5GW v. 1+2+3=4

POST: What If? An Alternative History of the War since 9/11

If WWIV is your gig, then Newt is your man. My problems with his approach are 2-fold: 1) adding all the first, second and third-generation efforts to a fourth-generation war will bankrupt us, first and foremost morally because of the high violence quotient associated with it, and 2) we'd go from tackling problems sequentially to accumulatively,and that would get you blowback from Muslims in general and much of the rest of the world--all of whom feel under some serious onslaught already from globalization (loss of identity) and then would have to suffer our jingoistic efforts at rapid assimilation.

Newt wants his Long War to be a shorter, Big War, but the reality is that the integration processed cannot be magically sped up. Globalization's spread and impact is way beyond our control at this point in history. We will deal with many small wars that it unleashes, but we can't bundle them all up into a single notion. We're no longer in that unitary state world, but a networked one that gets built one node at a time.

Petraeus effort is seminal and does show the way. There's just no shortcutting history with a rousing call to arms.

In short, we should be exploring what 5GW means, not adding 1GW + 2GW + 3GW = 4GW.

(Thanks: Terence Hill)

The dream of Iraqs is alive and multiplying

POLITICS & ECONOMICS: "Congress's Last Chance to Alter War: Lawmakers Agree Drawdown of Troops Probably Falls to Next President," by Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2007, p. A4.

OP-ED: "Listening to Petraeus," by John McCain and Joe Lieberman, Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2007, p. A14.

OP-ED: "'You Have Liberated a People,'" by Fouad Ajami, Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2007, p. A15.

LEADING THE NEWS: "U.S. Zeroes In on Iraq-Iran Border: Targeting Flow of Weapons To Shiites Is Part of a Shift In Focus Away From Sunnis, "by Yochi J. Dreazen and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2007, p. A3.

ARTICLE: "Hunt Oil Skirts Baghdad, Signs Deal With Kurds," by Chip Cummins, Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2007, p. A1.

ARTICLE: "To Understand Sheiks in Iraq, Marines Ask 'Mac': Self-Taught, He Serves As Corps' Tribal Expert," by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2007, p. A1.

This cluster of pieces, all in the WSJ the day of Petraeus' report, is wonderfully indicative of where we've landed--finally (I don't get to the print version, typically, til all are asleep in my house).

First, buttressing my point in the previous post, is the King and Jaffe piece. Congress is basically MIA at this point, just like the White House. McCain and Lieberman want Congress to "change course," but that's almost a sad joke, since Congress has never had any "course on Iraq,"--just like the President. The closest we've come to political leadership is Joe Biden pointing out the reality of the soft partition.

No, instead of political leadership, we dawdled, until the Army and Marines, most under duress from this sad mismanagement, brewed up their own answer and pursued it--the surge strategy.

Petraeus gets the Sunnis somewhat settled and puts AQI somewhat on the run: two big successes. Now we're going to shift to more advising and more focus on border security (the Vietnam-in-reverse).

Ajami thinks a "people" have been liberated, but let's be clear: the Kurds were liberated and the Shia liberated themselves--from the Sunnis. The Sunnis have been made to accept these outcomes, or what I once called (three years ago in Esquire), "the same narrowing solution we forced on the Serbs in the Balkans."

As one military planner puts it so well in the Dreazen piece:

"The Sunnis realize they have lost the battle for Baghdad. The problem we face is that the Shiites don't realize they have won."

Meanwhile, the Kurds cut their own oil deals and the Bosnia-done-backwards continues to unfold. We can argue about the likelihood of the much ballyhooed "bloodbath" to follow, but the separation of sects continues unabated. The battle for Baghdad is over and the first Arab Shia state, Bush's unintended gift to the world, continues to emerge. Bush's second unintended gift, the first Kurdish state, likewise flourishes.

With these three Iraqs emerging, we'll need every tribal expert we can get. As I like to point out in the brief: SysAdmin work is not classified. You just need to be able to speak the language and learn the cultures.

Petraeus' report was everything we were told it would be

Having been leaked out slowly in the days leading up, there were no surprises.

Petraeus makes his case for tactical progress, and surge critics argue the disconnect with strategic goals (the government in Iraq is not jelling and the slo-mo partitioning proceeds--albeit with fewer deaths).

Making the case for the status quo on troops until next spring, promising a drop down to pre-surge levels only a year from now, is going to be a very hard sell to make.

Most of the rejection will come from a public that sees a return to war-plus levels of casualties, but with little sense of payoff or positive movement. Like the addict who consumes the drug with no hope of a high but merely the absence of an unbearable low, we seem to be running faster just to stay in place.

Still, since the public trusts the military far more than either Congress or the White House regarding a fitting glidepath toward lower troop levels, Petraeus may just have sold enough well enough to buy some significant leeway on his request.

But if so, I will also tell you this: the public won't stand for a serious ramping up toward a major military intervention into Iran on the side.

If Petraeus wins most of what he wants (say, he gives up some token reductions before the end of the year but most of the surge is preserved through next spring, as we engage in all the troop rotational lengthening schemes we can muster), then we'll be definitely locked into a long, slow drawdown starting next spring that will effectively rule out any other major intervention by Bush save for the pointless lobbing of missiles and bombs from above.

If so, and the latest intell estimates are correct in saying that Iran's within a couple years of achieving its bomb, then this is a done deal that's been left to the next president, most likely along with Kim.

See what happens when you telegraph your punches with that "axis of evil" bit?

You end up only landing one.

No radio tonight ...

Host cancels. My understanding it that he battles some health issues, so that may be the nature of this last-minute cancellation.

I welcomed it deeply. So foggy and out of it at end of day due to allergies--and that after going back to bed at 0800 after driving kids to school!

I have had a hard time coming back to EST after the Australia trip. Went there fine but came back off-kilter, so staying up super late and doing lotsa reading (thus the wave of posts recently).

Or maybe it was taking my eldest out for her first car drive. Spotted a couple extra gray hairs!

Trading in the Pilot for an Accord tomorrow. Wife won't have daughter learn on either Odyssey or Pilot, which is smart. Eventually, my daughter and I will fight over the Accord and I'll be forced to strike out on my own again, and this time, my inner middle-age-crisis voice says "pick-up!"

If it's a new Cold War, why are we chartering Antonovs?

POST: Russia/Ukraine to Restart Antonov 124 Production; Russian An-124s Flying into Iraq, Afghanistan

Excerpt:

If the Pentagon continues using Russian companies to provide critical logistical support for the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, how seriously should Americans be taking all of the current hype about a "New Cold War" between the U.S. and Russia?

Rising MSM awareness of AFRICOM

ARTICLE: 'The Next Battlefront: The United States is planning a new strategic command to take the global War on Terror to the Horn of Africa,' By Scott Johnson, Newsweek International

Pretty good summarizing piece that I'll cite primarily as an example of rising MSM awareness of AFRICOM.

Also note the local fear, which is why I'd go radical on structure and make a retired 4-star the "commander."

(Thanks: Jeff Jennings and Tom Mull)

Logical SysAdmin-level containment

ARTICLE: 'U.S. to Target Iranian Arms Entering Iraq,' By Yochi J. Dreazen and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2007

To me, this is logical SysAdmin-level containment of Iran's activity in Iraq: part and parcel of Development-in-a-Box-style delivery of security capabilities to a host nation. This is basic stuff that any country needs to monitor its borders and control the flow of unwanted stuff. Your want your SysAdmin stint to provide locals fundamental capabilities that boost trust internally and externally.

'An expeditionary capability other than military'

OP-ED: Letting Soldiers Do the Thinking, By George Will, RealClearPolitics

Great piece by Will.

Money quote from officer re: "an expeditionary capability other than military," aka the "everything else" that's now recognized as 80 percent of the Army's portfolio.

Great points re:SysAdmin

INTERVIEW: Verbatim '. . . there isn't enough media coverage about what our troops are actually doing ...', Philadelphia Inquirer

Nice interview by Kaplan that makes a lot of great points re: reality of SysAdmin work on the ground.

Also nice to hear him speaking so ... I dunno ... so non-confrontationally about the Chinese now.

Just so you know I'm not making it up ...

Excerpt from thank-you email from World Economic Forum organizer in Geneva regarding last week in Australia:

His keynote speech was both a change of pace and perspective for the participants at the opening session: two aspects that were invaluable in creating the context of challenging ideas and clarity of thinking that we hoped the entire programme would represent.

It was noteworthy that there was a reference to Dr Barnett's work in almost every geopolitical session that followed, as his presentation and ideas stuck in the minds of everyone there. I also received a huge amount of positive feedback from the other organisers, who appreciated Dr Barnett's candour and consummate presentation skills.

Nagl on After Words on C-SPAN

Regarding COIN manual. Link on C-SPAN front page right now gets you the video online.

On radio tonight with John Loftus

11-12 pm, John Loftus Show, find here.

The guy's got too many angles to casually infer what the discussion will focus on, so we shall see. I'm guessing it'll be the Middle East.

There is a link for live listening here.

Tom around the web

+ The Korea Times picked up last week's column.
+ Then LexisNexis picked up The Korea Times.
+ Gossip Rocks linked that column, too.
+ The Ventura County Star must have, too, because they printed a letter to the editor on it.

+ Robert Paterson linked the TED video.
+ So did Oliver Thylmann.
+ So did Rattler Gator.
+ So did GW Discourse.

+ Bharat Rakshak India defense forum picked up the China over India column.
+ China Law Blog linked Why Bad News for the US isn't Good News for China....
+ bestdestiny can't recommend strongly enough that you that you read PMN and BFA.
+ SCSUScholars linked Liveblogging the radio program.
+ Midwest Commando recommends PNM.
+ Best of Karachi linked Bhutto: hope for Pakistan.

+ Hot soup in my eye linked Explaining Development-in-a-Box‚Ñ¢.
+ Scottish Right supports the Core/Gap model.
+ pamc mobilizes Tom's arguments in a debate about why we're in Iraq.
+ The Korsakov Files linked You're right. Both Tel Aviv and Riyadh play us like violins.
+ Nuclear Notebook linked today's column.
+ NonParty Politics linked Hitchens is right. We're fighting at least three Iraq wars.
+ Auspundits quoted 'China needs to grow up on Taiwan ... and so do we,' and linked You're right. Both Tel Aviv and Riyadh play us like violins.

+ Al Alborn linked Foreign Policy's "think again" on legalizing illegal drugs in America.
+ So did New Yorker in DC.
+ So did Wormtown Taxi.

Ouch! Where's my Philly commenter now?

He better be trying out for punt returner.

Hate to lose one of those sloppy first games of the season--especially at home.

Why?

Those are the ones that haunt you in the second half when you're trying to get into double digits.

Pack is incredibly young on offensive skill players. More wins we can squeeze out before they mature, the better the chance for the playoffs.

Mattis to USJFCOM

POST: LtGen Jim Mattis to US Joint Forces Command

A good sign for the evolution of the force. The ultimate "monk of war" takes over the primary "force generating" command, whose Area Of Responsibility is "the future"!

This week's column

The lasting peace provided by nuclear weapons

Recently on a remote Australian island, I had the privilege of spending time "on the beach"--so to speak--with Nobel economics laureate Thomas Schelling, whose thinking on nuclear deterrence shaped the international security environment we enjoy today. Expecting to find the wizened strategist downcast on the subject of nuclear proliferation, I instead found an outlook as optimistic as my own.

Speaking to a World Economic Forum retreat, Schelling admonished everyone to remember just how effectively nuclear deterrence has worked over the past six decades. No state, he noted, that has developed nuclear weapons has ever been attacked by another state. Moreover, no state armed with nuclear weapons has ever attacked another state similarly armed.

Think about that.

Read on at KnoxNews.
Read on at Scripps Howard.

An interesting book on Iran

BOOK REVIEW: "The Trouble to Come" (Review of The Iranian Time Bomb, by Michael A. Ledeen), by Arthur Herman, Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2007, p. W5.

Vonne: Please get me this one.

Ledeen's a hard-liner on Iran but in a smart way. He wants us to view Iran, from Khomeinism onward, as an attempt to dominate the region much like the Sovs aspired to and eventually dominated much of Eurasia--a scary, aggressive mix of ideology and nasty authoritarianism and power projection.

Unfortunately, Ledeen reaches for Hitler analogies a lot when Herman says Mussolini's brittle brand of fascism is more to the point (thus Herman argues for a naval-focused denial strategy with Iran that leverages the experience and success of the Tanker Wars of 1987-88, which is intriguing, to say the least--the only problem being Asia this time around is a whole helluva lot more than just compliant, silent Japan).

Where Ledeen intrigues more is with a connectivity-style counter-the-revolution strategy of seeding the mullahs' downfall from within using dollars and PCs. In principle, this is how we took down the Sovs (infecting them with the hard-currency dollar that revealed the falsehood of their economy and the information revolution, the economic advance the Sovs couldn't command their way through), starting this process with Nixon's brilliant detente.

To me, that's getting a lot closer to an appropriate, Cold War-like mix of aggressive soft kill and sensible containment combined with negotiations over those things we need to manage (like nukes) instead of getting all wobbly over them like we've never dealt with them before (some self-confidence, America, please!). Herman (not Ledeen, as far as I can tell, who seems stuck on his Hitler gig) compares the possibility of a Gorby-like decline in the USSR to that of the mullahs, so maybe I'd be happier ordering Herman's non-book instead of Ledeen's book, but I'll take what I can get for now.

Not an unlikely Iranian TV hit whatsoever

ARTICLE: "Iran's Unlikely TV Hit: Show Sympathetic to Plight Of Jews During the Holocaust Draws Millions Each Week," by Farnaz Fassihi, Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2007, p. B1.

You have to understand Sunni domination of Shia for the vast majority of Islam's history to see why Persian Shia would identify with Jews being persecuted in Europe. From the outside of today's propaganda being issued by Tehran, it seems counter-intuitive, but that's a domestic regime legitimacy function, not something based in any past grievances.

Truth is, relations between Persians and Jews have historically been pretty good, and there is much identification between the two in terms of being persecuted minorities.

Khomeinism was the break with this, and Ahmadinejad certainly plays that card with great gusto to justify his attempts to revive the dead revolutionary spirit of the place. Khomeini aspired to be a pope for all Islam, so he played up the pan-Islamic angle by focusing all anger on Israel (near devil) and the US (far devil). Osama tries similar stuff today, although the Salafists can't help doing pleasure (killiing Shia) before business (killing Americans), and thus AQI overreached so badly in Iraq (let's be honest, AQI f--ks it up everywhere they've ever gone, but we buy their propaganda just like with lap up Ahmadinejad's, and if we weren't such pussies about nukes we'd be a heckavu lot more likely to look past that transparent manipulation).

The learning curve is steep my friends, especially on the Shia and Iran. The best thing about all this war talk with Iran is that our media gins up stories like us as a result.

You're right. Both Tel Aviv and Riyadh play us like violins

OP-ED: "Anti-Semitism and the Anti-Israel Lobby: What's so nefarious about Jews exercising their right to speech?" by Jeff Robbins, Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2007, p. A15.

Of course, there's nothing wrong about Jews exercising their free right of speech, or using their money to push their agenda. It's as American as apple pie and it's how every minority/immigrant group has ever risen to express itself politically (watch the Indians right now and the gays prior).

It's also okay for foreign governments to seek influence with ours. We're the closest thing there is to world government and we own the world's largest gun, so you have to expect that or get out of the business of being the world's sole full-service superpower.

This op-ed mostly contrasts the strong Israel lobby with the also strong Saudi one, which manipulates American foreign policy just as much.

Frankly, I'm not happy with either outcome because they both conspire to keep America highly unrealistic about what real pluralism will look like in the region--namely, the liberation of the Shia (as nasty and immature as they're likely to be in the historical short-run). Riyadh and Tel Aviv both want Iran slapped down: the former wants to stay regional kingpin and the latter wants help on Iran's support to Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran, meanwhile, plays into their hands quite nicely by eschewing the reality of the Shia-Sunni fight and instead playing up the anti-Israeli/anti-US card.

So both Tel Aviv and Riyadh point to Tehran and Tehran points to Tel Aviv and Washington, who in turn return the fingers with Riyadh's additional "I told you so!" echoing in their ears. Problem is, behind Tehran stands Asia's rising energy requirements.

It's like a perfectly enclosed energy system that runs on its own forever, or the end of a John Woo shoot-em-up gangster movie where all the main characters are in a standoff holding pistols to each others' heads.

I'm just tired of it all. I'm tired of being manipulated by two powers who are willing to fight right down to the last American, and a third whose rancid authoritarianism is propped up by simply answering their mail.

We are being played for fools by all sides (including the free-riding Asians), and it strikes me as pathetic.

Some stunning practicality on Iraq

POLITICS & ECONOMICS: "Out of Iraq, Some Common Ground: Troop Drawdown Could Enable Democrats and Republicans to Claim Victory," by Neil King, Jr., and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2007, p. A4.

First para says what I've been arguing for a while now:

The likelihood that U.S. forces will begin pulling out of Iraq later this year is tamping down what was expected to be a rancorous debate over the U.S. role there and providing an opening for Democrats and Republicans to reach agreement on an Iraq policy both sides could tout as a victory.

Petraeus gets to declare some progress, which is real, but the first pullouts will come naturally by the end of this year.

As troop levels fall over the course of 2008 from the peak of 160,000, U.S. forces are likely to gradually shift to more of a training and advisory mission advocated by many moderate Democrats.

Put this reality (Vietnam-in-reverse) with the on-the-ground reality of the continued soft partition (Bosnia-done-backwards) and you've got my package written up in State of the World last December (March Esquire).

Hardly rocket science. Most could see this coming miles away on the troop rotation.

Again, the un-uncertainty on troop levels.

Like it or not, this is our political system working as designed. Bush has been at the plate for a very long time. Congress can't make him succeed. It can only curtail him after the failures pile up.

As the piece points out, the max the surge could be maintained without further breakage of the troops is April '08, and if the Iraqi central government had shown some desire to take advantage of the window we've given them to date, I believe we would have rewarded them with those months.

But that was never going to happen with Maliki. He's there to kill time and protect Shia interests (again, I'm shocked! Shocked to hear the Shia don't trust America after we left them twisting in the wind under Saddam in the early 1990s [more feel-good Powell Doctrine outcomes] and are taking matters into their own hands to secure their future dominance in a southern Iraq where they're 3/4ths of the population).

Bush, by his choices, created the first Arab Shia state--big time. We can whine about that reality or we can adjust to it and see where it takes us. Given the alternative of the usual Sunni dictatorship, I think we do far better on the Big Bang to run with this path, so long as we get less weak-kneed about Iran's reach for the bomb.

It's almost perverse, but this thing is still working out pretty well--the Big Bang. I know, I know, it was sold as the Continental Congress showing up and then everything falling into place regionally--a glorious myth-making bit of nonsense. But the reality is, it'll be ugly and scary and fairly dangerous. That's how real change happens in the real world. You want to pluralize the Middle East? Then get ready for the Shia revival and the Sunni counter-reaction (Nasr's analysis).

You pick your poison, but you go with the structural realities (the Shia are our natural allies, despite the past bad blood), because the alternative sucks (both going back to the support of Sunni dictatorships and finding ourselves back on Osama's side in the Sunni-Shia struggle--an absolute doubleplusungood).

This way (running with the Shia revival), we're siding with the Chinese of this equation, not the Sovs.

Nixon pulled that difficult trigger in 1972, and we should pull it again.