The spammers are getting to me!

You know all those emails you get from real people where it's obvious some spammer has hijacked the email address of the person and has sent you some crap and the subject line has some two-word phrase (typically a modifier-adjective combo)?

Well, those things drive me nuts.

Why?

I actually get a lot of legit emails from people with subject lines like "disturbing flippant," "outrageously self-absorbed," and "brilliantly insightful." So I have to check through all this stuff, always looking for the "Tom/Dr. Barnett" at the top of the email that says it's a real email (whether I care for the message is--of course--a different thing!).

I dunno, maybe this approach drives other people nuts too, or maybe I just get a lot of over-the-top email so I'm particularly vulnerable to this latest trend.

The Vulcan mind-link between blogs

My hope with Steve DeAngelis's blog is coming true: he and editor Bradd Hayes naturally blog a certain section of articles that I would otherwise feel a certain need to cover. In many instances, like Americans discover the global commute, it's a subject I've covered in the past and don't really have anything new to say about, but Steve does, extending the argument further in new and neat ways.

So, much like Steve and I when we're together and tend to exhibit a lot of overlapping dialogue (we'd be naturals in a Robert Altman film), the same's happening with our blogs. I'd been carrying this article (cited in Steve's blog) around in my briefcase for days, trying to get to it, but Steve does a better job than I would have, thus freeing me of the effort.

Of course, if I consider the blogosphere as a whole (in terms of "freeing me of the effort"), then I'd never write anything! But obviously, my connection with Steve is very unique, yielding some great opportunities for both of us in our collaboration within Enterra.

War-within-the-context-of-bureaucratic/academic-inertia

ARTICLE: "Bush Focuses on Iraq as G.O.P. Tries to Change Subject," by John M. Broder, New York Times, 26 October 2006.

EDITORIAL: "Money Down the Drain in Iraq," by New York Times, 26 October 2006.

ARTICLE: "Warfare skills eroding as Army fights insurgents," by David Wood, , 24 October 2006, sent in by Chris Isgrig.

The problem with Bush pushing the war as a judgment factor in the election is that both the term (war) and American thinking on it (binary--as in, we win 100% or we leave) does not bode well for him. I know it all comes off as sheer terminology, but it's crucial.

What's going on in Iraq now is better captured by terms like counterinsurgency and postwar reconstruction and stability operations. In those paradigms, there is no easily defined ending, and victories tend to come in the 50-60% range--as in, you reach the critical mass. But it's never an obvious or abrupt conclusion, and it takes years--as in, upwards of a decade or more.

When Bush says, "trust me on this war," he's using the wrong word, but he's the one who made that choice, because it gave him the freedom to blow off potential allies (America really doesn't need allies for wars, but it does for postwars) and to get just enough of a mandate from the American people to conduct a war.

But Bush has never really sought any mandate from anybody on the postwar--not from the public nor from our allies. Thus, he basically plays into his critics's hands when he persists in calling Iraq a war: those who opposed the war (which was brilliantly waged by our armed forces) can now tar Bush with his mishandling of the postwar (and deservedly so). But the sad thing is, the well-run war and those who should feel proud of that effort now are no longer able, because it's been so badly squandered.

And that squandering, while it had much to do with the Pentagon, also had far more to do with the great failures across the rest of the USG--to wit, the non-existent interagency process. That failure will allow historians to paint a very critical portrait of Condi Rice's time in power (first in National Security Council, where, as Advisor, that was her essential job--a complete failure never well discussed; second as SECSTATE, where the rerun on WMD with Iran occurred on her watch, making our military's fight in Iraq continue to unfold under the worst possible circumstances--also toss in our non-engagement with Syria regarding its border).

Many people recognize these failures and are working hard to make appropriate changes for this Long War (a term that is as much a cry for help by the Army and Marines as a declaration of national determination), but because the interagency belongs to everyone, it is the responsibility of no one, so there isn't great hope that the next postwar will be that much better than the last one. And there is the realization that--as I have long argued--more failure will be required to pile up for change to occur.

The resistance to make any serious changes is already mounting and will continue to grow. As always, the Army will argue that its readiness for Big War will decline if it's forced to focus on postwar and counter-insurgency. This is true, and it's also irrelevant, because Big War simply isn't in the making. The best remaining big scenario (Korea) will not be a U.S.-ground-led affair, but this myth will be pushed by many inside the Army to prevent any further evolution in the direction of optimizing for COIN, which is why I see the elimination of this scenario in the near term as a very good development for the Army's future, for once we remove the last remaining scenarios for the fantastic premises surrounding land wars in Asia involving great powers, then the Army, as well as the Navy, can finally start adjusting to the Long War's real strategic environment more comprehensively.

That was one of the messages I delivered in Beijing: if you want the U.S. off the China/Big War model, then get rid of Kim and use that experience to build trust with the U.S. Do the same dastardly trick that Arbatov talked about regarding the Sovs/Russians--in effect, "we will do the worst possible thing to you: we will deny you an enemy."

None of this resistance should be surprising. Our national security establishment is still dominated on top by Cold War-bred thinkers (and will be through for another decade or so). Plus, the U.S. military's ethos, as Nagl points out so well in his book, has always been annihilation-oriented in definitions of victory in war. It simply believes that limited wars are wrong.

So don't expect the war-within-the-context-of-war mindset to disappear any time soon. A new generation of thinking exists and is rising, but the overthrow of the old order will take more than 9/11 and more than the failure in Iraq, especially since so much of academia is likewise tainted with this old mindset and does no better at teaching horizontal thinking than the military or U.S. government does within its own ranks.

What needs to drive our efforts at change is clear: our knowledge that our troops (specifically the Army and Marines) will--without this change--continue to fight under the worst conditions and suffer unnecessarily high casualties, constantly confronted with the claim that America cannot waste its time and treasure on such "lesser includeds" and instead focus on preventing and winning Big Wars against big opponents.

Yes, a certain amount of our strategy for change is simply waiting this crowd out--meaning until they retire and/or die. But that is not enough. If we do not raise the next generation of thinkers and do-ers capable of making all the horizontal connections, we'll simply be generating more square pegs for increasingly round holes, and that will only lead to more unnecessary deaths on our side and less relevancy for our forces in international security.

And that's just unacceptable.

Reading Nagl's book

"Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam."

It is brilliant and written to be read by anyone. I really recommend it. First three chapters on mil reform, Brit mil culture/history and same for U.S. are worth price of book alone.

But rest is even more amazing: everything we've relearned or got smart on in Iraq was previewed by the Brits in Malaya--right down to "ink spots." And every mistake and bad instance of non-learning was previewed in Vietnam.

Going into the book, I feared it would be too dry and academic, but it really is an exciting read for someone trying to think his or her way through this stuff.

Our man in Oak Ridge

ARTICLE: Command's experiment bringing focus to urban challenges, By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, Oct. 19, 2006

One of the top JFCOM players in such exercises now works for Enterra as our man in Oak Ridge--Shane Deichman. This article talks about one of the great ex's his shop just put on before Shane jumped to our ship.

Serious point of pride for me, as Shane was my recruit.

Thanks to Brad Lena for sending this in.

ARTICLE: "Bush Focuses on

ARTICLE: "Bush Focuses on Iraq as G.O.P. Tries to Change Subject," by John M. Broder, New York Times, 26 October 2006.

EDITORIAL: "Money Down the Drain in Iraq," by New York Times, 26 October 2006.

ARTICLE: "Warfare skills eroding as Army fights insurgents," by David Wood, , 24 October 2006, sent in by Chris Isgrig.

The problem with Bush pushing the war as a judgment factor in the election is that both the term (war) and American thinking on it (binary--as in, we win 100% or we leave) does not bode well for him. I know it all comes off as sheer terminology, but it's crucial.

What's going on in Iraq now is better captured by terms like counterinsurgency and postwar reconstruction and stability operations. In those paradigms, there is no easily defined ending, and victories tend to come in the 50-60% range--as in, you reach the critical mass. But it's never an obvious or abrupt conclusion, and it takes years--as in, upwards of a decade or more.

When Bush stays, "trust me on this war," he's using the wrong word, but he's the one who made that choice, because it gave him the freedom to blow off potential allies (America really doesn't allies for wars, but it does for postwars) and to get just enough of a mandate from the American people to conduct a war.

But Bush has never really sought any mandate from anybody on the postwar--not from the public nor from our allies. Thus, he basically plays into his critics's hands when he persists in calling Iraq a war: those who opposed the war (which was brilliantly waged by our armed forces) can now tar Bush with his mishandling of the postwar (and deservedly so). But the sad thing is, the well-run war and those who should feel proud of that effort now are no longer able, because it's been so badly squandered.

And that squandering, while it had much to do with the Pentagon, also had far more to do with the great failures across the rest of the USG--to wit, the non-existent interagency process. That failure will allow historians to paint a very critical portrait of Condi Rice's time in power (first in National Security Council, where, as Advisor, that was her essential job--a complete failure never well discussed; second as SECSTATE, where the rerun on WMD with Iran occurred on her watch, making our military's fight in Iraq continue to unfold under the worst possible circumstances--also toss in our non-engagement with Syria regarding its border).

Many people recognize these failures and are working hard to make appropriate changes, but because the interagency belongs to everyone, it is the responsibility of no one, so there isn't great hope that the next postwar will be that much better than the last one. And there is the realization that--as I have long argued--more failure will be required to pile up for change to occur.

The resistance to make any serious changes is already mounting and will continue to grow. As always, the Army will argue that it's readiness for Big War will decline if it's forced to focus on postwar and counter-insurgency. This is true, and it's also irrelevant, because Big War simply isn't in the making. The best remaining big scenario (Korea) will not be a U.S.-ground-led affair, but this myth will be pushed by many inside the Army to prevent any further evolution in the direction of optimising for COIN, which is why I see the elimination of this scenario in the near term as a very good development for the Army's future, for once we remove the last remaining scenarios for the fantastic premises surrounding land wars in Asia involving great powers, then the Army, as well as the Navy, can finally start adjusting to the Long War's real stratigc environment more comprehensively.

That was one of the messages I delivered in Beijing: if you want the U.S. off the China/Big War model, then get rid of Kim and use that experience to build trust with the U.S. Do the same dastardly trick that Arbatov talked about regarding the Sovs/Russians--in effect, "we will do the worst possible thing to you: we will deny you an enemy."

None of this resistance should be surprising. Our national security establishment is still dominated on top by Cold War-bred thinkers (and will be through for another decade or so). Plus, the U.S. military's ethos, as Nagl points out so well in his book, has always been annihilation-oriented in definitions of victory in war. It simply believes that limited wars are wrong.

So don't expect the war-within-the-context-of-war mindset to disappear any time soon. A new generation of thinking exists and is rising, but the overthrow of the old order will take more than 9/11 and more than the failure in Iraq, especially since so much of academia is likewise tainted with this old mindset and does no better at teaching horizontal thinking than the military or U.S. government does within its own ranks.

What needs to drive our efforts at change is clear: our knowledge that our troops (specifically the Army and Marines) will--without this change--continue to fight under the worst conditions and suffer unnecessarily high casualties, constantly confronted with the claim that America cannot waste its time and treasure on such "lesser includeds" and instead focus on preventing and winning Big Wars against big opponents.

Yes, a certain amount of our strategy for change is simply waiting this crowd out--meaning until they retire and/or die. But that is not enough. If we do not raise the next generation of thinkers and do-ers capable of making all the horizontal connections, we'll simply be generating more square pegs for increasingly round holes, and that will only lead to more unnecessary deaths on our side and less relevancy for our forces in international security.

And that's just unacceptable.

To do (still): improve interagency

ARTICLE: A Strategic Lunch with Mr. Rumsfeld, by Austin Bay, October 25, 2006

Important to see how this process (improving interagency) IS NOT happening still!

Thanks to Lexington Green for sending this in.

Will Rice make term 'herstoric'?

ARTICLE: Rice proposes Asia form security alliance, By Nicholas Kralev, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, October 25, 2006

Good sign. Rice makes something happen on this (which I've been telling everyone in Beijing to jump on) before her political clock runs out and history will be herstory.

Thanks to John Mooney for sending this in.

Back in the USA

Got up this am and spent morning with seniors at China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies. Great give and take. Nice lunch. I've found they read the blog rather carefully, so let's let it go at that.

Felt like I wrote a chunk of Vol. III as I spoke though, which was cool.

Then the long flight back. Read Nagl's book and watched a ton of Ric Burns' "The Way West."

Lucked out on duty tax, because my overage (above 800$) was all in unframed art, which is exempt!

Then signed two hard BFAs in a Hudson at Terminal 3 at O'Hare.

Waiting on yet another flight.

Hope to get to my hotel before midnight.

Would 300B$ convince you?

Ray Kimball has a post up at Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America entitled Birthing Pains of the SysAdmin. Here's a sample:

I certainly agree that our soldiers are focusing on different skill sets than they would in conventional warfare. Thomas Barnett has some of the best explanations on why this is inevitable, and how if we really want to fight this Long War correctly, a division of forces into Leviathan and SysAdmin is not only warranted but inevitable. And yes, that seems like a huge, unmanageable burden. I remember the first time I read his work, my main comment was "Great idea, but the American taxpayer will never pay for it." $300 billion and counting later, it's safe to say I'm a believer now.

Go read the whole thing.

Austin, TX expeditionary force

ARTICLE: Austin Police, Fire officials help Iraqis aim for better public services, by Spc. Jason Dangel, 24 October 2006

As I ponder my rice congee at breakfast in Beijing, here's a nice little example of SysAdmin on the ground.

Thanks to Keith Mitchell for sending this in.

Solid day with Royal Dutch/Shell

DATELINE: China World Hotel, Beijing, 25 October 2006

Spent six hours leading 30 RDS senior execs through an extended version of the brief, complete with discussion sections and instant feedback votes. Half were from outside China and half were local Chinese. Very invigorating discussion and interaction that left the RDS training execs very happy along with Duke Educational Corp people (my direct clients).

Today's performance guarantees my participation in next event, which isn't until next summer and probably will be in either Dubai or Moscow. I have not briefed up roughly half of all of Royal Dutch/Shell's senior execs, so it'll be interesting to see what that critical mass yields.

After that long effort, went shopping with local friends, buying art and a few pearls from the famous RuPeiPei, who recently received some business (actually, RuPeiPei had to go to her) from Condi Rice during her recent trip. RuPeiPei is where all the foreign dignitaries go for pearls, as all the celebrity photos on the wall of her shop attest.

Then a late dinner with local friends and a connected senior who's going to help me get BFA published in Chinese.

Tomorrow is a roundtable with a bunch of senior military officers. I am told to expect most of the discussion will be about North Korea. No presentation by me, since I briefed a large number of officers at this think tank last June, so this time is all conversation for about three hours. Should be more than interesting.

Development-in-a-Barrel: No help from West required

ARTICLE: "War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows," by Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 24 October 2006

SysAdmin sans America, skipping the military intervention. This is China's version of the pre-canned bankruptcy, and it works because it facilitates the Chinese model: externally connect and internally repress as desired.

This is the true system balancing response to America's perceived misguided use of its Leviathan.

And yeah, it's pretty effective.

Fun with Google's new Custom Search

I've been fooling around with custom search at Rollyo and Windows Live. But my preferred platform is Google. And they have some new Custom Search tools that I thought it would be fun to try out with Tom's network.

So, we've got a new homepage for the Tom and friends search.

Or, we can just throw a search box up right here:

What do you think? Any interesting results?

In Beijing, catching up with news...

DATELINE: China World Hotel at China World Trade Center, Beijing, China, 24 October 2006

Long productive flight over. Wrote my Sunday column (on adopting Vonne Mei, born three years ago this week), then worked the brief for the 5 hours I'll be spending with senior Royal Dutch/Shell officials and a second group of young Chinese execs. Then listened to Ric Burns' docu "Way into the West," taking notes. Then almost finished Friedman's "Moral Consequences of Economic Growth." Also watched "Devil Wears Prada" three times, "Cars" once and "Click" (right up there with "Ground Hog Day") twice. Funny what you can get done when stuck in a plane 14 hours.

What I didn't do is sleep.

Got here and had a brief meeting with a friend who's setting up some shopping later today and a F2F with a China Reform Forum senior who's helping me get BFA sold for Chinese rights (PNM in the process of coming out).

Then had meeting and dinner with Shell and Duke Educational Corp. officials about today's events, before my brain gave out at 9am Monday morning (back home time, equating to 9pm Monday night here) just after I found out the Pack won in Miami.

Up today with solid 8 hours (thanks to Ambien keeping me down) and gearing up for the day.

Interesting piece in NYT ("To Stand or Fall in Baghdad: Capital Is Key to Mission" by Michael Gordon, 23 Oct) makes me think the two breakthroughs that Bush might accept from Baker would be direct talks with both Syria and Iran to clamp down on the borders (huge problem of picking a fight with the entire bar at once instead of just concentrating on the badass you started up with) and some acceptance of an international state/force package for Baghdad (a more modest admitting of failure and a mea culpa that allows us to socialize our problem a bit with the right allies). I think that combo would do a lot. Sad to say, I don't see the Bush administration being willing to change. It's like that quote in the NYT on Friday: something to the effect that the problem with the neocons isn't that they're not often right, it's that they never admit that they're ever wrong.

Ethan's review of Tom's Pop!Tech talk

New Yorker in DC writes in to point me to the best summary/review of Tom's Pop!Tech talk that I have seen. Thanks, nykr!

It's by blogroll denizen Ethan Zuckerman: Two hours of Tom Barnett in twenty - thirty? - minutes. For those of you who have heard Tom speak, you know that sounds about right.

This post reads like Ethan has basically written up his notes from Tom's talk. Check it out!

Tom around the web

+ Let's start with Pop!Tech. Community Mobilization covered Tom's appearance Friday and linked his own review of Tom's appearance two years ago.

+ Let's pick up the North Korea situation next. ZenPundit linked China just not ready to go all the way on North Korea.

+ The most-linked topic again this week is 5GW. Let's round it up:

• ZenPundit linked My own personal 5GW dream
• So did Christian Soldiers (2x).
• A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds was linked by Zenpundit.
• So did Mistakes by TJM.
• So did Dreaming 5GW.

+ China Law Blog linked China's middle class looking less inscrutable.

+ Here's a new one on me: The Double-Tongued Dictionary has linked Tom twice: for 3-D job and giving someone the wire brush.

PNM and BFA go to USAWC

PAPER: THE LEGACY OF MAHAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, BY Commander Bruce Black

Interesting piece, at first glance. Most interesting is that it's an Army War College student research effort.

Thanks to brother Andy for sending this in.

"Mr. President" Mar 05 piece holding up nicely

DATELINE: United flights from Indy to Beijing, 22 October 2006

I wrote the original piece based on an impromptu response to a question from an Air Force general at Air War College the morning after the 04 election. He basically said, "Well, what would you advise the President on his second term?"

I gave him three points: 1) co-opt Iran to help you fix Iraq and keep the hope of the Big Bang alive and begin the construction of a regional security forum, 2) Get China locked in by toning down the whole Taiwan issue and thus demoting it within DOD planning circles (to aid the Marines and Army in budget battles), and 3) go after Kim instead of Iran, getting yourself an East Asian NATO in the bargain that allows further shifting of resources from Asia to the Mideast and Africa and begins to tap China's serious help in what we now call the Long War.

When I told Mark Warren about the conversation later in Princeton (where I spoke at Woodrow Wilson), he told me I had to write it up for Esquire. I did, it became the "Mr. President" piece, and it was selected for the "Best American Political Writing 2005" volume and the issue was one of three Esquire issues submitted for consideration by the National Magazine awards for 2005. Another was November issue in which my "The Chinese Are Our Friends" pushed the arguments even farther (that one was selected for the 2006 compendium of "Best American Political Writing"). Esquire ended up winning the "general excellence" award for its subscription range of 2-5 million based on those entries.

When the "Mr. President" article came out, many lambasted it as fantasy, with the summary blogosphere judgment being, "logical, but it'll never happen."

Undeterred, I made these arguments the foreign policy centerpieces of "Blueprint for Action," where most critics again blasted them as fantasy.

Well, those arguments are looking better and better by the day.

Iraq continues to be a mess, and Iran continues to be the local player most able to help us on that issue. Back then, I made that argument for such dialogue, now James Baker and his bipartisan commission are making very similar noises.

Back then, everyone said we could never live with a nuclear Iran. Now, even the Israelis openly debate this eventuality, as it's clear that China and Russia and India--not to mention Europe and Japan--have no desire to see this administration re-run the Iraq storyline.

Back then, North Korea was viewed as a backburner issue. Now Kim gets it back out front, and Rice and her diplomats visit Beijing weekly pushing for strategic cooperation on North Korea, while Chinese leaders secretly debate the logic of Kim's inevitable demise. Japan moves to repair relations with China, and Taiwan, much touted in the fall of 2004 as a near-term flashpoint (story in Atlantic, for example, fueled by speculation from Naval War College professors) is more quiet than ever, as the threat of the pro-independence president has largely passed, with no small effort by this administration to quiet all such talk (plus China's many clever diplomatic sleights of hand). Meanwhile, our diplomats visiting Beijing speak openly of the need for an East Asian NATO, always tying those words with a call for China's help on North Korea. Also meanwhile, China's top energy planner calls openly for strategic partnership with the U.S. on exploring, developing and protecting energy sources inside the Gap.

All in all, the "Mr. President" piece is standing up quite well as this second Bush term hits mid-term. Expect the course correction on Iraq to coincide with a reach out to Iran. Also expect Kim to be the main regime-change focus of the last two years of Bush's administration, with our strategic relationship with China developing greatly as a result.

Once NK and Taiwan are off the DOD planning table, look for the Army and Marines to finally start receiving the resources they need for this Long War.

All these changes and moves make the goal of shrinking the Gap far more feasible for succeeding administrations. Bush I jump-started this process, but because of all those mistakes in Iraq and subsequently with Iran, Bush II becomes mostly an effort at strategic triage, and that's what the original article and the subsequent BFA were all about: getting the conditions right for this blueprint to become realizable.

My vision, as I have consistently noted, isn't about "winning" this month, this year, this election, or this administration--any more than containment could be reduced to just one Cold War presidency. Like containment, shrink-the-Gap will be judged by most as failing throughout its implementation, but ultimately it is done and recognized as successful because there is no other, more reasonable and morally defensible pathway worth choosing.

But yeah, it does feel good to have gotten it all down in print.

Best of Pop!Tech

Tom got this email:

Tom,

Caught your talk at Pop!Tech and am still here. Bob Metcalfe, in summing up, said yours was the best talk this year.

Tim Beidel

Tom says:

Nice to hear. Bob hosted my session last time, so perhaps he's a bit biased.

Actually, the guy who blew both me and Eno away was the comedian just before lunch on Thursday. The guy with the instant dubbing machine. Funny as hell, but the music was really quite beautiful in its own right, and it was all real-time sampling of just his voice--McFerrin-like.

I met the guy in the green room afterwards. He told me I really opened his eyes, and I just kept saying how wonderful his music was. Seriously, I'd buy it as straight music--no laughs requires.

Thanks, Tim, and Bob.