Find it here.
Porter has done some very aggressive reporting on Fallon in the past (the Petraeus encounters as some alleged they occurred). Here, he does a very balanced job of putting my piece in a larger context, especially citing Mullen (Chairman JCS) saying--in effect--last fall that starting a third war in that region would be a mistake.
This was how I originally looked at the issue:
-->1951 Truman fires MacArthur because the general wants to take the South Korea-North Korea conflict all the way to China (the third country). Truman says, too far, and ends the debate.
-->Today our Trumans (Bush/Cheney) are the ones pushing for/contemplating the third country war (after neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan (partial) and this time it's the MacArthur(s) who argues caution (along with Mullen as Chairman and Gates as SECDEF--the two guys who arrange Fallon's hire for this purpose, as I note in the article).
In that context and with a White House that routinely raises big war imagery (Hitler, WWIII), which, in the past, has most definitely presaged war, there's natural tension between the Trumans and MacArthurs here, and that tension carries some interesting implications about the nature of civil-military relations after 7-plus years of this administration (Arkin's point in his WAPO blog). I especially find this interesting for having worked in the Pentagon under Cebrowski under Rumsfeld, and having written about Rumsfeld in Esquire and his team's desire coming into power in 2000 to re-establish more civilian control over a military they felt had gotten to big for its britches under a weak Clinton oversight (something, quite frankly, I agreed with). Isn't it supremely ironic (or dangerous, as Arkin argues for any Dem that might take the White House next) that the Bush-Cheney years end up actually making the military more independent of civilian control than less?
Back to the piece: writing about Fallon allows the more reasoned "inverted MacArthur" position to be explained in a way that no one else has done in any other article (yes, there have been articles on the Iran debate, but none which put it in the deep context of a military leader on the spot), which he did across almost 1,300 words of quotes. Writing a piece that pretended there was no tension, when it exists in spades, would have been dishonest. Not preparing the American public for the possibility that Fallon's stance may cost him much like it did MacArthur would also have been poor journalism, which is supposed to inform, provide context, and provide a capacity to judge current and future events as they unfold. Finally, it would have been wholly irresponsible from the view of my status as an expert in the field of national security, independent of the journalism function, to not raise the issue that what Fallon's doing here is exactly what so many young officers in the military now say wasn't done before Iraq: providing strategic context to the debate about whether or not this country goes to war again (the true money quote in the piece).
Does shining a light on that tension exacerbate it? Only to the extent that the tension is real and/or growing. I completely understand the admiral's desire to distance himself from the piece by "killing the messenger," although his impugning of my character ("poison pen") is ironic given I spent seven thousand words defining and defending his. For an administration that says it follows the advice of its military leaders in the field on Iraq, spotlighting Fallon's clear stance on Iran (nothing new, as he's said it in the press for months now) and contextualizing it within a larger and--I would argue--impressive strategic vision, is definitely going to cause some backpressure, but no more than what's been there all along. As Fallon demonstrates in the piece, he knows how to present his arguments logically and he's not shy about doing so. That makes him an effective and responsible military leader in my opinion, something I make clear in the article.
But let me be clear here regarding any impression garnered from the admiral's "rejection" of the piece: I approached the admiral expressly on the issue of his ongoing stance on Iran, informing him that Esquire was interested in exploring the man and the vision attached to this stance. The subject constituted a major portion of my first interview with him and later ones following the trip. Unsurprisingly, it leads the piece but comes nowhere near constituting its bulk (otherwise, how could I provide context for his strategic thinking on Iran?), which covers his strategic views on China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia in addition.
As my wife Vonne, who has a degree in journalism and worked for a few years as a journalist and newspaper editor, says, "You didn't go to journalism school. You don't have enough training to be unethical."
Anybody who's ever read me or seen me talk knows I am about as transparent as they come. I am routinely criticized by the Left for not using my profiles of leaders (Rumsfeld, Petraeus, Mattis, Fallon) or U.S. commands (CJTF-HOA) as platforms to critique the underlying context of "American empire" and the like. What a surprise from the guy who wrote "The Pentagon's New Map"! I consider my approach to begin with certain undeniable truths. Others don't see the same truths and hence consider me biased. Fine and dandy. I have a body of work that displays all the complexity required. I don't pretend to tee it all up for every single article or column. I lack the ego or ideological rigidity for that. My views evolve over time, as anyone who reads my stuff can readily attest.
When I was with the government I, like the admiral, had a recurring problem of speaking my version of the truth too readily to the press or--worse--in the press under my own name, and I got in trouble for it many times. One early time I felt a profile on me unfairly made me look too arrogant (which it did), and my first instinct was to blame the journalist. Many of my mentors reminded me of advice I'd been given many times: journalists can't do anything to you that you don't do to yourself. They can only use the words you provide, placing them in context. If you don't like the context, don't provide the words. If you do, don't operate under any illusions that it's the journalist's job only to make you look good. Their job is to provide the context and respectfully inform the reader on that basis, letting the reader decide how well you're doing your job.
The Fallon article accomplishes that fundamental goal quite nicely.