The military coup in Iran--one argument

OP-ED: "Iran's Hidden Revolution," by Danielle Pletka and Ali Alfoneh, New York Times 17 June 2009.

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have affected a coup d'etat--silently.

Ahmadinejad is the stalking horse of this crowd that wants to--in effect--secularize and concentrate political power in the nation within their small ranks (the nomeklatura, or highest ranks, of the elite).

Why do this? Popular resentment against the mullahs grows (urban types hate the stultifying rigidity of the laws, and the rural poor hate the corruption), so to preserve the autocratic rule of the elite, they must be marginalized.

Many have written in the past (noted here) about Ahmadinejad's efforts to concentrate new powers in the presidency, to--in effect--create an alternate power center based on the military/Revolutionary Guards/etc. The Guards in particular rule like a one-party state already in the economy.

The Supreme Leader buys into this "undercutting" of his own class out of sheer survival, the great fear being a soft regime change a la Ukraine (and yes, see how the opposition embraces green), the secondary fear being encirclement by U.S. military forces.

In sum, the "Islamic" is being removed as well as the trappings of the "Republic."

Clear out of sight

ARTICLE: Clear airport security fast-lane program shuts down, By Stephanie Chen, CNN, June 23, 2009

I have used Clear for about a year and a half and it was great, well worth the money (less than half of any hotel room you'd have to get when you missed just one flight per year). Since I had Clear, I have never missed a flight.

It will be sorely missed by this road warrior. That card was my ace in the hole.

Aloha Maginot!

FRONT PAGE: "U.S. Fortifies Hawaii to Meet Threat From Korea," by Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 19 June 2009.

We're moving ground-to-air missile systems to Hawaii.

Please. As if North Korea's crappy missiles could hit something that small in the middle of the Pacific.

I'd rather see us park such stuff right off Nork's coast and blow up the next missile test early in the flight.

The good news is that the stuff we're moving into Hawaii is capable of doing that, according to this report.

Obama should keep turning these specific screws, hitting them where it counts.

Another Cohen-Blitzer exchange yesterday

Noting how Ahmadinejad blew it by tossing names at those Iranians who did not vote for him.

Also noting his incredibly low profile since.

Also noting how Speaker of the Parliament Larijani is hedging his bets in public statements, acting a whole lot more presidential than Ahmadinejad himself.

Again, all-around great stuff.

Roger Cohen has written many great op-eds on Iran in recent weeks.

Regarding Obama's increasing "tougher stance"

The GOP isn't going to nail Obama on responding too slowly to events in Iran.

He's responding as things are happening. There is no reason to get in front when things are going so well.

This is James Baker/George H.W. Bush smart circa 1989.

Let your enemies dig their own graves so long as they're ready and willing. No sense in grabbing anybody's shovels and declaring it all to be about America. Please, this is why we elected the guy. We wanted smart and cool and calculating and careful.

Roger Cohen (NYT) reporting from Iran to Wolf Blitzer just now (23 June 2009): Obama couldn't be more popular among the protesters.

So you know what? As much as I'd love to be proven wrong and have the regime drop tomorrow (I'm thinking months, not weeks), we play it smart to highlight issues as they emerge, letting the world judge and mobilize. We have such a self-negating history here, from the 1953 coup to the Iran-Iraq war to the "axis of evil" decisions by Bush, that we don't have the same easy entry we typically enjoy in such situations.

So yeah. Tweak 'em, tweet 'em, promo it like crazy, letting the news cycle work it's maniacal magic. Iran is isolating itself through its actions. It don't get any better than this.

And Obama's just humble enough and smart enough not to get in the way while things are going well.

It's when things truly go bad that he'll be more usefully employed.

The goal: tarnish Iran's current regime as much as possible

ARTICLE: Iran Unrest Reveals Split In U.S. on Its Role Abroad, By Scott Wilson, Washington Post, June 23, 2009

An interesting article on the split between Cold War instincts and post-Cold War sensibilities. In a broadcast world, you need to broadcast your support, but is the same required in a peer-to-peer world, or does that just come off as old-school propaganda?

There would seem to be some middle ground between poisoning the well with Iran's leadership for another long stretch (we have so much history of regime-change-encouragement there) and not doing enough to reward the immense courage of the protesters, who are indeed quite inspiring.

So what additional skin can we put in the game to reward such behavior and highlight the evil of the crackdown?

I would say anything that keeps this thing as Iranian as possible (as one aide put it) but keeps it as top-of-the-global news food chain as possible. Also, anything that allows the global community to display its displeasure, so working the UN seems good.

In short, we want to make this period as uncomfortable and as revealing as possible for the Iranian regime. We cannot stop the crackdown, but we can tarnish the regime with it now and for a long time, as I--again--expect this to be a lengthy, Solidarnosc-like struggle if it is going to succeed.

Meaning big labor strikes are next.

The picture-perfect martyr

CNN: "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer," 23 June 2009.

Neda, who can be iconically rendered in both modern and traditional guises, is exactly the sort of rallying point the opposition is looking for: an educated, modern Iranian female brutally murdered on the street.

Clerics joining the protests

CNN: "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer," 23 June 2009.

This is a big and positive sign that underlies the electoral putsch by the Revolutionary Guards. The mullahs' rule is crumbling before our eyes.

What comes next is the martial law of the Guards.

And yeah, this is the next best iteration, from our perspective.

Ahmadinejad not to be sworn in until August

CNN: "The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer," 23 June 2009.

This is getting better and better.

I know it's standard timing, but if I were the Guards, I would have sped it up for appearances' sake.

Only Ahmadinejad can go to America

OP-ED: "A Different Iranian Revolution," by Shane M., New York Times, 19 June 2009.

Piece goes on and on, but some good bits.

One is:

... the election does reveal a paradox. There is strong evidence that Iranians across the board want a better relationship with the United States. But if Mr. Moussavi were to become president and carry out his campaign promise of seeking improved relations with America, we would probably see a good 30 percent of the Iranian population protesting that he is "selling out" to the enemy.

By contrast, support for Mr. Ahmadinejad's campaign was rooted in part in his supposed defense of the homeland and national honor in the face of United States aggression. Americans too-long familiar with the boorish antics of the Iranian president will no doubt be surprised to learn that the best chance for improved relations with the United States perhaps lies with Mr. Ahmadinejad. But Mr. Ahmadinejad is perceived here as being uniquely able to play the part of an Iranian Nixon by "traveling to the United States" and bringing along with him his supporters--and they are not few.

Been saying this in briefs for years, to a lot of shaking heads (both directions).

Brooks on Iran's fragility

OP-ED: "Fragile at the Core: Iran's regime is more fragile than its nuclear program," by David Brooks, New York Times, 19 June 2009.

Good section:

The core lesson of these events is that the Iranian regime is fragile at the core. Like all autocratic regimes, it has become rigid, paranoid, insular, insecure, impulsive, clumsy and illegitimate. The people running the regime know it, which is why the Revolutionary Guard is seeking to consolidate power into a small, rigid, insulated circle. The Iranians on the streets know it. The world knows it.

From now on, the central issue of Iran-Western relations won't be the nuclear program [FINALLY! Says Barnett]. The regime is more fragile than the program. The regime is more likely to go away than the program.

The central issue going forward will be the regime's survival itself. The radically insecure members of this government will make no concessions that might threaten their hold on power. The West won't be able to go back and view Iran through the old lens of engagement on nuclear issues. The nations of the West will have to come up with multitrack policies that not only confront Iran on specific issues, but also try to undermine the regime itself.

This approach is like Ronald Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union [actually, every Cold War president's approach], and it is no simply thing. It doesn't mean you don't talk to the regime; Reagan [as did all Cold War presidents, Reagan less than most] talked to the Soviets. But it does mean you pursue many roads at once.

Aren't you glad you've got a president capable of "many roads at once"?

Brezhnevian Iran--see the film

THE ARTS: "Iran's Tensions, Foreshadowed in Its Cinema," by A.O. Scott, New York Times, 20 June 2009.

CULTURE: ("Movies: 'The Stoning of Soraya M.') The Accused: A controversial new film looks at the treatment of women in Iran," by John Jurgensen, Wall Street Journal, 20-21 June 2009.

Reminds me of the way Russian films revived in the late 1970s and 1980s:

From the early 1990s until the middle of this decade, the work of Iranian filmmakers caught the attention of critics, cinephiles and festival juries around the global as Iran's historically rich movie culture, largely dormant during the Islamic revolution and the long way with Iraq, entered into a remarkable period of rejuvenation.

Arguably the most famous filmmaker of this time period, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, is now one of the spokesman for Mir Hussein Moussavi, the opposition candidate in the recent election. The reformist (sort-of) president of Iran from 1996-2004 (Mohammed Khatami) was the minister of culture who helped launch this cultural thawing.

What did these films show?

You see class divisions, the cruelty of the state, the oppression of women and their ways of resisting it, traditions of generosity and hospitality, and above all a passion for argument.

A typical Iranian film can feel like one long series of family quarrels . . .

Tell me this society isn't similar to Israel's.

Why globalization wins in Iran--in the end

OP-ED: "The Virtual Mosque," by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 17 June 2009.

SUNDAY OPINION: "Winds of Change?" by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 14 June 2009.

Great pair of pieces by Friedman that display his long-time analytic wizardry when it comes to explaining the forces of change in the Middle East.

The first piece argues implicitly that Bush's Big Bang strategy is finally yielding some serious fruit.

Yes, the new social networking technologies are crucial, but the example of Iraq helps make Lebanon conceivable, and Lebanon emboldens the average Iranian voter.

As for Obama? He's definitely an enabling factor, but nothing more. Guy's too smart to believe either the headlines or the more expansive claims of his aides.

The coolest bit from Friedman: calling social-networking techs the virtual equivalent of mosques. In the Before Time, you could only go to the mosque for such networking and it was all conservative. Now, the Net and its many venues have leveled the playing field quite a bit.

A nice, validating bit for his "flat world" mantra.

Iran's reactions

ARTICLE: Iran starts airforce manoeuvres in Gulf, Reuters, Jun 22, 2009

Would seem to replicate recent Israeli military exercises, suggesting the threat of tit-for-tat.

(Thanks: Michael S. Smith II)

Supporting what comes next in Iran

ARTICLE: A Tense Calm on Streets of Tehran, By Thomas Erdbrink, Washington Post, June 22, 2009

The quiet inevitably comes. And now the opposition realizes it won't shout the mullahs out of power a la Ceaucescu.

So the questions becomes, what organization now results?

Do we wish to support? Absolutely. But only in the most indirect sense. Still have to deal with the regime, and the nukes. We play bad cop still, Europe more easily the good. Support to the opposition best applied through private means, like the big Iranian ex-pat population in the U.S. Anything with USG fingerprints is bad.

And no, we don't particularly need to beam in "freedom radio." The Twitter connectivity proves that.

But you begin to see the utility of having a fairly democratic regime in Iraq right next door. Very unsettling in a good way.

Why I remain hopeful on Iran

The Pentagon's New Map, published 2004, page 380 under "ten steps towards this future worth creating," number 3:

Iran will experience an overthrow of the mullahs' rule by 2010 . . .

I hate predictions as a rule, and the sequence wasn't about predicting but rather imagining the best path forward. I always thought that one was optimistic, even writing it in the summer of 2003.

And yet . . .

NKorea: like Obama's take and a wish

ARTICLE:
N Korea defends nuclear programme, BBC, 22 June 2009

Rather than fanciful declarations of defending Hawaii (like North Korea could hit it), I like this take from Obama.

And what I'd really like to see is the U.S. shooting down the next missile tested.

Obama's economic priorities

ARTICLE: Core Reforms Held Firm As Much Else Fell Away,l By David Cho and Zachary A. Goldfarb, Washington Post, June 18, 2009

This guy's economic program in a nutshell.

China's NOC finds a strange amount of economic democracy in Iraq--aka farmers

WORLD NEWS: "China Faces Unexpected Problem Drilling for Oil in Iraq--Farmers," by Gina Chon, Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2009.

Sinopec is finding local relations a tough row to hoe in Iraq. I guess it's just not used to peasants who not only stand in its way but refuse to budge until sufficient compensation is offered.

Yes, eventually compromises are achieved, but it shows how, as one farmer put it, Sinopec should have been smarter about working with the locals from the beginning, where land ownership remains in doubt in many instances.

Of course, local Iraqi officials tend to be more embarrassed, and should be.

The point we make with Development-in-a-Box‚Ñ¢ is that the outside investor wants his money to trigger better rules and enable local counterparty capacity to grow, not merely reveal the lack of solid rules and create confusion about where the local counterparty capacity actually should reside. In sum, it is a highly iterative process. There is no waiting on the perfect law; just showing your commitment to leave the place more connected (both in infrastructure and capacity for further deal-making) than you found it.

How about Afghanistan in the context of everything else?

POINT: Afghanistan: The Path to Victory, By Joseph J. Collins, Joint Forces Quarterly, NDU, October 2009, p58

MIDPOINT: Destroy the Taliban's Sanctuary, By Steven Metz, Joint Forces Quarterly, NDU, October 2009, p62

COUNTERPOINT: Trapping Ourselves in Afghanistan and Losing Focus on the Essential Mission, By Ralph Peters, Joint Forces Quarterly, NDU, October 2009, p63

Interesting trio of articles that says: 1) the long hard slog can work (Collins); 2) the long hard slog is doomed (Metz) and 3) we have no strategic interests here and should leave (Peters).

No one talks about engaging regional players much--if at all. This entire discussion is held within the confines of America-doing-damn-near-anything. To me, it's a stunningly sterile discussion, as if we're the only power in the world.

China is mentioned twice--very obliquely. Collins talks constructively for a brief bit on India and Iran. Peters speaks about Russia and India mostly in terms of complications--Iran similarly. Turkey is unmentioned. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is never mentioned.

In effect, regional players are there to be worried about but never fully exploited. The sum effect is--again--an oddly limited debate.

Honestly, strategic thinking (other than the negating let's-just-get-the-hell-out-of-here crowd) in this country is dead. It is truly weird and sad.

The word "economy" is used once by Metz, to decry Afghanistan's complete lack of one outside of opium production. Collins talks "economic development" a lot, but that seems to mean NGOs exclusively.

Again, this is a depressingly narrow debate.