Nice letter on PNM from West Point grad who has lived its narrative

In his original email, this retired military officer stated (and this was my favorite part) that he didn't read anyting in PNM that he didn't already know, in the sense that it read like his career and lessons he'd learned along the way.
I love this sort of compliment and asked Brandon if I could post his letter. He edited it down a bit and consented. It's a good read, and I thank him for making this post happen.
Professor Barnett, 18 NOV, 2005
I just finished reading ìThe Pentagon's New Mapî and I want to share with you how your book directly relates to my background and experiences.
I graduated from WestPoint in 1997 and have served the last 8+ years as an Armor officer in the US Army. I led troops in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq and took an active interest in studying the local and global politics of the regions where I have been deployed. The concepts you put forward are very familiar and gaining wide acceptance, at least among the lieutenants, captains and majors who have been my peers. I have never before been motivated to write to an author, but I feel a need to thank you for giving me something solid to point to when I share my vision of a future worth creating. I hope every decision maker in the world reads it.
In 2000 I attended the Armor Officer's Advanced Course at Ft. Knox. There, we memorized Soviet armored formations and doctrine and war-gamed ways to defeat divisional armored threats in open terrain. The Soviet Army had disappeared 10 years previously, but the assumption was that we would fight a similar doctrinal enemy at some time in the future. We did not know who that would be so we studied the Red Army for practice, with the assumption that we would develop the mental tools needed to defeat a new doctrinal enemy when ever one might come along. On September 11, 2001 we added the word ìasymmetricalî to our vocabulary and put those doctrine books in a cardboard box.
As the only heavyweight doctrinal fighter in the world, nobody was willing to step into the ring with our military. America's enemies learned that they would have to come up with new and creative ways to jab at us while avoiding our right hook. They exploited weaknesses that we did not even know we had. Terrorism made the revolutionary leap from criminal nuisance to strategic threat.
I recently left the Army and I am now working for a defense contractor. I have a personal interest in seeing big budgets for net-centric warfare, leap-ahead technology, and futuristic weapons. I strongly believe that those things are in America's best interest too. It is the Defense Department's obligation to prepare now for any possible future contingency. It is true that many of the weapons being developed today will have little application in the Global War On Terror (GWOT) but we must maintain our Leviathan status through leadership in the quality, quantity, and technology of our weapons and intelligence. That is the shield that makes prosperity possible and the big stick to make it Global. We can never afford to risk losing that advantage. The world is full of irrational leaders, and we will always need our Big Stick to keep them from derailing progress.
What is missing is the ìSys Adminî force. Right now, we expect one Army to fill both roles with one set of equipment. We can see how well that is working in Iraq. I have discussed this very issue with my peers since I was a cadet at West Point. Soldiers are less than ideally suited for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) but right now there is nobody else better suited to do it. American soldiers are intelligent and flexible and will do their best at anything we ask of them, but it is costly and wasteful to expect soldiers to be proficient at two very distinct jobs. My soldiers, trained as a tank crewman to identify and kill enemy armor at a distance, had go through significant re-training before being qualified to walk through villages and build relationships with tribal leaders. Once that mission was completed, their skills as armored crewman were so diminished that they had to go through significant re-training before being certified again to perform their primary duties.
The Sys Admin force is desperately needed. As an armor officer I was primarily trained to defeat enemy armor. Yet, in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, my soldiers and I had responsibility or oversight for such varied areas as: commercial farming and irrigation, water purification, road and bridge repair, infrastructure assessments, opinion polls, public opinion shaping, educational assessments, electrical power distribution, organizing elections, advising local governments, refugee relocation, riot control, traffic control, training police, providing medical care, restoring essential services. . . the list goes on, but the point I want to make is that in order to succeed, we had to do all of those things while simultaneously fighting an insurgency. ìSimultaneityî is a major buzz-word for commanders in Iraq and the first time I heard it the meaning was clear - something is missing - the Sys Admin force. Some have argued that the Army has always gone back and forth between Big Stick and Sys Admin (civil war reconstruction, frontier outposts, WWII constabulary, etc). That doesn't make it right.
One of the biggest things saving us right now in Iraq is the institutional level of ìSys Adminî skills developed accidentally as a result of mission creep in the Balkans. Frustrated and saddled with open ended peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans that were distracting us from the ìrealî business of training for the next major war, Army leaders took on additional responsibilities to move things along faster. Once the fighting ended, there was nobody really pushing for economic progress, democratic institutions, reconstruction, and the list of other things which must take place in order to set the conditions for military withdrawal. Sure, there was the UN and OSCE and other NGOs but they just were not organized enough to be able to find their way to work every morning. To the benefit of all, the Army took a broader view of our mission and applied our surplus organizational skills and manpower to ensuring the success of many of the NGOs. We were not trained for such tasks but Americans see a need and pitch in. That experience is paying off in Iraq, where there are no NGO's and the Army is going it alone.
The Sys Admin half needs to be run by the State Department or some future successor to it. It needs some MP-type foot soldiers and a lot of military advisors and trainers, but most of all it needs expertise in the systems and functions of government to train and develop indigenous populations. It needs cultural and language experts; electrical, civil, and agricultural engineers; natural resource developers; communications experts Ö basically, everything we lack right now in Iraq. Much of this can not be contracted as we learned in Iraq.
The necessary split in the force will not be easy to accomplish. Your idea of first making all flag officers Joint will go a long way toward eliminating resistance to such a change. I would then take it a step farther and eliminate the separation of the services and make it one DOD. Same uniforms, weapons, vehicles, radios, networks, information systems, shared databases, personnel systems, promotion systems, everything. Tradition is great but not when it affects our ability to talk to each other and work together for what should be the same national security goals. Eliminating redundancy and waste would cut huge pieces out of the budget for other more necessary things.
I just want to list some of the other things in your book that were particularly meaningful to me:
Your description of Bush doing the right thing but not being able to articulate (sell) it is exactly right. WMD, 911, oil and vilifying Saddam are all distractions and secondary to the true value of our intervention in Iraq. As I often explained to the soldiers under my command, the best reason for us to be in Iraq is simply the hope of a future without conflict when Iraq would stand as a shining example of democracy and freedom and have a domino effect of stabilization and freedom in the neighboring countries.
It seems a lot farther away now than it did when the statues of Saddam were falling. Like the president and much of America, I bought into the idea that we would topple Saddam and let the Iraqis' natural thirst for democracy take over. After that, an Army of contractors would arrive to reconstruct the country, fully funded by Iraq's own oil revenues. Of course the Iraqi desire for democracy turned out to be a false premise and the unforseen foreign backed insurgency has prevented reconstruction and suppressed the oil production that could provide the income to make the Iraqi government self sufficient. The road to success is now longer and harder than we had bargained for. However, that does not change the fact that shrinking the Gap is the only effective means of ending terrorism. Everything else is just treating the symptoms. Success in Iraq will be costlier than we imagined but failure would be far costlier in the long run.
The description of Navy Captain ìPhilî on p. 273 precisely describes the dilemma of every foot soldier in Iraq today: Do I shoot first and risk killing an innocent person, or do I risk my life and try to understand what is really going on? It is a question every soldier must answer for himself. It takes a long time to learn what is normal and what is out of place. By the time you figure it out you have inevitably made some mistakes but you learn and adapt and in the end do more good than harm.
I had been aware of ìGlobalizationî for several years before I truly understood what it was and its impact on the world. Although there are the professional protestors who consider it as some global conspiracy, it is nothing more than a manifestation of free choice. I am sorry if Coca-Cola and blue jeans are destroying your traditional culture (361), but we are not forcing anyone to buy our pop cultural icons. We export only what foreign markets demand. If you don't think it is better than what you already have, then don't buy it. Societies that fail to modify their ìtraditionalî ways once exposed to something better get left behind to die. American culture redefines itself every day is it grows to become more inclusive, more educated and more technologically advanced. I think you should have spent more time on this idea because it goes right to the heart of what we are facing in the GWOT. The Middle Eastern Islamic way of life will not survive globalization. It will be forced to make such fundamental changes that it will no longer be recognizable from the Islam practiced today. The Middle East will become more like Turkey and Turkey will become more like Europe. Those behind the terrorism know this and that is why they are fighting so fiercely. It's not about protecting their traditional way of life, it is about protecting their traditional basis of power. The leaders in the Middle East today are tribal sheiks, imams, ayatollahs, kings, emirs, mullahs, and others who exert a traditional form of influence. They enslave their women, run private militias, extort money from contractors and sell their influence to their constituencies. While their practices are widely seen as corrupt to the West, they are accepted and respected in the Middle East. Those leaders are not elected; they are born into power and keep it through nepotism. By joining the Core they stand to lose everything. The stakes are much higher for them than they are for us so they will risk more to win. Their true failure is in not recognizing that the outcome is inevitable. The terrorists can temporarily isolate sections of the globe from progress by limiting access to information but, as China proves, they can not keep their people indefinitely ignorant. Even if the US troops withdraw today, Globalization is still an irresistible force. Our soldiers only marginally speed up what would happen naturally in 50 years time. Perhaps these things should not be rushed.
Freedom can not be imposed, only offered (356). Freedom came too fast for Iraq. Iraqis told me that they prayed for someone strong to take control and bring back order and stability to the wild land, with just a bit less repression. Some asked me to be that person. I was hurt, how could someone return such a beautiful gift? Unlike Americans, they were willing to trade freedom for security.
Refugee flows from the Gap (313) are a major concern. In the Balkans I assisted in the preparation for the forced return of refugees from Core European countries. Europe sat and watched the war and was content as long as it stayed isolated. It was not until the refugees threatened to break the bank in the social welfare states of Western Europe that they decided they had a responsibility to do something about it.
The lack of interoperability with other militaries is increasingly a problem that we deal with (314). On various occasions I have had the opportunity to participate in Joint operations where the difficulty of integrating our partners nearly negated the benefit. The value of joint partners is often political and not in most instances militarily advantageous. At a seminar in 2001, I learned that the US defense budget was then ten times greater than the sum of all of the other NATO partners combined! If that is true (I did not fact check) then it makes unilateral action seem most appropriate. The ability to act unilaterally is a tremendous advantage that makes the US unique in its ability to pursue its interests. If we fail to attract allied troops, it is a political issue, not a military one. Contrast that with the formerly sovereign countries of Europe which are in the process of subordinating their ability to act unilaterally to the EU's EUROCORPS. To deploy, EUROCORPS needs French infantry, Norwegian fuel trucks, Dutch medics, German helicopters, etc. If one partner backs out then the others won't be able to go it alone.
Thanks for putting war where it belongs - ìwithin the context of everything else.î I can't wait to read your second book and catch up on the dialog on your website. How strange that I had not heard of your book until Amazon said, ìPeople who bought Calvin and Hobbes also bought . . .î
Brandon K. Trevino