Thomas, I've read your book "Great Powers" and what Im about to say is not advancing the policy for a need for another great enemy (China). That being said, as much as it disturbs me to see China free ride off of an unsuspecting US - I say unsuspecting because Im not sure that US mil-pol opperations in the Gap had an intended consequence to allow China to move in - and implement a "SimCity" policy in the Gap, Chinese actions might have an unintended consequence on their long term military policy. The greater the Chinese presence in the Gap, the more they begin to owne the problems of the region. This might force the Chinese military hand, or COIN strategy. If the Chinese fail in their attempts to control the regions they are invested in with a weak military response, what can the world expect to happen? To ensure the progress of glabalization, does the US step in and assist or should the US sit and see what develops internally in China due to ineffective military response? I can probably answer my own question due the amount of message control the CCP has, but nevertheless, ineffective military campaigns can delegitimize governments. So, is it really in the US's best interest to allow China to free ride and also, if and when the US pulls out of the region, is it in the best interest of the US to support Chinese security measures in the Gap? If so, how does this help advance the level of economic liberalization needed in China to perpetuate the economics of globalization?

That is the crux of conundrum: we can't make the Gap stable merely by virtue of our pol-mil efforts (our economic ties are frankly weak), so we need the dovetailing of the Chinese network-economic integration. Left to their own devices, they will do that badly--and they know it and fear it. But they also don't feel the confidence to try things abroad that would elicit the "wrong" thinking back home. What is the solution? A Chinese leadership that recognizes the compelling reasons to clean up their act abroad while taking in hand the consequences of more political liberalization at home. And that's one generation of leadership (the 6th) away, meaning we navigate a tough decade ahead (unless the upcoming 5th Gen surprises in a good way). Ideally, we'd hold the fort, so to speak, in the Gap for the next decade, but as the financial crisis revealed, we're pretty much tapped, as is our traditional slate of allies. That means the key thing of this decade is working on a reorientation of our alliances from the tired, aging West to the restive, rising East, because therein we find the natural partners for frontier integration and further expansion of globalization--even if their top leaders don't yet realize or are too scared to confront this emerging reality. That is a tricky course for us: demonstrating our continuing utility as an ally yet likewise signaling the limits of our strength--a very FDR-like balancing act with a much poorer hand than FDR had but with a magnificently more benign international environment (only peon threats, really, and no one coming close to our military power and the willingness/experience to use). So there's good and bad, a tricky decade ahead, and a premium placed on careful, calculated, visionary US leadership. I see Obama being good on the careful and calculated, but I don't yet see any real vision--except the brain dead "get-rid-of-nukes," "smart" sanctions (oh my, replacing the dumb ones, yes), "smart" power (ditto rhetorical nonsense) and so on. Also, to answer your last question: Anything we do to secure globalization's advance helps China to liberalize by keeping them on track toward more integration globally and regionally, more income growth, and more effort devoted to uplifting the still 700m or so rural/outskirts/interior poor. We forget that huge burden all the time, seeing only the booming coast (almost no one visits the interior, but it is a very different place), and we underestimate intense Chinese fears of the country coming apart being haves and have nots (not a global threat, but definitely a state-based one in key pillars--i.e., the BRICs).