Iraq: one size fits none

ARTICLE: "Migration Complicates the Future Look of Iraq," by James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, New York Times, 19 September 2007, p. A1.

OP-ED: "Shaky Allies in Anbar," by David Ignatius, Washington Post, 20 September 2007, p. A21.

ARTICLE: "India's Long-Established Ties With Iran Straining Alliance With U.S.," by Rama Lakshmi, Washington Post, 20 September 2007, p. A15.

The ethnic separation process, we are told, is more complex than the "soft partition" realists like me would have you believe, so sayeth the Iraqi Red Crescent in a new report.

Turns out there has been a lot of separating going on, with 3 clear ethnic divisions emerging, but with a Baghdad center that's still highly mixed. And yes, even within those divisions, there is some mixing.

This, we are told, makes the notion of the soft partition, or the creation of semi-independent states within a loose federal structure, far harder to imagine or achieve.

I see this argument as a red herring. No one expects sectarian purity as the going-in requirement. Indeed, having minorities within each of the three is important, giving each a reason to interact on such issues and to learn what it takes to accommodate "others" within their national identities. Sooner that happens, the faster the political reconciliation comes in the larger sense.

None of this will be easy or fast. We need to focus on direction, not degree.

What worked with the Sunni tribes, won't necessarily work with the Shia, and to the extent it does, as Ignatius points out, this isn't nation-building as far as Iraq is concerned.

In reality, this is nation-building as far as the Iraqs (Kurds, Sunni, Shia, Baghdad) are concerned. Without security, nothing gets restarted and without restarting economic activity, there's little for anybody to compromise over (like we're watching already with the Turks and Kurds).

For Iraq the project to unfold in its bottoming-out phase, each of the three major regions needs to find some stability, which means some stabilizing connectivity with its immediate neighbors. Why Kurdistan works is because Turkey is making money like crazy as its great supplier and buyer. Jordan's the obvious partner with the Sunnis (to deal with them is to find them in Amman, just like Ignatius did). And with the Shia, you know who the stabilizer ends up being, whether we like it or not.

That's why I don't agree with conflating the Iraq situation with the Iran situation. It just doesn't fit the reality of Iraq's sequencing, nor does it work with the reality of Iran's place in the world, which involves it increasingly with Russia, India and China.

This roll can quickly get stuck on one big rock. Iran ain't going anywhere, and no amount of scapegoating it for Iraq is going to get us what we really want and need there.

The rule set is coming on armed guards

ARTICLE: "Armed Guards In Iraq Occupy a Legal Limbo," by John M. Broder and James Risen, New York Times, 20 September 2007, p. A1.

ARTICLE: "Where Military Rules Don't Apply: Blackwater's Security Force in Iraq Given Wide Latitude by State Dept.," by Steve Fainaru, Washington Post, 20 September 2007, p. A1.

Blackwater is so big to State that State defends it at every turn, and that's not surprising. But with the outsourcing comes the extension of diplomatic protection that's unsustainable. Unlike the military which has its own internal justice system, Blackwater's sitting on a "legal island," as Rep. Murtha put it, and that's not going to work for anybody over the long haul.

There's a reason why Blackwater joined the International Peace Operations Association: they can see the regulation coming and want to engage the process. But what they, and the IPOA, surely understand is that such regulations typically come in response to a tragedy or anger tipping point.

We may be there right now in Iraq, and Blackwater better pick its spots to bend so it does not break. Sometimes being the industry leader means more than just pulling in the lion's share of the business.

The balanced world economy is more easily achieved than imagined

ARTICLE: "World Economy in Flux As America Downshifts: Huge Trade Gap Narrows As Dollar, Housing Slide; Exporting Lobster Traps," by Michael M. Phillips, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2007, p. A1.

ARTICLE: "Dubai Exchange Vies for Global Role," by Aaron Lucchetti, Alistair MacDonald and Jason Singer, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2007, p. C1.

The opening paras made a powerful observation:

For years, economists have warned that the U.S. can't run up endless charges on the national credit card to cover its huge appetite for imported cars, oil, electronics and other goods. Someday, they said, the bill will come due.

It looks like someday may have finally arrived.

After 16 years during which the U.S. mainly borrowed and bought while much of the rest of the world lent and sold, the global economy appears to be undergoing a fundamental shift. American exporters are finding eager overseas markets for their products, U.S. consumers are beginning to temper their free-spending ways as the housing boom turns to bust. China, the Middle East, central Europe and Africa are absorbing more of the world's imports. The result: Instead of depending as heavily on the U.S. for demand, the world economy could become more evenly balanced.

The slow "decline" of the dollar is a very good thing.

In 2000, the U.S. absorbed almost one-fifth of the world's imports. Now it's under 15%. Meanwhile, the New Core emerging markets (Brazil, South Africa, India, etc.) are now up to 40 percent of import consumption, a significant rise from 28% in 1991.

The rebalancing is more natural and less painful than predicted, so long as the slide goes slowly.

Meanwhile, we watch Dubai continue to weave its way into global financial nets. A three-way deal brewing between Bourse Dubai, Nasdaq and a Nordic exchange operator will end up giving Dubai a minority stake in the London Stock Exchange. The link-up "would create an exchange group with business that stretches through three regions: the U.S., Europe and the Middle East."

Western exchanges are keen to expand their business in the Middle East, where capital markets are developing fast amid high oil prices and changes in corporate governance and regulation.

Again, it's not the slowing of globalization that challenges us, it's how fast it continues to proceed. But the self-balancing is encouraging. The unsustainable is naturally corrected, because the feedback loops are real and functioning.

The worst war, let's be honest

ARTICLE: "War and Remembrance," by David Gates, Newsweek, 24 September 2007, p. 54.

The best reason to watch this documentary:

"It was time," says Burns, "to just unwrap the bloodless, gallant myth of the second world war and say this was the worst war ever. The worst."

Amen, brother. I have always flinched when I've heard it described as the "good war."

60 million dead.

Giuliani reaching to the wrong audiences

ARTICLE: "Giuliani Visit to London Aims to Bolster Credentials," by Mary Jacoby, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2007, p. A7.

Selling old Thatcher lines ("isn't a time to go wobbly") for pre-emptive war, resurrecting the ancient bit about Israel joining NATO ( and suggesting a bunch of Asian countries too, one supposes, to save them from Chinese domination), and tying it all off with a promise to bomb Iran if that's what it takes to stop them from getting nukes (promising only to set back their program a few years).

It just all comes off as too quaint by half.

Out macho-ing the macho promises of others isn't the way to sell his brand of foreign policy experience.

Preview with UK troops?

ARTICLE: "UK close to agreement with US on reducing role of troops in Iraq," by James Blitz and Stephen Fidler, Financial Times, 19 September 2007, p. 1.

Interesting precusor perhaps.

This is the Petraeus deal:

1) intervene when sectarian violence gets too high

2) maintain supply lines out of country

3) train the Iraqis.

Add the anti-AQI ops and you get close to our long-term package, with the short-term variant being a focus on border security vis-a-vis Iran (which, if we're smart, works both ways to start some self-incentivized buy-in from Iran).

So you see, even with the Brits' "departure," we're looking at 5,000 soldiers giving us a preview of coming attractions.

Top ten books

Bill Cumming wrote:

Do you have a top ten reading list of books that support your PNM and
BFA books since 9/11?

Tom's reply:

1) Wolf
Why Globalization Works

2) Baghwati
In Defense of Globalization

3) Collier
The Bottom Billion

4) Lomborg
The Skeptical Environmentalist

5) Sageman
Understanding Terror Networks

6) Nasr
The Shia Revival

7) Roy
Globalized Islam

8) Kagan
Dangerous Nation

9) Robb
Brave New War

10) Nagl
Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife

Good run-through of logic...

ARTICLE: Why Bush won't attack Iran, By Steven Clemons, Salon, Sept. 19, 2007

on Iran attack possibilities. Intelligent.

(Thanks: kilngoddess)

What can $9B buy these days?

ARTICLE: Saudis Pay 4.43 Billion Pounds for 72 Eurofighters, By Emmet Oliver and Massoud A. Derhally, Bloomberg, September 17, 2007

ARTICLE: Russia Buys Right to Restore Iraq For $9 billion, Kommersant, Sep. 20, 2007

Fascinating. Been saying for a while we should have/could have outsourced the reconstruction to New Cores like Russia, India, China.

Was bound to happen.

Scary to some, but to me a harbinger of future allies in our goal of shrinking the Gap.

(Thanks: Matthew Garcia)

Dancing and strings

ARTICLE: U.S. officials deny intent to attack Iran, by Rowan Scarborough, The Examiner, Sep 19, 2007

And so we continue this misleading and mischievous dance, strings being plucked on all sides.

Playing politics on DC

ARTICLE: Senators Block D.C. Vote Bill, Delivering Possibly Fatal Blow, By Mary Beth Sheridan, Washington Post, September 19, 2007; Page A01

Per my "55th State" piece in this month's Esquire, see how the GOP in Senate block this innovative House compromise (blue seat to DC and red one to Utah) out of fear that precedence set for DC statehood and 2 blue senators.

Thus the free-slave state analogy I offered in the piece. No DC movement without accompanying balance in Senate by a new red state.

If Serbia wants to disconnect, then that's its choice

ARTICLE: "Serbs See Rift With West if Kosovo Gains Independence: A country's entry into the European Union seems more distant," by Nicholas Wood, New York Times, 16 September 2007, p. WK3.

If Serbia wants to go to the mattresses--in diplomatic terms only, mind you--over Kosovo, then so be it. Backsliding along the seam is to be expected. And if you're telling me Serbia could end up in Moscow's "camp," then I'm really unimpressed.

Setbacks to some, just normal give and take to me. Big point is how anger gets expressed and whether you get back on my security radar or not. If you think Putin and his crowd will do anything for Serbia that costs them anything real, I think you're dreaming. So this is all one great exercise in pissing in the wind. Serbia's always had a pride issue, just like Russia. But again, it ain't a question of you being squeaky, it's a question of whether or not there's any real danger of kinetics being attached. The rest is simply finessed.

Good case made on carbon tax

ECONOMIC VIEW: "One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax," by N. Gregory Mankiw, New York Times, 16 September 2007, p. BU6.

The wargame I ran with Cantor on global warming and Asia pushed for a cap-and-trade answer more than carbon taxes, which, if I remember correctly, finished a close second in voting.

I never got the argument on taxing back then, but am warming up to it now thanks to solid arguments like this one offered by the always impressive Mankiw.

Worth contemplating.

Why did our group reach for cap-and-trade? I think part was the--then--recent glow cast by Kyoto, where the problem perceived wasn't the modality but the defined pool of players (India and China given a pass). Also, plenty of appreciation for the regional SOx and NOx schemes in the U.S. and the great successes there.

But in the end, the tax route may logically trump on this more globalized pollution issue. SOx and NOx cap-and-trade schemes may work because the causality is more readily appreciated in a regional sense, while global warming is just that--too global for such schemes to work in the intended way (as Europe's experience to date seems to indicate).

Anyway, read up and get smarter.

The case for signaling Iran as compromise

ARTICLE: "In Bush's Speech, Signs of Split On Iran Policy," by Helene Cooper, New York Times, 16 September 2007, p. A1.

Hmm. Would seem to find support for analysis offered in previous post regarding Osirik-like example: this signaling by proxy is mostly our telling Iran what we're contemplating.

Nice to have my thinking confirmed so "quickly."

Just goes to show you the advantages of letting your news "age" a bit before tackling your newspapers all at once!

China's example on reducing drug cultivation in its neighborhood?

ARTICLE: "No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast Asia," by Thomas Fuller, New York Times, 16 September 2007, p. WK3.

Fascinating story on the decline of poppies production in the Golden Triangle.

The untold story? China's influence. Since China is the main local market and it's seen a "spike in addicts and H.I.V. Infections from contaminated needles," apparently Beijing decided to act, using its economic muscle on Myanmar, with whom it has a decidedly mixed relationship in terms of encouraging human rights.

Still, hard to argue with the outcome. The China-Myanmar border region had accounted for 30 percent of Myanmar's poppy production in recent years. Recently it was declared poppy-free. Myanmar is still number 2 global producer of heroin, but production is down overall by 80 percent over the last decade.

China plays a big role in this, as one Dutch researcher (Martin Jelsma) on this illicit trade declares:

China has had an underestimated role. Their main leverage is economic: These border areas of Burma are by now economically much more connected to China than the rest of Burma. For local authorities, it's quite clear that, for any investments they want to attract, cooperation with China is a necessity."

Yes, we can argue about China's negative environmental impact on Myanmar, but the underlying dynamic here is real and noteworthy, and obviously a reminder to the U.S. when we think about our drug war in Latin America.

You either displace with better investment opportunities or no amount of eradication changes anything.

I doubt China has cut any domestic demand, and it's drug laws have to be as harsh as anybody's, but its investments speak more loudly.

Is Blackwater too big to fail?

ARTICLE: "Blackwater Incident May Upset U.S. Plans in Iraq: Baghdad's Attempt To Limit Contractor Follows Shootout," by August Cole and Neil King, Jr., Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2007, p. A9.

Judging by the headline, I would say yes. Blackwater's just too integral to U.S. military and diplomatic ops to be singled out and punitively cut out of the picture by Iraq's central government, even if it did screw up on this shootout (no clear judgment on that to date, either way).

Reality is, State relies on Blackwater plenty, and with troops inevitably drawing down in Iraq, DoD's ability to cover gets harder, not easier, with time. So if Blackwater gets in trouble, expect our government to smooth things over, making Blackwater effective USG in theater.

People ask me, "Are you unhappy not to see the SysAdmin-Leviathan split getting more pronounced?" And I just have to laugh. What could more pronounced than this? Blackwater is simply private-sector backfilling on the SysAdmin. The Pentagon will resist formalizing resource shifts (like the apparent Army decision to shelve Nagl's proposal on setting up a 20,000-man advisory corps for now, given how incredibly stretched it is on BCT rotations due to Iraq) to the SysAdmin for as absolutely long as possible.

I understand that bureaucratic impulse. I also understand the related bureaucratic reality of having to tap the Blackwaters of the world (remember, Blackwater begins primarily as a trainer, not operator) in the meantime.

I've been saying from the beginning that the SysAdmin function inevitably ends up being more civvies than mil, more USG than DoD, more international than US, and more private sector driven than public sector funded.

This is a frontier-integrating age, and Blackwater is the Pinkertons of this era. Don't expect them to be liked. Just expect them to be used more often.

Signalling Iran with our proxy

OP-ED: "Osirak II? Israel's silence on Syria speaks volumes," by Bret Stephens, Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2007, p. A14.

Israel conducts an air raid on Syria last week and announces it's put nuke cruise missiles on its German-made subs.

The strike is alleged, via leaks, to have been conducted against a North Korean shipment of nuclear materials, supposedly sent there to be put on ice while Kim shows the inspectors how little he actually has.

Plausible? Come on, we're talking Kim. The guy's capable of anything.

So a signal to whom, this strike?

Not to Kim, I would say.

Not so much to Syria either. Israel's been itching for a while on that score anyway. Doubt Damascus needs much reminding.

A dry run for Iran? The logistics make little sense, as Stephens points out.

A sign to Iran that if Israel is willing to go nuclear on Syria (our proxy versus Iran's), then what do you think America is willing to do to Tehran?

That angle, the only one not covered by Stephens (perhaps tellingly so) strikes me as most useful.

In this scenario, useful idiots (NK, Syria abound), as do proxies making proxy war (our Israel as punisher, Iran's Syria as whipping boy). We side-signal to Kim that we can see what tricks he's up to, while signal to Syria how willing we are to let Israel "bombs away," plus we proxy signal to Tehran: "This could be you."

As signaling goes, I would give Bush an A-plus on that one.

I know it must seem like I go back and forth on Bush and Iran a lot. There is simply the reality of my wearing many hats. Under certain circumstances, I make certain arguments, but in other rooms, I simply deal with the hand being dealt. I don't confuse the roles, and neither do people with whom I work. At the end of the day, it's never personal, despite the tendency of readers to imagine it's so. As I say again and again, I'm not political and my side's never out of power.

When I criticize the powers that be, though, some imagine a clear agenda. Ditto for when I praise them. Naturally, all such perceived "shifts" are considered "betrayals," which I always find quite humorous, since, by and large, I can't stand the ideologues on either side who sometimes deign me with their praise and other times damn me with this criticism. In the grand scheme of things, I find such games meaningless beyond belief. The hatchet types can wrap themselves around such axles all they want since it's a free world and since most of their posturing is just for frat-boy show, but there's a big difference between "useful" and "useful idiots."

Do yourself a favor if you want to pursue a serious career in this field and learn how to spot the differences between the two, because when the doors shut you want to be on the inside, included in the conversation and not outside performing to the cameras and microphones.

The abdication of King George

OP-ED: "Somebody Else's Mess," by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 16 September 2007, p. WK10.

Bush's "tacit resignation," as Friedman puts it, seals an early post-presidency that I've been describing since Katrina. It remains a stunning end to this presidency, assuming Bush doesn't decide to climb back into office via Condi on Israel and Palestine or a heading-out-the-door military campaign on Iran.

Friedman quotes David Rothkopf on the best take I've yet seen on Petraeus' amazing and weird week in DC:

"In one fell swoop George Bush abdicated to Petraeus, Maliki and the Democrats," said David Rothkopf, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, referring to Gen. David Petraeus and the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki. "Bush left it to Petraeus to handle the war, Maliki to handle our timetable and therefore our checkbook, and the Democrats to ultimately figure out how to end this."

Game, set and match to Rothkopf on analysis.

Friedman's final nail?

The sad thing for the American people is that we have no commander in chief anymore, framing our real situation and options.

As I consider Iran to be next on deck, the interesting question then becomes, "And what of Fox Fallon?"

Gossip has it that he and Petraeus clash over Petraeus's push to extend the surge. No surprise there, as it ties Fallon's hands just as he steps into our military's most important combatant command. I wouldn't want my career-capping moment to be OBE on the basis of a subordinate's decision either, especially as I'm staring at possible strikes against Iran, the success of which may mark my entire tenure in command.

If Bush is truly backing out of office, what is Fallon's crucial role on Iran, given the surge tie-down in Iraq?

Fallon was famous at PACOM for standing up to Rummy on mil-mil contacts with the Chinese. No doubt he's now behind calls for confidence-building measures with Iran's Revolutionary Guards (Fallon simply wants to keep his options wide open and to do that he needs comm venues with the RGs, otherwise he's potentially flying blind during crises).

So if Bush passes the baton to Petraeus on Iraq, what's Fallon's leeway on Iran, I wonder.

Would we have to stop blaming Canada?

After the Esquire piece on adding more states, Tom got an email from Jonathan Wheelwright at United North America. They want to join the US and Canada.

New Esquire pieces are up

Part of The 2007 Esquire 100. Check them out:

+ Nos. 5 Through 9: The Next Five States

+ No. 40: Sea-Traffic Control