivity? Which sounds like a better future where we make more money?

(Thanks: Patrick O'Connor)

Wanna-be suicide bomber loser

ARTICLE: Flight 253 terror suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab bemoaned his 'loneliness' in online postings, BY Michael Saul, New York Daily News, December 29th 2009

Classic tale of the lonely loser.

Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula naturally takes credit, looking to bolster its international rep as the terror center du jour.

We get as jacked as we want.

But as hills-of-beans go, Yemen would be more palatable as a Saudi crackdown.

Bernanke was critical

ARTICLE: Person of the Year 2009: Ben Bernanke, Time, Dec. 16, 2009

Reasonable choice, as this was the big event--and big danger--of the year. And this guy was #1 on the hot seat.

Pakistan: plenty of half-full glasses

BRIEFING: "Pakistan's crises: Front line against the Taliban; Fighting this hydra-headed enemy is only the most obvious of the many deep problems afflicting Pakistan," The Economist, 28 November 2009.

Nice overview of the recent military efforts in the FATA.

Upside: General Ashfaq Kayani seems intent on crushing the Pakistani Taliban.

Downside: he evinces no such commitment regarding the Afghani Taliban hiding on his side of the make-believe border.

Not much new in that.

Now, the bad news:

Underpinning the army's reluctance to go after the Afghan Taliban, whose leaders are said to reside in Pakistan's city of Quetta, has been its belief that America and NATO will fail in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's military is okay with this outcome, because American failure in Afghanistan is seen as a zero-sum outcome for Pakistani influence, meaning--most importantly--a decline of Indian influence.

Pakistan's free media is preaching an anti-Americanism just as virulent as that officially espoused in neighboring Iran . . . In Peshewar's stricken bazaars, many blamed the recent blasts on foreign spies--American, Russian, Indian or Israeli.

And you wonder why I've long stated my preference for making India happy in whatever we do inside Afghanistan. I mean, what have we got to lose? Assuming you don't buy into the notion that anybody with a nuke gets whatever they want.

Time to get more mature on the subject.

Ahmadinejad's trip proves nothing, except that Brazil doesn't take orders well

THE AMERICAS: "Iran and Latin America: Ayatollahs in the backyard; President Ahmadinejad's visit to Brazil this week vindicates Iran's strategy of cosying up with Latin America," The Economist, 28 November 2009.

WORLD NEWS: "Brazil's Leader Encourages Nations to Engage Iran: Ahmadinejad's South America Tour Starts With Endorsement by da Silva and Demonstrations Over Human Rights," by Paulo Prada, Wall Street Journal, 24 November 2009.

Lula's a hugger, in more ways than one, and so he welcomes Ahmadinejad and chides the world to pursue connectivity over isolation when it comes to his regime.

Ah, but we are told by experts that Ahmadinejad is most distinctly rattling our chains in our neighborhood. Naturally, this should strike fear in our hearts!

But Iran's success so far is only with weird little countries (Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba) and not with the mainstays--to include Brazil, despite this show.

But yes, Lula and Brazil are eager to be seen as an important diplomatic player, and frankly, given a lot of clever things they've done over the years, they should be considered as such.

Does that mean they must necessarily back off on our command? Hardly. Such reticence does nothing for them and--quite frankly--virtually nothing for us in our stubbornness and mania over nukes! Nukes! NUKES!

Plus, the more Ahmadinejad travels, the dumber he looks and the more protests he encounters. Bring on the jackass!

Bashar continues to surprise

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: "Syria: Has it won? Under its surprisingly durable leader, Syria has stubbornly nudged its way back into the heart of regional diplomacy. It can no longer be ignored," The Economist, 28 November 2009.

I had real hopes for Bashar Assad when he appeared--you know, the usual fantasies about the Western-educated, "scientific" son. That was nine years ago.

Then he disappeared into the Byzantine labyrinth that is Syrian politics (with the whole Hariri assassination mucking things up mightily--on purpose, one assumes), and you realized that he had lotsa ducks to get in order before he'd be able to make any moves of note.

Well, that time seems fast approaching.

First, Syria's GDP, foreign trade and private-sector loans have all doubled in the past four years:

For decades Damascus looked as dour as Bucharest under communist rule. Now it pulses with life. New cars throng its streets. Fancy boutique hotels, bars and fully booked restaurants pack its rapidly gentrifying older quarters, while middle-class suburbs, replete with shopping malls and fast-food outlets, spread into the surrounding hills.

And yeah, I do see this as a positive outgrowth of Bush-Cheney's big bang on Iraq--most definitely, to include Turkey's recent connecting ambition throughout the region (their strategic paranoia put to great use).

Trade with Iraq is "surging" (nice term) and the EU stepped up last month to sign a long-delayed association agreement. Nice.

The key figure under Bashar regarding all this liberalization? Deputy prime minister Abdullah Dardari.

Of course, the piece ends with the usual stuff about how all the easy reforms have been pursued and now we get to the hard stuff. Fine and dandy. Best conversation about Syria in a very long time.

Has Syria given in on any pressure regarding its foreign policy? Not really, despite our attempts and Israel's.

But the external connectivity as the primary driver in the economic resurgence is indisputable. Bush-Cheney put Assad on the list, and his clever response was to seek expanded economic connectivity so as to win over his population and as many external sponsors as possible.

And it worked.

Tom around the web

+ Anthony Clark Arend embedded the TED video
+ So did Wally Carter.
+ So did Libertas and Latte.
+ TechH2o.com.
+ dsawyer linked it.
+ Webster Tarpley Blog embedded the NDU PNM video.

+ zenpundit linked Neocons are Alive and Kicking.
+ And linked This is where China joins the solution set on Afghanistan.
+ HG's WORLD linked Imagine that: home-grown mass murders in America! and A familiar flight and--thankfully--a familiar ending.
+ Leigh Drogen linked Soft border solution for AfPak.
+ And linked We're living with our choices around Iran.
+ Nick Ottens analyzed Neocons are Alive and Kicking.

+ PoliticalSeason tweeted Pressure Kim and make him China's problem.
+ TI 702 Geography and Geographing is reading the PNM article.
+ Greg R. Lawson linked Don't follow Palin on climate change.
+ Larry Dunbar linked Reminder: we're not there for the oil.
+ WhatEverDude quoted 'The Matrix meets Ferngully'.
+ Quality Leadership Weblog reprinted 'You say protocols, I say rule sets'.
+ KatPol Blog re-linked their interview with Tom.
+ Morgan says 'Gates Proposes $2 Billion in Funds to Aid Unstable Countries' sounds like what Tom has been proposing.

It's like they wish things were worse

ARTICLE: The Great Pipeline Opera, BY DANIEL FREIFELD, Foreign Policy, SEPT. / OCT. 2009

This article, which is good, is a perfect example of the semantic inflation regarding the word "war." We are told that "some call it a war"--this political fight within Europe over whether it should rely on Russia for energy or not. What are the instruments of this "war"? Mostly cushy consulting jobs for former European political leaders. But it is most certainly a "war" nonetheless!

It is with this sort of semantic inflation that we are convinced--day-in and day-out by "security experts" that the world is most definitely a more dangerous place--perhaps constituting the most dangerous time in human history!

It is just silly. What if we were told "some call it an orgy"? Would we freak out over the implied sexuality? Calling it the most "sexed up period in human history"?

This is nothing more than the goofy battle of headlines. "Look! See this dangerous thing I've uncovered!"

There are no military build-ups. There is no real chance for conflict. There are no casualties. This is politics, macho-ed up for public consumption by "security experts" determined to signal their professional worth.

Insecurity experts would be a more apt title.

Here's the thing to remember about this "war": as non-associated gas (meaning gas not found in conjunction with oil) is increasingly found around the world and new, non-traditional means of accessing gas are developed (check out all the media stories on the Marcellus Shale Gas in the U.S. dramatically improving our long-term supply prospects), the notion of an "OPEC of gas" running our planet is almost already overtaken by events.

As usual, the experts stoke up our fears just prior to the point of great, real-world deflation.

So yes, plenty of stories of kickbacks and theft to wade through, and yes, Russian calculations of pipelines will enter into some of their truly nasty efforts (like Georgia, an actual "war"(!!) that raged on for days and killed hundreds of people . . . well, ALMOST a thousand people were killed!), but no, there will not be a future chock full of resource wars. Gas is plentiful. It's everywhere. It's subject to all sorts of extraction methods. But it's not subject to oligopolistic control with Putin in charge of everything.

I know, it sucks when things work out.

(Thanks: Michael Griffin)

Yemen is next

BRIEF: Al-Qaida in Yemen: Target Airports/Airplanes With Small Explosives, NEFA, October 29, 2009

On almost any case, as usual, you're going to find tracing-back evidence that says, "This loose network of inspiration/cooperation/coordination goes back to some deep Gap state."

With 9/11, that was clearly Afghanistan. Going forward, the inspirational center shifted to NW Pakistan, but operationally, a certain amount of organizational capacity shifted back toward the Gulf, nearer the truly desired target of Saudi Arabia. Yemen, right next door and a longtime near/actual failing state, is not a surprising pick. Al Qaeda has roots there that go back quite a bit. Under the right conditions, we could be having a similar conversation about Somalia, but it's telling that when the U.S. forces aided Ethiopian forces going into Somalia in January 2007 (what I wrote about in "The Americans Have Landed") to drive out the AQ elements and foreign fighters, virtually all who escaped sought refuge in Yemen, where AQAP (Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula) continues to evolve.

Given the already aggressive bombing campaign pursued by the Saudis a while back (along the border, as I remember, but please correct me if I underestimate), a reasonable scenario to expect might be the US pushing/aiding the Saudis in some sort of crackdown effort there. How likely is that? No idea, since the Saudis do as they please. This particular event probably isn't enough to create the impetus for a significant intervention, but it will likely lead to a bigger effort by US special forces in that area, in conjunction with the Saudis.

Point of the post? Under the right scenario, Yemen is next. Again, not a surprise as many experts have been talking this possibility up for a while, along with Somalia.

My particular point? AQ can almost always, if they really try, trigger some sort of US military response against the sponsoring-location-of-note. Pull the right future attack, or just keep up the appropriate drum beat of small attacks, and this conversation will expand.

(Thanks: MICHAEL S. SMITH II)

Wish the Colts would have played to win

ARTICLE: On football: Shame on the Colts for tossing away perfect record, By Bob Kravitz, USAToday, December 28, 2009

I agree totally with this analysis. I watched the game and was very excited to see the Colts leading deep into the 3rd, with the Jets doing nothing to suggest a comeback other than the luck of a KO return.

I got very mad when the coach pulled Peyton. I think it was a deliberate attempt to throw the game and do it in an obvious, we-don't-care fashion. I thought it was disrespectful to the game, and patently dishonest to the players.

Benching Peyton for one quarter, when he faced no hits, was totally meaningless in terms of playoff preparation.

This was all about the coach believing the team was better off without the pressure of perfection, but now he's created, as one ESPN analyst (Trent Dilfer, who's good) put it, a big pause in the team's sense of history and inevitability and invincibility, and that can be crucial in a sport as emotional and momentum-driven as football. You just don't mess with mojo, and you don't take off two weeks and then skip a week of playing and suddenly place the first serious game in a month and not risk a collapse, which happens all the time to college teams in the big layoff before bowl games.

So I thoroughly disagreed with the decision, and I sure as hell hope it doesn't come back to haunt them in the divisionals.