ARTICLE: “Rumsfeld Aims To Elevate Role Of Special Forces,” by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 18-19 February 2006, p. A1.
ARTICLE: “The Future of U.S. Warfare,” Julian Barnes Q&A with Peter Schoomaker, U.S. News & World Report, 27 February 2006, p. 25.
ARTICLE: “Army Teaches Officers to Think Globally,” by Associated Press, Washington Post, 21 February 2006.
ARTICLE: “U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a New Mind-Set: Course in Iraq Stresses the Cultural, Challenges the Conventional,” by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 21 February 2006.
OP-ED: “Musings About the War on Drugs,” by George Melloan, Wall Street Journal, 21 February 2006, p. A19.
OP-ED: “Send in the State Department,” by Robert Kaplan, New York Times, 21 February 2006.
Usual great piece from Jaffe, this time on Rummy’s plan to expand Special Ops Command by growing 14k more bodies (this will take time, Schoomaker points out).
Here’s the worrisome bit:
The Pentagon chief’s focus on these elite forces reflects his conviction that the Iraq war--in which about 140,000 U.S. troops are struggling to rebuild a country from the ground up--is an anomaly that is winding down and won’t be repeated, say senior defense officials.
“We are not going to invade and occupy our way to victory in the long war against Islamic extremism,” said Michael Vickers, who served as a senior adviser on the secretary’s recently released review of Pentagon spending and strategy.
This is an okay argument, if not taken to extremes. Reality is that postwar reconstruction ops are here to stay, whether or not we repeat the largely go-it-alone approach we applied in Iraq. Remember, Bush the Elder started the first go-around on Iraq (beginning, we now know, our successful nation-building process in Kurdistan) and Somalia, and Clinton started efforts in Haiti (resumed under Bush the Younger), Bosnia and Kosovo. Bush then started an effort in Afghanistan (small footprint model) and then restarted the effort in Iraq (go-it-alone model), so you have to be careful to avoid the notion of many Big War hawks in the Pentagon, of which Vickers is certainly one, who want to push off the entirety of the GWOT (not to mention the entire Gap) to SOCOM, leaving the Pentagon free to dream up big wars against a big opponent, as in China.
There is no way SOCOM is going to handle the Gap on its own, and civil affairs will remain largely a niche function so long as it’s ghettoized in SOCOM instead of the Army. Plus, as Frederick Kagan points out in the Jaffe piece, Rumsfeld’s belief in the model of letting the locals handle as much as possible “is unshaken even in the face of multiple setbacks over the last few years.”
As Jaffe notes:
One of the most striking features of the Rumsfeld vision as outlined in the review is that it doesn’t provide much new for the conventional Army and Marine Corps units who are now doing the bulk of the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, it suggests that these sorts of wars are an aberration that won’t be repeated any time soon.
And here I think we finally locate Rumsfeld’s version of MacNamara-like guilt over Iraq. It is a classic out-of-sight-out-of-mind concoction, this QDR, that proclaims the Long War and then immediately outsources it all to SOCOM, as in, “Will no one rid me of this GWOT?”
Schoomaker’s remaking an entire Army for the Long War, but this force, and the Marines, seem missing in action in Rumsfeld’s QDR, which prefers, deep down, to keep planning on great power war with China. Despite all the rhetoric and new support to SOCOM, this is still Rumsfeld trying to lowball the GWOT, reasserting its status as lesser included when compared to “disruptive” threat China.
This is a shame, because the Army, the Marines, and CENTCOM are busting ass to refashion themselves sufficiently for the tasks that lie ahead, whereas Rummy seems intent on farming the entire effort out to an already tapped SOCOM that won’t magically cover the Gap with 14k extra guys.
This low-balling approach is what gets you the multi-decade, no-progress effort called the (global) War on Drugs, or GWOD I suppose. In the GWOD, we’ve transferred most of the costs to American society (roughly $50B a year) that would be better spent on increasing our foreign aid budget... oh, about 10-fold!
But here’s the rub in the end, as Schoomaker points out, and as the new COIN (counter-insurgency) doctrine points out, the winning mix is about 20% kinetic and about 80% non-kinetic. SOCOM, even expanded, comes nowhere near handling the 80% non-kinetic, which invariably involve the Army and Marines big time, along with a lot of civilian US government personnel.
Everyone knows this, except perhaps Rummy and the China hawks in the Pentagon, who want desperately for things to return to the way they were.
Even Robert Kaplan, in an excellent NYT piece, finds himself reaching for an interagency-focused federal department in the model of the British Colonial Office.
Can anyone say “Department of Everything Else”?
Apparently, Bob Kaplan can.