The real future of naval aviation

REPORT: The Future of Naval Aviation, MIT Security Studies Program

I sent Tom this link with the following comment:

Interesting, looooong (78 pp) pdf. Happily plays down the threat of war with China (p16). Very pro Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, advanced airborne early warning, and airborne electronic attack.

Tom writes:

This stuff speaks very realistically to the future.

Kilkullen from down under

POST: Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt

Good bit of analysis. Kilkullen, I find, is well-known and widely-respected among Australia's top leadership.

I spent a lot of face time with Jim Wallace, former head of Australia's SAS, this weekend. Very good guy. A real education.

Explaining Development-in-a-Box‚Ñ¢

This post is being published on both my web site and Stephen DeAngelis’. It is an effort to explain more fully the concept of Development-in-a-Box™. We hope this post helps readers better understand what we mean when we mention the Development-in-a-Box approach.

First we’d like to clarify the name. We have noted before that some pundits believe the name is a bit too flippant -- that it trivializes the difficulties involved in fostering development and that it doesn’t reflect the fact that each nation’s situation is unique. We don’t ignore such criticism, but we have given the name a lot of thought over the past couple of years. Because Development-in-a-Box is a new and complex approach to sustainable development, we needed a name that could serve as shorthand for what we are trying to accomplish. Since the centerpiece of the approach is adapting internationally recognized standards and best practices to local conditions to jump start development, we couldn’t find another name that emphasized both development and standardization as well as the term Development-in-a-Box.

Development-in-a-Box began as a discussion between the two of us about how we could integrate our two world views. Steve started Enterra Solutions to help transform organizations (which include nation states, governmental agencies and corporations) into highly agile and adaptable enterprises that are systemically able to adjust to rapidly changing security, compliance and performance stimuli within the context of globalization. Globalization also frames my strategic security vision, which focuses on connecting the disconnected parts of the globe (the Gap) as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Besides recognizing the importance of globalization, both visions share an understanding of the importance of trust and how adhering to accepted rules can help generate it. Countries are welcomed as full contributing members of the global economy when they can be trusted by the rest of the developed world (the Core). Trust is not something that can be given, it must be earned. But there are shortcuts available that can help garner trust where there is no history upon which to draw. Those shortcuts are contained in the standards and best practices used by the Core. It makes no sense for each emerging market country to reinvent these standards and practices. They can be imported as “in the box” solutions and, when necessary, adapted to local conditions. Because they don’t have to be reinvented or discovered in each new situation, valuable time is saved and precious resources aren’t squandered.

Some critics believe that Development-in-the-Box is patronizing at best and warmed over colonialism at worst -- but they are wrong. Colonialism was about exploiting natural resources to bolster manufacturing at home. Development-in-a-Box is about fostering economic progress in emerging markets. It does this by helping countries establish the basic standards necessary to attract foreign direct investment and become a trusted international partner. Development-in-a-Box is about generating sustainable capabilities and interfaces, not dictating content. It is about improving quality and transparency in any area where an emerging market country desires to transact international commerce. Which areas they pursue and how those paths unfold are idiosyncratic -- how they must connect with others working in the same sector is not. By adopting the internationally recognized standards and best practices, emerging market countries can gain trust quickly even when they have no history of trust upon which to build. The current manufacturing challenges faced by China in the toy industry, for example, could have been avoided had a Development-in-a-Box approach been taken.

This approach doesn’t intend to step on the toes of those already engaged in relief and development. They are providing valuable work and their heroic efforts must continue. Development-in-a-Box offers them a way to better coordinate their efforts with others in a larger community of practice building on lessons learned in the past. The beauty of communities of practice is that they are voluntary groups. Since no one “leads” the effort, organizations can opt in and opt out as their interests coincide with the interests of others. And because it is a leaderless community, no organization need fear that joining the community of practice means that it is buying in to someone else’s agenda. What keeps the group together is good will and shared objectives. Communities of practice also help refine the approach by sharing new lessons learned. They form the critical feedback loop that makes any process sustainable and valuable.

Development-in-a-Box is not a humanitarian assistance program, although traditional development programs often lay the foundations upon which subsequent development efforts build. Development-in-a-Box also doesn’t ignore the special knowledge of those working locally; it provides a framework in which such knowledge can be more usefully applied. It doesn’t try to impose an outside solution on an emerging economy but it helps reduce the number of roadblocks that could otherwise slow economic progress. Most importantly, Development-in-a-Box helps set in place the trust framework necessary to attract foreign direct investment -- which is the key to achieving sustainable economic growth. In every emerging market country currently developing a sustainable middle class, it is being done primarily through private investment.

There are pre-conditions that help move the Development-in-a-Box approach along more quickly. The most important pre-condition is security. Foreign direct investment is a coward. It shies away from any scenario where a return on investment is unlikely. In addition to security, Development-in-a-Box works best where a visionary and competent government is in place. If both those conditions are present, then a literate and hardworking populace can be added to the mix. With those three pieces in place, Development-in-a-Box has the best chance of working most effectively. So how does the process work?

For emerging market countries seeking to understand and find a systemic means of complying with the rules of engagement necessary to be a new and integrating member of the international community, Development-in-a-Box offers a way forward. As I have written before, Development-in-a-Box is a highly flexible framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development as well as for enabling emerging market countries that are not in a post-conflict or post-failed state environment. The process is often initially supported by the international community or a single developed economic power (as in Iraq), but it can be used by any group whose programs aim to serve as a catalyst for attracting private sector investment. Development-in-a-Box involves a four-step flexible framework:

• First, it creates a wireframe for understanding the internationally recognized best practices and standards for compliance, security, and management efficiency that are requirements for any emerging market country to integrate into the global economy. These standards and best practices create transparency and trust.
• Second, it delivers standardized, pre-configured technology and management solutions that can be adapted to meet the specific historical, socio-economic, cultural and other unique requirements of that nation or region. This highly adaptive solution allows a country to jump start itself in the industry segments on which it is focusing.
  
• Third, it embeds the business logic, or electronic rules sets, that constitute the best ways of operating an organization into its information and management systems. That is, it automates internationally recognized best practices into pre-configured business processes in order to reduce human errors, improve effectiveness, and generate trust in those processes both locally and internationally. The business processes are then kept compliant with changing requirements much like anti-virus software keeps a computer updated to rapidly changing virus threats.
  
• Finally, beginning in the first stages, local personnel are trained and educated and function as apprentices who learn the international practices and standards of that industry sector ‚Äì allowing them to have the capability transferred to their operation after a multi-year training period. These apprentices, along with country based subject matter experts, are brought in at the first stage to assist with the customization of the catalog of best practices for the specific needs of that country.
  

Supporting this effort is a public information campaign that attempts to educate the population about critical components of economic development. Let me give you a glimpse of how these pieces fit together in a notional emerging market country that is ready to take the next step forward.

The country has stabilized and its expatriate citizens begin returning or start investing in the country. Buildings start to go up, other infrastructure investments begin to emerge, but key economic pieces are missing. Some low price consumer products begin to appear like fast food and toiletries. Mobile phone service was one of the fist utilities to gain purchase in the new economy, but it was not accompanied by a high speed, broadband network that is essential for economic trade.

The country wants to take the next step, but there is no reason that it has to reinvent how to develop and install the necessary infrastructure. For broadband service, for example, it can adopt standards and practices, such as those used in Asia and Europe, to ensure that once it is up and running it is world class. This system is essential to ensure that international business transactions can take place.

Business transactions also require a national banking system to process these transactions and handle foreign direct investment. People simply can’t run around the country carrying satchels full of hard currency. Banking transactions are also necessary to handle e-commerce, collect taxes, and ensure that payrolls are efficiently handled. For example, more than 1,400 business processes exist that are core and common to every global retail bank. Globalization has rapidly created these as standards and best practices that all banks subscribe to and there is no need for the country to stumble through a mistake-ridden, learn-as-you-go process when such a system can be put in place without the local government having to reinvent it. Local businesses, that have no history or expertise in connecting with the global economy, need a way to ensure their products meet world standards. They need a way to market their products and support customers once contracts have been signed. To meet their needs, business support offices and business-to-business exchanges can be created to meet local requirements, but using accepted standards and practices. Job training and mentoring programs can be established using the best techniques currently available.

Supporting all these activities are public education programs explaining why it is important to get health checkups, keep children in school, obtain job training, trust the banking system, and so forth. Development-in-a-Box is a way to get an entire nation pulling together to raise its standard of living and quality of life. It helps further the national dream rather than imposing a preferred international scheme.

As you can see, Development-in-a-Box can be adapted to any situation and can focus on any economic sector desired by the country being helped. Although it provides world-class solutions that can help jump start industry sectors, it doesn’t dictate what those sectors are. Development-in-a-Box involves the best standards and practices available, but it doesn’t provide cookie cutter solutions that force those being helped down a road they don’t want to travel. The decisions about content and direction remain in the hands of local leaders, Development-in-a-Box simply help them get down that road a little quicker.

Tom on Time

This is the master post for Tom's interview with Time magazine's Bill Powell. It was published in three parts on Time's China Blog:

Part 1: Why the US and China are destined to be Allies...

Part 2: 'Locking in China at Today's Prices'

Part 3: Why Bad News for the US isn't Good News for China...

Bhutto: hope for Pakistan

OP-ED: 'A moment of truth in Pakistan: For the sake of the civilized world, democracy must overcome extremism,' By Benazir Bhutto, Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2007

Benazir Bhutto comes with many flaws, but she does represent a big hope for Pakistan, and that alone makes this piece worth perusing.

Serious growing up to do

OP-ED: Bush's Lost Iraqi Election, By David Ignatius, Washington Post, August 30, 2007; Page A21

To me, it's Ignatius' analysis that's naive here. Iraq is 60 percent Shia, so Shia are going to dominate in any free election. Right up to that election we've got Sunni regional powers supporting the anti-Shia insurgency and AQI activity (right down to sending suicide bombers to massacre Shia). To expect Iran not to match Saudi meddling is very naive. And when America floods the landscape with money for its desired outcomes, citing Iranian funding flows to influence an election is oddly hypocritical.

Also, when Ignatius casts aspersions against Sistani, he fundamentally misrepresents the ayatollah's role and profound (I mean, going back decades) independence vis-a-vis Khomeinist Iran (and yes, I know Sistani is Persian).

To me, this is a very crude and subpar piece from Ignatius, usually one of the most intelligent and sophisticated analysts of the region.

But alas, the rush to demonize Iran is widespread. Join it or be labeled soft on radical Islam. Inaccurate and even historically and strategically counter-productive, but our knee-jerk habit of aligning our strategic interests with Riyadh and Tel Aviv is a long one, despite failing us completely for decades now.

You push democracy in the Middle East, and Sistani's mantra of "one man, one vote" will get you Shia power in Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. Sure that makes the House of Saud and the Hashemite king in Amman nervous, but let's skip the naivete on the subject on our end.

Again, some serious growing up on our part is in order.

The coming SysAdmin

Nathan Machula wrote:

I came across two good articles by a law advisor to MNF-I:

"Who Should Establish Rule of Law in Iraq?" where he states the cases for civilian, military, or mixed leadership. He ultimately argues for the last case-analogous to your DoEE concept.

"What a Civilian Reserve Corps Would Look Like" where he outlines current plans in the works.

Tom writes:

Nathan's comments work for me.

Good example of what Petraeus will have to compete with next week

ARTICLE: 'Report Finds Little Progress On Iraq Goals: GAO Draft at Odds With White House,' By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, August 30, 2007; Page A01

Listen up

ARTICLE: Front-line lessons from the Iraq surge, By MICHAEL TOTTEN, New York Daily News, August 29th 2007

As we take in Petraeus' report, there is another voice worth listening to on the subject of the surge's perceived success in various categories.

(Thanks: Patrick O'Connor)

Lead geese positive feedback loop

ARTICLE: Islamic Bonds to Get Boost From Singapore, India, Moody's Says, By Shanthy Nambiar, Bloomberg, Aug. 30, 2007

Further evidence of the positive feedback loop created by south and east Asian Muslim "lead geese" on Islamic finance. Long run, this is a great trend.

(Thanks: greg)

Decent, unsophisticated Obama piece on Iran

ARTICLE: Hit Iran where it hurts, By BARACK OBAMA, August 30th 2007

Decently balanced piece--in most regards--on Iran by Obama.

Still, the knee-jerk to demonize Iran as the greatest threat in a generation is historically sloppy and strikes me as strategic pandering.

The Iranian Revolution went nowhere since 1979, including its failure in Iran. Tehran's reach for the bomb, quite frankly, makes a ton of strategic sense given: 1) our recent wars on its right and left and our avowed talk of regime change and 2) Schelling's historical point that the bomb ends your vulnerability to U.S. invasion (in fact, invasion or attack from anyone--in short, deterrence works, whether you're Tehran or Tel Aviv).

As for Tehran's support to fellow Shia radicals in the region,that's also expected given its new-found influence thanks to America's toppling of two nasty Sunni regimes (Taliban and Saddam) and the enabling of the region's first Arab Shia state (Iraq). That Iran fights us and Israel assymmetrically may distress us, but that's just how weaker powers fight (terror and insurgency and proxies). Over-emotionalizing--with strategic hyperbole--such tactics in the region helps no one.

Meanwhile, America has to grow up a bit and realize that the Big Bang leads to the Shia revivial and that it's only through that path that we'll foster genuine pluralism and less religious extremism in politics. Sure, it'd be cool to jump right to the Tom Jeffersons, but let's be real about what comes next.

Can't have pluralism with the continuation of Sunni authoritarianism and suppression of Shia minorities (the Saudi path that brought us the Taliban and al-Qaida and 9/11), and when it comes to mixing religious fundamentalism with political authoritarianism, it's the Sunnis with their Wahabbism and Salafism and accompanying al-Qaida network that's the bigger problem today, not Iran's exhausted revolution (a failed mixing of Shiism and politics that's historically quite abnormal--unlike in the Sunni world) nor Sistani's "quietism" (that says Shia must rescue faith from politics--the opposite of Khomeinism). [Me, I give Sistani the Nobel for peace every year starting in 2003. His influence and importance remain vastly unappreciated.]

The realistic grand strategist sees more allies than enemies in Shia and puts aside the traumatic memories of 1979. If our new anti-Shia strategy takes hold, we'll be back in the business of bolstering Sunni dictators and mass repression and killing of Shia.

Then again, it's what we know and what we're comfortable with throughout history.

You'd hope for more sophisticated and grown-up talk from Obama, but that's just domestic politics, I guess.

Flying back from Australia

Had a great time overall, with tons of useful contacts made.

Again, the Friday night keynote went over very well, described in the sum-up on Sunday by one Brit as a "virtuostic display of verbal and virtual pyrotechnics" (God those English can ... uh .... use English quite well). Better yet, throughout the weekend, panelist after panelist would say, "I couldn't help be struck by one point Tom Barnett made in his presentation." Considering all the intellectual firepower at this thing (e.g., Pei on China, Wolf on globalization, Schelling on nukes), such overt verbal footnoting was most gratifying.

I say that especially since it's a hard time to be an American at one of these globalized events nowadays, unless your specialty is criticizing America to no end (Prestowitz is a master, and we tangled on two panels). Then again, I really love going abroad like this when our rep's in the garbage can. It's boring being the American when everything's going our way, and more interesting to be put on the defensive (it sharpens the blade, so to speak).

I did one panel on Saturday and three on Sunday. Saturday's was "politics after Blair and Bush" and dealt a lot with America's damaged standing in the world ("declining hegemony" was Prestowitz's fave phrase) and our handicapping of the '08 race. My comments centered on the generational failure of Boomer politics and the need to move beyond.

Sunday I did "Changing Islamic Identity" with Australia's top Islamic expert and one of the leading academic lights out of the U. Of Tehran (a very impressive guy who gave me a fascinating tour of Iranian politics during our nighttime cruise on the sea). I was nervous on this one going in, but was really glad. It was a fab session that taught me a ton. Goes to show, better to stick your neck out than stick only to your strengths--an essential reminder for the wannabe horizontal thinker. Between this session and my Roy and Nasr books in flight (both stunningly good, with Nasr's almost a regional studies masters-in-a-book) this trip has been quite the education.

Second session (I did three in a row) was on Australia's new military arrangements with Japan--basically, exploring the "against who?" question. I was a bit scathing here on the disutility of pinning one's strategic hopes on the Middle East being a "blip" (the old Kaplan bit) and future great power war being centered in East Asia. Paul Dibb and I tangled there.

Last session for me was "hard v soft power" with Pei, Gareth Evans and Prestowitz. This was Bush-bashing at its best (Evans and Prestowitz), with Pei being both more reasoned and profound (this bit I loved: govs do hard power, but private sector leads in soft, because hard is all about influencing other govs and soft is about influencing people, which private sector "gets" better).

Again, Pei is a brilliant China expert but he's an even better all-around political scientists--especially on his adopted country (he's a U.S. Citizen who warned everyone not to underestimate America's profound recuperative powers, something that's disappointed our critics generation after generation). In that session, I just did the Development-in-a-Box pitch with PPT. Eyes opened and jaws dropped. Prestowitz naturally kept deriding it as cookie cutter, but most got my house-going-into-a-subdevelopment analogy (we prepackage the standards--especially on connectivity--but don't tell you what furniture to buy or mandate your house style).

Dinner Sunday night was way cool: Schelling and his wife on my left and Ronnie Chen and his spouse on my right. I talked a lot of Enterra with Ronnie, but spent more time speaking to the wives than the husbands--just my way. You learn a lot about such great figures by interacting with their spouses.

Long day back today (Mon). Up at 0500, pay bill at hotel, then last fab buffet breakfast, then hour-long boat from Hayman to Hamilton, then hour layover, then two hour flight to Sydney, then two hours (some souvenir shopping), then 13 hour flight to SFO, then the customs drill and two more hours in United lounge, then 4 hour flight to Chicago, then two more in lounge, then 1 hour to Indy and drive home. I hit the hay at 0200 Tuesday, after a solid 35 hours in motion.

But no time to waste as Enterra's work in Kurdistan taking off like gangbusters, so Tuesday will be a back-to-work day!

Tom around the web

I think Tom would say a fair amount of heat came out of his last appearance on Hugh Hewitt's show, but not much light:
+ Hugh continued to belabor his debate with Tom in More On Iran.

This is a perfect example of what Tom talked about in his long post on the Hugh appearance. Looks like Hugh's jumped into the same category for Tom as NPR's Chris Lydon. Too bad.

Other coverage or links:
+ Dumb Looks Still Free
+ NonParty Politics
+ ShrinkWrapped
+ majelix
+ Razorwire
+ The Hotline
stream'.
+ A Second Hand Conjecture
+ Critt linked Why the killings to follow will all be blamed on Bush (Tom's first post after calling in with Hugh).

+ et alli. linked The soft partition of Iraq is not a function of American strategy; it is oblivious to American strategy.
+ Hydro-Logic linked last week's column and Two for [last] week's column.
+ Hidden Unities likes Tom's posture toward China, but is worrying about the military-industrial complex.
+ Kindred Winecoff linked today's column and 'Locking in China at Today's Prices'

+ NW Bloggers mentioned Tom's visit to Ft Lewis.
+ beowulf1723 linked Back to square one in the Middle East.
+ Erabulus linked the TED video.
+ So did ZenPundit.
+ From DC to Jerusalem linked Why the US and China are destined to be Allies...
+ Justin Talks mentioned Tom in 'Mil Theory Goes Main.
+ 893 Studio calls PNM and BFA 'crazy awesome'.
+ Myk's Sandbox linked Chinese contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations.
+ The Societal Cynic says PNM is a 'great read'.

Tom on Time: parts 2 and 3

Tom's conversation with Bill Powell over at Time's China Blog has been published in parts 2 and 3:

Part 2: 'Locking in China at Today's Prices'

Wholey moley! Is that the title for Book 3 right there at the top of this post? 'The Coming Realignment: Reconnecting American Grand Strategy to a World Transformed'. Thanks for breaking it over here first, Tom ;-)

Haven't read this illustration before:

Time: But you must get accused of wanting to sell out the Taiwanese all the time, right?

Barnett: “Oh I do, sure. But the way I try to explain this for US audiences is, imagine if Jefferson Davis and what remained of the confederacy after the US civil war slipped off to Cuba and set up an anti American country on that island, constantly thumbing its nose at us. Then, fast forward to 1905, and imagine how the United States would have tolerated some distant imperial power like England telling us what we could or could not do with regard to this bunch of losers sitting in Cuba. Imagine what Teddy Roosevelt would have told the Brits what they could do with their defense guarantee!

Can't say much for the 35 comments on this post.

Part 3: Why Bad News for the US isn't Good News for China...

This week's column

Targeting roots of terrorism in this long war
With the Bush administration's efforts in this long war against radical extremism grinding to an inconclusive halt, it's useful to revisit strategic issues that invariably frame our approach.

What makes a terrorist? Are the drivers primarily political or economic?

Depending on the answer, one could argue that America's grand strategy should lead with either promoting democracy or encouraging economic growth.

Princeton economist Alan Krueger has made a great study of this question, and published his findings earlier this year in a book whose title, "What Makes a Terrorist," lacks a question mark. That's because Krueger, marshaling persuasive statistics and analysis, comes down firmly on the side of politics, pointing out that most terrorists are middle-class and well educated.

Read on at KnoxNews.
Read on at Scripps Howard.

Boom! Goes the connectivity.

Really connecting at this event. Not the sort of ties you describe publicly, but the kind you tap when the time is right.

I expected it would be like this, but a few key connections here have been big eye openers--like a master's being hand delivered by your own personal tutor.

Hard to capture, but powerful stuff.

Who's up and who's down in my appreciation

Martin Wolf is world-class every time he opens his mouth, plus he's just a blast to hang around. Real thrill.

Minxin Pei remains the most reasonable and intelligent thinker on China.

Steve Kobrin from Wharton is very impressive.

Simon Tay from Singapore is also very impressive.

Ronnie Chan, Chairman of Hang Lung Property in Hong Kong, simply blew me away. This guy is Warren Buffet-like smart, and hugely entertaining.

Schelling lived up to his Nobel billing--natch. He heads to Iran soon to see if he can find anyone who knows anything there about what it means to have nukes. No matter. He plans on telling them a thing or two. Keep an eye on that one.

I was less impressed by a bunch of other big names, whom I've only know by reputation. Since I have nothing nice to say about them, I'll leave it at that.

Listening to Schelling

He’s pretty old and fragile. Yesterday on stage he cited stuff I had said on stage Friday night but he couldn’t remember my name (he kept calling me “that young man,” which--at age 45--I simply love hearing!). But that seems indicative of where he is: guy doesn’t sweat the meaningless details, but still has a stunningly sharp mind and a deep memory of what matters (in this speech, he gives a great mini-history of the Korea War).

The basics that stuck with me:

We forget how amazingly successful we’ve been over the decades to stop nuclear proliferation (although yesterday Schelling said that Iran’s nuclear achievement is basically a fait accompli).

Hard for young people to remember how scary nukes where (strong expectations of nuclear war in the early 1960s, with full-page newspaper ads for fall-out shelters), because it took us so long to figure them out.

To him, the big uncertainty on North Korea and Iran is not whether they have/get nukes, but whether their leaders realize how effectively they deter American attacks (the history of the last 60 years--get nukes, and direct attack by America is basically ruled out). In short, the history of the last six decades says nukes are highly effective for deterring and basically ineffective in military terms (militaries, the world over, when asked, prefer not to use them, even when confronted with the possibility that the other side might--a Schelling observation made directly on numerous occasions across his vast career, and something I’ve found to be true through my entire 18 years as well).

Cool speech, even cooler to finally see him talk live. Something to remember when I’m the old guy who can’t remember names but still have the crucial narratives still deeply engraved in my memory.

The un-uncertainty of our troop levels in Iraq

The good news/statistics reported by Petraeus to the Australian media (printed yesterday) that sectarian killings are down 75 percent from same time last year suggests that the fears of coming bloodletting are quite possibly way overblown. Experts say as many as one-fifth of the remaining population (down from maybe 20 million to 18 with 2 gone through emigration under duress, so we’re talking 3-4 million, located largely in a few big cities, moving X neighborhoods or X towns over to satisfy the sectarian elements that be) are still at-risk or slated for “cleansing,” which can mean simply being scared out of your homes and forced by fear to live elsewhere among your coreligionists or can be as bad as being murdered if you refuse to submit.

If Petraeus’s numbers are right (or at least the proportions are roughly right, although I’m sure we’ll be confronted with competing interpretations), then we may be further along in the Bosnia-done-backwards scenario that most people (including me) have previously thought. Say our numbers are good on killings, then the continuing movement of people (here, I’m going on numerous press reports over the last months that say neighborhoods are being slowly emptied by the “unwanted” [“wrong” sect] and repopulated [somewhat] by the new “desirables”--or “right” sect) conceivably proceeds relatively bloodlessly.

You can say, “This is a bad thing that must be prevented, even if our presence has depressed the killing rate temporarily.” In a perfect world, that would be nice (why uproot people from their homes?), but even in America, we live in neighborhoods largely segregated--and peacefully so--by race, so expecting Iraq’s fragile mosaic to survive any better than Yugoslavia’s did is--in my opinion--an unreasonable requirement for our perceived “success.”

Indeed, I would argue, the most logical and fastest route--given the security stresses that Iraq will inevitably face in coming years--to rough pluralism emerging in Iraq (meaning, pluralism that survives the end of our overt and large presence) is for Sunni, Shiia and Kurds, all relatively secure in their perceived homogeneity and their expectation of respective oil wealth (the Sunnis are discovering/have discovered they’ve got plenty oil too), slowly but surely coming together in increasingly logical federalism that both manages and expands their logical economic cooperation-leading-to-reintegration.

Whatever your dreams of perceived success for America prior to our inevitable drawdown, that’s the most likely pathway toward a stable Iraq, not something to be achieved in months but in years. And no, we won’t get much credit for it, anymore than we get credited for South Korea’s rise.

Meanwhile, all the sturm-und-drang over the question of the American surge and how long it lasts will continue for its primarily domestic political purposes, but in reality, that die is already cast.

The basic truth is that we have a lot of troops and gear in Iraq now and it would take a couple of years (easy) to drawn both down to any overwhelming degree (like, say, one-fifth of today). What’s most likely is that we’ll be where Army Chief of Staff General Casey (Petraeus’s predecessor) wants us to be by the end of 2008: down roughly half from today’s battalion numbers. Recently, I wrote a purposefully optimistic column that said that could be possible, given a diplomatic surge that leverages the current Hamas-Fatah split, meaning we could--under the best circumstances--reach a similar drawdown by the end of the summer in 2008. But since the Bush administration seems fairly unambitious on that subject (the Arab-Israeli regional peace meeting is slated--last time I heard--for November), I don’t expect any “superheroes”--as I dubbed the requirement in the column--are likely to appear on scene, so Casey’s downward glidepath strikes me as reasonable.

Yes, there will be much debate about whether we can accelerate that process, and that will be the crux of the congressional debate (I will be meeting with some House leaders--no, I’m not sure which party--next week on the subject) that ensues, but people need to understand how little wiggle room there really is.

Our presence in Iraq is huge. It cannot be rapidly dismantled unless we simply abandon everything and dash out. There is no way that will happen, so spare yourself any torment over such bogeymen. They’re complete bullshit.

But just as cast in policy stone is the reality that we must progressively drawdown. Saying otherwise would be the equivalent of Ike demanding we keep our WWII levels ad infinitum over the Cold War, and that would have naturally been a silly argument. We simply can’t maintain this level for long (a simple truth of this surge’s planning from the start--never hidden). We can argue about the steepness of that glidepath, but glide it will. Petraeus will argue for a slower decline than Casey, but that’s a natural break between force operator (was Casey, now Petraeus) and force generator (now Casey). Since these two are professionally tight, I would expect the outcome to be a reasonable compromise, assuming no intense Congressional intervention (people will fret very loudly over this, but the real chance of it happening is virtually nil, so don’t worry about it).

I expect Petraeus’ report to contain just enough good news to blunt any such intense Congressional intervention--save rhetorically for the cameras. I believe that report will reflect reality in a reasonably accurate manner: you concentrate troops plus start cutting deals with locals and things will improve. I think it’s a shame we didn’t have this strategy in 2003, but this administration has to live with that legacy.

Also fairly certain about the future American military presence in Iraq is that, even at the end of 2008, it will be large. Assume Casey’s druthers are met and we’re down by half in number of battalions by the end of 2008. We’d still be talking somewhere in the region of 70-80,000 troops in Iraq (the same rough figure I calculated in my 2K solution, remembering that any troops shifted into Kurdistan are still in Iraq, just differently arrayed). I’d like to see a 20-50 split of 20k in Kurdistan and 50k in southern Iraq, with the bulk of the latter focused on mil-mil and AQI hunting (many good stories in the press recently about how our military is planning for an advising-heavy--outside the SOF stuff, where rules of open-season hunting remain in effect--post-surge operating ethos for our military in Iraq).

A logical opposing view would say, keep the entire amount in southern Iraq and assume the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) will do fine on its own. My problem with that idea is I think AQI, to the extent it’s reduced in southern Iraq, logically targets the KRG over time. So to me, the logical post-surge fight is less about Sunni-Shia violence (some of it is inevitable, but again, if Petraeus’s numbers signal a sustainable trend--meaning it can survive our progressive drawdown [something I predicted in my recent column, so my optimism on that point is already on record], then there’s good chance that our Bosnia-done-backwards has been reasonably capped--thanks to the “monks of war” who finally were given the chance to run this operation correctly), and more about the coming fight for Kurdistan.

[As a sidenote, anyone who’d choose to describe this inevitable glidepath as “cut and run” is just a jackass who doesn’t understand anything about national security realities. Sadly, we suffer no shortage of jackasses, including in my own field of international security (indeed, the economic discussions here in Australia have been stunningly good, while the security ones have generally sucked, saved for the incredibly wise and reasonable Schelling--more on him in another post).]

If we let Kurdistan fall apart, we’ve missed a huge opportunity, in my mind, to continue (somewhat) effectively managing Iraq’s bottoming-out in its natural decomposition from unitary state to reasonably loose federalism. I think that flashpoint management will be the primary job of the next president. That’s where I see the potential upside and downside being profound, whereby I see the situation in southern Iraq being far more set (we must draw down for troop rotational/strain reasons, so there will be some but not overwhelming violence between Sunni and Shia [again, what I wrote in my column a few weeks back] because the central government will be just solid/mushy enough to avoid that and we’ll eventually get a regional security dialogue that includes Shiia-standard bearer Iran and Sunni standard-bearer Saudi Arabia over the inescapable reality that Iran’s going to get close enough to the bomb that the world’s great powers will need to find a stable position for Tehran in the region. Why? All that oil and gas in Iran and all that rising demand for it in East Asia.

You may not care for that pathway, believing it signals some sort of end-times for the region and/or the world, but as Schelling pointed out repeatedly this weekend in Australia, deterrence works and has worked for 60 years. It worked with those crazy Americans (and yes, we’ve had our share of goofy thinking on nukes over time). It worked with those revolutionary Russians, those whacked-out Chinese, the too-proud Indians, those unstable Pakistani Muslims, and even the Holocaust-damaged, Masada-complex Israelis. Every time you get a bipolar standoff, conventional war goes away. No war between US and USSR. None between USSR and PRC or between PRC and USA. None between India and PRC or between India and Pakistan. In every instance, experts galore predicted the inevitability of Holocaust and Armageddon, and every time they’re wrong. Instead, we get no wars whatsoever and the rise of diplomacy and economic connectivity.

Naturally, we will be told Iran is an incredible exception: crazier than any previous iteration (oh, how soon we revise history) and willing to support terrorism on an unprecedented degree (ditto, in fact, I miss those cuddly communists who made the world such a wonderful and stable place!). Clearly, there is always danger in bringing a new nuclear power on line (and there, I fear North Korea far more, because it’s acquisition introduces an imbalance to the peninsula while Iran’s introduces a Muslim-Israeli balance--and if you say, “But Iran hates Israel!” I answer, “And who exactly did you expect would be the country to create this balance then? Israel’s best Muslim buddy?”), and that means the key question on Iran’s quest for security vis-à-vis America is, “What is the state of strategic thinking regarding nukes inside Iran?” (Schelling’s penetrating question). I don’t know about you, but I haven’t heard any good data on that, just a lot of pathetic tea-leaf reading (although I’ve had some great conversations with a Tehran-based Iranian political scientist/security strategist here in Australia on this subject).

But back to the main point of this post: despite all the heat on the subject, I don’t think most Americans realize how already-largely-decided our glidepath is regarding Iraq as a whole--again, largely for troop strain reasons. Yes, there will be much political show and many strong words uttered over airwaves on this issue, but the wiggle room here is--by my professional standard--awfully small, meaning I don’t see much to debate from a grand strategic angle. The only thing that would change that is a diplomatic breakthrough in the region, logically first on the Arab-Israeli struggle, segueing into some engagement on Iran.

You might say that’s all impossible, and history would certainly be on your side. But consider this one thing that Bush and his team have completely avoided confronting: if you want a pluralistic Middle East, you have to accommodate the Shiia revival (very much of our own creating) because they’re the historically repressed and downtrodden minority in most of the states we’re targeting for political change. In turn, that means finding some way to deal with Iran and embedding it somehow in a larger regional security sense. Why? Read Nasr’s book on the Shiia Revival.

And please, if you want to approach this question without hysteria, please remember that al-Qaeda is Sunni-derived, not Shiia-based. Confusing the two is like saying Russia and China were natural allies in the Cold War because both were communists. True if you see the world in black and white, not true if you can spot some grey.

In short, avoid the sort of stunning simplification that Bush so regularly promotes.