There are two primary themes associated with the Maritime Strategy that are directly sourced to Toms work. Both are exampled well in the latest CSBA analysis I sent to Tom before its release.
The first money quote:
Because the United States was no longer constrained by the multi-polar competition of the Oceanic Era or the intense two-way competition of the Transoceanic Era, it was free to wield its substantial diplomatic, economic, and military power against any perceived threat to the advancement of globalization. Indeed, over time, some strategists began to conflate threats to globalization with direct threats to US national security. As one analyst wrote, US political leaders essentially globalized the Monroe Doctrine, which in turn led US national security interests to become broader, more global, and more expansive in scope. In the pursuit of US interests, although Democratic administrations may have emphasized multilateral solutions to a greater degree than Republicans, Bill Clinton’s idea of the United States as the “indispensable nation” was only slightly different from the neoconservatives’ notion of the United States as a benevolent “global hegemon.” Not surprisingly, then, during this early unilateral phase of the global Era, the United States became accustomed to going and getting its way, either without allied support or with “coalitions of the willing” that acquiesced to or supported American-led efforts.
The theme of “disconnectedness from globalization defines danger" is a driving force in the Maritime Strategy discussion. That theme is central to proposals of new initiatives like Global Fleet Stations, Proactive Humanitarian deployments, and regional maritime domain awareness for 'shared pictures.' Basically everything begins with engagement, not "disconnectedness", and the theme has become accepted as a requirement for credible principles and concepts for the peacetime strategy from the Navy POV.
The second money quote:
Given these advantages, the “Sea Services will establish a persistent global presence using distributed forces that are organized by mission.” The concept highlights four key geographical areas in which the Sea Services will be postured. It calls for “combat credible” forces to be continuously deployed in the Western Pacific and Arabian/Persian Gulf, and “increased peacetime activities” in Africa and the Western Hemisphere (Central and South America). Consistent with the concept’s theme of protecting the globalized system, this force posture reflects a shift away from the “functioning core” of globalization, especially North America and Europe, and toward the “non-integrating gap” of globalization that stretches from Central America and the northeastern corner of South America across Africa, into the Indian Ocean and down through the southernmost extension of the East Asian littoral. However, while these four regions merit special attention, the concept makes plain that naval forces can be “selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere.”
"Core and Gap" is the context for the Maritime Strategy discussion regarding where naval forces will operate. Where core and gap is not specifically cited to Tom, it is either assumed or implied. While there are other themes from Tom's work that enter the discussion, including Sysadmin and Leviathan from blogs (that Eagle1 link that started this discussion is a good example), those two themes cited above are nearly universal for the strategic context behind WHERE the maritime strategy is applied and WHAT the Navy will do.
If strategy is ends, ways, means, and context; PNM became primary source for ways and context, and there is a good argument that it applies to ends as well if like me one considers the mission statement of the Maritime Strategy to be "preventing war is as important as winning wars."
3 points as evidence.
First, the Kaplan "Navy's Flat Earth Strategy" immediately following the Maritime Strategy release was blogged extensively by several dozen. In comments in any number of blogs, Tom's work is cited. Kaplan may have referenced Thomas Friedman, but everyone who read the maritime strategy cited the Kaplan story with the name Thomas PM Barnett. A common commenter reaction I read in a number of places was "Somewhere Dr. Barnett is smiling."
Second. I get PPTs all the time from people who want me to read this or that and blog about it. I don't even know who most of the authors are, they just assume someone higher up is reading the blog based on my blogs traffic or discussions in their circles. I'd say half if not more leverage Tom's work in some obvious way. Note, the authors don't cite Tom's work, nor do they even use the same terminology, but the roots are self-evident (the map has become a religious artifact in any Navy brief that has the word strategy). Thus is the analysis I constantly see from within the Navy.
Third, I'd bet $100 that either you or Tom was contacted about VA Morgans blogger roundtable a couple weeks ago. I'd double or nothing that bet one of you was the first person contacted about the roundtable.
It would take awhile for me to list all the blog posts as more evidence, some are already linked from Tom's blog anyway, and a review of my blog would reveal more if more analysis or research is required. The gist is important though, what is often being called the Maritime Strategic Concept, what the Navy has declassified and called strategy, basically the document establishes ends, ways, and context; and given that I only communicate with naval analysts and aids of Congress, it says a lot that nearly all of them see the source for ways and context as derived directly from Thomas Barnett's work.
Thanks for all of the work, Galrahn. We're hoping to see it in Great Powers, too.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 2:28AM 
