The QDR vision is a lose-lose-lose
Tuesday, February 7, 2006 at 5:02PM ARTICLE: “Military Budget Spares Weapons From Cutbacks,” by Jonathan Karp and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 6 February 2006, p. A8.
ARTICLE: “Pentagon Adds Initiatives, Retains Old Ones,” by Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, 7 February 2006, p. A11.
ARTICLE: “Defense Plan Puts Off Cuts for Weapon Systems: Proposal Lifts Funding 4.8% To $439.3 Billion for 2007; But Doesn’t Fix ‘Mismatch,’” by Greg Jaffe and Jonathan Karp, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, p. A17.
ARTICLE: “Bush Would Boost Defense, Security In Budget Plan: Social Programs Face Cuts In Proposal for Fiscal 2007; Worries Over Heating Bills,” by Deborah Solomon and John D. McKinnon, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, p. A1.
ARTICLE: “Broad Ripples Of Iraq War In Budgets Of 2 Agencies,” by David S. Cloud and Joel Brinkley, New York Times, 7 February 2006, p. A14.
ARTICLE: “One Small Step for Drones: Legendary ‘Skunk Works’ Helps Lockheed Martin Jump Into Unmanned-Plane Market,” by Jonathan Karp, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2006, p. B1.
First, let me say that I do welcome all the many moves in the QDR toward the SysAdmin force, although I note, as many do, that the vast majority of these changes are operational and organizational, without touching force structure.
The QDR vision, then, is to have it all: to hold onto the past while trying to deal with the future.
And to me, that is unsustainable. So I argue as much in the blog.
I get an email today from a GS-15 from Joint Force Command who says either I make specific recommendations for how the Air Force and Navy can better support the ground forces in the Global War on Terrorism or my arguments against the strategic vision of the QDR are “amateurish.”
Fair enough, say I. I thought I was being clear enough, but let me be as explicit as possible here now.
I think the Navy and Air Force should reduce their force structure ambitions for the long term and accept the notion that funding should be shifted from their services to the Army and Marines to accommodate their rising manpower and current equipment costs. I think you can take basically every new platform requirement enunciated by both services and cut them in half, filling in by continuing to buy current technologies rather than upgrading them in these new platforms. I would then shift those acquisition savings to the Marines and the Army to allow them to plus-up their end strength and treat them better by shortening their overseas deployments (historically, the Navy has preferred to send out its ships for 6-month deployments, so why not the same for soldiers and Marines, instead of year-long affairs?).
In doing this, I would be accepting greater future risk from a “rising China” threat in order to maintain my country’s ability to manage the world in the near and mid-term, believing, as I do, that I am far more likely to obviate any Chinese threat in this manner rather than sub-optimizing my GWOT effort and keeping my powder dry for a China that I outspend, when supplements are included, roughly 10 to 1.
When I make a better world, I give China a better chance to develop peacefully, and I’m more likely to get China to help me in this effort with its own manpower. That is a win-win-win.
When I suboptimize my ground forces’ effort in the GWOT and keeps those much needed resources fenced off for the Big War crowd’s preferred enemy image of China, then I run my Marines and Army ragged (needlessly sacrificing far too many in the meantime), I get a worse world that’s far more likely to push the Chinese toward aggressive acts out of fear, and I deny myself China’s resources. To me, that is lose-lose-lose.
What my JFCOM critic wanted to hear was how I’d rearrange the Air Force and Navy budgets to give each a force structure better suited to supporting the GWOT effort. But again, what I want to do is stop pretending that each service deserves its sacred share no matter what. To me, that’s not strategic thinking, but simply pork-barrel politics and inter-service rivalries at their worst. Navy and Air Force officers and civilians are wrong to persist in this stagnant, unchanging assumption that equal shares somehow answer the strategic mail. Rumsfeld and company let them get away with it, because Cheney and Bush let the Pentagon get away with such overspending.
Worst of all, plenty of Pentagon officials, both civilian and military, know that this have-it-both-ways budget strategy is completely unsustainable—ESPECIALLY IN A LONG WAR.
We can sustain our effort in the GWOT, but we require some services to sacrifice so that others can get the job done.
If stating that simple truth makes me “amateurish,” I accept the charge with gratitude. But sometimes, simple problems meet simple solutions.
Reader Comments (13)
I'm surprised that you haven't been told that the Air Force is cutting back it's budget. Next year, many organization budgets will be cut by a third. While I agree that some needs to be shifted towards "ground pounders," I believe that focusing on a ground war and using people instead of machines is going back to the past -- old way of doing things. I think technology should be a major focus for future war fighting. Look at how much we gained by inventing and using aircraft, missles, GPS, sattelites, and the list goes on. They have new face shields that the Army has created that are bullet proof. They have a prototype tank that can do some real damage without putting troops in harms way. I just think that cutting back technology places more lives in danger and in the long term costs more.
Liz,
a big part of Tom's thinking is that you can't do the nation-building, peace-keeping, what he calls SysAdmin work without boots on the ground. Tom's all about stand off weapons when employing what he calls the Leviathan, taking someone down like Saddam or Kim Jong-Il. but you can't stand off and do SysAdmin at the same time. and the reality of the recent past and the near future is that we're going to need more SysAdmin capability than Leviathan. our Leviathan capability is already second to none. doesn't mean we should back off of tech and R&D or keeping our capability faw and away the world's greatest. does mean we have to balance those desires with the much more pressing need for SysAdmin and bedgetary constraints.
Why not cut the ground troops now that things are maybe, perhaps winding down in Iraq? I think new weapons procurement should have been frozen on 9/11 with savings going to the troops, but what's the point now?
As a pro-Air Force guy, it is tough for me to type this. I agree with Tom. Looking at JTF HOA, they have done amazing things with minimal "hot lead from the heavens" and maximum hand shakes and smiles. Look at just about every UN peacekeeping action. They use force in great amounts at the begining of operations, but then transition to almost purely ground. I do realize UN PK actions are not the most effect operations undertaken by the world, but that is due to beauracratic inefficiencies and UNDER SIZED FORCES .
We do need to maintain some semblance of that air/sea leathality, because without air dominance you CANNOT beat an enemy that has any offensive air component.
Would I say we could cut 50% of all of our current projects? No. Would I say that the AF could cut 100% of some projects and say 20% of others (F-22 being one I support)? Yes. What it comes down to is putting the money where it is needed. This time of so many foreigners willing to fund our debt will come to an end, and we need to capitalize on our riches now, through proper allocation. All this while not increasing the debt that people like I (being 26 years old) will be paying on for the next 50 years, in a time when foreigners will not fund our debt.
Cutting all platforms by 50% increases unit costs, many times significantly. You'd save more by fully funding half the platforms and killing off the other half. This would be a politically tougher course but it would be better for the country.
Yes I agree with your thoughts too -- We CANNOT continue to run the DoD like it is today -- train wreck waiting to happen. Myself, as a SysAdmin kind of gal that works closely with DoD would just LOVE to start building that SysAdmin force NOW!! Would love to start with the State Dept -- but it seems that DoD has the $$ -- so need to talk to DoD and let them know that this "nation building" is a good thing. Ah soooo, who to reach is the real question.
Cuts aren't what we need. What we need is about 1,000 F-22s, which will give us strategic first strike capacity. The problem isn't going to be quasi-colonial wars with the Muslims. The strategic therat that we need to be ready to handle is one that will emerge at the Taiwan Straits.
There is only one question that Rumsfeld needs to be asked about the future. If and when the Chinese tire of the game they are playing with Taiwan, and decide that it is time for their genuine power to reveal itself to the world, are we going to be able to thwart their take down of the Taiwanese. That is the question that history will ask of Rumsfeld. When hundreds, and hundreds, and hundreds of surface to surface missiles are launched at our Carrier Task Forces, are they going to go down under a hail of Chinese rockets, or are they going to emerge unscathed, and ready to unleash on the Chinese moving towards Taiwan.
That's the question.
And I don't much like my speculations on the answer.
Of course Prof Barnett thinks that the problem can be downgraded via diplomacy, or simply forking Taiwan over. I disagree.
Mike: because the demand for our 'security outsourcing', which is heavily SysAdmin (peacekeeping and nationbuilding) always requires boots on the ground.
Matt and TM: i don't hear Tom saying cut back specific platforms 50% as much as i interpret it as throw 50% less money at the problem, scaling back the technological leaps, buying more 'off the shelf' components, plussing up existing technology and platforms, etc. we are still and would still be 'without peer'
Dan is onto something key.
The emerging threat makes the current failed states we've encountered of late seem like minor bumps in the road.
The emerging threat is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the most dangerous axis ever to emerge in human history. We are going to be in a fight for our lives.
Professor Barnett and those who share his views will label me and those who share mine regressives, neandarthals, and other things, in much the same way some labelled Churchill back when naive and excessively optimistic appeasers ran the UK. Those appeasers nearly cost the Western democracies their existence. Few realize just how close the Allies came to losing WW2. The only thing that won it was the combination of military incompetence on the part of the Axis, and the falling apart of the Hitler - Stalin Non Aggression Pact.
The coming war, I surmise, will be much more coldly and shrewdly planned by the New Axis. They have learned from history. We have not.
Liz, while technology should be used to expand the lethality of the individual soldier, it still comes down to the man on the ground. Historically, no major new weapons system, be it ships, projectile weapons, gunpowder, cavalry, armor, artillery, or aviation, has replaced infantry's role in attacking, siezing, and _holding_ ground from an enemy. And infantry comes down to manpower. Boots on the ground. Men who can kick down doors, storm trenches, sneak through lines, root out hidden enemies, who can build and fight behind entrnchments and breastworks, and fire from the hip, from buildings, from holes in the ground.
Attempts to replace infantry with airpower alone (USAF in the 20th century) or artillery alone (India at the turn of the 19th century) have failed. Toys cannot replace fighting men, only make an already lethal individual more formidable.
As the mangled saying gows, "There are no lethal weapons, only lethal men." Or, to wit, "Guns don't kill people. I DO!"
I read this post on the QDR over at Belmont Club and rushed over to TPMB.com to see what he would be saying about it(I'm running late on my blog reading here).
I figured he would be claiming victory, so I am surprised to see it characterized as "lose-lose-lose."
I mean, "From an emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes....to focus on information, knowledge and timely, actionable intelligence." I thought maybe the Pentagon had brought Tom back on for the project.
As a former Army officer (and West Point graduate), I find the idea that the Army and Marines will drag the AF and Navy into a post Cold War "transformation" kicking and screaming amusing, because those two services did transformation early, and it is the Army that has been dragging its heels, and only just now, some 4 years into this war that it is waking up to the realities - I'll point to this Tom Ricks article as evidence. Ricks is the most reliable conduit for the point of view of Pentagon brass against the civilian leadership (during both the Clinton and Bush administrations), so if he's writing that the Army is finally turning the corner on transformation, then it really is. Again, I would have thought that this fits in the TPMB worldview - one that I always thought was closer to the Rumsfeldian view than he would admit (either one of them would admit, I guess).
"Transformation" is a passe concept. What Army is doing now goes way beyond going network. Blaster is still arguing the old cycle. The game has moved on.
Maybe transformation is an old buzzword, but it is just a buzzword. Doesn't matter what the flavor of the month is, it means the same thing.
AF and Navy have made significant force structure, and perhaps more importantly, philosophical, changes post-Cold War that the Army never did.