Recognizing the inevitables to approach the inconceivables

ANALYSIS: Obama Makes War Gains, By Dan Balz, Washington Post, July 22, 2008; Page A06
ARTICLE: Iraq Points to Pullout in 2010, By Sudarsan Raghavan and Dan Eggen, Washington Post, July 22, 2008; Page A01
The synchronicity here has more to do with Maliki's own conditions than with U.S. -perceived conditions. At some point, the half-life of our occupation is reached (Petraeus' theory all along), and any success from the surge simply accelerates that process.
As it happens, that dynamic is more in line with Obama's desire to redirect on Afghanistan. McCain wants his "victory," problem being, no one in Iraq (or the region) is much inclined to deliver that on terms he/America might find satisfactory (esp. vis-a-vis Iranian influence).
That's why, in my mind, making a diplomatic surge to accompany the troop surge was crucial. If the surge worked (which it did), then we time out for Iraqi domestic political reasons (happening now) and U.S. troop exhaustion reasons (plus now the lure of the redirect to Afghanistan). Both were always inevitable--meaning when, not if.
If the surge didn't work, same problems emerge but with no saved face for us (it may never be perceived as a US "win," but it's now unlikely to ever be perceived as a US "defeat" either--and that, quite frankly, is as good as it gets in this long war). Either way, we're forced to accommodate Iran in the end (something Bush is realizing finally), both on Iraq and its demand for regime security (neither pleasant, but hard to see how we get our way on either, given our strategic tie-down--again, as Bush is coming to realize).
The difference?
If we had made the diplo surge, then presumably fewer US troops needlessly killed in the meantime (Iran's obvious meddling) and we're simultaneously bringing Iran in from cold, working Israel-Palestine a bit better (hard to see it could be any worse/slower than it's been), and looking at a redirect on Afghanistan with Tehran's helpful collusion (they don't want Pashtun control/re-Talibanization either).
Eventually, all these things are going to work out in the manner I favor, the differential being our stubborness (almost non-existent with Obama, substantial with McCain). The questions have always been: 1) how much needless loss of US/NATO troops in meantime; and 2) how much Iran-Israel war risk ensues.
The question of Obama's support/lack thereof re: surge is meaningless, in my mind. We were headed to these decision points (occupation half-life in Iraq, Army-Marine institutional burn-out, accommodating rising Iran, and Afghanistan redirect) anyway, the only meaningful deltas being needless American deaths and military exhaustion (and no, civil strife in Iraq per se was never an important enough strategic measure, because it can always be resurrected at the drop of a hat--like we saw in Lebanon recently, thus U.S. military commanders always speaking of "fragile" gains).
As always, real grand strategy is getting leaders to recognize the inevitables as early as possible so as to approach the "inconceivables" with all appropriate speed.