Nice piece in FT on upcoming summit needing to defuse US-PRC tensions

Philip Stephens in Thursday's FT on the deterioration of the past year or so:

“You started it” has thus far been the shared refrain. So Mr Hu will be tempted to protest that the second of the two developments flowed from the first: the chill was a consequence of a US strategy to contain China. Mr Obama’s riposte will be that America’s diplomatic and military re-engagement in the region was an inevitable response to China’s decision to throw its weight around.

The sad thing is, how much this sounds like two children arguing.

Now to the real underlying tensions, which hardliners are taking advantage of.  Naturally, this was the guiding dynamic for our (Center for America-China Partnership) recent "term sheet" proposal for Hu and Obama:

This, of course, is before the two leaders get to the economics. Most of the headlines from Mr Hu’s state visit next week will probably be generated by differences over trade and exchange rate policy. China’s huge trade surplus generates strong protectionist pressure in the US. Washington’s oft-repeated demand for revaluation of the renminbi is seen in Beijing as unwarranted intrusion in China’s economic affairs.

These are the issues where the domestic political pressures most obviously bite. Mr Obama is presiding over a jobless recovery. Mr Hu is under constant pressure from the Chinese exporters who have driven the country’s growth.

The best point, which starts fleshing out our term sheet:

Taking a longer view, the success or failure of the White House summit will depend on whether the two presidents manage to break out of the loop of deepening mistrust over the balance of power in east Asia. The dangerous flashpoints in the relationship are to be found on the Korean peninsula and the seas off China’s eastern coastline.

On the face of it, there are powerful incentives to defuse the tensions. Neither country has anything to gain from an escalation of what already looks like an east Asian arms race. [emphasis mine] Both, albeit in different ways, are threatened by the unpredictability of the nuclear-armed regime in Pyongyang.

A longer bit reciting the recent Gates trip, J-20 show, etc.

The response of the People’s Liberation Army was to stage-manage the maiden flight of its new stealth fighter jet only hours before Mr Gates’s meeting with Mr Hu. The test of the hitherto secret J-20 inevitably fanned speculation about a power grab by China’s military chiefs.

Frankly, the rush to judgment on that last bit strikes me as silly.  Gates reads a face and assumes he knows how the Chinese portray surprise v. embarrassment v. putting on a good show ("What?  I know of no test" and so on).  Honestly, the speculation here, some by very experienced analysts on our side, is embarrassingly broad.

Chinese foreign policy experts acknowledge the rising influence of the PLA. Some of them worry about it. China’s economic rise, they say, has made the case for a rapid expansion of military capabilities to match the country’s burgeoning interests and vulnerabilities. The booming economy has provided the PLA with the wherewithal, while its leadership has proved adept at harnessing popular nationalism.

Can I get a "duh!" on all that.  Normal stuff for a rising power, and not at all illogical or particularly "provocative" as long as we act like adults.

The risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation reach beyond the particular ambitions of the PLA. Washington, too, has its hawks. What’s worrying is that the political leaderships of the two countries have thus far failed to provide an alternative narrative.

The true missing piece:  the "alternative narrative."  That's what the term sheet is for.

In the US administration’s version of events, Mr Obama’s offer in 2009 of a strategic partnership was misinterpreted by Beijing as admission of US decline.

Oh my, can we put away our shame for a second here and remember who we are?

China saw an America gripped by the financial crisis and facing secular decline. Its response was to push around its neighbours, to take a tougher line on Taiwan, to harden its maritime claims and step up the missile and other weapons programmes specifically designed to counter US access to the region.

All stipulated.  

In the Chinese account, the trouble began with US arms sales to Taiwan, its welcome for the Dalai Lama, its support for Japan in the disputed East China Sea and its declaration of a national interest in the South China Sea. Whatever Washington might say about partnership, its regional alliance-building, notably with India, and a provocative series of US military exercises smacked of a strategy of containment.

The second great "duh!" of the piece, but Stephens has to include, because that's how weak our dialogue on this subject has been.  We need to be reminded of our own actions and their consequences.  To me, this says the Obama crowd ain't all that different from the neocons.  The primacy impulse is still there--as in, "we call the shots, and you do the dance!"

A more objective view would say China did misjudge the reaction both in the region and in Washington to its more combative stance.

Clearly.  Point is, Beijing's reaction was not unjustified.  You're not paranoid if everyone around you is plotting against you.

In any event, you do not have to take sides to see where the present standoff is leading. China builds new weapons systems designed to push US forces farther from its coastline; the US develops countermeasures. The hawks’ prediction of inevitable confrontation then becomes self-fulfilling as mistrust feeds miscalculation.

Couldn't agree more.

There is no easy way out of this loop. China will continue to build its military and to stake its claim to a pre-eminent role in its own backyard. That is what rising powers do. The US is not about to abandon its role as the guardian of east Asian security. Great powers do not readily hand over to new ones. Anyway, most of the countries in the neighbourhood want the US to stay.

All true.

Washington is not trying to contain China. It knows the attempt would be futile.

Wrong.  Washington is being granted too much intelligence and foresight here by Stephens, who does not realize how strong the big war crowd is at the Pentagon.  Clapper was one thing, but just watch when RMAer Michael Vickers becomes USec for Intell.  Expect a steady stream of analysis on China as the looming big threat.  I could be wrong, but I see the combo of go light on terror (footprint) and go heavy on China as the new preferred mix in the PNT.  I think this is dreaming, because I know China will disappoint and Al Qaeda will not.

FT piece ends with a vague bit of, Can't we all just get along.

But other than the end, solid logic throughout and a great piece to see in the FT.

My WPR piece on Monday will extend this logic considerably:  It is entitled, "The Top Ten Reasons Why Washington Must Demonize China."

I join the Center for America-China Partnership

Happy and excited to join the team/theme.  

WPR's The New Rules: U.S. Defense Cuts a Step in the Right Direction

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates unveiled his much-anticipated budget cuts last Thursday, signaling the beginning of the end of the decade-long splurge in military spending triggered by Sept. 11. Gates presented the package of cuts as being the biggest possible given the current international security landscape, warning that any deeper reductions could prove "potentially calamitous." Frankly, I find that statement hard to swallow.

REad the entire column at World Politics Review.

Much better, less hyped NYT piece on same reporting (Chinese stealth fighter captured . . . on film!)

Sorry, but China on the brain.  Spent half-hour taping today at WFYI (local PBS) for NPR's "All Things Considered" weekend show (based on my recent China-focused Esquire article).  I will be interspliced with the eminently sensible Jim Fallows and Gideon (Mr. Zerosum!) Rachman.

Just had to include this piece from the NYT because the same story in the WSJ (see below) just set me off a bit.

Best bits here:

First, from VADM Dorsett, who's the N2/6 (or combo intell and info dominance guy):

Still, a top Navy intelligence officer told reporters in Washington on Wednesday that the United States should not overestimate Beijing’s military prowess and that China had not yet demonstrated an ability to use its different weapons systems together in proficient warfare. The officer, Vice Adm. David J. Dorsett, the deputy chief of naval operations for information dominance, said that although China had developed some weapons faster than the United States expected, he was not alarmed over all.

“Have you seen them deploy large groups of naval forces?” he said. “No. Have we seen large, joint, sophisticated exercises? No. Do they have any combat proficiency? No.”

Admiral Dorsett said that even though the Chinese were planning sea trials on a “used, very old” Russian aircraft carrier this year and were intent on building their own carriers as well, they would still have limited proficiency in landing planes on carriers and operating them as part of larger battle groups at sea.

That guy is sensible.

Then this bit from the Chinese side:

In an interview on Wednesday, a leading Chinese expert on the military, Zhu Feng, said he viewed some claims of rapid progress on advanced weapons as little more than puffery.

“What’s the real story?” he asked in a telephone interview. “I must be very skeptical. I see a lot of vast headlines with regards to weapons procurement. But behind the curtain, I see a lot of wasted money — a lot of ballooning, a lot of exaggeration.”

Mr. Zhu, who directs the international security program at Peking University, suggested that China’s military establishment — not unlike that in the United States — was inclined to inflate threats and exaggerate its progress in a continual bid to win more influence and money for its favored programs.

Ouch!  Very ouch!

Nicely reported and written piece.  Makes me feel sad for the WSJ (see below), and makes me wonder if Murdoch's influence is weakening its objectivity.

I especially agree with the NYT citation from the expert that this sort of military porn is China's preferred deterrence.  I think that's a brilliant conclusion:

It is the J-20, a radar-evading jet fighter that has the same two angled tailfins that are the trademark of the Pentagon’s own stealth fighter, the F-22 Raptor. After years of top-secret development, the jet — China’s first stealth plane — was put through what appear to be preliminary, but also very public, tests this week on the runway of the Aviation Design Institute in Chengdu, a site so open that aircraft enthusiasts often gather there to snap photos.

Some analysts say the timing is no coincidence. “This is their new policy of deterrence,” Andrei Chang, the Hong Kong editor in chief of the Canadian journal Kanwa Defense Weekly, who reported the jet’s tests, said Wednesday. “They want to show the U. S., show Mr. Gates, their muscle.”

Think about it:  they put together a plane that looks just like ours.  Can it get any more obvious?

Now, whether it operates as well as ours . . . that's a VERY different question.

Again, great piece.

Chinese military threat skyrockets just as Gates previews his defense cuts! Eta nye slyuchaina!

Gates announces his force structure cuts today on the Hill, culminating the burst of "sudden revelations" covered in the MSM about Chinese naval developments.

The PLAN submits a plan to build a carrier over the decade, but the WSJ describes it's "imminent deployment" (imminent apparently being in the latter years of this decade).  

The Chinese "carrier killer" missile is deployed and operational, claims PACOM, except it admits that it won't have the capacity to hit any moving ship until after "several years" of testing, so it's "operational" and "deployed" but not "fully operational."  The WSJ dutifully reports that the DF-21D is likewise looking at its "imminent deployment" -- again, correct if "imminent" means . . . oh . . 5 or 6 years from now.

In yesterday's WSJ  we see on page one the first images of China's 5th gen stealth fighter making a "taxi test." I can only assume it will be "operational" and "deployed" any minute now, despite being in testing for the next several years.

All of these announcements are meant to blow us away with the Chinese build-up, and we're getting this feed now because of the Gates' announcement on cuts and the initial presentation of the budget to Congress.  This is very similar to the drumbeat of stories about cyberwarfare that led up to the standing up of USCYBERCOM. You could call it "defense porn" or just plain propaganda and you'd be right.

But when we step back from the hype, you have to ask yourself what exactly do we expect to accomplish here?

Do we expect to somehow scare the Chinese into NOT building up their military as their economy expands so rapidly?  Is there any history that says this build-up is weird or provocative given China's rise?  We have several hundred military facilities around the world and regional commands that cover the world.  Does China have anything like that?  Are they outspending us or spending somewhere in the range of 1/6th of our budget?  Are they intervening around the world with their forces or is the exact opposite true and they're actually free-riding on all of our efforts?

More narrowly: Can we expect to maintain a confident supremacy over the Chinese military WRT to a small island just off its coast? Is that a realistic and practical force-sizing principle? Or is it open-ended in the extreme?

China's military is going to keep building up.  We can continue to encourage its focus on a big-war force by matching it in its neighborhood, but then we rule out enlisting Chinese help to protect China's ever-expanding global resourcing network, meaning we're effectively providing China a global security umbrella and allowing it focus on building a big-war force that we are determined to counter and remain supreme over in the single most stressing scenario imaginable (instantly reversing an invasion of a small island nation off their coast).

Anybody think we're going to be able to pay for such go-it-alone-ism globally while standing down the Chinese build-up in East Asia given our current and growing insolvency?  Sense any "realism" in this path or just full-specturm fear-mongering?

We were told by Team Obama that America would no longer seek to play unilateral global hegemon ("Primacy" as Paul Wolfowitz dubbed it), but the truth is, our national security establishment is crammed full of experts who believe in exactly that, even as few would identify themselves as neocons.  America must, in their opinion, dominate all domains of warfare and all players in all domains of warfare, because ANYTHING less means we've lost our grip on the world--the WORLD I tell you!

This is classic America being unable to handle the success of its multidecade globalization process.  We built a world in which multiple rising great powers could be accommodated peacefully, and yet now, as they display the temerity of actually moving in the direction of having militaries commensurate with their status, we're stunned to contemplate no longer dominating the planet militarily as we have over the past two, truly anomalous decades.

And so our answer is to freak out and demonize China, who just happens to be our huge trade and financial partner in the global economy--the same country which must help us "rebalance" both OUR economy and the world economy.

Spot a disconnect there?

Watch, just watch this sort of hype be used by Congress to fight Gates' reduction plan tooth and nail.  Their true intentions will be about jobs in their home districts, but the effect will be the same.

America is not handling this moment in history very well, and Obama is proving to be anything BUT transformational.  The GOP is no help whatsoever. There is far more business-as-usual here than real change.

So get used to being very afraid about the world, because that is what everybody is selling right now in Washington.

Yes, the real and serious adjustments will eventually be forced upon us by circumstances. I was just hoping we could meet them head-on thanks to real leadership. But we have no real leaders today--just followers and "good soldiers" and party "stalwarts."

Brzezinski: redefining the US-PRC relationship

Zbigniew Brezinski, who helped broker Jimmy Carter's normalization of relations with China in 1979, says in the NYT (HT, Robert Jordan) that the upcoming Hu-Obama meeting "should ... yield more than the usual boilerplate professions of mutual esteem" by aiming to redefine the relationship, something "that does justice to the global promise of constructive cooperation between them."

Hmmm.  Great minds think alike.

Why the effort?

The worst outcome for Asia’s long-term stability as well as for the American-Chinese relationship would be a drift into escalating reciprocal demonization. What’s more, the temptations to follow such a course are likely to grow as both countries face difficulties at home.

So show some ambition he says:

For the visit to be more than symbolic, Presidents Obama and Hu should make a serious effort to codify in a joint declaration the historic potential of productive American-Chinese cooperation. They should outline the principles that should guide it. They should declare their commitment to the concept that the American-Chinese partnership should have a wider mission than national self-interest. That partnership should be guided by the moral imperatives of the 21st century’s unprecedented global interdependence. The declaration should set in motion a process for defining common political, economic and social goals. It should acknowledge frankly the reality of some disagreements as well as register a shared determination to seek ways of narrowing the ranges of such disagreements. 

The instinct for the "grand strategy term sheet" is not idealistic--just timely.

Why so hard for the White House to open up its minds on the subject?  See my response to Zenpundit's musings here.

WPR's The New Rules: A Wish List for the New Year

To kick off 2011, I thought I'd put together my top-10 international affairs wish list for the year, going from left to right on my wall map. But like Spinal Tap, only better, my list goes to 12:

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

China - US Grand Strategy Agreement Proposal

PRESS RELEASE
For Immediate Release: 31 December 2010

A proposed China-US Grand Strategy Executive Agreement between Presidents Hu and Obama formally delivered today to the China’s State Council and U.S. Ambassador was drafted by John Milligan-Whyte, Dai Min and Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett with input from China’s:

  - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs;
  - Former UN ambassador,
  - Former U.S. ambassador,
  - Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA,
  - Former Military Attaché to North Korea and Israel,
  - Former Vice Minister of Commerce,
  - President of Shanghai Institutes of International Studies,
  - China’s Central Party School Institute of International Strategic Studies,
  - Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs,
  - China Center for International Economic Exchanges,
  - China Institute For International Strategic Studies,
  - China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies,
  - Boao Forum,
  - China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

The resulting final text of the proposed executive agreement published in China Daily Online, World Politics Review and Seeking Alpha is posted for free download in the publication section at www.CenterACP.com.

The purpose of the executive agreement is to ensure that U.S. and China balance their bilateral investment and trade, never go to war with each other, the US will refrain from seeking regime change and interference in China's internal affairs and China will continue its political, legal, economic reforms.

It combines in three pages a comprehensive package of bilateral and multilateral breakthroughs not otherwise achievable in 2011 for:

  - U.S. economic recovery,
  - Increasing U.S. exports to China,
  - Balancing China-US trade,
  - Creating 12 million US jobs,
  - Reducing U.S. government deficits and debt,
  - Stabilizing the dollar, global currency and bond markets,
  - Protecting the security of sea transport,
  - Rebuilding failed states,
  - Reforming international institutions,
  - Ensuring collaboration on climate change remediation, energy efficiency, and affordable green technologies essential for rapid and effective pollution remediation globally.

To achieve greater economic stability it provides the new grand strategy and framework that align the economic and national security of the U.S. and China, which 192 other nations depend upon for economic recovery. Creating 12 million jobs for Americans in 2011-2012is essential for the U.S.’s economic recovery and creating support for the executive agreement among Democratic and Republican members of Congress, governors, mayors and the American people. In order to create the12 million U.S. jobs:

  - Chinese companies will invest up to 1 trillion U.S. dollars at the request of the U.S. President,
  - The U.S. will lift export bans on high technology,
  - China will purchase sufficient U.S. goods and services to balance their bilateral trade each year,
  - The Strategic and Economic Dialogues will become a permanently sitting commission for constant senior-level collaboration,
  - U.S. companies’ access to the Chinese market will be equal to the access that Chinese companies have in the U.S. market,
  - The U.S. and China will encourage global joint ventures between U.S. and Chinese companies.

To achieve greater geopolitical stability the executive agreement provides that:

  - The U.S. and China will hold regular joint naval exercises in Asian waters, with invitations to other regional navies; have permanent officer-exchange programs and create a joint peacekeeping force and command; and establish a joint commission collaborating constantly on U.S. and PRC technology sharing and budget expenditures.
  - There will be a reduction of China’s strike forces arrayed against Taiwan, a U.S. moratorium on arms transfers to Taiwan, and a reduction of U.S. strike forces arrayed against China. - China and the U.S. will support a reunification of North and South Korea. The U.S. will eschew its regime change goals for North Korea, which will terminate its nuclear weapons program, and China will assist North Korea’s economic reforms.
  - The U.S. and its allies will not attack or seek regime change and will eliminate trade restrictions against Iran and China will encourage Iran to suspend development of nuclear weapons.
  - China will create and invest in a South China Sea Regional Joint Development Corporation with other shareholders that have conflicting sovereignty claims and negotiate the eventual resolution of sovereignty disputes on the basis of the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
  - The U.S. and China will harmonize and coordinate their roles in Asian Economic and Regional Security and relations.

The executive agreement is not a treaty, does not require U.S. Senate confirmation, does not constitute a "G2" or an alliance between the U.S. and China, nor replace existing U.S. alliances. It is an improved framework for collaboration among all UN members pursuant to the Preamble and Article I of the U.N. Charter.

TIME on PACOM versus WAPO on PRC's DF-21D

Nice Mark Thompson post at Time.com (U.S.-Chinese War Games Ratchet Up), where he starts out by noting that now PACOM is claiming the DF-21D is already deployed - as in, the PLAN could take out a USN CV tomorrow.

So what's the deal?  WAPO citing experts saying it could be years away from effective deployment and Admiral Willard of PACOM saying the carrier killer is already deployed?

Bit of a discrepancy, huh?

My guess is that the DF-21D has been signed to the practice squad and that's emboldened Willard to declare that the Chinese are on the verge of winning the Super Bowl with the missile as presumed MVP.  These things all take time, so Willard is playing his chip as early as possible.  Justification? If he doesn't make this stink now, he believes the long-in-coming relief (e.g., pushing ahead with long-range carrier-based strike UAVs) won't arrive in time.

Is this lying? In business we call it "forward selling."  In football, they call it "throwing the receiver open."

PACOM would undoubtedly say otherwise, and I'm perfectly willing to be proven wrong, but the wording of what Willard says suggests I'm right.  I have no doubt that there are some of these missiles theoretically teed up in this mode.  I also have no doubt that it's still in testing and that to say it's operationally capable of taking out a carrier is untrue. I'm betting Willard was careful with his words so that what he says is technically true (deployed = missile in field and missile "turned on" and capable of being fired), but I think he purposefully forward sells the capability to a degree that most people would consider it pure hype.

Evidence to that effect comes at the end of the FT's front-pager announcing Willard's claim, in which the admiral himself, in the last para, is cited thusly:

Adm Willard said the new Chinese weapon was not fully operational and would probably undergo testing "for several more years." The key remaining step is a test of the entire system at sea.

And that'a the cleverness of the forward-sell:  Willard's claim gets the FT to publish a front-pager with the title "Chinese missile tilts power in the Pacific: Beijing's anti-carrier weapon is operational: Deployment challenges US naval strategy."  But the truth is, it's not "fully operational," so it's not really operational at all, and saying it's deployed can simply mean it's parked somewhere.  So Willard's claiming an operational capacity that's really not there.  Parts of a capability chain are in place, but the chain itself is not yet achieved.

Unless, of course, John Pomfret, a superb journalist, is talking to a bunch of navy experts on our side who are completely clueless about the real story on the missile, but I'm guessing he's - and they are - right on the money and that Willard is out on a truth limb.  I also find it interesting the Willard needs to suddenly come out and make this declaration days after the WAPO front-pager by Pomfret suggesting that the DF-21D is years away from being truly operationalized in its carrier killing capability (so not just a missile built and not just a missile sitting on a launcher somewhere, but the A-to-Z capability - with all the attendant tracking and sensoring nets - to find, target and hit a carrier with one of these missiles).

So, in the end, this is all a battle of headlines:  WAPO's "years away" headline does battle with Willard's "deployed and operational now*" headline (with * denoting "not fully operational").  There is no real disagreement between the pieces, it's just how the selling is being spun.  Pomfret's sell accurately notes that the capability to kill a carrier is years away, while Willard's sells the notion that just having a DF-21D capable of being fired and on the launcher signals the intent to blow up our carriers.  So no real argument on the facts, just one side (WAPO) publishing a piece deflating the arms race momentum and Willard popping up almost immediately to counter that impression with an arms race strengthening claim.

The difference here is that when the Chinese develop a capability, we say they intend to use, and when we develop a similarly threatening capability, we say we're developing it purely for defensive means.  And if both navies stuck in their backyards with these capabilities, there would be no discussion. But we have the tendency to bring ours right to China's front door, and thus the conversation begins.  We have our reasons for such a global reach. We just need to ask ourselves what we're trying to achieve here. If all we want is to propel an arms race, then objective achieved.  If we hope to cower the Chinese during their rise, then that won't work, especially over something as sensitive as Taiwan.  If we want a truly cooperative relationship with China, we'd find another route in the military realm--something less provocative than this one.  But we don't seek that route.  We say, in effect, we need to be able to make the Chinese cower right on their doorstep, and if they can't handle that as a prerequisite for our friendship, then too bad.

And then we wonder why our mil-mil ties are so strained.

I'm not arguing against the logic of the individual moves in the race: we scare them and they come up with capability to negate that asset, and so now we come up with AirSea Battle, whose logic I cited approvingly in a recent China Security piece. I'm arguing against the entire race itself, and I'm especially arguing against letting that race dynamic be driven by the latest forward-selling claims of military types on both sides, because, in this atmosphere, the most aggressive forward-selling wins the headline battle time and again. And the result is always the same: the countering side is driven to the next step.  At the beginning and the end of the day, everybody agrees the scenario remains unlikely, but some of us argue that we should nonetheless pursue this arms race vigorously--just in case.  And that's a self-fulfilling prophesy driven by the most militant voices on both sides.

Far-sighted types on both sides will tell you that the inevitable next stage for this race is space. And I guarantee you, that when both sides take the next step, they will have gloriously justified rationales.  Sensible-sounding, authoritative types will tell us these steps must be taken.  But the underlying logic will still suck when arrayed against the larger realities of globalization and our interdependent relationship. But we will be told these are prudent measures, all things being considered.  And the big lie will be: this is the only path possible.

Thompson quotes a recent post by me on the CSBA bombing maps and reprints one himself.  I ginned up that post because I want people to understand why the Chinese chortle when we say things like, "We have no intention of going to war with you." [For the record, the CSBA is a private-sector think tank very much in favor with the current Pentagon and this tank is widely credited with successfully selling the AirSea Battle Concept to the Defense Department, so when it publishes things, they come with the implied imprimatur of the USG]. China parks no carriers off our coast, nor does any wargames up close, nor has any air force bases within strike range.  We have all those on China, and we publish war plans in detail saying we'll bomb their entire country and destroy all their shipping and sink all their naval vessels - for starters! 

And no, I don't think its particularly "provocative" for the Chinese to develop weaponry (which they most certainly are, even if it's taking them time) to prevent our carriers from sitting off their coast with the capability of launching attacks across the breadth and depth of their mainland.  I don't find that counter odd at all.  I would find it odd if a rising power sat idly by while another nation (that wants a different political system for it) has the capability of unleashing such military strikes and routinely floats that capability along its shoreline--especially when that same country has a record of toppling regimes.

And yeah, that's pretty ballsy - or just plain stupid - when you're in the financial situation we're in. Our military remains - by and large - clueless about the larger economic interdependency we have with China.  I mean, they're aware of it, but THEY JUST DON'T GET IT. That lack of understanding, combined with the knuckleheads sprinkled across the upper reaches of the PLA and PLAN, is one dangerous combination, because this is how world orders are destroyed: ambitious people simply doing what they think is their job, and nobody with enough courage or intelligence to rein them in.

I want a strong military, and I'm on too many records to play saying that I want to use it regularly. This isn't about who's "realistic" about the world. This is about who understands the place of war in the modern era and who still wants to keep it an isolated plaything - no matter the cost or consequences.

Dangerous stuff.

I'm not picking on Willard.  I don't know the man.  He comes with the reputation of a hard-liner and he's demonstrating that.  Most guys go to PACOM and see the larger picture and push for better relations with China.  We've seen that time and again. Willard is pushing in another direction because he believes that is best, but I think such thinking takes us down a very uncertain and foolish path.  I see no strategic logic in it.  I see only community self-interest (USN, USAF) and tired historic analogies (the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere nonsense from CSBA).

Globalization is a bit too important to be left to the generals and admirals and retired colonel think-tankers.

Again, you can tell me we need to hedge on the Chinese.  That's easy.  Deciding we need to be able to fight them instantaneously right on their shoreline and destroy their entire military lest they do something we fear? That's a bit aggressive by anyone's standards. Getting up in their grill regularly on this score? Again, a bit aggressive. They don't do it to us and nobody else does it to them, so why are we so convinced we need to tee up a war with China to feel secure?  And why right now?

This is not a discussion we're having.  This is one our military is pushing along the path on its own, justifying itself on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (and please, don't tell me PACOM feels this bit of legislation to be a burden they must meet because it's a hunting license and certain elements on our side simply love it). The rest of America is clueless on the subject. We're told simply to be scared and accept the arms race that results.

And that's wrong. We have a choice here and we're limiting ourselves to 19th-century logic. No wonder nobody trusts our leadership anymore. We bark and we don't listen.  We live in the past. We're clueless about the present and mostly scared about the future.

We are killing our own global leadership with such hyperbole and fear-mongering, and we deserve to taken down a peg or two in global power fora if we don't improve (already happening). Our great genius in creating this globalization is that ultimately, it does not need us to continue. It only needs our unwillingness to destroy it.

And now, even that basic intelligence is being brought into question.

The strategic "tells" on China's military build-up

NOTE:  No WPR column today because journal takes off this week.

Great WAPO piece by John Pomfret (by way of David Emery) on the hollowness that is China's military rise.

Great line from Chinese expert (from China) about the inability of China's defense industry to create good engines being the "heart disease" of the PLA. Why?  It's the crux of their inability to create a solid force structure on their own, hence the need to buy so much from Russia (half of the latter's exports in arms).

So how afraid are we supposed to be about a force that buys Russian stuff?  Meanwhile, the much-feared "carrier killer" missile is . . . how many years from being operational?  Who knows.

But here's the larger logic and the real "tell" when it comes to strategic intent:  because China refuses to station troops abroad, it really doesn't have any overseas bases in the traditional sense. That, plus a paltry 3 replenishment ships and almost no training time for their subs (relative to ours) says this is nowhere close to being a blue-water force. It is - at best - a regional area-denial force, which means it's completely and narrowly defensive in scope.

And yeah, until China changes it mind about "non-interference" as represented by stationing of troops abroad, it will NEVER be a blue-water navy - simple as that.

I don't want China's navy to be offensive, but I do want it to become global over time. It can do that and remain largely defensive.  China's resource dependency demands it.

And I want that because America will need some help in the years and decades ahead.  Our fiscal reality demands it.

More Chinese media coverage

Seemingly, a second Phoenix TV story on the "term sheet" discussion coverage.

My WPR column of this week (Obstacles to a U.S.-China Partnership Made in U.S.A.?) gets translated into Chinese and then posted by:

• Xinhua.net
• ChinaDaily.com 

The Chinese essay on the "term sheet" in Lianhezaobao（联合早报) of Singapore has been re-posted by the two influential website of China. See below:

• 星岛环球网 (Website Stnn.cc) 
• 中国选举与治理网(Website China Elections and Governance)

Esquire: "When China Ruled the World" (January issue)

For the record, my 20th piece in the magazine.

Intro:

There's a moment in part two of Quentin Tarantino's revenge epic, Kill Bill, in which legendary martial-arts master Pai Mei teaches the Bride how to exact her revenge by delivering the killer blows instantly and then waiting for her nemesis to drop. Pai Mei "hits you with his fingertips at five different pressure points on your body, and then lets you walk away. But once you've taken five steps, your heart explodes inside your body and you fall to the floor."

And the battle is over before it really begins.

Okay, a gruesome analogy, perhaps, but apt. I'm here to tell you that America plunged its fingertips into the Middle Kingdom's body politic across the 1970s, beginning with Nixon going to China in 1972 and culminating with Jimmy Carter's normalization of relations in 1979. The first embrace allowed aged Mao Tse-tung to extinguish his nonstop internal purge known as the Cultural Revolution by firewalling his fears of Soviet antagonism. The second cemented China's wary-but-increasingly-warm relationship with the United States and allowed Deng Xiaoping, who narrowly survived Mao's insanities, to dismantle the dead emperor's dysfunctional socialist model, quietly burying Marx with the most revolutionary of eulogies — to get rich is glorious!

Deng chose wisely: Reversing Mikhail Gorbachev's subsequent logic, he focused on the economics while putting off the politics. This decision later earned him the sobriquet "the butcher of Tiananmen" when, in 1989, the political expectations of students quickly outpaced the Party's willingness for self-examination. But it likewise locked China onto a historical pathway from which it cannot escape, or what I call the five D's of the dragon's decline from world-beater to world-benefactor: demographics, decrepitude, dependency, defensiveness, and — most disabling of all — democratization.

Let us begin this journey right where Deng did, with a focus on the family.

Read the entire article at Esquire.com or in the January issue now on newstands.

Our plans to bomb the length and breadth of China

From AirSea Battle:  A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, by Jan Van Tol and others at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Under the section, "Blind PLA ISR Systems," this is the map of all the sites we'd presumably want to bomb as early in the campaign as possible:

Then in the section, "Executing a Missile Suppression Campaign," here's all the sites we'd want to hit early as well:

Then here's the sub bases we'd need to strike as part of our "Defeating the PLA submarine force":

It's interesting for our president to meet China's and sign a joint declaration where both sides say they don't consider the other to be an enemy and then to have a Pentagon-favorite military think tank publish maps of strike sites all over China that we'd want to hit in the opening days of our war with the Mainland over Taiwan.

When you're that open with your plans, it's hard to describe anything the Chinese do in return as particularly "provocative." And yet, we do offer Beijing the benefit of our transparency on the subject.

Me?  If somebody publishes maps of the U.S. delineating all the places they'd want to bomb on the first day of the war . . . I'd take that kinda personally.  No, I'm not naive enough to believe the Chinese don't have theirs. But it takes a certain chutzpah to publish yours so openly while decrying Chinese "provocations" and "throwing their weight around."  China hasn't waged war in a very long time.  The U.S. does so regularly.  Whose maps should we take more seriously?

I know, I know. We must think these bad thoughts in order to prevent their occurrence. I'm sure we have similar maps for every country in the world yes?  Just to be certain?

Fox Business News interview on Esquire China piece & "term sheet" proposal

COMMENTARY:  Felt I did alright considering all the pain meds over the past few days (I went cold turkey this ayem).  My right ear certainly stands out!  If you look closely, you'll see black-and-blue bruising.  The ENT basically had to enter my ear canal from behind the ear, so it's like he cut it off and then sewed it back on--hence the absurd swelling and why my ear sticks out so.  But trust me, I look 1000% better than the day before, and then the day before that, and so on. When I got home Friday, I looked like some CG monster!

Feed was nice into my left ear, and because I couldn't hear anything out of my right, I was sort of nicely insulated (i.e., no listening to myself live in the room and feeling disconnected from my interviewer in NYC). Jerry sat off to my right and watched the whole show quietly, but he found it weird that I would suddenly speak and then go silent and then speak and then go silent and . . ..

Felt it was a decent performance, considering the surgery recovery and all.  Nice limo ride into Indy for it, which Jerry enjoyed.  Felt I mentioned Esquire and my Beijing partners sufficiently, and the book and Wikistrat got nice plugs.  Obviously could have gone on far longer and there was so much more ground I wanted to cover, but there you have it in 5-6 minutes.

Final indignity:  vid stops right when I blink, like somebody turned the robot off!

On Fox Business News today b/t 1100-1130 EST

The details:

SHOW: FOX BUSINESS DAYTIME
ANCHORS: DAGEN MCDOWELL & CONNELL MCSHANE
INTERVIEW WINDOW: 11:00-11:30AM ET

I hope to post link to online video once it's up.  Waiting on Fox.

Meanwhile:

• Singaporean Chinese-language newspaper Lianhezaobao covers the term sheet solution
• That story's picked up by Ta Kung Pao.

POSTSCRIPT:  Got to WFYI (local PBS) early and had some fun with son Jerry.

WPR's The New Rules: Obstacles to a U.S.-China Partnership Made in U.S.A.?

 

In a column two weeks ago, I described the outlines of a proposed grand-strategic bargain between China and the United States. Basically, the "term sheet" that I helped draw up proposed various bilateral compromises over the security issues -- Taiwan, North Korea, Iran and the South China Sea, among others -- that keep the relationship clouded by profound strategic mistrust. The resulting climate of confidence would encourage Beijing to invest some of the trillions of dollars it holds more directly into our economy, instead of simply using them to facilitate our skyrocketing public debt. Since the column appeared, I and my co-authors spent two weeks in Beijing meeting with top government-sponsored think tanks and retired Chinese senior diplomats to discuss and revise the proposal. I thought it would be useful to report on this dialogue.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

The final version of the Sino-American grand strategy "term sheet"

Downloadable PDF

U.S.-P.R.C. Presidential Executive Agreement 

For Peaceful Coexistence & Economically Balanced Relationship 

Prepared by John Milligan-Whyte, Dai Min and Thomas P.M. Barnett 

Dec. 14th, 2010 

Presidents of U.S. and P.R.C. sign an executive agreement containing each nation’s pledge that: 

1. U.S. and P.R.C will never go to war with the other; 
2. Each will respect the other’s sovereignty and distinct political and economic systems; 
3. U.S. pledge to eschew regime change in P.R.C. and of non-interference in its internal affairs; 
4. P.R.C pledges to continue its economic, social, and political reforms. 

Taiwan 

Pledged demilitarization of Taiwan situation, to include: 

• Informal U.S. moratorium on arms transfers to Taiwan; 
• U.S. President’s adherence to defense requirements of Taiwan Relations Act of1979 is achieved through the following alternative means; 
• P.R.C. reduction of strike forces arrayed against Island; 
• U.S. reduction of strike forces arrayed against P.R.C. Mainland; and 
• Negotiation and promulgation of confidence building measures between U.S. and P.R.C. militaries. 

North Korea 

Pledged de-escalation of strategic uncertainty surrounding North Korea nuclear program, to include: 

• U.S. eschews regime change in North Korea; 
• P.R.C. encourages North Korea to adopt economic reform policies to be implemented on terms appropriate to North Korea’s own situation; 
• North Korea agrees to terminate nuclear program and resume economic cooperation with South Korea; and 
• U.S. and P.R.C. support peaceful reunification of North and South Korea on terms and timetable determined by North and South Korea. 

Iran 

Pledged management of relations with Iran to include: 

• U.S. eschews regime change in Iran; 
• P.R.C to support Iran’s peaceful development of its nuclear energy program; 
• Iran to willingly submit to regular international inspections of its nuclear energy program; and 
• U.S. to eliminate trade restrictions and promote trade with Iran. 

South China Sea & East China Sea 

Pledged management of sovereignty disputes to be solved peacefully and bilaterally, to include: 

• P.R.C. sets up multilateral South China Sea Regional Joint Development Corporation with neighboring claimant states; and 
• P.R.C. pledges to negotiate resolution of all such disputes on the basis of the P.R.C.-ASEAN agreement entitled, “The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” 

ASEAN Economic and Peacekeeping Collaboration 

U.S. and P.R.C pledge: 

• Harmonization and coordination of their respective roles in regional economic and security forums; 
• Pursuit of peaceful coexistence in their bilateral relations with other Asian nations; and 
• Promotion of economic stability and growth of ASEAN nations in their multilateral relations within ASEAN, APEC, etc. 

Military-to-Military Ties 

U.S and P.R.C. pledge to cooperate on international and non-traditional security issues, to include: 

• Lifting of U.S. embargo on military sales to China; 
• Regular scheduling of joint naval exercises in Asian waters, with standing invitations to other regional navies; 
• Permanent expansion of officer-exchange program; 
• Creation of joint peacekeeping force/command in conjunction with other countries within the UN Security Council framework; 
• Expansion of U.S.-P.R.C Maritime and Military Security Agreement to include frequency of U.S. close-in reconnaissance; and 
• Establlishment of joint commission collaborating annually on U.S. and P.R.C. technology sharing and transparency of budget expenditures. 

Existing and Future International Institutions and Issues 

U.S. and P.R.C. pledge to support continued reform of existing institutions (e.g., UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, G20) to better reflect the evolving global economy and international issues, to include climate change, Doha Agreement, etc. 

Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED) 

To implement the new collaborations: 

• SED becomes permanently sitting commission for continuous senior-level communications and collaboration on economic and security issues; and 
• SED reviews all existing tariffs, WTO complaints, and other trade and economic disputes and issues. 

P.R.C. Investment into U.S. Economy 

P.R.C. pledges to invest up to 1 trillion USD directly into U.S. companies at direction of U.S. President in exchange for: 

• U.S. removes trade restrictions and high-technology export bans with P.R.C.; 
• P.R.C. commits to purchase sufficient amount of U.S. goods/services to balance bilateral trade on annual basis; 
• P.R.C. companies’ access to U.S. market made equal to that of U.S. companies access to P.R.C. market; 
• Ownership limit for new P.R.C. investments in U.S.-owned or controlled corporations limited to 45 percent of shares, with additional 10 percent reserved for preferred equity/pension funds on a case-by-case basis and final 45 percent remaining with non-P.R.C. ownership; 
• Ownership limit for new U.S. companies’ investments in P.R.C. limited to 45 percent with additional 10 percent reserved for preferred equity/pension funds on a case-by-case basis and final 45 percent remaining with P.R.C. ownership; 
• U.S. and P.R.C. to facilitate global joint ventures between U.S. and P.R.C. companies, with initial example to involve major U.S. firm, possibly General Motors; and 
• U.S. and P.R.C. to collaborate in SED on goal of full employment throughout each economy, targeting in particular areas suffering inordinate unemployment or needing special economic growth arrangements. 

Other Areas of Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation 

P.R.C. and U.S. to collaborate: 

• Implementing principles in the Preamble, Article 1 of the UN Charter; 
• Rehabilitation of failing and failed states seeking assistance; 
• Combining U.S. and P.R.C. markets, technology and financing to ensure affordable costs for all nations of effective pollution remediation and sustainable energy and financing of globally needed technology; and 
• Joint space exploration with other UN member states. 

No Creation or Operation of “G2” Arrangement 

Nothing in this Executive Agreement constitutes, is intended to, nor permits the creation or operation of a “G2”, and instead this Agreement: 

• Establishes an improved framework of collaboration among the U.S., P.R.C. and other UN member states; 
• Neither seeks nor infers any formal alliance between the U.S. and P.R.C.; and 
• Creates a new U.S. and P.R.C. partnership commitment to the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the UN Charter. 

Mutually agreed on the _______day of_________ 2011. 

____________________________________            ______________________________________ 

President of the United States Barack Obama           People’s Republic of China President Hu Jintao 

Esquire's Politics Blog: Obama's Afghanistan Review, Decoded

So the White House just released its much-anticipated review of our ongoing military efforts in Afghanistan (and Pakistan, mind you). And while President Obama, Bob Gates, and Hillary Clinton took pains to explain in a press conference on Thursday that "this continues to be a very difficult endeavor," it can also be very difficult to parse propaganda from, you know, the actual end of a modern war. But since this is a reasonably well-written document that the president's talking about here — and since it more or less outlines the past, present, and future of our troops' presence in region in a still-untidy five pages — it seems worthwhile to deconstruct the review line-by-line... and (white) lie-by-lie. Here goes.

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

More Chinese coverage of grand strategy "solution" term sheet

Found here at the newspaper Ta Kung Pao.  This is a shot, left to right, of John Milligan-Whyte of the Center for America-China Partnership (New York/Beijing), President Chen Yulu of Beijing Foreign Studies University (which trains the bulk of China's diplomats), me, and Dai Min also of the Center.  That was last Saturday late afternoon/evening.  Across the table were a bunch of senior policy-experts/academics, the anchor of CCTV4 (I recognized her from watching her in DC when I catch it) and other press.  Beyond them were four rows of audience from all over the place. They did simultaneous translation (I'm wearing an earpiece you can't see). Maybe total audience of 60-75.

It was a good event:  opening bit from Chen, 5 or so from Dai Min, 20 or so from me, then John for 20, and then an hour of questions. Later a dinner.

The second s/c-ite comes from Phoenix TV out of Hong Kong. Basic summary of event (citing Takungpao story) and then interview of expert.

Filming was done by the Center of all of meetings.  I am expecting to have access to some edited compilation in the near term.  When I do, I will embed here from Center's site.

Bloomberg BusinessWeek pickup of my China Daily article

Found here.

Back home, finally.  Couple of days to get things done and then I have ear drum fixed.