Thomas P.M. Barnett

■"Rebels Keep Up Attacks In Sunni-Dominated Cities Of Central and North Iraq " by Edward Wong, New York Times, 21 November 2004, p. A16.

As I make suggestions in this blog that America may well be forced by events in this insurgency to accept the notion of a partial victory in Iraq, I get more than a few emails complaining as to this line of reasoning. Let me recap my logic as it has emerged over the course of events (and yes, my logic emerges over time, it does not spring fully formed out of my head one day only to be held sacred for the rest of my life):

ï America isn't going to defeat transnational terrorism in its current, Mideast-driven Islamic-heavy form until the Middle East itself is transformed from its current dyfunctionality (no matter what grievances you want to cite, the real problem is the combination of crappy governments and societies thatóquite franklyósuck at globalization.
ï To start that process after all our years of diddling on the margin, perturbing that system as a whole makes sense.

ï The best target for such an effort following 9/11 was Iraq, because Saddam had checked so many boxes and everyone in the system wanted him gone, even if we didn't have a transparent, A-to-Z Core rule set for dispatching such rogues and rehabbing their systems.

ï Once you decide to go in, make if fast and furious with the transformed Leviathan force (check!) but then overwhelm the country with a committed, massive peacekeeping Sys Admin force that segues quickly into round-the-dial reconstruction efforts that emphasizes small-and-beautiful efforts that keep hands busy, put money in pockets, put food in bellies, and give people back their dignity (completely unchecked that box)

ï Understanding nation-building is hard, the larger reason for going into Iraq (once Saddam is removed) is not Iraq, but the rest of the region. Expect a strong anti-American reaction as the force for change, but then watch for that change and take advantage of it as it emerges in Syria, Israel-Palestine, Iran, etc. Make the deals, create the local ownership, be generous with the quid pro quos, etc.

ï To the extent that you can't resolve Iraq as a whole, I advocate resolving what you can. The Kurdish north isn't the problem, and the Shiite south can be dealt with, leaving the Sunni center triangle as the odd man out.

ï There is no reason for the Kurds and Shiites to be held back by the Sunnis, given all the nasty history between them. Iraq is an unreal country with no real basis in history. It was created by the Brits to cover their tracks. We are no more held to that past in Iraq than we were in Yugoslavia, so we need to make do with those who want to get things done, growing the Core and transforming the region where possible, instead of waiting for perfect answers.

ï If it seems like we're making this up as we go along, guess what? That's how it always has been in foreign policy and national security: exploiting victories as they present themselves, likewise adapting to failures as they present themselves.

The larger reality of globalization's embrace of any region is that it tends to break things down to logical constituent parts first, which is why globalization seems so disintegrating as it comes in. When that logical reduction is achieved, you tend to see those same pieces come together in more logically defined and fair-minded economic, social, and political alliances, meaning that integration follows initial disintegration. It is a constant struggle this process, always a precarious balancing between yin and yang.

The reality for Iraq for the foreseeable future may well be: accept the disintegration for now, understanding that a lot of score-settling is inevitable after all those years:

Mr. Hussein, himself a Sunni, heightened ethnic and religious difference by installing Sunnis in the most senior positions and persecuting Shiite Arabs and Kurds. Now, with a power and security vacuum throughout Iraq, those tension are reviving and threatening to unravel the very social fabric of the country.

What does this process say to the rest of the Middle East? Better to reform your oppressive regimes that see similar events happen to you. But is also says, Iraq is the Yugoslavia of the Middle East.

I'm not a casual "Divider," as some may assume, but I do believe in adaptive planning. I believe to don't wait for perfect plans, answers, outcomes, but constantly satisfice. If we're not going to bring in significant New Core help on Iraq (seems unlike with second Bush Admin), then we better be ready to create local ownership of the process, meaning we creating local owners for the Shiite south and Kurdish north.