Wikistrat Middle East Monitor, May 2011

We're excited to announce the launch of Wikistrat's Middle East Monitor for May 2011, which can be viewed in its entirety here.

Summary

The killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan grabbed the attention of the world, but it has had no effect on the strategic equation of the Middle East. It did not result in upheaval or even a strong outburst of anti-Americanism capable of influencing the Arab Spring. The event will undoubtedly positively affect the West’s efforts to combat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and has put profound pressure on the relationship with Pakistan, but it does not alter the balance of power by any means in the Middle East.

The region overall is currently at a standstill. There is still a huge amount of internal strife with consistent protests and bloody crackdowns, but there have not been any significant changes in these conflicts. In Libya, each side has fought to a stalemate. In Syria and Yemen, both sides are refusing to budge and the status quo has remained. The protests have grown in number, but neither side can claim that ground has been gained. Of course, these situations can quickly change in the event of key defections, massacres, international intervention, or galvanizing moment for the opposition.

Yemen is currently the country most likely to descend into civil war next month. President Saleh has again backed out of signing a deal to step down from power at the last moment. The time where the opposition concludes a peaceful transfer is impossible is drawing near. Indeed, clashes are quickly escalating in the capital and dozens have been killed. Major tribes and military commanders have defected since the uprising began, which could enable these clashes to quickly turn into civil war. In Yemen, the situation is more like Libya than Syria, as the latter has not seen significant military/government defections or tribal uprisings.

 

Wikistrat Bottom Lines

Opportunities

• There are multiple divisions within the Iranian regime putting it in a position of weakness. The parliament is divided between pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad camps, with a growing number of members supporting impeachment proceedings. There is also a very public split between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. These divisions could limit Iran’s ability to project power in the region.
• The Arab Spring was unaffected by the Nakba Day provocations against Israel that the U.S. and Israel have accused Syria of engineering. Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran almost certainly also were involved. This shows that the revolutions are focused on internal matters and it will be difficult for them to be directed against external actors.
• Hezbollah has publicly taken the side of the Syrian government. This decision will undermine support for the group. Lebanese and Syrians who have generally supported President Assad because of his stance against Israel and the West will have difficulty justifying the killing and detainment of protesters. Furthermore, the pending U.N. indictments of Hezbollah and possibly Syrian officials do serious damage to the group’s image as a “resistance” force.

Risks

• The U.S. and Europe are more vocally supporting the protesters in the region. Western pressure could restrain the governments, but could also convince them that their internal opponents must be immediately crushed in order to alleviate the pressure. It is also possible that demonstrators will become emboldened, thereby escalating the situation into greater violence and putting the West in a more uneasy position.
• The instability in Yemen is very likely to cause a decentralization of power. Al-Qaeda is already advancing in the country, and a weakened government would allow the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels to reassert themselves in the north. The secessionist movement could also be strengthened. Salafists and groups tied to the Muslim Brotherhood will also benefit politically from any democratic process.
• Some governments are releasing Islamist prisoners and reaching out to extremist opponents. This is happening either because they genuinely believe Islamist forces are driving the opposition, or it is a gambit to put an Islamist face on the opposition.

Dependencies

• The impact of the clashes in Sana’a on the military, tribes and general population. The clashes are an indication that the patience of the opposition is running out. The increased bloodshed, combined with the realization that President Saleh is not genuine in his negotiations, could convince the defected military forces that it is time to fight on the side of the people.
• The degree to which Supreme Leader Khamenei believes he must distance himself from the increasingly unpopular President Ahmadinejad. He must also calculate how much he can distance himself, as his own position is weakened because of internal divisions within the regime.
• The effect of the formation of a transitional council by the Syrian opposition on the uprising and on the international community. The U.S. and Europe has hesitated to directly call for President Assad’s resignation and there are consistent news reports indicating that the West is concerned about what a post-Assad Syria could look like. The creation of a transitional council by Syria, as was done by the Libyans, could comfort the West that chaos will not ensue in the event of regime change.

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Comments

[David Emery]

It is interesting how, as you point out, the Bin Laden death has been such a non-event. I think that's probably a good sign.

There is a sense of hypocrisy with respect to intervention in Libya ("He's killing his people!") and the lack of same in Syra. But intervening in Libya is a lot easier, I admit.

Under what circumstances (any?) would the Saudis intervene in Yemen? Could Yemen join with Somalia to become a new "Axis of Chaos", could we suffer piracy from both sides?