Is Blackwater too big to fail?

ARTICLE: "Blackwater Incident May Upset U.S. Plans in Iraq: Baghdad's Attempt To Limit Contractor Follows Shootout," by August Cole and Neil King, Jr., Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2007, p. A9.
Judging by the headline, I would say yes. Blackwater's just too integral to U.S. military and diplomatic ops to be singled out and punitively cut out of the picture by Iraq's central government, even if it did screw up on this shootout (no clear judgment on that to date, either way).
Reality is, State relies on Blackwater plenty, and with troops inevitably drawing down in Iraq, DoD's ability to cover gets harder, not easier, with time. So if Blackwater gets in trouble, expect our government to smooth things over, making Blackwater effective USG in theater.
People ask me, "Are you unhappy not to see the SysAdmin-Leviathan split getting more pronounced?" And I just have to laugh. What could more pronounced than this? Blackwater is simply private-sector backfilling on the SysAdmin. The Pentagon will resist formalizing resource shifts (like the apparent Army decision to shelve Nagl's proposal on setting up a 20,000-man advisory corps for now, given how incredibly stretched it is on BCT rotations due to Iraq) to the SysAdmin for as absolutely long as possible.
I understand that bureaucratic impulse. I also understand the related bureaucratic reality of having to tap the Blackwaters of the world (remember, Blackwater begins primarily as a trainer, not operator) in the meantime.
I've been saying from the beginning that the SysAdmin function inevitably ends up being more civvies than mil, more USG than DoD, more international than US, and more private sector driven than public sector funded.
This is a frontier-integrating age, and Blackwater is the Pinkertons of this era. Don't expect them to be liked. Just expect them to be used more often.
Reader Comments (3)
Talking about Blackwater specifically, I'm on my second tour in Iraq right now and every encounter I've had with them has given me less reason to trust them. Most of the employees seem to be ex-SF types who liked playing Johnny Rambo but wanted more pay or didn't want to have to answer to authority, shave every day, pee in a cup, or wear a uniform. As a result, they've caused huge problems shooting people and then leaving the Army guys to deal with the backlash.
What's the solution? Perhaps a branch of the SysAdmin force could be trained specifically for personal security of VIPs--but whomever it is, they must be truly accountable to the law.
The "Auxiliaries" were former British army officers who were being mustered out after the war as the army shrunk back to pre war levels. They were given decent pay and wore army uniforms. They wore tams for headgear, crossed bandoleers, shiny officers boots and carried a brace of Webley revolvers along with their En-field rifles. They had a reputation as excellent fighters.
The "Tans" job was to terrorize the populace. They tortured and murdered IRA prisoners and innocent citizens alike. Their drunken rampages brought more recruits to the IRA than any other British misstep. They were a disgrace. Shaun Moylan, an IRA Commander, said "The Tans could not have helped us more if they fought side by side with us."
The Auxiliaries were more disciplined and tended to treat civilians well. They were not well liked by regular army officers. There was significant resentment about their independence and there being outside of the chain of command. "A bit too much dash" as opposed to the gentlemen of the regiments. The constabulary thought them to be arrogant and knew that whatever the outcome of the war that the "Auxies" would leave Ireland when the fighting was over. The policemen would still have to live there.
Interesting parallels. Lessons unlearned.