Place diatribe here

For those of you who caught it, this space was previously occupied by a significant rant by me in the direction of my former speaking agency, Leigh Bureau.

As much as I feel that organization is very badly run and very dishonest, I don't even want to give them the satisfaction of the diatribe.

It was one of those things that was great to write, but better to toss in the garbage once done, like my previous relationship with Leigh Bureau.

First time I've ever erased a post (yes, I know they don't really get erased) and I'm hoping it shows some emerging maturity. God knows I earned some at Leigh Bureau's gain.

Kim or Iran?

Tom got this email from Victor Algaze of Manhattan Beach, CA:

Mr. Barnett-

Many times, I have heard you mention the idea that an Asian NATO (or rough equivalent) could be cemented "over Kim Jong-Il grave" if some provocative action from DPRK unified disparate groups.

With that in mind, I have a question:

I cannot imagine the frustration you must feel when "Monday-morning quarterbackin'" "armchair sitting" geo-strategic thinkers look at a map with a circular overlay of the useful range of that North Korean missile and see an opening, but humor me: what do you think? Can this "crisis", like the Chinese character, represent also an opportunity for a new security partnership?

PS. Last chapter of BFA is EXACTLY what we youngsters are hungry to read- if you can-please do more of that.

Tom's reply:

Third book will be all that.

On DPRK question is one posed by Sanger in NYT today: does Bush want to work Kim more than Iran in the time remaining?

To me the choice is obvious because Kim is excuse to upgrade relations with China. The Bush problem is that this administration wants to simultaneously constrain China with countries like India, Vietnam and Japan, and China will clearly come away from a reunification process as the dominant regional kingpin (why does the U.S. keep ground troops in East Asia then with such stretching demands in the Middle East and with African demands looming in places like Sudan and Somalia and maybe even Egypt soon enough?).

Strategists keep saying China is not ready to liquidate the DPRK and that the South fears the costs involved. But honestly I think the U.S. defense community is more nervous and least prepared to see that scenario go away because then both our national missile defense rationale and our East Asia rationales are weakened. At that point we must fish or cut bait on the China threat plus explain why we still starve the Army and Marines and the Long War on assets.

That is why I consider North Korea such a positive floodgate of strategic change and opportunity. Done well we can shift a ton of resources from Core to Gap and close off the possibility of great power war in Asia while shifting resources to the SysAdmin force and function and finally accepting the strategic requirements of the Long War.

In my mind Kim is doing Bush a big favor. Big question now is whether or not Chris Hill is empowered to negotiate anything other than useless sanctions when he lands in Beijing.

Progress toward SysAdmin

Sent to me by one of my favorite CENTCOM majors: What US wants in its troops: cultural savvy. He writes:

Another great article on how we are trying to adapt to 4GW. This one caught my eye because Dr Salmoni was one of my instructors at NPS. I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that it's being done right at this school.

It reeks of "less Clauzewitz, more Sun Tzu," which speaks greatly to the SysAdmin shift.

One last thing on China...

Nowhere in my interactions do I get this vibe of China as uber-strategists who think long-term compared to those puny American brains that can only concentrate on the here and now. Nor do I see it in their writings. The more I interact with them, the more I think that's the usual mirror-imaging: they model themselves on us because we're the leaders and then we freak at their modeling behavior, believing it reveals some deep, strategic, long-term thinking when in actuality none exists.

I find China as clueless about the future as most emerging countries. That's why they plan so much. People really confident about the future don't have to plan. They simply know what to do. I believe this is a naturally accruing capability with age, and in that regard, China is "young" despite the age of its civilization. Again, we need to think of them more like the U.S. at the start of the 20th century: getting brash but essentially uncertain and nervous about how to behave in the world. The more the bluster, the more the fear--I always say.

Speaking to defense analysts there, most confided that China's military build-up is without any serious grand strategic thought, and that stuff just gets bought due to bureaucratic outcomes more than seriously applied strategic or even operational rationales. Sad to say, the Chinese military is far too much like our own in that regard.

And that's why the idea of alliance with the U.S. in the SysAdmin function interests them so: they are desperate for hints and guidance on how to emerge militarily over something besides Taiwan, which remains their mindless default position--unless we choose to move them off it.

The growing backlash against the Chinese in the Gap is real, and it will unfold. Better we have them grooved into some useful role there militarily when some serious shit really hits the fan. Better for us, better for the Chinese, better for the Gap, better for the Core.

Recollections from the China trip

DATELINE: Above the garage in Indy, 5 July 2006

Cut short the family holiday trip over the 4th to get back for quick one-day journey to DC (actually No. VA) to meet with exec of company that’s expressed the usual interest in Enterra.

On cab ride home (Pilot still being fixed) I tried to write down some of my major impressions of how the vision/briefs were received in China at the various venues (U. of Beijing, military research tank/audience, and prestigious China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR).

First, I was surprised to see how many had already read the book in English, even more so how many brought volumes for signature. The bottom line being, the Chinese pol-mil elite study our writings a lot.

Second, most of their interest centered on the future of U.S.-China relations, so my argument for strategic alliance were of the utmost interest, the general feeling being that it was possible to consider on China’s side but that the Americans would be too suspicious for it to happen--or simply too fearful of China’s “rise” to see the logic of it.

Third, what seemed to strike the biggest chord with people was my notion that while the U.S. needed alliance with China, China needed it even more with the U.S. Torpedo the global economy and America’s still relatively rich and strong, but China might well come apart. Yes, free-loading on the global security was fine for now (and just about all Chinese I interact with loathe the notion of stepping up the country’s global security profile), but a budding backlash is brewing in the Gap against perceived Chinese economic exploitation that says China’s formula for trade with these states is really no better than the old European colonial model (raw materials at cheap prices for China and a flood of cheap finished goods for the local elites and minute middle class--so some enclaved development but no real integration). So while America catches a lot of flack today as the face of globalization, China’s continued emergence will soon push it into that same limelight. So it’s ally now or ally later, with higher costs likely on both sides the longer we collectively wait.

Fourth, China’s foreign policy elite know that the country’s growing reliance on foreign energy is unsustainable, not merely in terms of potential disruption but--quite frankly--in sheer volume required. The system simply will not adjust enough to accommodate China’s growing appetite, so it’s new rules forged by China’s development pathway or inevitable stagnation at some point in the mid-term, with political instability at home as the by-product.

Fifth, the car culture in China is taking off far more today than it was even two years ago. It’s all so 1950s-like (echoing last Sunday’s op-ed), with the leaded gas and the seat belts no one wears and the slower speeds and the plethora of mismatched vehicles on the roads. And it will only get worse in terms of congestion and pollution. People there simply love the freedom of movement too much. Cat’s outta the bag on that one.

Finally, I believe I now have some new friends on the book publishing front, which makes me a whole lot more optimistic on getting both PNM and BFA out. I’ll let my agents follow up on that, but hopefully something will break by the end of the year, perhaps even a joint publication of both books.

Overall, a great trip that will lead to many more, I am sure, and not just to China but to places around Asia.

We have not yet put the man on the moon on post-whatever responses

ARTICLE: “8 Months After Quake, Little Relief for Some Pakistanis: ‘We are sitting here and counting on God,’ says a father of six,” by Carlotta Gall, New York Times, 21 June 2006. p. A3.

ARTICLE: “’Breathtaking’ Waste and Fraud in Hurricane Aid,” by Eric Lipton, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A1.

Eight months past the Pakistani temblor that kills 73k and leaves 3 million homeless in a nation of 170 million (the equivalent in America would be 5 million) and so many “families here still swelter in tents waiting for a government compensation plan to kick in so they can start to rebuild.”

Hmmm. Where have I heard these complaints before?

The Pakistani army is credited with averting widespread hunger and disease and providing emergency shelter to tens of thousands, but then the ball is essentially dropped by the government and--by extension--the international relief community (which is obviously limited by the local government’s low-capacity in the matter and the choices it makes).

So we see the usual pattern in Pakistan that we see in so many other places: big splashy effort by military in immediate aftermath which does much good in limiting damage, followed closely by huge outpouring of private giving along with usual scrimpy public giving, followed by all sorts of grand statements about rebuilding and meeting the needs of the people, followed by a lot of inactivity, waste fraud and abuse, delay, and then sad stories 6-to-12 months later about how people are still suffering the effects of the disaster as though the follow-up was essentially a grand illusion.

And where does all that money go?

Typically, no one knows. But one assumes most is lost to graft, theft and corruption.

David Petraeus told me that he constantly ran into the “man in the moon” problem in Iraq during his years there trying to rebuild: Iraqis would say, “America can put a man on the moon” but it can’t do X in Iraq! Why is that so?”

But the truth is, we can’t put the man on the moon here in the States, as New Orleans has shown.

Can you believe that after 9/11 and all the other hurricanes we’ve had that both FEMA and the American Red Cross have to cry “uncle” and admit they were basically unprepared and overwhelmed by Katrina?

So $2 billion just disappears.

Why is a concept like Development-in-a-Box so compelling and timely?

How can it not be, given our track record at home and abroad?

Sar-Box said that there is a new minimum standard for operating a public business in the U.S. Either meet it or get bought, go bankrupt/out of business or go private. The Bush Doctrine said similar things about the international security environment: new standard that you either meet or your choices are play rogue, go failed or get invaded.

These new rule sets are all about setting new minimum standards and pushing players to best practices. No such minimum rule set yet exists on development and especially so on the subject of post-disaster/conflict recovery.

How can we hope to get good on long-term rehab when our emergency room procedures are so inadequate--again, both at home and abroad?

Just-in-time strategy for this stop on the Long War

ARTICLE: “U.S. and Iraq Make Inroads With Insurgents,” by Greg Jaffe and Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 22 June 2006, p. A3.

ARTICLE: “Some Insurgents Are Asking Iraq For Negotiations: Sunni Groups Reach Out; Reconciliation Plan Draws Responses From Factions Said to Be Nationalist,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A1.

ARTICLE: “Car Bomb Kills More Than 60 In Iraq Market,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 2 July 2006, p. A1.

One story I did not clip but only heard on the TV/radio over the past couple of weeks was members of Congress getting mad at an Iraqi proposal for amnesty to insurgents who have killed American soldiers. All I thought at the time was how unrealistic those sorts of demands would be on our part, plus how insulting they could come off to the locals (as in, it’s okay to kill Iraqis and get amnesty but kill an American and that’s that).

But as far as I know that’s a hubbub that comes and goes, since the first article above said that “the only firm line… was that no amnesty would be granted to members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia or guerrillas intent on restoring Saddam Hussein’s rule.” That seems reasonable enough.

But beyond all those details, the key thing is that we’re talking directly to insurgent groups, and when I say “we,” I mean both the U.S. forces and the Iraqi government. To the extent that Sunni insurgency factions come in from the cold and we affect a sort of ideological divorce between them and the Saddamists and Salafi jihadists represented by Al Qaeda, this insurgency becomes a whole lot more manageable and ultimately small enough to turn over to the Iraqi forces with the U.S. remaining primarily in the advising role (sort of a purer SysAdmin from above--or behind the scenes).

All of this unfolds with increasingly bold talk from U.S. commanders of reducing troop levels in the fall. With the continuing violence, that seems far-fetched as a hope, but it need not be. Insurgencies ratchet up violence as negotiations such as these mature. We’ve seen this time and time again. The insurgents want to be able to claim that the change achieved was primarily due to their willingness to commit acts of violence. For some, it’s an honor thing, for others, sheer negotiating plank, and for still others eyeing the next fight (like the Al Qaeda guys), there is the need to start building the myth--however far-fetched--that it was their “glorious victory that drove out the invaders” when--in reality--the “invaders” simply shifted the Long War to its next logical stop.

Indonesia on the Seam, Indonesia on the front lines in the Long War

ARTICLE: “Spread of Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes Toll on Women,” by Jane Perlez, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A6.

ARTICLE: “Indonesia Scolds U.S. on Terrorism Fight: Defense chiefs openly disagree on America’s actions abroad,” by Michael R. Gordon, New York Times, 7 June 2006, p. A6.

Great pair of stories on always fascinating Indonesia.

Working woman on street waiting for ride home from work, dressed in standard one might expect from any working woman: casual but utilitarian. She is hustled off, the article says, by brown-shirted “tranquility and public order officers” and charged with lewd conduct according to Shariah:

Her case has become a symbol of an increasingly impassioned tussle in Indonesia between those who favor the introduction of Shariah, or Islamic law--sometimes called Islamic-like laws--by local governments, and those that assert that this large Muslim country, recognized for its moderation and diversity, must hold firm to its secular Constitution of 1945.

There are strong similarities, I would argue, to this local-v-federal struggle in the history of the U.S. civil rights movement: local governments saying “this is how we do it around here” and the central government struggling to respect that desire without letting it ruin the social fabric of the nation as a whole.

As with U.S. civil rights, the strongest undercurrents here are sexual: in the U.S. it was the innate fear of black men “preying” on white women and in many Muslim states it is simply the perceived promiscuity of “dangerous” females imitating the nefarious and degenerate ways of the West.

Beyond that internal struggle, there is the larger strategic reality that Indonesia is a front-line state in the Long War, and as it moves in the direction of Core status, it will tell us much about how we should fight that Long War. As the world’s largest Muslim state, Indonesia is a serious lead goose on both the socio-economic and security fronts:

“Some Indonesia analysts view the United States as focused on the ‘search and destroy’ aspect of the war against terror, and feel that the United States has not focused sufficient attention to winning the ‘hearts and minds’ aspect of the struggle,” according to a study by the Congressional Research Service.

Actually, quite a few American analysts feel the same way.

So Rummy gets a a bit of lecture from his counterpart in Indonesia while visiting there recently. We should get used to such lectures. There will be many more in the future.

The New Core sets most of the new rules in economics, but expect the Seam States like Indonesia to set many of the new rules in security. It’s only natural, given the front-line status.

Keeping a lid on China is China’s task, not America’s

ARTICLE: “China Covers Up Violent Suppression of Village Protest,” by Howard W. French, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A3.

ARTICLE: “Rioting in China Over Label on College Diplomas,” by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 22 June 2006, p. A1.

Caboose braking comes in many forms in China. In my vernacular, the “caboose” of the globalization train for any country tends to be the rural poor. It’s their ability to handle the whirlwind of rapid globalization that determines any country’s speed in that process. The train’s engine (usually industrialized, well-connected coastal areas) cannot travel any faster than the caboose.

Well, China’s caboose is getting awfully cranky, across the dial. China’s choices here are stark: slow down globalization and risk even further unrest due to slower growth, or make the tough political choices that deal with that despair at its source (like introducing private land ownership to the countryside like it exists in the cities) or give that despair more political voice in the system (more local self-representation and self-rule and more conduits for dialogue with the center).

Right now, if you’re a peasant in China and you’re pissed off, you basically have three choices: live with the pain, leave the pain (illegal economic immigration) or riot to get some action from the powers that be--ever so far away.

This is not an efficient system for China, which is moving a big chunk of its population along to something better--or so some students at a regional university thought when they paid high tuition rates on the premise of receiving a degree with the parent university’s name on the diploma. When those diplomas were handed out and the right seal of approval was not affixed, what did the students do? They rioted too.

One thing when peasants riots in China. That’s to be expected, like the summer dust storms in Beijing. But students at universities? Over a diploma? That shows you that expectations are rising across the dial in China, meaning more voices demanding to be heard when thing don’t go according to the plan--or the market’s expectations.

Many will interpret these examples of unrest as marking the beginning of the end of the Chinese economic miracle, when in reality they mark the end of its beginning. The easy stuff has been done. Now we get to the hard part, where ceilings are increasingly determined by the government’s willingness to trust its own markets and its own people more. Deals are being made and deals are being broken. As long as the volume of the former outpaces that of the latter, this train keeps on rolling.

Losers are hard to manage, politically speaking, but winners even more so.

The perceived failure of Israel’s one-state solution is really Hamas’ missed opportunity for statehood

ARTICLE: “Palestinian Leader Orders Forces to Find Seized Israeli: Israel Masses Troops and Armor at Border,” by Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 27 June 2006, p. A8.

ANALYSIS: “Hamas: Rivalry Breeds Extremes,” by Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 2 July 2006, p. WK4.

ARTICLE: “Seizures Show New Israel Line Against Hamas: Party Officials to Face Criminal Charges,” by Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 30 June 2006, p. A1.

ARTICLE: “Israel Squeezes, Steering Gazans Toward Hamas,” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 2 July 2006, p. A1.

EDITORIAL: “Hamas Provokes a Fight,” New York Times, 29 June 2006, p. A24.

First I was a clear Israel-backer with PNM, because of my arguments on Iraq. Then I was a clear enemy of Israel with BFA, because of my arguments on Iran. Naturally, many saw me as just plain inconsistent, because you have to be one or the other, right?

Well, I think Israel is doing the right thing right now on this latest terrorist attack from Palestine. The one-state solution with the fence isn’t enough if Hamas can’t change its stripes once in power. Israel has waited long enough for some signs, and then got a clear one with this tunnel-enabled attack.

The truth is worse than the implied assumption: Hamas may well have had nothing to do with the attack, because Hamas is no more in control of Palestine’s security situation than Fatah was.

The Palestinians have a bitter joke: What would happen if the Palestinian Authority disappeared? The answer: How could you tell?

Those of us who argued for patience had the hope that Hamas’ reputation for unity would mean than deeds would match words, but that unity has proven to be quite fragile. The political wing can promise, but the military wing does what it wants, as do the exiles in Lebanon and Syria.

Israel isn’t strangling the infant government, Hamas’ military wing is, but expect Israel to extend its punishment to those it can reach: the political leaders and the people in the West Bank and Gaza.

Yes, this effort will be largely fruitless in discrediting Hamas, as the rally-round-the-incompetents effect will be profound (why should anything change in the shift from corrupt and incompetent Fatah to more honest and incompetent Hamas?). But not much will be lost in this punitive push that won’t be lost anyway.

The NYT is correct:

Contrary to the hopes of many outsiders, five months in government has failed to educate Hamas to the reality of the world the Palestinians live in. Hamas has merely assumed the political privileges of power without accept the minimal responsibilities that go with it.

In short, Hamas cannot police its own, so the promises of its electoral victory are illusory.

And so the Wall continues to go up with a determined logic, and my blessing. The one-state solution may be costly today, but it’s the best long-term choice for Israel, which will do just fine with its amazingly robust and competitive economic connectivity.

Meanwhile, Palestine will continue to rot from within…

Making it in China will someday soon merge with making it in America

ARTICLE: A Big Shot in China: To fight Nike, an (sic) Beijing sneaker giant aims to turn NBA journeyman Damon Jones into a star,” by Stephanie Kang and Geoffrey A. Fowler, Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2006. P. A1.

ARTICLE: “Indiana Town Woos Honda: Region Reviled Japan’s Cars For Years, but Now It’s Battling To Win New Plant to Build Them,” by Ilan Brat, Wall Street Journal, 22 June 2006, p. B1.

ARTICLE: “Indiana Wins the Bidding for New Honda Assembly Plant,” by Micheline Maynard, New York Times, 29 June 2006, p. C4.

In Blueprint for Action, I describe the journey from Gap to Core, noting that a state’s status as New Core reveals a number of inconceivables, such as it now becomes highly lucrative to become famous in your market.

Well, that day has arrived for Damon Jones, journeyman NBA non-star. Watching a local sneaker firm use him like he’s some Michael Jordan reminds me of middling Major League Baseball stars becoming superstars in Japan in past decades (something that is greatly diluted when you get guys like Suzuki ripping up the record books here in the States).

And far faster than anyone realizes, Americans will soon be wooing Chinese manufacturers (yes, even car manufacturers) just like we now woo Japanese ones. Twenty years ago, if you drove a Honda in Indiana, you risked having it keyed by angry local residents who saw the state as GM territory and nothing else. Now, of course, Indiana woos companies like Honda (successfully, in this last investment decision).

I know, I know, it can never happen.

Except it will, and far faster than anyone can imagine.

The 3-D Hispanics prove a hardy lot in America

ARTICLE: “Of meat, Mexicans and social mobility: Among the very poor, the American Dream is alive and well,” The Economist, 17 June 2006, p. 31.

Most of this article is about the meatpacking industry (clearly, one of the 3-D jobs--as in, dirty, dangerous and difficult), but what struck me were the following factoids about Mexicans in America:

But in absolute terms, Mexicans have grown much richer by coming to the United States. If they had not, they would go home. And their children are doing even better. Whereas only 40% of first-generation Mexican immigrants between the ages of 16 and 20 are in school or college, nearly two-thirds of the second generation are…

Immigrants’ children are typically American citizens, having been born on American soil. More than 90% speak English fluently; by the third generation, 72% speak nothing else. Many help their less-fluent parents with form-filling, as other children help their elders navigate the Internet. The parents, in turn, try to infuse their offspring with their work ethic and entrepreneurial spirit. (Latinos open new firms at a rate three times the national norm).

Three times the norm in start-up businesses! How can entrepreneurial America turn down a crowd like that?

Happy 4th

Got back to Indy and saw my builder had gotten our flag pole up just in time to hang Old Glory.

DPRK missile launches trigger parity with US

Now our failed missile defense is matched by Pyongyang's failed long-range missile offense. Symmetry achieved!

School-in-a-box for India

Lexington Green of Chicago Boyz sends in link to Deeshaa's Rural Infrastructure & Services Commons.

The aim of RISC is to address the problems of one such complex nonlinear system — the rural Indian economy — and to outline a solution that addresses the problem of economic growth comprehensively by accomplishing a set of interlinked transitions to a more efficient equilibrium.

Regarding the concept paper Green writes:

It is interesting... about Connectivity, and microcredit, and seems closely related to issues Tom has written about.

Tom's most recent KnoxNews column

China's U.S.-like time machine

I recently flew from Chicago to Beijing, a prosaic enough journey for this experienced business traveler and, yet, a fascinating journey for this student of U.S. history.

How so?

Putting aside all the cultural differences, traveling to China is like surveying - in real-time fashion - the past dozen decades of America's social and economic history. It's all there: from our 1890s robber baron capitalism to today's high-tech post-industrialism, with a slew of social revolutions tossed in. [read on]