■"Bush Gives Plan For Iraq Victory And Withdrawal: No 'Artificial' Deadlines; Strategy Loosely Follows Methods the U.S. Has Used in Afghanistan," by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 1 December 2005, p. A1.
■"Plan: We Win," editorial, New York Times, 1 December 2005, p. A34.
■"'Complete Victory': A strategy beyond 'staying the course' in Iraq" editorial, Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2005, p. A14.
■"For Once, President and His Generals See the Same War: Agreeing that the war is winnable, and also on the plan to win," by John F. Burns and Dexter Filkins, New York Times, 1 December 2005, p. A18.
■"U.S. Directive Prioritizes Post-Conflict Stability," by Bradley Graham, Washington Post, 1 December 2005, p. A21.
■"'A Beacon on the Summit of the Mountain,'" op-ed by Eliot A. Cohen, Wall Street Journal, 30 November 2005, p. A18.
Bush gives his more sober rendering of the won war, the botched peace, and a rationale definition "victory" leading to "withdrawal," which, quite honestly, just means lower numbers and most of those numbers behind the wire in camps. In short, it's the plan to finally reduce the number of U.S. casualties.
With this statement, Bush and the his advisers finally catch up to the military, which, once let loose from the idiotic search for WMD in the spring of 2004, began slowly but surely putting together the package that'll let us start to achieve "victory," which means, again, far fewer casualties and fewer troops in theater: we close the borders, we clean the bad nests, and we work up the Iraqi forces to deal with the remainders over the long haul, allowing our guys to retreat to the camps, as in, out of sight, out of mind, and off the front pages, which is how we worked our high frequency stuff across the vast majority of the 90s (e.g., low casualties mean the freedom to work the environment as much as you want).
I saw the speech as a big nothing, really, just a synching of Bush's rhetoric with the reality I've seen all around in my work with military commands like SOCOM (Special Operations Command) and CENTCOM (Central Command) and JFCOM (Joint Forces Command). Exciting and a big step forward for those who worry that the political leaders have grown excessively out of step with the military's judgment, but frankly, inside the defense community, few people I know had any other view of the conflict.
Of course, the NYT sees nothing new because they hate Bush so much, and the WSJ is very approving, because they like to see Bush all caught up to reality, but the NYT story by Burns and Filkins nailed it completely: Bush just made it explicit that he now views the war the same way as his generals do.
The gut-check practicality time that David Brooks talked about months ago has finally happened for the White House, at least in a public sense. Many could and will argue that it was there all along, just that Bush and his crew seemed loath to give a rat's ass about public perceptions.
That, apparently, has changed, but the underlying reality has not, nor has the strategy, which, again, came into being more than a year ago once the myopic focus on WMD was abandoned and we got more serious about training the Iraqis.
Now, if we could only get more realistic on economic reconstruction in Iraq, like we did long ago in Afghanistan, where Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) from a host of NATO countries have divvied up the country, allowing each donor nation to self-select provinces on the basis of their self-perceived skill sets best brought to bear on the problems.
You look at Dayton ten years later, you look at Afghanistan, you look even just at the Kurdish provinces and you have to say: this can be done and done reasonably well. We just haven't gotten comprehensively serious about templating (or best-practicing) that development-in-a-box concept I find myself talking about more and more: that ultimate post-whatever push package that meshes security, civilian infrastructure outsourcing (Steve DeAngelis' term), and both top-down institution building and bottom-up social engineering (e.g., central bank from above, private entrepreneurial spirit from below).
That's the win package. That's the ultimate victory package: build the market and pluralism will come.
So now we see the Pentagon officially declare that postconflict stabilization will be as important as warfighting, and we'll plan accordingly.
Some experts are disappointed that we don't create dedicated constabulary units, but this misses the point: the SysAdmin function is a whole lot more than the military (as the recent OSD directive argues). Trying to turn the military into the entire SysAdmin force would be a mistake. Trying to turn America into the entire SysAdmin force would be a mistake.
As I say in BFA: done well, with enough interagency, enough civilians, and enough coalition partners (basically the entire Core), the U.S. military doesn't really have to change that much. Over time, the air and sea forces naturally continue to specialize more heavily in the Leviathan's work, while ground forces are inevitably drawn into more SysAdmin work.
It's the function, not the force, that's ultimately split from warfighting. It becomes the off-season that obviates playing war by the old rules. We win more and more without firing a shot.
When we get confident enough in that function, we'll see that Department of Everything Else come into being, and the Department of War (Defense) will recede, becoming ever less important in the preservation of international stability.
A dream to some, a very clear vision and inevitable progression to me.
As I also say in BFA (and as I was reminded by my Chinese friends): the only logical vision is a mix of realism and idealism. Cohen nails it on the head. It's the veering back and forth that hurts. The key is to keep our eyes on the prize: globalization's expansion. Those elements that support that process in their countries and elsewhere: those are our friends and allies, no questions asked. That's realism. Those elements that oppose that process in their countries and elsewhere: those are our enemies and targets, no question asked. That's also realism.
The idealism comes in believing we owe history and the Gap to be consistent in that realism.
"Soon we must all make the choice between what is right and what is easy," so sayeth the realist-idealist Albus Dumbledore.