Another good take on Putin's "silver bullet"

■"Putin: Russia to Deploy Missiles 'Unlikely to Exist' Elsewhere," by Peter Finn, Washington Post, 18 November 2004, p. A25.

Besides Putin reminding us that Russia mattered, this story offers another reason why he made this announcement about a new nuclear missile system that is unique: he wants to be able to declare that, as far as Russia is concerned, our new missile defense system is no big deal.

True or not? Doesn't matter. Only the declaration matters. He's saying that as far as he and Russia are concerned, mutually-assured destruction between them and us is not altered one whit.

The Netherlands is joined by the Global War on Terrorism

■"A Brutal Killing Opens Dutch Eyes To Threat of Terror: Crackdown on Radical Islam Follows Filmmaker's Death; Immigrants Get Scrutiny," by Andrew Higgins, Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2004, p. A1.

The assassination of the Dutch filmmaker who spoke out strongly against the treatment of women in traditional Islamic societies has really brought the GWOT to Amsterdam. Here is what one 39-year-old socialist alderman said: "We have to fight terrorism. The war on this small group of terrorists has to be very severe."

The filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, was shot, stabbed and had his throat slashed by a "suspected Islamic radical":

The killing set off a wave of attacks on mosques. It also triggered a surprising shift in a country where, like elsewhere across much of Western Europe, America's "war on terror" has often been derided as too crude and too brutal.

As one politician put it: "People here thought that terrorism was for other countries, not for the Netherlands. This is a rude awakening."

Sounds like a System Perturbation to me.

"Greater China" eclipsing China as a "great power"

■"Hong Kong, Taiwan Draw Investment As China Cools Down," by Craig Karmin, Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2004, p. C1.

■"Drug Companies Look to China For Cheap R&D," by Laura Santini, Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2004, p. B1.

■"New York Port Hums Again, With Asian Trade," by Eric Lipton, New York Times, 22 November 2004, p. A1.

Investors are cooling on China the mainland, but still pumping money into Hong Kong and Taiwanóor the so-called Greater China markets.

That phrase tells you plenty: Greater China is an economic reality to which the political reality of something beyond China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan has yet to emerge. Economics racing ahead of politics. Connectivity racing ahead of security. The gaps suggest the need for new rule sets.

The question is, How do they come about? By violence or by diplomacy?

Guess which route means more money for everyone?

The definition of Greater China includes sectors like the drug industry, which is deciding to send more and more of its R&D effort from the US to China. But it also includes geographic realities, like a New York port system that is revitalized largely by Greater China's explosive growth over the past five years.

When I was in Beijing, I told reformists there that they needed to do more than come up with a Theory of Peacefully Rising China. They need to come up with a Theory of Greater-Than-Mainland China that was more than just economics and growing connectivity, but included political and security definitions of a better tomorrow for all who joined.

This is Rising China's real task right now, and if completed, the world will enter a new era of even greater stability and growth across a growing Core.

The New Core is the future of environmental degradation and environmentalism

■"India Sets Pace on Cleaner Air: Capital Converts Bases, Other Vehicles to Less-Polluting Fuel," by John Larkin, Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2004, p. A12.

The first para says what I've been long stating:

India's dusty and congested capital seems an unlikely place to find ideas about how to cut a country's dependence on expensive foreign oil. In many ways, New Delhi is an environmental disaster zone. But it also is at the forefront of a global push to convert more motor vehicles to cleaner, less expensive natural gas.

In 2002, the city became the first in the world to mandate that all diesel buses switch over to compressed natural gas. India, by the way, imports 70% of its oil.

Who are other states apparently moving in similarly bold ways? Why, that would be China and Brazil, two other New Core powers. China plans to have its fleet ready for the 2008 Olympics held in Beijing. Why? Connectivity doesn't just require code, sometimes it requires clean airóespecially if you want anyone to run 26.2 miles in Beijing!

The New Core is the logical center of gravity for future experimentation and new ideas in environmentalism. Why? These states are at a real inflection point in terms of development, meaning they're extremely motivated to find answers.

You want to get the rest of the Gap "green"? Get them into the New Core!

Japan sounds more ready to deal on North Korea

■"Japanese Offical Warns of Fissures in North Korea," by James Brooke, New York Times, 22 November 2004, p. A3.

Hereís the shocking opening paragraphs:

After weeks of reports from North Korea of defecting generals, antigovernment posters and the disappearance of portraits of the country's ruler, the leader of Japan's governing party warned Sunday of the prospects of "regime change" in North Korea.

"As long as Chairman Kim Jong Il controls the government, we have to negotiate with him, but it is becoming more doubtful whether we will be able to achieve anything with this government," said Shinzo Abe, acting secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, on Fuji TV, referring to talks on North Korea's abductions of Japanese in the 1970's. "I think we should consider the possibility that a regime change will occur, and we need to start simulations of what we should do at that time."

By breaking an unspoken taboo on talking publicly about "regime change" in North Korea, the powerful Japanese politician underlined a feeling spreading in the region that cracks are starting to show in the Kim family's control over North Korea after nearly 60 years.

Actually, the only shocking thing about the quote is that the Japanese up and said it!

Anecdotal evidence says more than 100 North Korean generals has fled the country, or roughly 10% of the military elite. What does that tell you about the situation at the top?

It tells me that insiders can be had for a song.

Hereís the kicker: ìoutside analysts are speculating that the personality cult around "Dear Leader" is being curbed, either to advance painful economic reforms or to head off a military coup fomented by China.î

If thatís the rumor, you have to wonder whether or not Beijing is ready to deal on Kim. If theyíre ready, the question becomes, What do we offer?

The automatic first economic step in any SysAdmin job

■"Major Creditors in Accord to Waive 80% of Iraq Debt," by Craig S. Smith, New York Times, 22 November 2004, p. A1.

A good sign and a needed sign. The Core decides collectively to cancel 80% of Iraq's outstanding debt of $39B.

Now the pressure's on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Middle Eastern regimes to do the same.

Nice move, say I.

Also as a mental note, this decision should be automatic in any future A-to-Z Core-wide rule set on processing politically bankrupt regimes in the Gapóno ifs, ands or buts.

The "world election" needs a more globalized slate of candidates

■"The 28th Amendment," op-ed by William Safire, New York Times, 22 November 2004, p. A31.

William Safire is retiring soon, so what he chooses for his last articles mean something. That he chooses to spend one on the notion that America should let foreign-born citizens run for president means something. It means he understands that the election of our president is the closest thing the world has to a global election.

We need to open up that process by opening up the available pool. We need to say to the world that America is open for business, open for newcomers, open for real expansion.

I thank Mr. Safire for making this choice.

The wrong lesson, the wrong teacher, the wrong replacement, the wrong job

Dateline: SWA flight 132 from KC to BWI, 21 November 2004

■"Hawk Sightings Could be Premature: It's hard to flex muscles around the world when the troops are tied up in Iraq" by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. WK1.

■"A Doctrine Left Behind" op-ed by Mark Danner, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. WK13.

■"The Power-Values Approach to Policy: Move to State Raises Rice's Profile" by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 21 November 2004, p. A8.

■"Rumsfeld Isn't Showing Signs That He's Leaving: The defense secretary says he has not yet talked with Bush about staying on" by Richard W. Stevenson, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A23.

The Neocons are grounded, we are told, by having to keep 130,000 troops in Iraq, rotating out the old and preparing the new 365 days a year for as far as this administration can see. Far enough point. If you don't plan for the peace, you get stuck with the occupation. And if you don't build the SysAdmin force, you'll never be able to plan realistically for the peace.

What we learned in Iraq is not the enduring wisdom of the Powell Doctrine, but the incredible costs we're now paying for slavishly following it all those years, for its distaste for all "quagmires" (read nation-building) is why we don't have a SysAdmin force after 15 years of watching our military deal with such situations all over the Gap at an exploding rate. The Powell Doctrine isn't the cure, it was the cause of our current malaise, reflecting our desire to avoid administering the system of security in the age of globalization, believing, a la Tom Friedman, that the electronic herd would ride herd over all, and that globalization needed no bodyguard.

Will Rice be the answer at State. Remember, not only is she famous for declaring that "we don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten" (the classic put-down of Military Operations Other Than War), but she is logically held to blame most for the massive failure of the postwar occupation of Iraq.

The job of interagency coordination falls to the National Security adviser, pure and simple. As Mark Danner remarks in his op-ed:

After Condoleezza Rice's elevation as Mr. Powell's successor, so much of the commentary seemed focused on her "closeness" to the president that it might have seemed the height of indiscretion to point out that she has been something of a disaster in her present jobóa fact widely acknowledged among foreign policy professionals.

Meanwhile, one of our greatest Secretaries of War ever (Don Rumsfeld) survives to transform the military another day. Here's hoping he knows enough to seed and invest n the SysAdmin force, because the impetus for that development is sure as hell not to be coming from the other side of the Potomac. Foggy Bottom will remain foggy in this second administration, as far as clear grand strategy is concerned.

If you're looking for the Secretary for Everything Else to emerge, watch for him in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and my fervent hope is that his name will be Admiral Ed Giambastiani (currently head of Joint Forces Command), and that his title will be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We need a Secretary of Everything Else and an anti-Powell Doctrine that places overwhelming presence on the peacekeeping side of the ledger, letting the transformed Leviathan force do its thing as designed. Adm. Giambastiani is just the man to make such a revolution occur.

Here's the rest of today's catch, basically the Sunday NYT:

■On the Axis of Evil, danger and opportunity are two sides of the same coin

■"Hegemons" like China aren't made, they're cornered

■The Dis-abstraction of genocide

■Colonial "villains" ain't what they used to be

■"The Dividers: a Quinn Martin production"

■In the New Core, diversity is often a four-letter word

On the Axis of Evil, danger and opportunity are two sides of the same coin

■"Bush Says Iran Speeds Output of A-bomb Fuel, by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A1.

■"Mongolia Under Pressure to Serve as haven for Refugees, by James Brooke, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A13.

Bush in Asia sitting down with a host of New Core leaders: he talks some scary noise on both Iran and North Korea, right up to mimicking Reagan's call to Moscow to "tear down that wall" in his pointed remarks to Kim Jong Il ("Get rid of your nuclear weapons programs.").

But no matter how harsh the rhetoric, even some of Bush's senior people are beginning to see the writing on the wall:

But Mr. Bush's quickness to seize on the Iranian production of uranium hexafluoride was driven, administration officials said, by a sense among his national security aides that there is still time to stop ran from actually producing a weapon. "We're past that point with North Korea," one senior adviser said recently. "With the North, it's a question of unwinding what's already happened."

Instead of asking which one is easier to stop, shouldn't we simple deal with the situation that's far worse? There is no deal to be made with North Korea, because that regime has nothing to offer. With Iran, there are clear things that country could offer in terms of better regional behavior that would be worth a lot to us right now, trapped as we are in Iraq. With Kim, it's just a nutcase with nukes, so disconnected from the global economy that the only way he makes money to prop up his regime is through criminal activity.

To me, the sequence of future events seems clear. If you believe China is the rising threat to peace, don't you focus on things that could bring war between you too first, while understanding that China is going to be making energy deals the world over to accommodate its massive development trajectoryólike with Iran?

"Hegemons" like China aren't made, they're cornered

■"China Widens Economic Role in Latin America, by Larry Rohter, New York Times, 20 November 2004, pulled off NYT web.

■"Tension rises as China scours the globe for energy, by David Spencer, Daily Telegraph, 21 November 2004, pulled off DT web.

■"China Eases Rules on Joint TV Ventures, by Reuters, New York Times, 19 November 2004, pulled off NYT web.

China's moving into Latin America big time in search of raw materials, throwing around investments and aid like a . . . well . .. rather developed state. We may ignore our "backyard," but China cannot. Its growth is simply too explosive and too long-term. We can turn that "scouring the globe" phenomenon into a threat ("China's infiltrating the Western hemisphere!"), but don't expect Latin America to agree with the diagnosis.

Instead, expect other New Core pillars like Brazil to speak of strategic alliances. In fact, expect, China to be offered strategic alliances all over the dial. We can sit back and view all this with alarm, or we can get our bid in early. Ask yourself which course seems like a more strategic call?

The more we delay, the more China will move in an inefficient, seemingly "threatening" manner to secure oil around the world. Why? They fear a Taiwanese move toward independence they cannot ignore, and that the upshot of that act will be an attempt by the US to punish China militarily through cutting off its access to oil, in a truly cutting-off-our-noses-to-spite-our-face globalization logic.

China's trying hard to open up to the outside world, witness the moves on such touchy areas as mass media. But it's not going to open up to that outside world strictly according to our rules and our rules alone. It's going to create its own rules along the way, which will join and shape the larger Core rule set on globalization. We can be part of that process, or simply fear it. But it will happen regardless of our stance.

The Dis-abstraction of genocide

■"Mr. Bush's Better World, editorial, Washington Post, 21 November 2004, p. B6.

■"At Holocaust Museum, Turning a Number Into a Name, by Joseph Berger, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A13.

The Washington Post editorial board is blasting the Bush Administration for doing nothing about Sudan, where likely well over 100,000 are dead (probably four times the number of dead in Iraq since the war began, according to realistic estimates, but let's be unrealistic and say it's probably only two times as many dead). The paper is right to push Bush on this issue ("How can it recognize genocide, shrug its shoulders and then carry on claiming that its vigorous foreign policy is about creating a better world?"), but why not push the entire Core, to include China for holding up a stronger response in the UN Security Council out of oil interests there (China's got it right, huh! Sudanese blood for Chinese oil).

Everyone wants to blame Bush and the Neocons, but frankly we created the conditions for this messóAmerica itselfóyears ago by refusing to admit the world would need serious administering following the end of the Cold War. We created the Powell Doctrine, we didn't rebalance the military forces as military-operations-other-than-war effectively quadrupled in demand across the 1990s, and we decided to invade Iraq without an adequate plan for the peace because we didn't have an adequate understanding for that mission much less the force structure to implement it. Our failure in occupying postconflict Iraq is rooted in America's ambivalence about its role as alleged global cop following the collapse of the Soviets, and it's that ambivalence that's on full display yet again on Sudan. We can't do anything about Sudan because we're so tied down in Iraq, and we're tied down in Iraq because we don't "get" SysAdmin work, don't want to do it, haven't prepared for it, and run away from it every time we bump into its ugly realities.

And we always blame the other guy. In the 1990s the right blamed Clinton and his do-gooders for wanting to do all that nation-building crap. Now the left blame the Neocons for wanting to try . . . God forbid! . . . . nation-building. When will we stop running from the international security environment, pretending that it can be either left alone or treated merelyóin Powell Doctrine-styleóby going in, shooting up the place a bit, and then being sure to pull out fast lest we fall into any Vietnam quagmire. The Gap itself is globalization's ongoing quagmire. It's only a question of how much failure and pain the Core must endure before coming to grips with the reality of what it will take in terms of military employmentóboth warfighting and peacekeepingóto really shrink the Gap.

In the Core and Core-like states trapped in the Gap like Israel, we treat tragedies like the Jewish Holocaust as something worth rememberingóperson by person. That's what the Israeli Holocaust museum seeks to do: put a name and address to every one of six million that died. That's the responsibility of societies that value individuals. When we begin to view the Gap in the same way, we won't stand by while genocide unfolds, because we'll stop seeing this carnage as abstract statistics, and begin seeing individuals dying.

And we'll be moved to do something about it.

And when we do want to do more that just flag our jaws, we'll need both the Leviathan to win the wars and the SysAdmin to keep the peace.

Colonial "villains" ain't what they used to be

■"France Is Cast as the Villain in Ivory Coast: Whoever the Enemy, Ivoirians and Their Neighbors Stand to Lose," by Lydia Polgreen, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A10.

The Ivory Coast was an island of relative prosperity and stability in postcolonial Africa largely on the basis of France's continued economic and social and political connectivity to the country. That has frayed in recent years, and as the economic situation worsen and social stress rises to the point of violent outbreaks, the French are naturally scapegoated, along with all those immigrant workers who served the upper classes when times were good.

The latest wave of violence began Nov. 5 when the government strafed a French military camp, killing nine peacekeepers and an American aid worker, and the French retaliated by destroying much of the tiny Ivoirian Air Force. The events seemed destined to deepen a crisis that had already pitted Muslim against Christian, northerner against southerner and Ivoirians with deep roots here against those whose parents and grandparents immigrated here seeking work. But France is being made into the bogeyman.

Let the disconnecting begin. Let the diversity flower. Let the bloodshed flow.

Yes, the homogenizing effect of globalization must be a bad thing, turning everyone into fat, indolent slobs who just want to eat, have sex and watch TV. Real cultural identity must be cherished, no matter what the cost!

Otherwise, we have to call it imperialism and empire.

"The Dividers: a Quinn Martin production"

■"Rebels Keep Up Attacks In Sunni-Dominated Cities Of Central and North Iraq " by Edward Wong, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A16.

As I make suggestions in this blog that America may well be forced by events in this insurgency to accept the notion of a partial victory in Iraq, I get more than a few emails complaining as to this line of reasoning. Let me recap my logic as it has emerged over the course of events (and yes, my logic emerges over time, it does not spring fully formed out of my head one day only to be held sacred for the rest of my life):

ï America isn't going to defeat transnational terrorism in its current, Mideast-driven Islamic-heavy form until the Middle East itself is transformed from its current dyfunctionality (no matter what grievances you want to cite, the real problem is the combination of crappy governments and societies thatóquite franklyósuck at globalization.

ï To start that process after all our years of diddling on the margin, perturbing that system as a whole makes sense.

ï The best target for such an effort following 9/11 was Iraq, because Saddam had checked so many boxes and everyone in the system wanted him gone, even if we didn't have a transparent, A-to-Z Core rule set for dispatching such rogues and rehabbing their systems.

ï Once you decide to go in, make if fast and furious with the transformed Leviathan force (check!) but then overwhelm the country with a committed, massive peacekeeping Sys Admin force that segues quickly into round-the-dial reconstruction efforts that emphasizes small-and-beautiful efforts that keep hands busy, put money in pockets, put food in bellies, and give people back their dignity (completely unchecked that box)

ï Understanding nation-building is hard, the larger reason for going into Iraq (once Saddam is removed) is not Iraq, but the rest of the region. Expect a strong anti-American reaction as the force for change, but then watch for that change and take advantage of it as it emerges in Syria, Israel-Palestine, Iran, etc. Make the deals, create the local ownership, be generous with the quid pro quos, etc.

ï To the extent that you can't resolve Iraq as a whole, I advocate resolving what you can. The Kurdish north isn't the problem, and the Shiite south can be dealt with, leaving the Sunni center triangle as the odd man out.

ï There is no reason for the Kurds and Shiites to be held back by the Sunnis, given all the nasty history between them. Iraq is an unreal country with no real basis in history. It was created by the Brits to cover their tracks. We are no more held to that past in Iraq than we were in Yugoslavia, so we need to make do with those who want to get things done, growing the Core and transforming the region where possible, instead of waiting for perfect answers.

ï If it seems like we're making this up as we go along, guess what? That's how it always has been in foreign policy and national security: exploiting victories as they present themselves, likewise adapting to failures as they present themselves.

The larger reality of globalization's embrace of any region is that it tends to break things down to logical constituent parts first, which is why globalization seems so disintegrating as it comes in. When that logical reduction is achieved, you tend to see those same pieces come together in more logically defined and fair-minded economic, social, and political alliances, meaning that integration follows initial disintegration. It is a constant struggle this process, always a precarious balancing between yin and yang.

The reality for Iraq for the foreseeable future may well be: accept the disintegration for now, understanding that a lot of score-settling is inevitable after all those years:

Mr. Hussein, himself a Sunni, heightened ethnic and religious difference by installing Sunnis in the most senior positions and persecuting Shiite Arabs and Kurds. Now, with a power and security vacuum throughout Iraq, those tension are reviving and threatening to unravel the very social fabric of the country.

What does this process say to the rest of the Middle East? Better to reform your oppressive regimes that see similar events happen to you. But is also says, Iraq is the Yugoslavia of the Middle East.

I'm not a casual "Divider," as some may assume, but I do believe in adaptive planning. I believe to don't wait for perfect plans, answers, outcomes, but constantly satisfice. If we're not going to bring in significant New Core help on Iraq (seems unlike with second Bush Admin), then we better be ready to create local ownership of the process, meaning we creating local owners for the Shiite south and Kurdish north.

In the New Core, diversity is often a four-letter word

■"Some Hard-Liners in Turkey See Diversity as Divisive" by Susan Sachs, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A8.

■"Just Another Quick-Witted, Egg-Roll-Joke-Making, Insult-Hurling, Chinese-American Rapper: Jin tries to find his place in the hip-hop nation,", by Ta-Nehisi Coates, New York Times Magazine, 21 November 2004, p. 54.

New Core states typically are not far removed from their moment of achieved national identity, meaning that touchstone point in their history when they felt they had achieved their natural state of affairs/territory/self-definition. This identity achievement is typically what allowed them to get comfortable enough with the outside world so as to open up ("we are confident of who we are, therefore we can handle higher social and economic transaction rates with the rest of the world).

The further India gets away from the separatist experiences that led to the births of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the more confident it becomes. And the closer China gets to reconstituting its historical sense of self (now, only Taiwan remains beyond its acknowledged grasp, the more confident it becomes.

One of the key quid pro quos currently being foisted upon Turkey as it seeks membership in, and connectivity to, the European Union is that Europe is demanding the government there allow for more religious freedom within the country. Turkey has long defined itself as both secular but very clearly Turkish/Islamic. To really belong in Turkey, you had to be Turkish and Muslim. Others were toleratedójust barely.

The fear, of course, was all about minorities whose very existence would be used by outside powers to weaken and divide Turkey. That's because this is exactly what happened to the Ottoman Empire, of which Turkey remains as sort of the rump state, like Serbia is to the former Yugoslavia, and as Sunni-land will someday likely become for the former Iraq. Minorities in Turkey, therefore, as considered a matter of national security, a bad act that America occasionally dips into (like with too many Middle Easterners today, the Japanese in WWII, etc.).

But here's the rule-set reset demanded by Europe: stop treating your state as an ethnic identity marker and start treating it as a geographic administrative conceptómeaning the definition of being a Turk needs to expand to basically anyone who lives in Turkey, speaks Turkish, and wants the same rights as anyone of Turkish ethnic descent. In short, the EU is demanding Turkey genericize the concept of being Turkish if it wants to join the EU, because the EU lets in modern states, not immature ethnic nations. If the EU approached it any other way, the dream of a United States of Europe (gee, what a familiar ring) never really takes off, because the USE can only be the USE if its united around the concept of states united, not ethnic ghettos stitched together.

When you get a mature USE, it will most definitely look like a USA, all "profound" economic lifestyle differences aside. You'll see ethnic blending and appropriation that's not seen as stealing, but the highest form of flattery, like a Chinese-American rapper who's just trying to fit into a hip-hop nation of half-breeds and mongrels (God love him).

I'm going home

Dateline: Kansas City International Airport, Kansas City MO, 21 November 2004

If you ever watch "Gods and Generals," there is this fabulous song of that title sung by a woman that is really quite moving. I think of it often while heading to an airport at the beginning of a journey home.

Heading home this morning and feeling very fine about that. I have been gone more than home over the past several weeks and I've begun to really hate it. When I left on Wednesday after only two nights home in a row, my older kids got back from school, called my wife a liar when she told them, and searched the house for me, calling my name.

I have told Vonne that this is my version of deployment, and it's the least I can do when others sacrifice so much more. No, I don't get to spend much time in my "ivory tower," so when I hear that charge, I often wonder if some people would be as vociferous about things if it involved doing anything more than just typing away from their den. My price of being away from home so much is a small price to pay, I believe, in the grand scheme of things, but for obvious reasons my kids don't agree--and I don't blame them. Having spent so many years living in military communities, it's a serious burden I see on a lot of little kids' faces, many of whom I've coached in various sports over the years (to my great delight).

Between now and the end of January, I'm going to be gone only 3 more nights and I am so looking forward to that sort of immobility.

But I do thank people for all the kind emails I get, especially on the road. That sort of stuff really bucks me up and I appreciate it immensely.

Esquire catches up with The Best & Brightest Alumni

Dateline: The Hedenkamp Ranch, north of Kansas City MO, 20 November 2004

Eight hours of serious strategizing with a trio of new friends/colleagues as to what could logically lie ahead--this Future Worth Creating. I haven't had this much self-directed strategizing and goal-oriented navel gazing since I did a week of EST up in the Maine woods following my first-born's long struggle with cancer in the mid-1990s. A truly calibrating experience of the sort I really need right now.

In short, somebody needs to manage this career, and that somebody is me--armed with the right firepower.

The need for such orientation reflects the trajectory of the past three years, which has been intense. 9/11 really perturbed my system from top to bottom, as well it should, given my line of business, but it's also very important to remember who I am amidst all the increased velocity, new connectivity, additional responsibilities.

To that end, it was great to go out to dinner with friends Michael and Janet from Lawrence KS, daughter Arwen in tow. We replicated one of the great memories from our shared trip in China: a fabulous night out with our new babies in Guangzhou at a Vietnamese restaurant. Like all good visits with dear friends, you leave the experience feeling more centered, more aware, more you.

That sense of feeling self-connected is important as you strategize ahead on an individual, familial, and group level. Likewise, it's useful to remember the road traveled. Esquire decided to do the same this issue (December) in its third annual Best & Brightest edition, devoting a two-page "centerfold spread" to a small collection of B&B alumni, to include myself, Jeffrey Sachs, and Craig Newmark (creater of Craig's List).

Here's the intro and the entry on me:

The Best & Brightest: The Alumni

Strategists * dreamers * builders * healers * corporate leaders * seers * world-beaters * public servants * thinkers * writers * actors * artists * inventors * stargazers * watchdogs * citizens. First appearing in these pages in December 2002, the Best and the Brightest continue on their paths of inspiration and accomplishment. Here's what some past honorees have been up to in the last year, and it's nothing short of creating the future.

From obscure Naval War College to strategic rock star, THOMAS P.M. BARNETT catapulted into the limelight after his appearance in Best and Brightest 2002. His March 2003 article for Esquire, "The Pentagon's New Map," outlined his grand strategy for the United States in the post-cold-war era, which, in expanded form, became a New York Times best-seller this spring. And Barnett's blog, thomaspmbarnett.com, is now required reading throughout the political and military establishment. Barnett says, "Up until Best and Brightest, I was slaving away in relative obscurity in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a proposed grand strategy for the United States in the global war on terrorism." He added that his presentation, although well received in policy circles, "wasn't getting a lot of traction. Now, well . . ." Barnett's work articulates a bracing new vision and lexicon to confront security challenges in our drastically changed world. He now works as the senior concept developer at Joint Forces Comand, advising the four-star general running Special Operations Command and working with other "change agents" within the intelligence community. In the June 2004 issue of Esquire, Barnett wrote a follow-up to "The Pentagon's New Map" titled "Mr. President, Here's How to Make Sense of Our Iraq Strategy."

COMMENTARY: I got the request from Esquire about two months ago to write a couple of paragraphs about what's gone on in my life since December 2002, so that's how they got the basics. The first "quote" up there is either a bit "enhanced" or it comes from someone else. As you can see from the second "I" quotation, I did use the word "obscurity" but , frankly, I would never deign to call myself either "obscure" (trapped in obscurity, yes, but not obscure per se!) and while I've said in the blog that I sometimes have strong responses from audiences that feel like a musical performance, I've never actually called myself a "strategic rock star"--not that I don't like the phrase . . ..

Actually, other people refer to me as a "rock star," and all they really mean by that short hand is that I experience blimpse glimpses of significant fame, like getting in Rolling Stone. My usual reply to such things is, "yeah, riiiiight!--a la Doctor Evil. But then people remind me that I'm the only person they've ever known who's gotten into Rolling Stone or been page-1 profiled in the Wall Street Journal and I step back for a second or two and realize what's the basis of their excitement on my behalf (which is always touching) and think--for another minute or too--"yeah, that is pretty cool." But you can't spend much time thinking about that sort of stuff, otherwise it just becomes consuming, plus it always gets old for me very fast. I have an attention span that's very short on such things, so I enjoy them for a good five minutes or so and then I'm gone.

What's important to me about this remembrance from Esquire is that they consider me one of theirs, not just in terms of the selection as B&B, but as a writer who's penned a couple of pieces and--ta da!--has one in the works. Writing for a magazine like Esquire has been a truly "horizontalling" (yes, I make up words) experience for me, meaning I get to move out of my narrow confines and understand the true possible impact of the ideas, which--in many ways--need to pick up horizontal "speed" if there are going to become real, in a very broadband sense, for U.S. foreign policy as a whole. That's what this whole weekend of strategizing has been about: making the vision less me-centric so as to both enhance its broadband appeal and to--frankly--free me up for what I do best: move on to the next iteration. Esquire really got this ball rolling for me, and for that I am eternally grateful to Andrew Chaikivsky, my friend and compadre Mark Warren, and David Granger. You appreciate people who really believe in your work, especially as you receive plenty of correspondence from those who don't.

Heck, that's why this weekend was so special for me, and that's why this issue of Esquire was so special for me. That makes the 8th time I've been in the pages (B&B issue of Dec 02, PNM article of Mar 03 and two "Sound & Fury" letter issues following, Mr. President article of June 04 and two more letter issues, plus this one). Next month's article will make it nine times, and yes, I am hoping this is still just the beginning of a beautiful relationship between me and the mag.

Reviewing the Reviews (Defense and the National Interest)

Dateline: Hedenkamp Ranch, somewhere north of Kansas City, MO, 19 November 2004

Spending some time with friends in KC at the end of my business trip, thinking about the way ahead. Very nice to spend time with people whom I rarely get to see F2F.

Here's a review of PNM that was sent to me by numerous readers over the past few days (thanks to you all). My comments follow, then the daily catch:

Find the original at http://d-n-i.net/dni_reviews/pentagon_map.htm

The Pentagonís New Map

Thomas P. M. Barnett

426 pp., including extensive notes

Reviewed by Chet Richard

Editor

Defense and the National Interest

November 12, 2004

The late American strategist John R. Boyd noted that ìInteraction permits vitality and growth while isolation leads to decay and disintegration.î Boyd worked out an effective strategy for isolating an enemy physically, mentally, and morally in order to produce his disintegration and facilitate his destruction. In his new book, Barnett asks, rhetorically, why are we treating one-third of the worldís population as our enemies?

His solution would also be familiar to Boyd: Start doing whatever it takes to integrate that third of the human population, which he calls the ìNon-integrating Gap,î back into the rest of the world, the ìFunctioning Core.î If this could be done, Barnett claims, the result would be an end to the forces driving global ìterrorism,î which would diminish to the nuisance level as just another form of international crime ñ disturbing, but not threatening the future of Western or any other Core society.

The genius of Barnettís concept is that it avoids the two major pitfalls that most plans for winning the ìglobal war on terrorismî fall into: Either a reliance on military force as the primary tool, or an appeal to social theories about the causes of ìterrorism.î The problem with military force, per se, is that there are few cases short of genocide where an established insurgency was defeated by conventional military force. The problem with the theories is that they are theories, with counterexamples for virtually every one.

Barnett takes a higher level approach, without ruling out any of the others as useful tools. He says, simply, that itís the system ñ the world system ñ that keeps the Gap isolated, and so if we want to make real, lasting, long-term change, we have to change that system. Rather than propose his own utopian scheme, he prescribes ìperturbingî the Gap out of its depressingly stable state and then guiding its redevelopment to ensure connectivity and democracy. New social, political, and economic systems will emerge in the different Gap countries, but they will all be guided by the principle of connectivity with the functioning core, to which they will all eventually belong.

As societies of the Gap accept, or are restructured to accept, the ìglobal security rule setî and emerge into the Core, their standards of living will increase dramatically as will their contributions to the economy and quality of life in the rest of the Core countries. Support for ìterroristî organizations will decrease as fewer people will see any point in supporting organizations that are working against their interests and those of their children.

It is a wonderful vision for humanity, at least as seen from the Western world, and if he had just stopped there, there would be little to argue over. But then he wouldnít have had a very long book.

But he didn't stop there, and embedded within it is a cornucopia of ideas, from recognizing Harry Truman as the architect of victory in the Cold War to schemes for reforming general officer promotions. One stands out from the crowd: the need for an organization other than a traditional military force for the purpose of rebuilding Gap counties and integrating them into the Core. This ìsystems administratorî (Sys Admin) force is the crucial idea in the book. Without such a force, we mightóthrough massive military effortóperturb a Gap countryís system, but we will have no mechanism to steer it into the Core. We are seeing this in Iraq today where the initial surgery on the country was successful, but both the patient and the surgeon may succumb to the post-operative infection.

Iraq is the most mystifying element of the book and some may use it to attempt to discredit his basic premise. Barnettís rationale for Iraq, however, actually lies outside the concept of perturbing the Gap. He does make a weak claim that the invasion was a perturbation to force change in the Middle East, but this is belied by the effort extended ñ enough, but just enough, to take Baghdad and eventually capture Saddam. Certainly not enough effort to guide the transformation of the Middle East.

The problem is that it is not true, as Barnett claims, that ìwhen the United States perturbs the system, we set the conditions under which the new rules emerge.î This is wishful thinking, as shown, ironically, by the example he chooses to illustrate his pointóIraq (the manuscript was completed in the Fall of 2003.) When we perturb the system, we put the country in play with us as one of the players. What happens next depends on how skillfully we play the game. If we act fast and begin the hard work of shaping the new system while the situation is still perturbed, we may stand a chance. This is what the Sys Admin force is supposed to do. Without it, perturbation will be followed by chaos or re-descent into the Gap.

His other, and probably his real explanation for Iraq is that Saddam was bad and so the war was justified. Such an argument is an after the fact case of ends justifying means, offered only when the original justifications ñ WMDs and the threat of providing them to terrorists ñ turned out to be what can charitably be called ìmistakes.î Considering that we had no Sys Admin force on the books, the results are exactly as he should have predicted, but didnít. His basic argument ñ shrink the Gap by means of perturbation exploited by a robust Sys Admin force ñ is sound.

To get the Sys Admin force into position, Barnett recommends a restructured military, and here he begins to stray from his forte of grand strategy. He has a naÔve faith in the efficacy of military force. Ours in particular will always win, and win quickly, through an application of maneuver warfare and high technology. ìWe no longer,î he proclaims, ìneed strategic surprise to defeat a well-armed enemy.î Well, maybe, but such a claim would carry more weight if it were based on something other than the 2003 invasion of Iraq. We didnít do that terribly well in Vietnam, as I recall. It also fails to give future opponents any credit for being able to watch and learn.

His intervention force, ìLeviathan,î contains smaller editions of the four services, but employing hardware even more top-of-the-line than DoD is buying today, ìthe few and the expensive.î Given the nature of Defense R&D and procurement, the ìfew and expensiveî will become the ìfew and very expensive,î and one can only envision the debates in Congress over a $400 million F-22. A more practical idea might be to realign the Cold War era force structure into something else, simplified and streamlined to form the point of the spear that Barnett envisions (I made a few modest proposals in A Swift, Elusive Sword).

He assumes that once weíre in, the locals will recognize that they have lost and give up. He makes the curious claim that ìwe know our enemies cannot defeat us in extended conflicts,î even though history has shown that protracted war is exactly where we are most vulnerable. This view of war better describes the Third Generation (to his credit, to be sure, given the Second Generation nature of much of our force), but he has no vision of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW.) In 4GW, the defeat of a state army by an invading 3GW force is prologue to the main act. Other entities ñ tribes, cartels, nations without states (e.g., the Kurds), and transnational ideological and religious groups (e.g., al-Qaíida) ñ are now waging war, and as we have seen in Iraq, they can pick up where the state leaves off. And they can keep it up for a very long time. All the high tech whiz bang $400 million fighters are useless in such a struggle because they wonít have targets to shoot at, and what they do hit will provide new recruits for the opposition. What will prove useful is a massive Sys Admin force on the ground, which of course is what we donít have in Iraq.

A few minor points. Barnett informs us on at least four occasions that he is Catholic. Does this mean that his arguments donít apply if the reader is Baptist? He tells us that the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus is a historical fact (p. 262), which is contrary to the Quran and so is not accepted by the worldís billion or so Muslims nor for that matter by the 5/6 of the world that is not Christian. Does this invalidate his arguments for those people? Or does Barnett have something else in mind? In the midst of displaying his religion on his sleeve, he proclaims that the US has a mission to transform the Middle East. Into what? Inhabitants of the Gap might logically suspect, ìChristianity and Western morality!î not really democracy and the Internet.

And then thereís that map. It needs to go. In addition to placing virtually the entire Muslim world prominently into the Gap, the Pentagonís new ìexpeditionary theater,î as he calls it, it is also wrong. Israel and Dubai, for example, are in the Gap, while North Korea lies in the Functioning Core. Hello? His explanation is that he wanted to make the map simple to draw.

My recommendations:

There is a lot in this book not to like. At 426 pages, it seems long, maybe because Barnett regales us with story after story about his glorious career as a Pentagon briefer and how he charms skeptics around the globe. The tone can turn priggish and sometimes even arrogant. ìI see the future worth creating and I choose to embrace it.î he announces at one point. Osama bin Laden could make the same statementósuch moral certitude makes it difficult for the rest of the Core to trust that we will use our power wisely, an essential condition for success as Barnett notes many times. And his attempt to retrofit Iraq into his scheme, when it is more properly seen as verification of what happens when we do not operate according to his paradigm, may lead many to write him off as garden variety neocon.

You can, however, ignore his endorsements of both himself and of Iraq, or not, as you wish and disagree with every one of his conclusions about the composition of the Leviathan intervention force and still stand in awe of the power of his fundamental thesis: Perturb and integrate the Gap. This is the first work since Boyd to offer a coherent vision for action from national goal to grand strategy and down to strategy, operations, and even tactics. It is breathtaking in scope and in hope for the human race. If there is a significant shortcoming in the book, it may be that Barnett is seriously underestimating the effort needed to perturb a system as large as a country, much less the entire Gap. As he notes, ìFor a System Perturbation to be triggered, peoples' worlds need to seem turned upside down.î Remember, we're talking some two billion people whose worlds need to be upended. The real work of this perturbation is not done by the military component, the Leviathan Force, but by the System Administrators. Leviathan just puts Sys Admin in position to get started. So how big should the Sys Admin force be?

If there are indeed two billion people in the Gap, one could envision the need for an international Core Sys Admin force of some 20 million members [applying Shinseki's ratio, which in light of recent events may be conservative] trained and funded to take control of failed societies and rebuild them not as Western, Christian democracies but as connecting members of the World Core in all its myriad forms, each respecting all the others as long as they continue to connect. Although a force this size may seem impractical, it is only marginally more than the 16 million Americans who served in WW II. The entire modern Core holds around 4 billion people, and eliminating the Gap is the most critical factor in their, that is, our continued well being and perhaps of our continuing to exist at all.

COMMENTARY: I don't know where to go with this review. I guess I have to put it down as one of those Chinese reviews where you're "70 percent great and 30 percent horrible." Richards gets the main point of the book so well (in some ways, better than I doómeaning I learned some interesting things about my own book by reading his description), and then offers some truly lame criticism of the sort that just makes my jaw drop (e.g., map isn't perfect so it "must go," I mention my faith and therefore I zero out all my logic to anyone who's not Catholic, and then this bizarrely literal interpretation of troop levels for the SysAdmin). I mean, how can you buy the main thesis so well and then carp so loudly on the map, which is just a visual representation? As for the religion angle, that's just goofy. I read people of all faiths all the time, and I always appreciate hearing their expressions of that faith, not feeling myself automatically excluded from understanding their thinking simply because of that distinction. As for the 20 million calculation, that's just sophomoric. What's so weird about these weird criticisms is the otherwise highly sophisticated capture of the whole Core-Gap and SysAdmin arguments. I guess this is what you'd call a Jeckyl and Hyde review: brilliant one minute and oddly stupid the next. Then again, I guess that's how he views PNM, so perhaps turnabout is fair play.

For an additional bit of analysis on Richard's "20 million" force argument, click here for a later post.

Here's today's catch based on papers I could grab at the airport:

■And then there was two . . .

■UNSC gets up close and personal on Sudan

■Just when you thought there was no more good/depressing news on Iraq/Afghanistan

■A trademark worth infringing

And then there was two . . .

■"Bush Confronts New Challenge On Issue of Iran: Ominous Disclosures on a Nuclear Program," by Steven R. Weisman, , 19 November 2004, p. A1.

■"Powell Presses for Nuclear Talks With North Korea," by Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 19 November 2004, p. A10.

Here's where the lack of competing outlooks within the second Bush Administration may get dangerous. Are we so locked in on Iran that we can't imagine any possibility other than going to the mattresses? The mullahs aren't dropping any time soon, and no amount of huffing and puffing is going to blow their house down. We go all the way on Iran during this term and who exactly is going to be with us on that one? We've got no local ownership on the situation in Iraq and we're losing our out-of-area friends on the subject. Eventually, somebody other than the House of Saud has to become part of our imagined solution set in the Middle East.

"You can't call yourself a revolutionary regime and also negotiate with the Great Satan," said an administration official.

Yes, exactly. So which part is more distasteful and which part is more desired: holding our nose for the negotiations or ending Iran's claim to being a revolutionary regime?

Think about that one.

Meanwhile, out in Asia there may be a truly wobbly regime (where are all those official portraits going?) surrounded by a load of countries that either are already our friends or should logically be our friends. What's our answer there?

Explain the logic to me on this one Ö

UNSC gets up close and personal on Sudan

■"U.N. Council, in Nairobi, Again Warns Sudan: Bringing diplomacy closer doesn't always make it more effective," by Marc Lacey, New York Times, 19 November 2004, p. A6.

The UN Security Council hits the road and has a meeting right next door to Sudan in Kenya. Ooooh, that is impressive!

The result? Same toothless declaration specifying unspecified actions against those who do not cease and desist in Darfur.

As always, the UN is right on top of things, administering the global security system.

A trademark worth infringing

■"W.T.O. Said to Weigh In on Product Names," by Paul Meller, New York Times, 19 November 2004, p. W1.

Interesting article on how WTO has to work through issues with companies that share very similar names but want to operate in each otherís traditional markets.

Why of interest to me?

A while back I seek trademark protection for the phrase, ìA Future Worth Creating.î

Yesterday I get a letter from a Hawaii attorney representing a Everett W. James, who markets Neuro Linguistic Programming under the trademark, ìCreating your future.î Whatís NLP? Basically subliminal therapy. The letter is your basic ìback off buddy!î

Is my phrase close enough? At least you might have an argument there, but itís a weak one, grammatically speaking.

How about the second big test for trademark protection: that I might steal some of this guyís business?

Hmmm. Letís say Iím the government of India and I want to contract Thomas Barnettís consulting company for global strategic thinking.

Oh . . . what the hell! How about some self-help tapes instead!

[cut to the PM of India lying in bed with headphones on]

ìIím big enough militarily, and Iím smart enough in information technology and . . . damn it! Great powers like me!î

Thing is, this guyís claim covers books as well. Sounds like a job for G.P. Putnam . . . and Sons!