ARTICLE: “Military Budget Spares Weapons From Cutbacks,” by Jonathan Karp and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 6 February 2006, p. A8.
ARTICLE: “Pentagon Adds Initiatives, Retains Old Ones,” by Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, 7 February 2006, p. A11.
ARTICLE: “Defense Plan Puts Off Cuts for Weapon Systems: Proposal Lifts Funding 4.8% To $439.3 Billion for 2007; But Doesn’t Fix ‘Mismatch,’” by Greg Jaffe and Jonathan Karp, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, p. A17.
ARTICLE: “Bush Would Boost Defense, Security In Budget Plan: Social Programs Face Cuts In Proposal for Fiscal 2007; Worries Over Heating Bills,” by Deborah Solomon and John D. McKinnon, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, p. A1.
ARTICLE: “Broad Ripples Of Iraq War In Budgets Of 2 Agencies,” by David S. Cloud and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 7 February 2006, p. A14.
ARTICLE: “One Small Step for Drones: Legendary ‘Skunk Works’ Helps Lockheed Martin Jump Into Unmanned-Plane Market,” by Jonathan Karp, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, p. B1.
First, let me say that I do welcome all the many moves in the QDR toward the SysAdmin force, although I note, as many do, that the vast majority of these changes are operational and organizational, without touching force structure.
The QDR vision, then, is to have it all: to hold onto the past while trying to deal with the future.
And to me, that is unsustainable. So I argue as much in the blog.
I get an email today from a GS-15 from Joint Force Command who says either I make specific recommendations for how the Air Force and Navy can better support the ground forces in the Global War on Terrorism or my arguments against the strategic vision of the QDR are “amateurish.”
Fair enough, say I. I thought I was being clear enough, but let me be as explicit as possible here now.
I think the Navy and Air Force should reduce their force structure ambitions for the long term and accept the notion that funding should be shifted from their services to the Army and Marines to accommodate their rising manpower and current equipment costs. I think you can take basically every new platform requirement enunciated by both services and cut them in half, filling in by continuing to buy current technologies rather than upgrading them in these new platforms. I would then shift those acquisition savings to the Marines and the Army to allow them to plus-up their end strength and treat them better by shortening their overseas deployments (historically, the Navy has preferred to send out its ships for 6-month deployments, so why not the same for soldiers and Marines, instead of year-long affairs?).
In doing this, I would be accepting greater future risk from a “rising China” threat in order to maintain my country’s ability to manage the world in the near and mid-term, believing, as I do, that I am far more likely to obviate any Chinese threat in this manner rather than sub-optimizing my GWOT effort and keeping my powder dry for a China that I outspend, when supplements are included, roughly 10 to 1.
When I make a better world, I give China a better chance to develop peacefully, and I’m more likely to get China to help me in this effort with its own manpower. That is a win-win-win.
When I suboptimize my ground forces’ effort in the GWOT and keeps those much needed resources fenced off for the Big War crowd’s preferred enemy image of China, then I run my Marines and Army ragged (needlessly sacrificing far too many in the meantime), I get a worse world that’s far more likely to push the Chinese toward aggressive acts out of fear, and I deny myself China’s resources. To me, that is lose-lose-lose.
What my JFCOM critic wanted to hear was how I’d rearrange the Air Force and Navy budgets to give each a force structure better suited to supporting the GWOT effort. But again, what I want to do is stop pretending that each service deserves its sacred share no matter what. To me, that’s not strategic thinking, but simply pork-barrel politics and inter-service rivalries at their worst. Navy and Air Force officers and civilians are wrong to persist in this stagnant, unchanging assumption that equal shares somehow answer the strategic mail. Rumsfeld and company let them get away with it, because Cheney and Bush let the Pentagon get away with such overspending.
Worst of all, plenty of Pentagon officials, both civilian and military, know that this have-it-both-ways budget strategy is completely unsustainable—ESPECIALLY IN A LONG WAR.
We can sustain our effort in the GWOT, but we require some services to sacrifice so that others can get the job done.
If stating that simple truth makes me “amateurish,” I accept the charge with gratitude. But sometimes, simple problems meet simple solutions.