Comment upgrade: even deeper on China in Afghanistan

In response to Deep dive on China's Afghan copper FDI, Brian B wrote:

Thomas, I've read your book "Great Powers" and what Im about to say is not advancing the policy for a need for another great enemy (China). That being said, as much as it disturbs me to see China free ride off of an unsuspecting US - I say unsuspecting because Im not sure that US mil-pol opperations in the Gap had an intended consequence to allow China to move in - and implement a "SimCity" policy in the Gap, Chinese actions might have an unintended consequence on their long term military policy. The greater the Chinese presence in the Gap, the more they begin to owne the problems of the region. This might force the Chinese military hand, or COIN strategy. If the Chinese fail in their attempts to control the regions they are invested in with a weak military response, what can the world expect to happen? To ensure the progress of glabalization, does the US step in and assist or should the US sit and see what develops internally in China due to ineffective military response? I can probably answer my own question due the amount of message control the CCP has, but nevertheless, ineffective military campaigns can delegitimize governments. So, is it really in the US's best interest to allow China to free ride and also, if and when the US pulls out of the region, is it in the best interest of the US to support Chinese security measures in the Gap? If so, how does this help advance the level of economic liberalization needed in China to perpetuate the economics of globalization?

Tom replied (in two comments):

That is the crux of conundrum: we can't make the Gap stable merely by virtue of our pol-mil efforts (our economic ties are frankly weak), so we need the dovetailing of the Chinese network-economic integration. Left to their own devices, they will do that badly--and they know it and fear it. But they also don't feel the confidence to try things abroad that would elicit the "wrong" thinking back home.

What is the solution?

A Chinese leadership that recognizes the compelling reasons to clean up their act abroad while taking in hand the consequences of more political liberalization at home. And that's one generation of leadership (the 6th) away, meaning we navigate a tough decade ahead (unless the upcoming 5th Gen surprises in a good way).

Ideally, we'd hold the fort, so to speak, in the Gap for the next decade, but as the financial crisis revealed, we're pretty much tapped, as is our traditional slate of allies.

That means the key thing of this decade is working on a reorientation of our alliances from the tired, aging West to the restive, rising East, because therein we find the natural partners for frontier integration and further expansion of globalization--even if their top leaders don't yet realize or are too scared to confront this emerging reality.

That is a tricky course for us: demonstrating our continuing utility as an ally yet likewise signaling the limits of our strength--a very FDR-like balancing act with a much poorer hand than FDR had but with a magnificently more benign international environment (only peon threats, really, and no one coming close to our military power and the willingness/experience to use).

So there's good and bad, a tricky decade ahead, and a premium placed on careful, calculated, visionary US leadership. I see Obama being good on the careful and calculated, but I don't yet see any real vision--except the brain dead "get-rid-of-nukes," "smart" sanctions (oh my, replacing the dumb ones, yes), "smart" power (ditto rhetorical nonsense) and so on.

Also, to answer your last question: Anything we do to secure globalization's advance helps China to liberalize by keeping them on track toward more integration globally and regionally, more income growth, and more effort devoted to uplifting the still 700m or so rural/outskirts/interior poor. We forget that huge burden all the time, seeing only the booming coast (almost no one visits the interior, but it is a very different place), and we underestimate intense Chinese fears of the country coming apart being haves and have nots (not a global threat, but definitely a state-based one in key pillars--i.e., the BRICs).

Comments

[Gilbert Garza]

Tom says:

“That is the crux of conundrum: we can't make the Gap stable merely by virtue of our pol-mil efforts (our economic ties are frankly weak), so we need the dovetailing of the Chinese network-economic integration. Left to their own devices, they will do that badly--and they know it and fear it. But they also don't feel the confidence to try things abroad that would elicit the "wrong" thinking back home.”

And from that:

--- “ (our economic ties are frankly weak) “

Which of our economic ties are weak? Why and how are they weak? Why is strengthening these weak economic ties not a better opportunity and a more important and urgent task than most other strategic considerations that are holding/demanding our national attention?

[large]

Gotta go with Gilbert on this one . . My greatest criticism of the Dubya Administration was the inability to chew gum and walk at the same time . . and instead of getting better (as promised) it has gotten worse . . We have a war, and we have economic problems, same thing we had going in . . If you, I and your many correspondents can "almost" figure it out, why can't the people we have put in place to do so?

[Tom Barnett]

Gilbert, our ties are weak for global economic structural reasons--not something we're going to fix with a bit more inspiration. We sit near the top of the production chain, the Gap sits at the bottom. In global economics, you tend to produce for yourself and a couple of steps below yourself, but you don't go back to the economics of your youth. There's simply no logic for it. Indeed, all the logic of wealth creation and technology creation say, go ever more upward.

So, in general, our economic links to the Gap remain weak, as in narrow, as in limited, as in centered on commodities. We can't sell a lot of our stuff there due to lack of income and inability to absorb within infrastructure-hostile environments.

Countering that reality is the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid argument, which we must and will pursue in order to boost exports. But will we outperform the mid-range players in the production chain in this regard? Economic logic and history say no: we'll make most of our money off the rising tide right behind us (the BRICs, next tier), while it will be largely that tier that makes money inside the Gap as it comes online, primarily through the New Core's resource requirements--the most dominant networking function going on right now. That's the role we played once upon a time but are not slated to play this time, unless it becomes our dream to slow down and return to our economic past, which I find an inadvisable course of action. I don't want to own the bottom of the pyramid as a market, I'd rather see China and India and Brazil and others get rich(er) doing that, otherwise, I don't see how the hundreds of millions of poor people still living within their countries are going to improve their lives. Our job requirements, compared to theirs, are downright miniscule--insignificant even.

So do I want to focus all my attention on "beating" New Core pillars like India and China "to the Gap" and its rising lower-middle-class markets? Not really. In the end, I still want to push America into the next big, higher technology markets, the ones that will command the greatest shares of disposable income in the future, so I would emphasize bio, nano and genetic (plus medical and improved food production) and let the Chinese sell lower-to-middle level consumer goods.

What people often find very frustrating about my thinking is the apparent inflexibility it displays on the course of globalization (I have the strong tendency to want to ride the big waves of globalization's expansion, choosing, as much as possible, to avoid trying to stem them--because I see it as a fool's errand.) Also, I have the habit of discounting people's first instinctive desire to have America step in and do it better than the potential partners are currently doing it--like China. That unilateral, almost parental instinct is deep within our system after almost seven decades of "leading the Free World."

But indulging it in the days and years and decades ahead would be a big mistake, in my mind--a refusal to admit our successes in expanding globalization and to realize that the total package we've got spinning now is beyond our comprehensive control. We'd do better mentoring along the rising crew and seeing them fulfill their economic destiny (and enrich their remaining impoverished and remain stable) than trying to run the entire show ourselves--or even trying to outdo them on most things.

So no, I don't advocate putting our economy on a trajectory that would see us out-duel China and India and Turkey and Brazil as primary developers of the bottom-of-the-pyramid/Gap/emerging global middle class. I think there's great room for our improvement in that sphere, but I see our economic future in higher technology realms, because that path makes us wealthier, does not deny the obvious economic wealth-creation opportunities to the New Core pillars, plays to our strengths (innovation, entrepreneurship, financial risk-taking, educational system), and lets us continue to ply our comparative pol-mil advantage (Leviathan, emerging SysAdmin leadership) very long in the making.

Indulging in the pursuit of perceived short-cuts (energy autarky, subbing global warming for a struggle against radical extremism, deciding we'll focus heavily on soft power or economics) will always remain a deep attraction, but it denies our role in history up to this point and raises a very troubling--and inevitable, in my mind--scenario of NOBODY stepping into our shoes and fulfilling that pol-mil leadership role, meaning a surrender to the logic of great-power competition and ultimately conflict across the Gap. I find that path such a huge waste of blood and treasure as to remain inconceivable as a strategic choice, so I do not embrace the prioritization you suggest.

I believe it's the role of grand strategy to elucidate the "inevitabilities" and contextualize them for decision-makers. I think it inevitable that we'll need to help rising New Core players step into much bigger Gap nation-building/policing roles commensurate with their rising economic interests there, just like the Brits wisely did with us a century ago. To deny that difficult grand strategic task is to invite the dissolution of our greatest gift to humanity--the stunning prosperity and peace associated with this international liberal trade order-cum-globalization of our making.

In this sense, I inevitably sound like a persistent nag, refusing the allure of apparent--and seemingly easier--alternatives.

But I don't see the role of grand strategist as being one of telling America what they'd like to hear at any one point. We have a small universe of political pundits and op-ed columnists ready to do that.