Wikistrat Middle East Monitor, May 2011

We're excited to announce the launch of Wikistrat's Middle East Monitor for May 2011, which can be viewed in its entirety here.

Summary

The killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan grabbed the attention of the world, but it has had no effect on the strategic equation of the Middle East. It did not result in upheaval or even a strong outburst of anti-Americanism capable of influencing the Arab Spring. The event will undoubtedly positively affect the West’s efforts to combat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and has put profound pressure on the relationship with Pakistan, but it does not alter the balance of power by any means in the Middle East.

The region overall is currently at a standstill. There is still a huge amount of internal strife with consistent protests and bloody crackdowns, but there have not been any significant changes in these conflicts. In Libya, each side has fought to a stalemate. In Syria and Yemen, both sides are refusing to budge and the status quo has remained. The protests have grown in number, but neither side can claim that ground has been gained. Of course, these situations can quickly change in the event of key defections, massacres, international intervention, or galvanizing moment for the opposition.

Yemen is currently the country most likely to descend into civil war next month. President Saleh has again backed out of signing a deal to step down from power at the last moment. The time where the opposition concludes a peaceful transfer is impossible is drawing near. Indeed, clashes are quickly escalating in the capital and dozens have been killed. Major tribes and military commanders have defected since the uprising began, which could enable these clashes to quickly turn into civil war. In Yemen, the situation is more like Libya than Syria, as the latter has not seen significant military/government defections or tribal uprisings.

 

Wikistrat Bottom Lines

Opportunities

• There are multiple divisions within the Iranian regime putting it in a position of weakness. The parliament is divided between pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad camps, with a growing number of members supporting impeachment proceedings. There is also a very public split between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. These divisions could limit Iran’s ability to project power in the region.
• The Arab Spring was unaffected by the Nakba Day provocations against Israel that the U.S. and Israel have accused Syria of engineering. Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran almost certainly also were involved. This shows that the revolutions are focused on internal matters and it will be difficult for them to be directed against external actors.
• Hezbollah has publicly taken the side of the Syrian government. This decision will undermine support for the group. Lebanese and Syrians who have generally supported President Assad because of his stance against Israel and the West will have difficulty justifying the killing and detainment of protesters. Furthermore, the pending U.N. indictments of Hezbollah and possibly Syrian officials do serious damage to the group’s image as a “resistance” force.

Risks

• The U.S. and Europe are more vocally supporting the protesters in the region. Western pressure could restrain the governments, but could also convince them that their internal opponents must be immediately crushed in order to alleviate the pressure. It is also possible that demonstrators will become emboldened, thereby escalating the situation into greater violence and putting the West in a more uneasy position.
• The instability in Yemen is very likely to cause a decentralization of power. Al-Qaeda is already advancing in the country, and a weakened government would allow the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels to reassert themselves in the north. The secessionist movement could also be strengthened. Salafists and groups tied to the Muslim Brotherhood will also benefit politically from any democratic process.
• Some governments are releasing Islamist prisoners and reaching out to extremist opponents. This is happening either because they genuinely believe Islamist forces are driving the opposition, or it is a gambit to put an Islamist face on the opposition.

Dependencies

• The impact of the clashes in Sana’a on the military, tribes and general population. The clashes are an indication that the patience of the opposition is running out. The increased bloodshed, combined with the realization that President Saleh is not genuine in his negotiations, could convince the defected military forces that it is time to fight on the side of the people.
• The degree to which Supreme Leader Khamenei believes he must distance himself from the increasingly unpopular President Ahmadinejad. He must also calculate how much he can distance himself, as his own position is weakened because of internal divisions within the regime.
• The effect of the formation of a transitional council by the Syrian opposition on the uprising and on the international community. The U.S. and Europe has hesitated to directly call for President Assad’s resignation and there are consistent news reports indicating that the West is concerned about what a post-Assad Syria could look like. The creation of a transitional council by Syria, as was done by the Libyans, could comfort the West that chaos will not ensue in the event of regime change.

Read the full edition here

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On NPR's Morning Edition with Renee Montagne 1 June

Taped remotely this morning at WFYI here in Indy.

She said it would run near front of program, so EST at about 5:10-15, then 7:10-15, then again at 9:10-15.

Even hours on the West Coast.  All very confusing, but you know what I mean.

Subject is Af-Pak and America's choices.

Spoke for close to half-hour, but they will edit down to best bits, which should make my pollen-addled brain sound smarter.

My mistake

NPR reminds me this ayem:  it's Morning Edition, not All Things Considered.

I am embarrassed, because - frankly - I catch ME more than ATC.  It's when I take the kids to school.

WPR's The New Rules: "Why the U.S. Should 'Give' Af-Pak to China"

Nuclear Pakistan, we are often told, is the Islamic-state equivalent of a Wall Street firm: In geostrategic terms, it is too big to fail. That explains why, even as the Obama administration begins preparing for modest troop withdrawals from Afghanistan this July, it dispatched Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Islamabad last week to smooth over bilateral relations with Pakistan's paranoid regime, which were strained even before the killing of Osama bin Laden. But Clinton's trip and the Obama administration's instinctive embrace of Islamabad is a fool's errand, doomed by history, geography and globalization itself.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

COMMENT:  This piece fleshes out the most provocative scenario from the "4 options" column I penned two weeks earlier.  That column lands me a taping tomorrow on NPR's All Things Considered, and I wanted to state the most logical case more fully prior to going on.

One of the key things I think a genuine grand strategist is supposed to do is to remind decision makers of the logical consequences of their strategic choices.  We have made choices on Afghanistan, most importantly our unwillingness to regionalize the solution, because we're committed to "winning" in a very particular way.  We've also made some choices on China, as the Chinese have made some about us.  India and Pakistan intersect among those choices, and I believe we make a very bad choice by picking Pakistan amidst all those intersections.

Also, while I remain certain that China and the US are slated for high levels of strategic cooperation in the future for all manner of structural reasons, I think there are all manner of routes to that cooperative space, including some that involve serious learning for us both along the way.

But my definitions of good grand strategy require plenty of flexibility and adaptability along with the core principles.  I don't believe in fixing every state - just the ones that really matter.  I continue to think that Iraq was worth it - despite our fundamentally unilateralist pursuit of the outcome.  I think Afghanistan is worth it - if you accept the logic of a regional solution set.  But I have yet to be convinced that Pakistan, given its set of unique circumstances is worth it - or even salvageable.  

I see opportunity at this moment for President Obama, but only one option being provided.

Chart of the Day: Good governments come with good income

WSJ story on academic study.  Gist of story is that China cannot really move into high-income without dramatically improving its government, but the converse logic also holds:  we shouldn't expect too much from governments until their society's per-capita income level gets up there.  Yes, there are exceptions in each (rich-enough Russia, rich-enough emirates), but the basic pattern is clear enough.

Why the lag?  It takes a demanding citizenry to get good governments, and citizens get more demanding, the more money they have.  It's really that simple.

At the end of the day, all things being equal, there's no question that democracies outperform autocracies. But the "all things being equal" part doesn't include the catch-up phase, like the one China is going through now. 

When does that "catch-up" end and the democratization kick in?  The people decide that, usually between $5,000-$10,000 per capita income.

Note that the numbers above are PPP, so high.  China measured less relativistically sits at about $4400.

Chart of the Day: Asia and Africa's near-perfect asymmetry on trade

From FT.

Africa has raw materials to sell and needs manufactured goods, one would assume.  Asia is just the opposite. The asymmetry is acceptable so long as both growth as a result of the trade - like now.  But over time, everybody wants things to even out some.

And yet, with climate change, that logic may go out the window.  Africa will suffer, but it's got about half the unused or underused arable land in the system, whereas Africa is a major grain importer already.

North America will face similar asymmetrical pressures in its trade with Asia, begging the question, Will we be happy enough being - once again - the land of the plenty?

Why Mauritius highlighted on ease of doing business?  It's an Indian Ocean banking center (island) that aspires to be the main conduit of finance from Asia into Africa - the Singapore of this equation.

Tom on Backbone radio (Colorado talk) - 2 segments

Did two segments with Ross Kaminsky last Sunday night.

First one on Pakistan, second one on Israel.

Find them both here.

CoreGap 11.13 Released - Arab Spring Forcing US to Choose Between Longtime Allies

 

Wikistrat has released edition 11.13 of the CoreGap Bulletin.

This CoreGap edition features, among others:

• Terra Incognita 11.13 - Arab Spring Forcing US to Choose Between Longtime Allies
• IMF Chief’s Abrupt Resignation Sets Off Scramble on Replacement
• Latest Ministerial Meeting of Arctic Council Signals Rule-Making Maturation
• With Bin Laden Dead, US-PRC Military Tension Takes Center Stage
• Victorious in Putsch, Iran’s Ahmadinejad Now Comes Under Clerics' Counterattack

And much more...

The entire bulletin is available for subscribers. Over the upcoming week we will release analysis from the bulletin to our free Geopolitical Analysis section of the Wikistrat website, first being "Terra Incognita: Arab Spring Forcing US to Choose Between Longtime Allies"

US policy in the Middle East has long been based on a troika of bilateral relationships with Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  The relationship with Saudi Arabia was based on the economics of energy, hence Riyadh’s ideological excesses were tolerated – even after 9/11.  With Israel, security has always come first, and with Egypt, stability was prized above all else.  Now, as Egypt evolves tumultuously and Saudi Arabia deploys its own military muscle in defense of fellow monarchies, it’s clear that Washington will no longer enjoy the same relationship with either, leaving the question of how the Washington-Tel Aviv bond will hold up in the months and years ahead.

President Barack Obama’s 19 May speech appeared – at first blush – to throw a giant monkey wrench into those works: by citing the pre-1967 war borders as the framework for a land swap deal leading to a two-state solution, the president seemed to be putting Benjamin Netanyahu’s government on notice.  But subsequent backtracking by Obama in a speech to the powerful pro-Israeli lobby group AIPAC two days later indicated just how unprepared he is to significantly revise this alliance.

Read the full piece here

More about Wikistrat's Subscription can be found here

To say that President Barack Obama’s foreign policy plate is full right now is a vast understatement, and it couldn’t come at a worse time for a leader who needs to revive his own economy before trying to resuscitate others (e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, South Sudan, Ivory Coast – eventually Libya?). Faced with the reality that America’s huge debt overhang condemns it to sub-par growth for many years, Washington enters a lengthy period of “intervention fatigue” that – like everything else, according to the Democrats – can still be blamed on George W. Bush.

Referenced from Wikistrat: http://www.wikistrat.com/geopolitical-analysis/obamas-chinese-menu-of-past-presidential-doctrines/#ixzz1Gs4QTx6a

Time's Battleland: Army not lucky, just desperate to avoid Leviathan supremacy over next decade

Picking up on Mark's thread this morning, Galrahn, the eminent blogger at Information Dissemination, likewise sees a fight that's getting nasty, arguing yesterday that the Army was "lucky" (in that, Will-no-one-rid-me-of-that-meddlesome-flag-officer! way) to see two of its great rivals for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff falter in recent days. Those two are current Vice Chairman and Marine General James Cartwright (recently clearedof decidedly smear-like charges of sexual misconduct with a subordinate officer) and current EUCOM/NATO Admiral James Stavridis (who we're now being told didn't do so well in his interview - something Galrahn finds incredible, as do I).

Read more at Time's Battleland blog.

Chart of the day: GM is the true globally integrative enterprise

WSJ chart and story on Toyota's struggles.

Whole point about being a globally integrated enterprise:  you source, R&D, manufacture and sell locally - all over the world, meaning your production isn't concentrated in your home country (reducing the perception of you being a "foreign" car everywhere you sell - to your advantage).

Check out the stats and you see that GM is the least concentrated in its home country.  I've always held up Toyota as prime example of what Sam Palmisano, CEO of IBM, means when he uses the term GIE, but to my surprise, GM is already more "there" than Toyota.

And yes, I am impressed by that.

WPR's The New Rules: Obama's Israel-Palestine Red Herring

Much of the reaction to President Barack Obama's speech on U.S. Middle East policy last Thursday focused on his reference to Israel's pre-1967 borders as the basis for a future two-state solution with Palestine. But Obama's speech was far more focused on long-term realities, suggesting that he is not really willing to push for some historic Israeli-Palestinian peace plan against the background of the Arab Spring. In fact, it's fair to wonder why he chose to expend any of his political capital on this deadlocked issue, especially since he had to know that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would reject the 1967 boundaries proposal as a starting point for negotiations, as Netanyahu had already protested that point's inclusion in the speech prior to its delivery.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

"Emily Updates" begins eBook production

I am in the process of working out the details with my literary agency, Zachary Shuster Harmsworth, to publish the "Emily Updates," our (Vonne and I) real-time diary of our first-born's battle with cancer as a three-year-old in the mid-1990s, as a eBook serial this summer.  We're looking at four volumes, roughly 50,000 words each, released sequentially as eBooks via Barnes and Noble and Amazon.

Today I turned in the edit of Volume 1, which encompasses the discovery/diagnosis (chapter 1), the long initial hospital stint (chapter 2) and then, after a time jump, the start of the weekly updates six months into her chemo protocol.  The rest of the updates take the reader through the end of her treatment 14 months later.

I'll be doing the same light edit of the rest of the 150,000 words of text over the next couple of weeks.  I am enjoying the process immensely and remain very proud of the work.  The original e-diary (really a blog before there were blogs) came to 400,000 words.  I spent 1996-1998 editing that down to 200,000, and that's the version I'm editing now.  That version was online from 1998-2004.

This collaboration with Zachary Shuster Harmsworth will be an experiment for both of us - a first-time event. But I wanted to explore doing eBooks, and I think this is the perfect venue and the perfect time to finally put this out.  It is especially joyous for me to work the text with Em herself home from her first year of college!

Today I edited a bit where my 1995 Tom was dreaming of watching an older Emily pull away from the pack at the 2.5-mile mark in the road race, as well as stun the audience with her brilliant comment during the competition.  I have since witnessed both events:  Emily winning her division in a 5k race at the Naval War College sometime in the early 2000s (the trophy is upstairs); and Emily helping her constitutional team take first honors in a state competition in Indianapolis as a HS frosh (I was in the audience when she pulled out the constitutional case that was the lever civil rights lawyers used to start overturning a certain class of discriminatory laws in the South (interstate commerce clause, if I remember)).

Anyway, it was just so amazing to see the words on the screen - dreams that have literally come true since then I penned them in pure aspiration 16 years ago.

More news on this project to follow, but for now the plan is to get all four volumes out as eBooks this summer. Reason for my personal push is that I begin discussions on a new professional book in the fall with 1-2 potential collaborators.  Pretty excited about that too, so want this out of the way.  Scrambling on the edit now because of the Wikistrat grand strategy coming up, where I'll be judging 200,000 words of submissions (minimal) every week for four weeks running.  I take grading very seriously, so I expect that effort to be consuming.

The food-land equation

From Jason Clay, World Wildlife Fund in a NYT debate on population:

We currently use 33 percent of the Earth's surface for food.  As 25 percent isn't usable (deserts, cities, roads) and 12 percent is set aside for national parks and the like, we continue to expand the food production frontier each year.  At the current rate of habitat loss, after 40 years, we will have "eaten" nearly all the remaining natural habitat on the planet.  Whatever is sustainable with 7 billion people will not be with 10 billion.

So you add up 33 + 12 + 25 and you're talking 30 percent of the surface that theoretically gets exploited. Population growth (we hit 7 billion around Halloween) to come by 2050 (40 years) is approximately 2.5 (not 3 to make 10B), but let's take the three and say we'll have 40% more people.  

Honestly, considering how low yields are in most ag environments around the world, the notion that we can't support 40 percent more if we boost current land yields and get access to good land freed up by global warming/climate change (unmentionable to any WWF because of the species loss that will necessarily occur) is a huge supposition, given recent history.   For example, America now produces 50% more corn on the same land as it did in 2000.  Remember the corn fields you ran through as a kid.  Impossible today!  Why?  Dense rows of plants.

Clay then goes on to sound ominous notes about food production in 2100 due to per capita (he has to switch his argument there because the pop growth will level off and end mid-century) and he comes up with this meaningless stat that we'll "need to produce an amount of food that is 2.5 times the amount that all human societies have produces in the last 8,000 years."  That one is a pure scare tactic.  Human population was negligible until about 200 years ago and hunter-gathering was the prime route for a major portion of that sub-billion population, so stacking up the previous 7,800 years of ag production is a goofy standard.  Almost as unintelligent as saying we've got more humans alive today than have ever lived!

I do like the stats on the land use, so I blog to remember.

Can we now please end the rare earths fear-fest?

The hand-wringing on this one has been so boring.  The world allows China to become the near monopolistic supplier of rare earths because nobody apparently wants to spend the money and suffer the environmental hassles of keeping their own mines open.  Then China, as it moves into higher-end production modes, starts, with its usual backward attitude, to obsess over the security of supplies.  Export controls are discussed and then implemented.  Then the West is shocked - shocked! - to discover this huge vulnerability only a couple of decades in the slo-mo making, and op-eds are cranked ad nauseum about this significant national security threat.

Predictably, Congress blows hard on the subject, and voila!  The owner of the once-booming US mine is now seeking investments for "secure" supplies.   Rest assured this is happening pretty much anywhere else in the world where not-so rare earths are actually found.   Crisis averted!  Whew!

Now, pontificating types are opining that rare earths symbolize America finally waking up to being "disemboweled" by China and India all these years and finally starting to take back those jobs!

It is all good theater, and Molycorp Minerals should clean up on their US mine, but historic turning point it is not.  It's just another example of rising demand creating temporary scarcity and clever people cleaning up on that basis, with their local congressman as front-man.  God bless them.  But spare me the larger meaning.

The rise of the rural market

WSJ story on GM betting big on China's rural market and FT story on Lenovo planning to use the selling expertise it gained there to penetrate similar bottom-of-the-pyramid markets in Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, India and Turkey.  

Per the chart above, you can see GM's logic plainly:  China is already a market roughly equal to its US share.

Per both, you begin to understand the logic that says, To sell globally is to succeed first in China.  Why?  It's not just the market size, but the BOTP experience gained.  Thus the larger logic of allying with Chinese firms as they go global.  Master the one, progress to them all.

The rise of the global middle class necessitates being able to sell in the rural market, because that's where a good chunk are located amidst all the urbanization between now and 2050 (we basically double the number of urbanites globally from 3.3B to 6.6B).  In marketing terms, this is Leninist-Maoist:  Go back in time and catch your target in their pre-branded state!

First car and PC sale is like first vote as adult:  brand affiliation is often set for life, so the effort is more than worthwhile for a GM and Lenovo.

Esquire's The Politics Blog: Obama's Middle East Speech Text, Decoded Line-by-Line

Expectations couldn't have been lower for President Obama's Middle East speech on Thursday, and yet it was a work of "realist" beauty that recognized: a) how little influence America actually has over these types of events, and b) where we stand at the beginning of what is likely to be a long process of political upheaval and — hopefully — economic reform that addresses the underlying issues driving the entire region. Yes, Obama took a pass on Palestine and Israel (his historic referencing of Israel's pre-'67 borders is the Mideast equivalent of a "world without nuclear weapons"), but he's got several touch points in the coming days (the Netanyahu meeting, another speech, Netanyahu's speech to Congress) with which to address that, so this was more of a broad-strokes laying out as to what America stands for, and what it's willing to do amidst its current fiscal realities. And — again — it was a great mix of stated idealism, expressed in long-haul terms, and political pragmatism that recognizes the here-and-now realities that must temper any sense of America coming to anybody else's immediate rescue.

Obama's was a well-crafted message — one that reassured both the world and Americans that this administration knows its limits and its responsibilities to history. It was, in a word, presidential.

And now, so you don't have to sit through it again, a little deconstruction of the most compelling sections excerpted (from the prepared remarks) at length....

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

How the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt cracks under pressure - naturally

This is pretty much how I always expect it to go in these situations:  the long-oppressed opposition party finally has its chance at the brass ring and - booyah! - it starts fracturing over how to do it.  This is usually how the single party - realized or just self-actualizing - falls apart.  It's how I would see the Cuban Communist Party falling apart after the Castros depart. ["Falling apart" here also meaning birthing new parties.]

WSJ story on leader of one of the more moderate factions within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood deciding to break from the party and declare his own presidential campaign.  "More moderate" is defined as:

. . . a positive relationship with the West, more rights for women and religious minorities, and democratic reform within the party's top-down leadership structure.

But here's the real rub:  Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and his faction believe the MB must split into two groups -a political party and a religious organization with attendant charities.

Since Dr. Fotouh, 59 years old, is effectively breaking the MB's promise not to field a candidate, many in the group are calling for him to resign because the group won't support his candidacy.

Despite the fears triggered by his announcement, I think this is a good thing.  If we want the Nelson Mandela-like figure, he will necessarily be of the group and simultaneously above the group.  The MB is the most organized party, so it's not odd that compelling figures will arise from it, but they need to do so as Fotouh seems to be doing, by forging a special, above-it-all path.

Obviously, a very early reading, but that's my suspicion.  The MB was the ONLY party to turn to - in opposition - under Mubarak, but now that he's gone, factions not only emerge but they break off and form new parties.

But no, I don't expect Egypt to pick some perfectly secularly leader.  I think that's unrealistic and - in some way - unwise.  But they do need the above-the-party-type figure, and maybe this guy is it.

Yes, I know I will be immediately bombarded by THE quote or action from Fotouh's past, but none of that will impress me.  The only thing that will count is what he does now.  Mandela was a figurehead for a Soviet-sponsored national liberation movement in my PhD diss - totally on the OTHER side.  Then the ANC got its chance, and Mandela made the most of it, and South Africa is South Africa today and Mandela is a near saint.

If you want the Egyptian Mandela, this IS the most logical source-path.

Time's Battleland: If issued, Libyan ICC arrest warrants would continue "perfect" Africa record for court

After many weeks of speculation and veiled threats-by-extension from Western government leaders, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced on Monday that he is seeking arrest warrants for Muammar Qaddafi, his son Seif al-Islam Qaddafi and his brother-in-law Abdullah al-Sanousi for systematically targeting citizens in Libya's ongoing protests and civil strife. Libya isn't a signatory to the ICC treaty, and prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo declared that the Libyan people should take it upon themselves to make the arrests, if warrants are granted. Moreno-Ocampo said he had enough evidence to go to trial immediately, just another sign that the Qaddafi clan has crossed a line that disallows their staying in power - as far as the West is concerned.

Read the entire post at Time's Battleland.

WPR's The New Rules: Four Options for Redefining the Long War

There is a profound sense of completion to be found in America's elimination of Osama bin Laden, and the circumstances surrounding his death certainly fit this frontier nation's historical habit of mounting major military operations to capture or kill super-empowered bad actors. Operation Geronimo, like most notable U.S. overseas interventions of the past quarter-century, boiled down to eliminating the one man we absolutely felt we needed to get to declare victory. Now we have the opportunity to redefine this "long war" to America's most immediate advantage. I spot four basic options, each with their own attractions and distractions.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

Syrian Regime Stability Simulation – Update and Intermediary Summary

What began as a small protest in the small country of Tunisia, the Arab Spring erupted, transforming the political landscape throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  People yearning for better opportunities and political freedom began protests throughout the region.  Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, in power for thirty years, resigned his position under intense pressure, while Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, in power for forty years, clings to power following a NATO airpower-backed rebellion. Bahrain and Yemen also endure protests that endanger their political leadership.  Another country, with a long history of brutal crackdowns against its citizens, with deep-rooted repression from a powerful security apparatus, and a key player in the Middle East peace process, begins to see cracks in its domination from small pockets of protest inspired by the events in region – Syria.

Wikistrat’s Syrian Regime Stability simulation analyzes the uprising in Syria using Wikistrat’s unique platform.  Wikistrat’s analysts and subscribers, led by Chief Analyst Thomas PM Barnett, collaborate online to examine the Syrian Regime’s stability and its effects on key themes.  How will a change in Syria’s Regime affect regional stability including Syria’s relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia?  How will Syria’s relationship with Iran change and how will it affect the region?  Will terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah benefit from changes in Syria’s government?  Will Kurds rise up against the Syrian Regime or other sectarian violence ensue? 

By incorporating possible scenarios, impacts on the countries involved in the region and diverse policy options for these countries, Wikistrat simulations give its analytic community a continually evolving up-to-date model of the geopolitical reality, rather than a static document.

Some of the Scenarios Proposed and their summaries:

(Scenarios plotted by Ryan Mauro, strategic analyst with Wikistrat and author of worldthreats.com)

 

1) Assad Survives and Quells Dissent – The Assad regime finds itself in a stronger position after violently crushing the uprising. The most influential activists are silenced through various means and the regime is able to identify its opponents and learn how to combat their strategies as a result of this victory. The opposition is demoralized and fractured while some opt to join the government as a minority voice following minor political reforms. The Muslim Brotherhood decides to officially endorse the Assad regime as an ally in the fight against the West.

Suggested by Trevor Westra, of theolog.ca, on the probability of this scenario occurring, “The plausibility of Assad emerging from the current crisis, with his leadership intact, depends heavily on the continued allegiance of the army…His commanders, most of whom are Alawite loyalists, appear firm in their support.” 

2) Assad Survives but is Unstable – Assad adopts a more-liberal tone and institutes minor economic and political reforms. His military stays intact. Visible signs of dissent remain, but the uprising ultimately recedes because its participants cannot organize a formidable opposition movement nationwide. As a result, the West no longer views their support of the opposition as a viable policy option.

A risk of this scenario by Nick Ottens, of www.atlanticsentinel.com, states, “If unrest persists…the burden of unemployment and further undermining the regime’s legitimacy even in the eyes of people who might have a vested interest in its survival.”

3) Assad Survives Through Iranian Intervention – Iranian forces secure Assad's regime, while strengthening its grip on Syria. A brief civil war breaks out but is quickly ended through the deployment of Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel and terrorists from Hezbollah and Hamas. The IRGC openly operates in Syria and becomes more intimately involved in the operations of the security services and government agencies. A series of agreements making Syria essentially a military base for Iran are signed and the West concludes that luring Syria away from Iran is no longer a viable policy option.

Comments from Mark Safranski, of zenpundit.com, include, “I have great difficulty imagining Israel and the United States tolerating, say, 25,000 – 50,0000 IRGC in combined arms units operating in Syria on behalf and in conjunction with the Syrian Army, slaughtering thousands of Syrians.”

4) Regime Change Brings Moderates to Power – Assad's regime does not survive the uprising, and is replaced by Moderates. The Assad regime is removed through a popular uprising and/or military coup. The opposition forces declare victory and the secular democratic opposition comes to the forefront of the transitional government. The Muslim Brotherhood performs well in the parliamentary elections but is a minority. The new government vows to bring Syria closer to the West and institute vast reforms. 

This scenario is summarized by Andrew Eccleston of the American Military University as, “A perfect storm of Iranian miscalculation and division within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood brings a moderate regime to power in Syria.”

5) Regime Change Brings Muslim Brotherhood into power: Assad's regime does not survive the uprising, and is replaced by Muslim Brotherhood leading the parliament. A series of defections from Assad’s government, including the military and intelligence services, leads to a civil war similar to the one in Libya. The Assad regime is removed from power and the Muslim Brotherhood declares victory. The Brotherhood and other Islamist parties hold a majority in the new parliament after elections are held and oversee the writing of a new constitution which makes Islam the primary source of legislation. The new government says it will maintain close ties to Iran and will continue to support Hamas and Hezbollah.

Professor Robert Edwin Kelly, of asiansecurityblog, also contributed to this simulation as to whether the United States should abstain from taking action in Syria. “[T]he ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) threshold must stay somewhat high, otherwise the West could get chain-ganged into multiple human rights interventions that will increasingly look to Arab audiences like neo-imperialism.”

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