Talking to Iran
Tuesday, June 17, 2008 at 9:45AM OP-Ed: “The Problem With Talking to Iran,” by Amir Taheri, Wall Street Journal, 28 May 2008, p. A17.
OP-ED: “How to Have Successful Negotiations,” by Dennis Ross, Wall Street Journal, 24-25 May 2008, p. A11.
OP-ED: “It’s All About Leverage: Countering the strategy of Iran & Friends,” by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 1 June 2008, p. WK12.
Great piece by Taheri distinguishing between Iran-the-revolutionary-movement and Iran-the-nation-state.
Iran-the-movement has been a colossal failure: not delivering at home and not spreading effectively anywhere else—save where the Iranians buy loyalty from those with fewer options than they have.
Taheri points out the dichotomy nicely: some states, like Iraq, are able to deal with Iran-the-nation-state on a host of issues, but with the United States, we remain trapped in battling the revolutionary movement because that dynamic suits the mullahs’ purposes best (and Bush-Cheney’s).
The thing is, you never really defeat the revolutionary movement, you simply get the nation-state to rein it in on its own, because there are better deals to be made.
For now, with Iran, all those better deals run eastward, with states that currently have no ambition to rein in its behavior (just not their definition of a rising great power).
Taheri makes fun of the idea of measly carrots being contemplated: spare parts for this and that. Granted, so long as we elevate Iran-the-revolutionary-movement to the status of Nazi Germany, that does seem weak. But the question begs: why elevate this crappy revolution so? Simply because Ahmadinejad shoots off his mouth?
To me, Iran’s much like the terrorism threat in general: this is all we’ve got left to worry about. So yeah, deal with it, but don’t inflate it beyond all measure, including plans for missile defense in Poland. To me, that’s just greedy programs of record looking for problems to solve, which is pathetic given our casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yes, Iran “meddles” in these places. Duh! They’re right next door!
You put a neighbor in play with tens of thousands of your “meddling” troops and you expect Iran to sit back? Our expectations here are stunning, given our bellicose rhetoric.
Ross’ point is somewhat better: don’t reward nonstate actors but don’t cut yourself off from dialogue with state actors—just because they do things you don’t approve of. When push really comes to shove, you can always act, but short-circuiting dialogue by—again—preemptively making Iran the equivalent of Nazi Germany or—better yet—the entire Soviet Union (McCain) is silly.
We’re perceived as weak right now by Iran, as Ross and Friedman argue, so talks in our current state of weakness won’t go anywhere. We’ve made our beds in the region and we’re stuck in them for now, and that tie-down impresses no one, so we get a lot of disrespect in return—going all the way back to Katrina.
Don’t want to be fielding so much disrespect? Well, then we gotta build back up our respect in this world, and that won’t happen by making bold threats we can’t follow through on. Hell, that’s what Israel is for right now.
Can we get leverage, as Friedman puts it, quickly? No. All we can do quickly is de-escalate the rhetoric and, in my opinion, stop acting like Iran is the mother of all regional threats. I mean, that sort of myopia didn’t get us solid decision-making on Iraq, so why assume it would work this time with Iran?
Once de-escalated, then we need to approach the situation slowly but surely, building bridges where we can and signaling firm resistance where we must—you know, just like we did with the Sovs.
Ah, but the Iranians are “crazy.” I forgot.
Ever think that’s a bad fallback position? Calling your enemies “crazy” because they want things you don’t want them to have?
Reader Comments (7)
"Earlier this year, Iran's former top nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani complained that superstition was growing in the country and that people were even putting out food for the Mahdi in case he returned that very night."
"The Imam Mahdi is in charge of the world and we see his hand directing all the affairs of the country," he said in the speech, which appears to date from last month but has only now been broadcast."
"We must solve Iran's internal problems as quickly as possible. Time is lacking. A movement has started for us to occupy ourselves with our global responsibilities, which are arriving with great speed."
Only when we understand our own deaths as a victory, as our enemy views their own deaths, will we be on their political battle field. It is not always about the economy. Why is this reality missed or denied by Dr. Barnett?
Surely we all find it appropriate in some discussions in some circles to fling out a well-considered or ill-considered “crazy” or some other such descriptive term to give added emphasis to our disbelief and/or disapproval of the speaker’s/writer’s action/position/intention/rhetoric. And we do this without having necessarily signaled an intention to take extreme actions or to have it be a guiding negative light of further discussions/negotiations/diplomacy. Still maybe such name calling and/or characterization are clearly inappropriate in international diplomacy and rhetoric with/about an “enemy” state. I don’t know the rules? I suspect there is no fixed universal rule on this.
Nasr's key point:
"It is a frequent refrain in Washington that the United States needs leverage before it can talk to Iran. In Iraq, Washington is getting leverage. America has the advantage while Iran is on its heels. Engaging Iran now could even influence who wins the Iraq debate in Tehran."
I think the situation is more forthright - the "debate" he describes in Iran is more a growing rivalry between Ahmadinejad and Khamanei... the US should exploit this opportunity...