ARTICLE: “As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam: Recent Books Pan Doctrine Of Overwhelming Power When Fighting Guerrillas; A Gift for Donald Rumsfeld,” by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2006, p. A1.
ARTICLE: “Deaths fall for U.S., rise for Iraqis: Changes in roles shift casualties,” by Thomas Frank, USA Today, 20 March 2006, p. 1A.
OP-ED: “The Stone Face of Zarqawi: The war in Iraq is not a ‘distraction’ from fighting al Qaeda,” by Christopher Hitchens, Wall Street Journal, 21 March 2006, p. A14.
OP-ED: “Passing the Dinar: Postwar planning? Not for this war,” by John Tierney, New York Times, 21 March 2006, p. A17.
ARTICLE: “Kabul faces fury over lack of aid to replace opium fields,” by Rachel Morarjee, Financial Times, 20 March 2006, p. 3
Yet another great piece from Greg Jaffe on how the Army is changing from within, under the duress of Iraq. As I like to say in my brief: the Iraq war changes nothing (what did we prove by waxing the regime?), while the Iraq (non) peace changes everything. Bush 41 crowed about finally killing the Vietnam Syndrome with Desert Storm back in 1991, but no such thing happened. Or maybe it did among the U.S. populace. But within the U.S. Army, the Vietnam Syndrome was really about our inability to do counter-insurgency correctly, and the Army’s profound desire post-Vietnam to get out of that business forever--thus the banishing of civil affairs to Tampa and SOCOM.
The star of this piece is the charismatic Col. John Nagl, whom I had the great pleasure of interviewing by phone for the “Monks of War” piece, even as I wasn’t able to work his stuff into the final version (alas, we could have only so many stars in that piece). Plus, to be honest, Nagl had to push pretty hard to even get permission to talk to me because apparently he was under a bit of a gag order at the time, either because he got a bit too much press when the NYT Sunday mag made him a cover boy a while back (that “Professor Nagl’s War” piece) or because his current role as military aide to DEPSECDEF Gordon England (if I remember correctly) places him a little too close to the top for such things. Nagl finally got permission and we had a great chat, but the word was it was only on background, so I took from him what I could, which was mostly a lot of tips on where to look and whom to interview.
Anyway, this is a great piece by Jaffe examining how the Army is rethinking its past and finally coming to grips with what counter-insurgency really means in this age of Fourth Generation Warfare, so Nagl’s great 2002 book, Eating Soup with a Knife, is cited, among others, as seminal work now making all the right rounds within the ranks.
In the piece, Nagl cites the great influence Andy Krepinevich’s book, The Army and Vietnam, had on his work (basically his Oxford PhD diss turned into a book), and after now spending a couple of days with Andy, I come to match Nagl’s admiration for the man’s very incisive reasoning on all things military. Doesn’t mean I agree with everything he puts out, but his consistent performance over a long, highly productive career is not in doubt.
I guess what I like most about this article is that it signals that Nagl’s influence is growing, and that influence is mostly about overturning Colin Powell’s “overwhelming force” concept as far as the second half is concerned.
Don’t get me wrong: I want the first-half war to be as overwhelming in its power projected as possible. But to me, the second-half peace, and any necessary counter-insurgency effort, is not about overwhelming force but overwhelming presence. So again, my old bit about Rummy being right on the footprint for the war, with all that overwhelming force, but Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki also being right about the much larger footprint needed for the peace, or what should have been overwhelming presence--the kind you feel in Manhattan when you turn the corner and bump into a couple hundred of New York’s finest.
It’s never a choice of one versus the other, but really one of sequencing, and to me, sequencing is everything when waging both war and peace inside the Gap, because the ultimate goal is connecting the country to the larger world, a tough process at any time but even trickier coming out of conflict, when you have the potential to either get things very right or very wrong.
So when Rummy shows up in Iraq recently, George Casey, current top U.S. military commander on the ground, gives him Nagl’s book.
And Nagl is one of the four officers tapped by the Wallace-Petraeus-Mattis trio (profiled by me in last month’s Esquire) to co-author the new Marine-Army COIN, or counter-insurgency doctrine. That is some serious God’s work:
One of the doctrine’s primary goals is to shatter the conventional wisdom that defined the post-Vietnam Army. “We are at a turning point in the Army’s institutional history,” Col. Nagl and his co-authors write in a forthcoming essay in “Military Review,” an Army journal.
The doctrine’s biggest emphasis is on the need to curb the military’s use of firepower, which created thousands of refugees and horrific collateral damage in Vietnam. “The more force you use when battling insurgents, the less effective you are,” the draft states.
That is some pretty amazing stuff, if you consider that Harry Summers’ On Strategy has dominated Army thinking on the failure of Vietnam since the 1980s (the idea being that the politicians kept it from fighting as hard it should have).
So what Nagl is doing is more that overturning the Powell Doctrine in the second half, he’s making it smart and cool and right again for young officers to study COIN, a field that fell completely out of favor after Vietnam.
The story of Nagl’s book is cool, because it features the right guys at the right moments helping out. He publishes his diss. with Praeger, just like I did. And I’m sure it sold the same 500 copies that such serious academic tomes do when put forth by the ivory tower’s version of a vanity press.
But then current Army Chief of Staff Pete Schoomaker gets a hold of a copy. And then Newt Gingrich, the Tyler Durden of military transformation (wherever I go, he was just there!), gets a hold of a copy. Newt makes some calls, the story goes, and Schoomaker writes a new forward, and now it comes out at a paperback with the U. of Chicago Press, which is very cool.
Now I know that everyone’s in love with Cobra II right now, and having perused the book, there are many reasons why one should be: it’s an excellent bit of reporting and military history by two of the best storytellers in the national security business--Michael Gordon the NYT and Mick Trainor. And yeah, it’s amazingly important to do the good deconstructions of what went wrong in Iraq. But as good as Cobra II is, it’s reference, not revelation.
The revelation books right now inside the Army are the one that finally do what Desert Storm never could do: exorcise the ghost of Vietnam, which wasn’t about losing but not fighting the right fight.
That fight is mutating as we speak. Iraqis are fighting the fight more and more, and the insurgents like Zarqawi have taken up the goal of trying to foment a civil war, because if the Americans succeed in making this an intra-Iraqi struggle, the insurgency will lose potency in a struggle between stakeholders and non-stakeholders, or between people who want a share of Iraq’s future and those who simply want Iraq.
The new COIN makes the case, as I was told in Leavenworth by its main handlers, that the victory will be only 20 percent kinetic and 80 percent non-kinetic. This informs everything, this calculation, and it’s backed up completely by supplemental spending since the end of the Cold War, which, once broken down, is about 20% war and about 80% peace (or postwar ops).
So yeah, clear the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, but if the promised aid does not appear, don’t expect the poppies to disappear. Eighty percent non-kinetic.
This article by Jaffe does a great job of describing the doctrinal revolution going on within the Army and Marines. It’s another great version of the story I told in “Monks” on lessons learned, and that Barnes tells in his U.S. News & World Report story on the revamped training centers.
It is a story that needs to be told again and again and again.