Buy Tom's Books
  • Great Powers: America and the World After Bush
    Great Powers: America and the World After Bush
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating
    Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century
    The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • Romanian and East German Policies in the Third World: Comparing the Strategies of Ceausescu and Honecker
    Romanian and East German Policies in the Third World: Comparing the Strategies of Ceausescu and Honecker
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 1): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 1): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 2): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 2): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 3): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 3): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 4): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 4): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Thomas P.M. Barnett, Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett
  • The Emily Updates (Vol. 5): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    The Emily Updates (Vol. 5): One Year in the Life of the Girl Who Lived (The Emily Updates (Vols. 1-5))
    by Vonne M. Meussling-Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Emily V. Barnett
Search the Site
Powered by Squarespace
Monthly Archives
« China's example on reducing drug cultivation in its neighborhood? | Main | Signalling Iran with our proxy »
2:28AM

Is Blackwater too big to fail?

ARTICLE: "Blackwater Incident May Upset U.S. Plans in Iraq: Baghdad's Attempt To Limit Contractor Follows Shootout," by August Cole and Neil King, Jr., Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2007, p. A9.

Judging by the headline, I would say yes. Blackwater's just too integral to U.S. military and diplomatic ops to be singled out and punitively cut out of the picture by Iraq's central government, even if it did screw up on this shootout (no clear judgment on that to date, either way).

Reality is, State relies on Blackwater plenty, and with troops inevitably drawing down in Iraq, DoD's ability to cover gets harder, not easier, with time. So if Blackwater gets in trouble, expect our government to smooth things over, making Blackwater effective USG in theater.

People ask me, "Are you unhappy not to see the SysAdmin-Leviathan split getting more pronounced?" And I just have to laugh. What could more pronounced than this? Blackwater is simply private-sector backfilling on the SysAdmin. The Pentagon will resist formalizing resource shifts (like the apparent Army decision to shelve Nagl's proposal on setting up a 20,000-man advisory corps for now, given how incredibly stretched it is on BCT rotations due to Iraq) to the SysAdmin for as absolutely long as possible.

I understand that bureaucratic impulse. I also understand the related bureaucratic reality of having to tap the Blackwaters of the world (remember, Blackwater begins primarily as a trainer, not operator) in the meantime.

I've been saying from the beginning that the SysAdmin function inevitably ends up being more civvies than mil, more USG than DoD, more international than US, and more private sector driven than public sector funded.

This is a frontier-integrating age, and Blackwater is the Pinkertons of this era. Don't expect them to be liked. Just expect them to be used more often.

Reader Comments (3)

I agree that SysAdmin is more civ than mil, and contractors have an enormous role in any nation-building effort. But I believe they have no business pulling triggers for the US. The government commissions officers based upon their competence in warfare, but also more importantly, their moral fiber--we can't trust just anyone to effectively and ethically wield lethal force when it comes to matters affecting national security. More importantly, there is law holding those officers and soldiers accountable and a commitment to be self-enforcing. Although private security contractors in foreign countries theoretically have to follow the rules that DoJ/FBI types follow, there has been little to no enforcement; certainly nothing like a court-martial. If indeed it went to trial, the court would have to work out all kinds of thorny issues of jurisdiction. Wielding lethal force on behalf of the US government is a role that should be exclusively military.

Talking about Blackwater specifically, I'm on my second tour in Iraq right now and every encounter I've had with them has given me less reason to trust them. Most of the employees seem to be ex-SF types who liked playing Johnny Rambo but wanted more pay or didn't want to have to answer to authority, shave every day, pee in a cup, or wear a uniform. As a result, they've caused huge problems shooting people and then leaving the Army guys to deal with the backlash.

What's the solution? Perhaps a branch of the SysAdmin force could be trained specifically for personal security of VIPs--but whomever it is, they must be truly accountable to the law.
September 20, 2007 | Unregistered CommenterJ. Mooney
During the Anglo Irish War (1919-1921) the British used 2 surrogate forces to assist the regular British military units and the Royal Irish Constabulary. The "Black and Tans" were an assortment of World War I veterans, adventurers, ex convicts and misfits. The Army did not want them wearing army uniforms and the Constabulary (police) did not want them wearing Constabulary uniforms. They wore a combination of the army (tan) and the police (black) hence the nickname "Black and Tans". That was also the nickname of a famous pack of real hounds who chased hapless foxes over the countryside.

The "Auxiliaries" were former British army officers who were being mustered out after the war as the army shrunk back to pre war levels. They were given decent pay and wore army uniforms. They wore tams for headgear, crossed bandoleers, shiny officers boots and carried a brace of Webley revolvers along with their En-field rifles. They had a reputation as excellent fighters.

The "Tans" job was to terrorize the populace. They tortured and murdered IRA prisoners and innocent citizens alike. Their drunken rampages brought more recruits to the IRA than any other British misstep. They were a disgrace. Shaun Moylan, an IRA Commander, said "The Tans could not have helped us more if they fought side by side with us."

The Auxiliaries were more disciplined and tended to treat civilians well. They were not well liked by regular army officers. There was significant resentment about their independence and there being outside of the chain of command. "A bit too much dash" as opposed to the gentlemen of the regiments. The constabulary thought them to be arrogant and knew that whatever the outcome of the war that the "Auxies" would leave Ireland when the fighting was over. The policemen would still have to live there.

Interesting parallels. Lessons unlearned.
September 20, 2007 | Unregistered CommenterTed O'Connor
They were complaining about the Auxiliaries, but not the Black and Tans? No wonder they lost. . .
September 21, 2007 | Unregistered CommenterMichael

PostPost a New Comment

Enter your information below to add a new comment.

My response is on my own website »
Author Email (optional):
Author URL (optional):
Post:
 
Some HTML allowed: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <code> <em> <i> <strike> <strong>