War-within-the-context-of-bureaucratic/academic-inertia
Thursday, October 26, 2006 at 6:08AM The problem with Bush pushing the war as a judgment factor in the election is that both the term (war) and American thinking on it (binary--as in, we win 100% or we leave) does not bode well for him. I know it all comes off as sheer terminology, but it's crucial.ARTICLE: "Bush Focuses on Iraq as G.O.P. Tries to Change Subject," by John M. Broder, New York Times, 26 October 2006.
EDITORIAL: "Money Down the Drain in Iraq," by New York Times, 26 October 2006.
ARTICLE: "Warfare skills eroding as Army fights insurgents," by David Wood,
, 24 October 2006, sent in by Chris Isgrig.
What's going on in Iraq now is better captured by terms like counterinsurgency and postwar reconstruction and stability operations. In those paradigms, there is no easily defined ending, and victories tend to come in the 50-60% range--as in, you reach the critical mass. But it's never an obvious or abrupt conclusion, and it takes years--as in, upwards of a decade or more.
When Bush says, "trust me on this war," he's using the wrong word, but he's the one who made that choice, because it gave him the freedom to blow off potential allies (America really doesn't need allies for wars, but it does for postwars) and to get just enough of a mandate from the American people to conduct a war.
But Bush has never really sought any mandate from anybody on the postwar--not from the public nor from our allies. Thus, he basically plays into his critics's hands when he persists in calling Iraq a war: those who opposed the war (which was brilliantly waged by our armed forces) can now tar Bush with his mishandling of the postwar (and deservedly so). But the sad thing is, the well-run war and those who should feel proud of that effort now are no longer able, because it's been so badly squandered.
And that squandering, while it had much to do with the Pentagon, also had far more to do with the great failures across the rest of the USG--to wit, the non-existent interagency process. That failure will allow historians to paint a very critical portrait of Condi Rice's time in power (first in National Security Council, where, as Advisor, that was her essential job--a complete failure never well discussed; second as SECSTATE, where the rerun on WMD with Iran occurred on her watch, making our military's fight in Iraq continue to unfold under the worst possible circumstances--also toss in our non-engagement with Syria regarding its border).
Many people recognize these failures and are working hard to make appropriate changes for this Long War (a term that is as much a cry for help by the Army and Marines as a declaration of national determination), but because the interagency belongs to everyone, it is the responsibility of no one, so there isn't great hope that the next postwar will be that much better than the last one. And there is the realization that--as I have long argued--more failure will be required to pile up for change to occur.
The resistance to make any serious changes is already mounting and will continue to grow. As always, the Army will argue that its readiness for Big War will decline if it's forced to focus on postwar and counter-insurgency. This is true, and it's also irrelevant, because Big War simply isn't in the making. The best remaining big scenario (Korea) will not be a U.S.-ground-led affair, but this myth will be pushed by many inside the Army to prevent any further evolution in the direction of optimizing for COIN, which is why I see the elimination of this scenario in the near term as a very good development for the Army's future, for once we remove the last remaining scenarios for the fantastic premises surrounding land wars in Asia involving great powers, then the Army, as well as the Navy, can finally start adjusting to the Long War's real strategic environment more comprehensively.
That was one of the messages I delivered in Beijing: if you want the U.S. off the China/Big War model, then get rid of Kim and use that experience to build trust with the U.S. Do the same dastardly trick that Arbatov talked about regarding the Sovs/Russians--in effect, "we will do the worst possible thing to you: we will deny you an enemy."
None of this resistance should be surprising. Our national security establishment is still dominated on top by Cold War-bred thinkers (and will be through for another decade or so). Plus, the U.S. military's ethos, as Nagl points out so well in his book, has always been annihilation-oriented in definitions of victory in war. It simply believes that limited wars are wrong.
So don't expect the war-within-the-context-of-war mindset to disappear any time soon. A new generation of thinking exists and is rising, but the overthrow of the old order will take more than 9/11 and more than the failure in Iraq, especially since so much of academia is likewise tainted with this old mindset and does no better at teaching horizontal thinking than the military or U.S. government does within its own ranks.
What needs to drive our efforts at change is clear: our knowledge that our troops (specifically the Army and Marines) will--without this change--continue to fight under the worst conditions and suffer unnecessarily high casualties, constantly confronted with the claim that America cannot waste its time and treasure on such "lesser includeds" and instead focus on preventing and winning Big Wars against big opponents.
Yes, a certain amount of our strategy for change is simply waiting this crowd out--meaning until they retire and/or die. But that is not enough. If we do not raise the next generation of thinkers and do-ers capable of making all the horizontal connections, we'll simply be generating more square pegs for increasingly round holes, and that will only lead to more unnecessary deaths on our side and less relevancy for our forces in international security.
And that's just unacceptable.
Reader Comments (6)
That was one of the messages I delivered in Beijing: if you want the U.S. off the China/Big War model, then get rid of Kim and use that experience to build trust with the U.S. Do the same dastardly trick that Arbatov talked about regarding the Sovs/Russians--in effect, "we will do the worst possible thing to you: we will deny you an enemy."
Yes, let China "wise up" over Little Kim. (As proper and sensitive American diplomats, we won't even call him "a dog-eating despot.")Just dump him. Do it. Yes, we'd like to see that. And who wouldn't? But what does it look like from the Chinese perspective, i.e. Politburo/Military? What do they see as their "reward" for such a good deed? The building of "trust with the U.S.?" Sounds nice. Also nice and nebulous. Does it sound anywhere near as enticing to them as, say, the capture and possession of independent and free Taiwan, i.e. their so-called "renegade province?"
One thinks not.
"Many people recognize these failures and are working hard to make appropriate changes for this Long War (a term that is as much a cry for help by the Army and Marines as a declaration of national determination), but because the interagency belongs to everyone, it is the responsibility of no one, so there isn't great hope that the next postwar will be that much better than the last one. And there is the realization that--as I have long argued--more failure will be required to pile up for change to occur."
The "Interagency process" is not responsible for the fact that our "Leviathian" gets 95% of the funding for the US government's interactions with the rest of the world.
And that appears to be exactly the way the American People and a bipartisan majority of both houses of Congress want it to be.
"That was one of the messages I delivered in Beijing: if you want the U.S. off the China/Big War model, then get rid of Kim and use that experience to build trust with the U.S. Do the same dastardly trick that Arbatov talked about regarding the Sovs/Russians--in effect, "we will do the worst possible thing to you: we will deny you an enemy.""
Yes, that has turned out so well for the Russians. I doubt your Chinese audience found the recommendation attractive. You are, like Arbatov, underestimating the capacity of the USG to continue to treat countries like Russia and China as enemies even as they do things like withdraw 8th Guards Army or buy a gigabuck worth of Treasury Securities a day.
Gringoman,
I recommend that you read what Tom has written on China & Taiwan either in the archives or in BFA, in order to answer your question. In the meantime (and this won't really do it justice), I will say that right now, the biggest worry of the Chinese leadership is possible political disintegration of the PRC. Their fears are rooted in China's long history of breakup and reconsolidation, so the CCP is charging ahead on market reforms and trade liberalization in an attempt to keep the people happy. In fact, when asked what his biggest worry was, Hu Jintao told Bush "25 million jobs." One reason they're not about to invade Taiwan is the fact that the two are so entwined economically, it'd be destroying one hell of an investment--China makes a lot of money off of trade w/ Taiwan. Nothing like a war in the straits to scare away investors--China would no longer be seen as a "safe" investment after that, but more like a loose cannon.
Besides, Kim has morphed from a potential cost to a real and exorbitant one for Beijing--he's costing them money, pushing Japan towards contemplation of nukes (something China would hate), and making them lose face (they can't control their own client state?). They've got a multitude of reasons to do something--goodies from us wouldn't necessarily be the deciding factor. Promise of a closer relationship w/ them certainly would sweeten the deal, though.
Tom - Austin Bay's recent interview with SecDef Rumsfeld seems on point:
Forgive the military jargon -- at one time I was Col. Bay -- but the question is essential. It also altered the luncheon ambiance. As I asked it, I saw our very steady chairman of the joint chiefs, Gen. Peter Pace, pass Rumsfeld a careful stare.
"I'll tell you we're better at it now than we were five years ago," Rumsfeld replied. He acknowledged that "challenges remain" in achieving Unified Action and that effective Unified Action is critical to winning 21st century wars.In other words, they know that they have a problem, are working on it, and have not yet fixed it.
gringoman - Right now we have a PRC that is willing to tolerate the defrauding of its citizens with counterfeit $100 bills, the endangering of their health with bogus N. Korean pharma products, potential refugee waves destabilizing their already fragile labor market, and a potential plague as N. Korea's ability to do public health becomes near nonexistent. And what do they get for all that? A manageable headache for the US, S. Korea, and Japan. So what does that tell the world about the PRC? They're willing to hurt themselves pretty badly in order to stick it to the Koreans, the Japanese and Uncle Sam. Now stopping the N. Koreans with a Moldova/Romania scenario provides some benefits to the other three parties but most of all it stops the counterfeiting, the drugs, the threat to domestic tranquility, etc. etc. etc.
So what's not to like from the PRC perspective?
Taiwan is a different issue. They can and very possibly already have negotiated reunification with the next KMT government. If the PRC offered to legalize the KMT in a 2 party system and siphoned off much of their cadre to join the KMT, unification could be achieved peacefully at the cost of letting the cream of the KMT have access to the economic trough of government advantage. It would be a small price as not only would they resolve China's civil war definitively, it would turn the PRC into a multi-party democracy in a way that would not threaten the current elite's control.
Though I can't find the quote right now, a recent visit by the head of the KMT to Beijing had a high CCP functionary state "we are not at war with the KMT". Once that is said, all the rest is negotiating details.
Brandon & TM Lucas,
You cite so many reasonable reasons for Beijing to cut the cord with Kim, one wonders why they kept it intact so long, let alone what are they waiting for now, after K is scaring the whole world and terrifying very important neighbors.
Maybe it really does have little to do with functioning as a trump for Taiwan? Maybe their major military build-up and "Unrestricted Warfare" by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xangsui--a guide believed useful to everyone from the PLA to al-Quaeda, says little about their future intentions? No doubt they'd prefer to "re-join" Taiwan without firing even a firecracker. (Sun-Tzu surely said something about that kind of victory) If the Taiwanese people wish to vote for such a re-union, who could or would object?
At any rate, there seems to be at least one inescapable reason why Kim and his playing with nukes will now focus China's attention: the prospect, or possibility, of Japan going nuclear. They would have to find that very bad sushi.
I saw a good interview with Michael Vickers on News Hour last night. The transcript is at the News Hour website. He was talking about training Iraqi security being hampered by a shortage of trainers, which reflects current military culture (military responds to incentives, who gets promoted, what jobs are "send our best guy" and what jobs are "OK, you'll do"? etc).
I thought what he had to say was congruent with your model, and might be interesting to you. Vickers, if you will recall, was the strategist behind the CIA operation in Afghanistan in the 80s.