OP-Ed: “The Problem With Talking to Iran,” by Amir Taheri, Wall Street Journal, 28 May 2008, p. A17.
OP-ED: “How to Have Successful Negotiations,” by Dennis Ross, Wall Street Journal, 24-25 May 2008, p. A11.
OP-ED: “It’s All About Leverage: Countering the strategy of Iran & Friends,” by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 1 June 2008, p. WK12.
Great piece by Taheri distinguishing between Iran-the-revolutionary-movement and Iran-the-nation-state.
Iran-the-movement has been a colossal failure: not delivering at home and not spreading effectively anywhere else—save where the Iranians buy loyalty from those with fewer options than they have.
Taheri points out the dichotomy nicely: some states, like Iraq, are able to deal with Iran-the-nation-state on a host of issues, but with the United States, we remain trapped in battling the revolutionary movement because that dynamic suits the mullahs’ purposes best (and Bush-Cheney’s).
The thing is, you never really defeat the revolutionary movement, you simply get the nation-state to rein it in on its own, because there are better deals to be made.
For now, with Iran, all those better deals run eastward, with states that currently have no ambition to rein in its behavior (just not their definition of a rising great power).
Taheri makes fun of the idea of measly carrots being contemplated: spare parts for this and that. Granted, so long as we elevate Iran-the-revolutionary-movement to the status of Nazi Germany, that does seem weak. But the question begs: why elevate this crappy revolution so? Simply because Ahmadinejad shoots off his mouth?
To me, Iran’s much like the terrorism threat in general: this is all we’ve got left to worry about. So yeah, deal with it, but don’t inflate it beyond all measure, including plans for missile defense in Poland. To me, that’s just greedy programs of record looking for problems to solve, which is pathetic given our casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yes, Iran “meddles” in these places. Duh! They’re right next door!
You put a neighbor in play with tens of thousands of your “meddling” troops and you expect Iran to sit back? Our expectations here are stunning, given our bellicose rhetoric.
Ross’ point is somewhat better: don’t reward nonstate actors but don’t cut yourself off from dialogue with state actors—just because they do things you don’t approve of. When push really comes to shove, you can always act, but short-circuiting dialogue by—again—preemptively making Iran the equivalent of Nazi Germany or—better yet—the entire Soviet Union (McCain) is silly.
We’re perceived as weak right now by Iran, as Ross and Friedman argue, so talks in our current state of weakness won’t go anywhere. We’ve made our beds in the region and we’re stuck in them for now, and that tie-down impresses no one, so we get a lot of disrespect in return—going all the way back to Katrina.
Don’t want to be fielding so much disrespect? Well, then we gotta build back up our respect in this world, and that won’t happen by making bold threats we can’t follow through on. Hell, that’s what Israel is for right now.
Can we get leverage, as Friedman puts it, quickly? No. All we can do quickly is de-escalate the rhetoric and, in my opinion, stop acting like Iran is the mother of all regional threats. I mean, that sort of myopia didn’t get us solid decision-making on Iraq, so why assume it would work this time with Iran?
Once de-escalated, then we need to approach the situation slowly but surely, building bridges where we can and signaling firm resistance where we must—you know, just like we did with the Sovs.
Ah, but the Iranians are “crazy.” I forgot.
Ever think that’s a bad fallback position? Calling your enemies “crazy” because they want things you don’t want them to have?