There will always be a "cause celebre"; take your pick in the Long War

From a David Sanger Week-in-Review piece in the NYT:

When President Obama decided last year to narrow the scope of the nine-year war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he and his aides settled on a formulation that sounded simple: Eviscerate Al Qaeda, but just “degrade” the Taliban, reversing that movement’s momentum.

Now, after the bungled car-bombing attempt in Times Square with suspected links to the Pakistani Taliban, a new, and disturbing, question is being raised in Washington: Have the stepped-up attacks in Pakistan — notably the Predator drone strikes — actually made Americans less safe? Have they had the perverse consequence of driving lesser insurgencies to think of targeting Times Square and American airliners, not just Kabul and Islamabad? In short, are they inspiring more attacks on America than they prevent?

It is a hard question.

At the time of Mr. Obama’s strategy review, the logic seemed straightforward. Only Al Qaeda had the ambitions and reach to leap the ocean and take the war to America’s skies and streets. In contrast, most of the Taliban and other militant groups were regarded as fragmented, regional insurgencies whose goals stuck close to the territory their tribal ancestors have fought over for centuries.

Six months and a few attempted bombings later, including the near-miss in New York last weekend, nothing looks quite that simple. As commanders remind each other, in all wars the enemy gets a vote, too. Increasingly, it looks like these enemies have voted to combine talents, if not forces. Last week, a senior American intelligence official was saying that the many varieties of insurgents now make up a “witches’ brew” of forces, sharing money handlers, communications experts and, most important in recent times, bomb makers.

Yes, each group still has a separate identity and goal, but those fine distinctions seem less relevant than ever.

Whether it's the decision to "take our eyes off the ball" and go into Iraq and put them back and stick it hard to al-Qaeda in Af-Pak, the "cause celebre" issue will always be there, so it's damned if you do and damned if you don't on the pro-active choice.

The alternative is to stay at home and let them find you at their leisure.  That was 9/11.

There is no detaching our ownership of the Long War from our parentage of globalization.  Our enemies will admit no such distancing.

In the category of pretty damn cool: American troops march in Red Square

NYT piece by way of Jeff Jennings.

Basics:

Never before in history have active-duty American troops been invited to march in the Victory Day parade, according to the United States military. The occasion is the 65th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, a date that carries an almost sacred meaning in Russia. Russian leaders have taken pains to explain that the Americans — along with contingents from Britain, France and Poland — were invited as representatives of the “anti-Hitler coalition.”

Not for nothing are they explaining. While more than half of Russians greeted the invitation with approval or enthusiasm, according to an April poll by the independent Levada Center, the sentiment was not universal. In a country that still regards NATO as its primary security threat, 20 percent of respondents said they disapproved and 8 percent were dead set against it. Communist and nationalist leaders have latched onto it as a rallying cry, organizing rallies on the theme, “No NATO boots on Red Square!”

There is ambivalence, even for those in the first category. Most Russians say they believe that the Red Army would have defeated Hitler without any assistance from Western allies, Levada’s research shows. Many say the Allies held back until it was clear which side would win.

You know the old bit:  British minds, U.S. money and Russian blood are what won WWII, so some truth in that suspicion.

Still, nice sign.

The Iranian "Blade Runner"

Gist:

While the world's film community continues to protest the detention of Iranian auteur Jafar Panahi, another helmer from Iran traveled to Italy's recent Cartoons on the Bay festival to unveil a sneak peek of the futuristic "Tehran 2121," billed as the country's first sci-fi feature, live action or animated.

Shot by locally popular animator Bahram Azimi, using a rotoscoping technique but with a "Blade Runner" aesthetic, "Tehran 2121," almost seems intended as Iran's answer to opponents of its hard-line government.

Azimi described the pic as being about "a far-away future in which, despite how much our country will have changed, the morality and the ways of Iranians will remain the same."

"Tehran 2121" producer Mohammad Abolhassani says, "The Islamic Republic is happy to use the tools of culture to spread peace and equality." He called Iran "the top animation nation of the Middle East," citing 200 companies in the country's toon sector. 

Animation is often used in Iran for government campaigns, such as the series of computer-animated adverts that Azimi shot in 2006 to spruce up the image of Iran's police force. 

Seven minutes of the big-budget "Tehran 2121" unspooled at the Italo toon fest. 

Pic revolves around a 160-year-old man, who, deeming his death to be imminent, wants his niece, to come to Tehran so he can pass on his inheritance to her, on condition that she gets married.

During her travels, she encounters three men: a taxi driver, a rock singer and the owner of a robot shop.

This I got to see.

Recent Bret Stephens column cites Bernard Lewis saying he can imagine a future where Turkey is the Islamic republic and Iran is the secular one.

Frankly, just the fact that Iranians can think like this is interesting enough.

Of course, the notion that the Revolutionary Guards will get you to this future is awfully ludicrous, but the Iranian people?  That I could see--post-revolution.

The "what if?" counterfactual on the Times Square bombing

Mohammad al-Corey Feldman, according to Saturday Night Live's "Weekend Update"; a "clean skin" according to AG Eric Holder. 

The bomb-training unit that supposedly prepped Faisal Shahzad was previously targeted by CIA drones, so there's that sense of payback.

The counterfactual to consider:  What happens if a max death count ensues?  Say, maybe a couple hundred bodies?

Well, first off, Obama is mercilessly targeted by the GOP in the usual, turnabout-is-fair-play mode.

Second, the Obama administration is required to make a big show of bombing the hell out of the direct links back in Pakistan.

Third, the US puts on a big show of calling Pakistan on the carpet.

Fourth, the US announces some sort of strategic review of our approach to NW Pakistan.

Fifth, we move according to the decisions of that review, and Pakistan counters with its own charges, moves, and diplomacy--likely to involve the Chinese?

Put the death total at a lot higher (better, bigger bomb and it works) and you just turbocharge that whole process.

But when the event fails, everybody breathes a sigh of relief--especially the Chinese!

And yet, if we move into the many-and-small-attacks world, every once in a while they will be successful, and so we'll need to get used to that, and develop some sense of proportional response that doesn't unduly freak out ourselves, the host nation, or its allies.

Local resilience versus national policing

WSJ story.

Nice image from Times Square, eh?  Pay no attention to those men in the tower!

Gist of piece:

The Times Square bombing attempt has re-energized a debate between spies and domestic-security officials within the Obama administration over how to handle ideologically driven violence in the U.S.

Intelligence officials at the National Counterterrorism Center have pushed for more responsibility over countering domestic radicalization, officials said.

But Homeland Security officials say the plot has strengthened their argument for a broader approach that would train local law-enforcement and citizens to spot early warning signs of any violence.

I have to side with the Homeland people on this one--fewer "czars" and more suspicious peasants!

I'd rather have everyone be a bit more suspicious and vigilant than have more powers vested into federal authorities.

Our best deterrence is exactly an outcome like this--repeated ad nauseum.

The problem is when the ants start marching

When all the little ants are marching / Red and black antennas waving / They all do it the same / They all do it the same way ...

So says Dave Matthews.

The reference here (WSJ story) involves Chinese college graduates who call themselves the "ant tribe" because they can't find post-grad jobs but nonetheless stick around Beijing's outskirts, squeaking out a cheap life while hoping for something to come along.

Term comes from a recent popular book that surveyed such students, one that inspired "both admiration for the young people's striving and indignation at their living conditions."

Sort of sounds like a Chinese "Rent."

This year's class of 2010 hits the job market at 6.3m strong, and more than 100k are expected to take up an ant-like residency on Beijing's margins.  Imagine five guys sharing 130 square feet, or getting by encapsulated in a "capsule" apartment that measures 8 feet by 28 (!) inches.

The popular "song of the ants" is neither Jonathan Larson- or Dave Matthews-like, and yet the punch line resonates well enough:

Though we have nothing, we are tough in spirit

Though we have nothing, we are still dreaming

Though we have nothing, we still have power

I think Bill Clinton created something like 8m jobs across two terms.  The Chinese need to create a noticeably higher figure every year.  The country's total labor supply grows about 25m per year.

The usual SysAdmin shortage: no enough trainers to go around

Pic found here

Per an NYT story, the usual suspect:

The Pentagon, in an official assessment of the Afghan mission released last week and current to the end of March, said that “one of the most significant challenges to the growth and development” of the Afghan security forces was the shortage of trainers.

So the US is forced to surge an additional 850 trainers to go with the 1,500-or-so provided by allies.  This is beyond the 30,000 troops surged previously.

That's a telling stat, is it not?

Amidst movement to crown the Shiite coalition, the Kurds recalculate

The Kurdish leadership, in the person of the regional government's president, is cooperating with the formation of a new government, and yet, per an NYT story . . .

... no one has been more openly aggressive in the jockeying for position than Mr. Barzani, and he is being closely watched because the issues he seeks to influence all have stark ramifications for Iraq’s stability. In particular, his demands for a federalist approach to governing Iraq — a weakened national government and stronger regional control — have revived fears that his Iraqi Kurdistan region may eventually try to secede.

During a recent interview, Mr. Barzani said he was determined to extract upfront commitments from any prospective coalition partners in Baghdad on potentially explosive issues like the settlement of disputed internal borders, including those of the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk, and the sharing of oil revenues.

“It is impossible for us to participate in or back a government that will operate in the same old way,” said Mr. Barzani, speaking at his mountaintop palace overlooking the regional Kurdish capital, Erbil.

With Jalal Talibani's party fading, Barzani seems to have effectively co-opted the rising reform movement known as Gorran, once again yielding a solid Kurdish bloc.

And so Barzani is once again pushing for a plebiscite that would possibly allow the Kurds to form their own independent nation.

One of the crucial Kurdish demands will be a pledge from the next prime minister to carry out Article 140 of the Constitution, a hotly contested passage that outlines the steps toward a plebiscite on the fate of the disputed northern territories, including Kirkuk.

“If Article 140 is not implemented, then this will mean the demise of the Constitution and Iraq itself,” Mr. Barzani warned . . . 

The back and forth over Article 140 is one example of how the Americans have sought to soften the Kurds’ demands while still showing support for their relative autonomy within a larger Iraq.

Mr. Barzani noted that one of the main reason Kurds dropped their opposition to the election law in November was a promise by President Obama that the United States would “push hard” to put in effect Article 140. He said Mr. Obama first made the promise in a telephone call at the time and then reiterated it at a meeting in the Oval Office in January.

The Administration, to the extent it ever did make such promises, has quietly backed off from any appearance of supporting a vote, fearing a Balkans-like conflagration would ensue as the Kurds seek a divorce.

And so the benefits of political integration and economic interdependency are stressed.

As I often argue in the brief, whenever globalization's connectivity is allowed in situations previously denied (by authorities or through sheer difficulty of circumstances), there's always somebody who considers the divorce route, and it's typically the most ambitious and experienced in terms of self-governance.  In Iraq, that's the Kurds, although some Shiite parties have made similar noises.  It's a tricky business for outside forces, because the surest route to keeping the state together is a unitary political structure, but then that makes any ambitious minorities all the more like to agitate against feared dictatorship.  If you encourage federalism, then the alternative problem is that the same minorities will often want to go all the way--so to speak.  So you end up trying to get them to see the downstream advantages of--again--political integration and economic interdependency.

A tricky row to how, as they say.

For a nice overview, see the referenced WPR article by Liam Anderson.

Best chunk:

As it turns out, the issues of federalism and oil and gas are both amenable to compromise in a way that accommodates Kurdish demands without alienating Iraq's Arabs. On the issue of federalism, for example, the problem is not so much the degree of autonomy the constitution grants to the Kurdistan Region, but the fact that this autonomy is not exclusively limited to the Kurdistan Region. At ISCI's insistence, Article 119 allows for governorates, singly or in combination, to form regions that would then enjoy the same level of autonomy as the Kurdistan Region. ISCI's original project for a nine-governorate region in the south now appears dead and buried, but this is no guarantee against the formation of smaller-scale regions in the future. Hence, the constitution contains the potential for the emergence of multiple regions, each of which would have the power to control its own internal security and to manage its own oil and gas fields. In the view of many Iraqi Arabs, this vision of federalism, in which powerful regions are loosely held together by an emasculated central government, is a blueprint for the disintegration of the Iraqi state. 

The oil and gas problem is more complex, but similar in kind. Once again, and despite periodic friction on this issue between Baghdad and Irbil, the real problem is not the Kurds. To begin with, the oil reserves of the Kurdistan Region are dwarfed by those in southern Iraq. And although the constitution allows regions to manage their oil and gas sectors, it requires them to distribute the revenues among the Iraqi people on a proportionate basis. The more serious problem is the possible future emergence of other regions, particularly one centered on Basra. Removing the management of Basra's oil from centralized control would leave almost no role for the federal government in the administration of the oil and gas sector.

Fortunately, the issues of federalism and oil and gas can be addressed as a package. The optimum vehicle for this is a separate autonomy agreement for the Kurds. The problem with Iraq's constitution is that it fails to treat the Kurdistan Region as sui generis.

Sounds fixable, allright.

What history predicts regarding a revalued yuan

"Economics focus" column from The Economist.

Story is an old one:  US in the 1920s, West Germany in the late 1960s, Japan in the early 1970s, Asian tigers in late 1990s, and China today.

The description:

A big export-oriented economy is booming but its trading partners are livid. Year after year, they point out, it runs large current-account surpluses. The country regards itself as an export powerhouse whose goods are prized abroad. Others castigate it for mercantilism. Some argue that it subsidises its exports unfairly by giving exporters credit at cheap rates and by keeping its currency artificially undervalued. Pressure builds on the country to revalue its currency and boost domestic consumption, which makes up an unusually small share of its GDP.

Nor is the size of China's surplus unprecedented:  both Germany and Japan owned one-fifth of the world's export surplus in their day, just like China now.

All ended up revaluing their currencies, and as the charts show, China has little to fear by doing so:

The contribution of net exports to GDP will fall slightly, but growth not impacted much at all--in either direction.  The slack was picked up by private consumption and investment.

The fly in the ointment:  better to have pursued a monetary stimulus than just revaluing the currency.  If you only do the latter, then every 10% in appreciation takes a GDP growth point off.  When Taiwan and South Korea did the same, they proceeded to liberalize their financial markets--meaning China should continue to do the same now.

Classic example of connectivity driving code: you connect to globalization to enrich yourself, and you end up having to conform your internal rules to those of the global economy--or you get burned.

The best sort of rebalancing

Japan Times story (by way of WPR Media Roundup) on recent global polling re: attitudes toward great powers:

Despite widespread talk of a rising China and an America in decline, the latest BBC World Service poll shows not just strong residual American soft power but actually an increase. At the same time, the data depict a China whose influence is viewed as more negative than positive in an increasing number of countries.

Old truth: when your popularity is high, it's got nowhere to go but down, and vice versa.

More tactical reality:  every day China gets perceived by more of the world as globalization's great purveyor/integrator/action-force.

And with that burgeoning reputation will come a lot of negative feeling--especially so long as China remains a single-party state.  Eventually, the CCP will have to kill the dictatorship to save itself.  Why?  It'll need the capacity to swap out leadership in response to dramatic failure.

And yeah, those failures will come, as will the global blame.

More polling details:

In 2005, 49 percent of people thought that China's influence was mostly positive, 11 points higher than that of the U.S. However, China's numbers have fallen, reaching 34 percent this year, trailing the U.S. by 6 points.

As China's political, economic and military power have grown, global attention has focused on its influence and activities in Asia.

Public sentiment in the region is shifting dramatically. Japan has for many years had a strained relationship with China. While 59 percent of Japanese had a negative view of China in 2009, this number has now fallen dramatically to 38 percent . . . 

But Indians are moving in the other direction. In 2009, Indians leaned toward a positive view of China, 30 percent versus 24 percent, with many declining to state a view. Now, there are more Indians who view China negatively, 38 percent versus 30 percent who have a positive view.

South Koreans are going even further than Indians, with 61 percent viewing China negatively, compared to 50 percent in 2008.

Elsewhere in Asia, Indonesians view China less negatively than before, with 43 percent holding a positive view and 29 percent negative, compared to 37 percent negative previously. And in the Philippines, sentiment has shifted sharply, from 52 percent negative in 2009 to 55 percent positive today.

Why a souring of perceptions in South Korea and India while none in the others?  SK and India see themselves as similarly rising powers, something that Indonesia and the Philippines don't yet do and something Japan has passed on.

I do not see 3D, in its current form, sweeping the TV landscape

Roger Ebert railing against 3D in Newsweek, and I will confess to agreeing with a lot of it.

The biggest gripe for me remains the murkiness of the image ("Have you noticed that 3-D seems a little dim?") and the tunnel vision it creates.  I actually liked "Avatar" better in my home theater (high-def projector) because there was so much more to see.  In the IMAX experience, which I liked plenty, you really find yourself staring at the actors in motion, with the background almost too much to take in.

I'm not arguing against 3-D per se, as I love the immersive quality, but I don't yet see the technology moving beyond the epic-picture requirement, and I really don't see my family donning glasses to watch regular TV.  Now, football (and sports in general)?  Yeah, I could see that, but again, we're talking the epic nature of the subject matter and a willingness on the part of the audience to totally commit to that viewing experience.

Ebert's larger point is that movies fear the Internet and other new challengers (e.g., role-playing games), and whenever Hollywood gets scared, it turns to technology to spice things up (think back to the 50s and the threat of TV).

I will admit that the lure works:  the vast majority of movies I've seen recently have been in Imax and 3D, otherwise I'm usually willing to wait til the DVD. And the kind of movies they're putting into IMAX are the sort that have big global appeal (the blockbuster trend that Hollywood chases right now more than ever), but there are still a ton of movies out there that would not benefit whatsoever from this technology, where it will be--in Ebert's words--a "distraction" from the storytelling, characters, etc. 

And as for TV, there's just little on it that justified the personal commitment to donning the glasses, sitting just so, and tuning out all other stimuli and actions.  With DVRs and series being seen more on DVD than live in some instances, I just don't see that breakthrough happening any time soon--except in the sense of the dedicated home theater, the committed participation by the audience and the right sort of material--all of which are limited to the epic subject matter.

For 3D to work for me as a routine participation in the home, it would have to escape the requirement for glasses and become more like the floating images that Tony Stark (Iron Man) plays and/or works with in his high-tech office.

The G20 can play global executive, but it needs to delegate rule-setting

Good piece by Daniel McDowell at World Politics Review that highlights the natural limits of G20 leadership

When the finance ministers of the G-20 nations met on the sidelines of the annual IMF-World Bank meetings in Washington last weekend, it marked the sixth time they had convened since the fall of 2008. When the G-20 leaders meet this summer in Toronto, the total number of summits held since the global financial crisis erupted will hit double digits. 

And yet, despite early cooperation that addressed the global liquidity shortfall, little substantial progress has been made in the area of international financial regulation. Given the trauma that the entire world economy has suffered, in part due to a lack of such regulation, one would think more headway would have been made by now. A closer look, however, reveals a litany of factors that has created conditions making coordination points incredibly difficult to locate and even trickier to maintain. 

Much like my A-to-Z-Rule-Set-On-Processing-Politically-Bankrupt-States, there's a place for executive level decision-making and another for determining the implementing the new rules.  So, to me, it's logical for the IMF to step up and assist in this manner.  Not a loss or gain of power, but a logical separation.

That's essentially McDowell's excellent advice:

What's needed is an institution with a clear mandate for monitoring and enforcing any agreements reached by the G-20. But creating such an institution from scratch is unlikely given the current distribution of power. The last time major economic institutions were created, the United States had emerged from World War II as a global leader with unparalleled power. Washington led the world in building the Bretton Woods system and was largely able to impose its preferences on weaker powers when there were disagreements. Simply put, coordination is easier when the balance of power so dramatically favors one state. 

Today, conditions are obviously less favorable. While the U.S. remains the pre-eminent economic power, its relative dominance has diminished. And when it comes to the issue of financial regulation, America is sorely lacking in leadership credentials given its starring role in the current crisis. 

Yet, if the prospects for building a new regulatory architecture appear weak, the G-20 could consider widening the mandate of the IMF to include monitoring and enforcement of any regulatory agreements.

The fund has already rebounded over the past two years from near-irrelevance to play a central role in responding to the crisis, including as an important voice on the issue of regulation. Its monitoring capabilities are unparalleled. Lastly, it's available -- and would likely accept the job. 

Agree.

Women in the kingdom: at least the debate is picking up steam

Piece in The Economist is the latest in a recent string of MSM articles about things opening up--ever so slightly--in the Saudi kingdom with the blessing of 85-year-old Abdullah, who is living up to expectations of being a consistent-if-gentle reformer.

Story leads with the apparent survival-in-his-job of Ahmed al-Ghamdi, head of the Mecca vice squad.  He recently came out for the innocent mixing of sexes, a notion that elicited many calls for him to be sacked.  In late April he was, only to have the official state news agency story rescinded two hours later.  So he remains in his post and the debate continues, apparently with some shielding from above.

The telling stat:  60% of college students are women.  For now they're a small bit of the workforce, but it grows with time.  Iran has this "problem" in a much worse fashion.

It's an old story:  educate a man and you've got yourself a productive head of household, but educate a woman and you're got yourself a transformed household.

The Saudi household is being transformed.  The government can pave the way for what must come next, or try to bar the door.  Abdullah sees that but will only rule for X many years longer, thus the great importance of who comes next.

Corruption as a business affair

Schumpeter column in The Economist on business corruption in the world, which is naturally worse in New Core countries like China and worst in Gap countries.

Recent World Bank study says that those who succumb typically end up spending more times negotiating with partners and bureaucrats, so the "efficient grease" theory doesn't hold.

Worse, it is corrupting for all involved.  Many businesspeople compare it to an illicit affair or cheating on their spouses:  once you start the lying, it takes over, especially since once you get the rep, they bribe-demanders just keep on coming.  Pretty soon you are "trapped in a world of secrecy and guilt."

But if you avoid such stuff:

Texaco, an oil giant now subsumed by Chevron, has such an incorruptible reputation that African border guards were said to wave its jeeps through without engaging the ritual shakedown.

So if you don't want to suffer corruption, present yourself as incorruptible.

America used to feel like the Lone Ranger on this one, with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  Legend had it that our businesspeople were disadvantaged.  But 38 countries have now signed the OECD's 1997 anti-corruption convention.

A long-term evolution, no doubt, but moving in the right direction.

One more go-around with Bremmer on "The End of the Free Market"

Ian comes back (on "The Call") with one more go in the conversation:

Today, a few final words from me on Tom Barnett’s thoughtful response to my book. Tom has argued that the state capitalist phenomenon is not as “unprecedented” as I think it is. He notes that “It’s not like OPEC’s national oil companies or China’s state-owned/-dominated enterprises came out of nowhere—they’ve been there all along.” He’s right about that, of course. OPEC was generating international headlines in the early 1970s. Sovereign wealth funds began appearing in the 1950s. China has had state-owned companies for decades.

In my opinion, the difference is not in the institutions but in their importance for international politics and the global economy. Until the end of the Cold War two decades ago, the isolation of the communist world imposed sharp limits on the global economy’s production capacity, but economic trends within it had little negative impact west of the iron curtain. Today, we’re wired together as never before.

The global economy will depend heavily on China for future growth for years to come. China’s growth has been dependent on exports to its largest trading partners: the European Union, the United States, and Japan. Though China has rebounded strongly from the global slowdown, thanks mainly to a massive state-directed spending spree, the Western financial crisis threw millions of Chinese out of work for some time. Greece’s vulnerability has threatened the cohesion of the entire eurozone.

And we now live in a world in which state-owned companies (which answer to political officials rather than shareholders) own more than three-quarters of the world’s crude oil reserves. With strong economic growth among emerging markets, global demand for oil is on a sharp upward trajectory. That means that state capitalist oil and gas exporters have much more direct impact on our standards of living than at any time in the past. And multinational companies are competing with Chinese state-owned giants armed with political and material support from Beijing in parts of the world where Chinese companies have only recently begun to compete.

State capitalism isn’t new, but it has never been so directly important for how the rest of us live. Throw in historic levels of market turbulence and long-term debt issues in America, Europe and Japan, and I think that we now find ourselves in an extraordinary transitional moment in the history of the global economy.

Reply:  Here's where Ian's argument serves its most useful purpose.  The real threat from state capitalism isthat political self-preservation stands in the way of the technological and market innovation required to meet the resource requirements of this emerging global middle class.  A Chinese economy that underperforms in its shift from extensive to intensive growth is bad news for everybody on the planet, but especially for the average Chinese.  In the end, that's what'll drive the political system to open up:  the fear of underperformance.  So, in the end, it's not about the perceived "superiority" of state capitalism, which neither Ian nor I believe in (or peddle).  Rather, it's about how long the Chinese "Communist" Party can maintain the illusion that the best route forward for the society is an economy that can be more pervasively commanded by the government (prioritizing stability) versus one that's truly liberated and fueled by the innovation of the Chinese people (prioritizing higher growth but accepting more churn).  For now, the balance sits on the side of stability, given all the change churning its way through China right now.  That won't end soon--but soon enough (e.g., the 6th generation of leadership that comes online in 2022 is the one to watch).

I'm betting the greed of the Chinese people for a better life and more wealth will overwhelm the greed of the CCP to maintain a single-party state.  So no idealism on my part:  I simply like the numbers.

Again, Ian's book, on sale today, is called "The End of Free Markets."

Gates stands firm on Navy's self-inflicted budget woes

Dreazen WSJ story.

Gates was fairly explicit in a recent speech about the Navy's continuing penchant for multibillion-dollar platforms being the real cause of its declining numbers, making clear (as Dreazen writes) that "he thought the Navy was buying too many big-ticket items, such as aircraft carriers, while failing to devote enough resources to unmanned submarines and other relatively inexpensive systems."

The Leviathan prefers the few and the expensive, but the SysAdmin demands the many and the cheap.

The numbers stagger:  $3-6B for a destroyer, $7B for a top-line sub, and $11B for a carrier.

Gates:

You don't necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s.

Naturally, Gates is accused by industry cheerleaders as "utterly misreading the strategic landscape."

My argument remains the same:  Buy fewer of the biggest platforms but keep the technology advanced and intimidating, accepting that the per-unit cost will suck.  But you will inevitably shift toward the many and cheap and the unmanned if you want to keep playing worldwide.  Violence has migrated downward from the system to states and now primarily to individuals.  So yes, keep a decent hedge against any possible resumption of system-level warfare, but do not pretend that's enough to manage the system.

Nobody forces the Navy to shrink its numbers except the Navy itself.

Pass me that hamburger, and my cousin's phone number!

NYT story about how globalization is changing diets in the Persian Gulf and how Qataris' tendency toward tradition (marrying cousins) combine to render the population unusually unhealthy--as in, too heavy, too much diabetes, and too many genetic issues.

Like other oil-rich nations, Qatar has leaped across decades of development in a short time, leaving behind the physically demanding life of the desert for air-conditioned comfort, servants and fast food.

While embracing modern conveniences, however, Qataris have also struggled to protect their cultural identity from the forces of globalization. For many here, that has included continuing the practice of marrying within families, even when it predictably produces genetic disorders, like blindness and various mental disabilities.

“It’s really hard to break traditions,” said Dr. Hatem El-Shanti, a pediatrician and clinical geneticist who runs a genetics testing center in Doha, the capital. “It’s a tradition carried from one generation to the next.”

Qataris live in a nation no larger than the state of Connecticut where they are a minority among the more than a million foreign workers lured here for jobs. But their problems are not unique.

Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia all share similar struggles with obesity, diabetes and genetic disorders, each suffering the side effects of an oil-financed lifestyle and a desire to hold on to traditions.

Yet, even in this neighborhood, Qatar stands out.

You know the old Godfather bit about, "Leave the gun, take the canoli"?

When globalization comes to you town, my advice is, "Forget your cousin, take the spinach salad."

But tradition is a hard habit to break:

For all of these challenges, and for all of its wealth, Qatar has primarily focused on the treatment of diseases rather than on prevention.

Everyone here points to lifestyle and tradition to explain the nation’s health crises. While it was once taboo to talk about the problems involved with marrying relatives, they are now talked about openly. There have been some discussions about premarital genetic screening, or genetic testing done at birth. But the tradition is so strong, no one has raised the prospect of curbing it.

“You can’t tackle the issue,” said Moza al-Malki, a family therapist and writer. “There are some big families, clans, they don’t marry outside the family. They won’t allow it.”

The issue of obesity seems to run into the same wall of tradition, health experts here said.

“If you don’t eat, it’s considered a shame, and if you leave someone’s home without eating it’s a shame,” said Abdulla al-Naimi, 25, who refers to himself as “chubby” but is noticeably overweight. “Half of my family has diabetes,” Mr. Naimi said. “My mother has diabetes. Three cousins younger than me have diabetes. For me, I eat too much and I don’t exercise.”

He is also married to his first cousin.

 Everywhere I have traveled in this world, I find the same attitudes:

1. Everyone says their culture is based on food; and
2. Everyone says everybody else's culture is more sex-obsessed than their own.

The inter-marrying thing is tough.  It pretty much has to change from within--as in, grandmas getting too unhappy about their damaged progeny.

On the food front, though, I'd love to America led a positive redefinition.  We need it desperately for ourselves, and we should make money spreading to the world.

First offshore wind farm approved by Fed

Found here

WAPO story:

Ending a nearly decade-long political battle over installing wind turbines in the waters just off Cape Cod, the federal government approved the first offshore wind farm in the United States on Wednesday, a move that could pave the way for significant offshore wind development elsewhere in the nation.

In approving the Cape Wind project, a group of 130 modern windmills in Nantucket Sound that would start generating electricity by the end of 2012, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said he would "strike the right balance" between energy development and protecting the area. Some opponents of the project said it would endanger the habitat for seabirds; others decried the visual impact of the turbines, as close as five miles from shore.

Cape Wind President Jim Gordon said the "tragedy" of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico underscores the problems with traditional energy development.

"It gives the nation pause to reflect on, really, what are our energy choices, and how are we going to live with them?" Gordon told reporters. "Every energy project has some impact. This was never about a choice between Cape Wind or nothing."

Shows you how anybody can cite the Gulf oil spill in their favor.

Of course, the either-or nature of most debates makes little sense.  My argument:  go alternative wherever you can, as every bit helps.

Personally, I love driving by all the windfarms in NW Indiana on my way to Chicago.  I think they're quite beautiful.  They also make me feel like I've actually arrived in a future I imagined as a kid.  And having lived right along the coast in question for many years, I wouldn't have any problem seeing them go in there either.  In fact, I think it would cool as hell to take a boat out there and check them out up close.

NIMBYs will always fight such things, but if you want to lead on such technology, you actually have to employ it.  Unless we want to cede the entire offshore windfarm industry and its technology, we've got to play in this way.

ElBaradei is all but running to replace Mubarak--with something else

Pic found here

A National story by way of WPR's media roundup.

ElBaradei's impact as a spokesman for democracy in Egypt seems to be galvanizing segments of the population, some even toward regular protests (a recent Tweet of mine).

Whether he has the ambition or not, and I think he does, one can imagine that he will be forced by his own success--eventually--to press for the presidency himself (technically, he does not currently meet the requirements for office, but . . .), probably against the son once the old man dies (his 82nd birthday was just spent in suspicious seclusion).

A serious democracy in Egypt, coming on the heels of one developing in Iraq?  That would be a major positive turning point.

So this is one to track--and for the US to support quietly.

The Russia-Ukraine Sevastopol deal, without hyperbole

Nice piece by Richard Weitz at WPR.  Totally lacking in the usual hyperbole.

Some highlights:

Despite the controversy the agreement has provoked in Ukraine, where commentators have debated its constitutionality and economic costs, Western governments have not paid much public attention to the deal. This silence partly reflects a desire not to antagonize the new Ukrainian government or contest Ukrainians' right to determine their foreign policies without outside interference. But it also is due to the perception that the lease extension will not appreciably change the balance of power in the Black Sea region.

During the August 2008 Georgia War, vessels from Russia's Black Sea fleet, based at Sevastopol, deployed along the coast of Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia in a belated effort to support Russian military operations. They did not materially affect the course of the war. When NATO ships entered the Black Sea following the conflict to provide humanitarian assistance to the Georgian government, Russian officials accused NATO of covertly re-arming Georgia. Adm. Eduard Baltin, former commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, boasted that the Russian Navy could destroy the NATO naval contingent within 20 minutes. But despite the bellicose rhetoric, no such attack occurred, and the Western ships soon departed.

Russia's dominance of the Black Sea is due less to its maritime might than to the Montreux Convention, which severely constrains the presence of extra-regional navies in the Black Sea. Turkey has been very careful to apply these limitations to NATO warships so as not to antagonize Moscow or risk losing the unique privileges that the convention grants Turkey as owner of the Bosporus Straits . . . 

Most importantly, Moscow demonstrated in 2008 that, even with minimal naval and air support, Russian ground forces can overwhelm Georgia's defenses . . .  

At an April 22 news conference in Estonia, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that Ukraine's decision to extend the lease would not harm its prospect of eventually joining the alliance . . .

On the one hand, Yanukovich had already made clear well before the base deal that he has no intention of joining NATO . . . 

On the other, while the gas subsidies will take effect now, a future Ukrainian government could annul the lease extension before 2017, when the current lease expires. Even after that date, a new government might try to revoke the extension by deeming it unconstitutional or citing other reasons . . 

Furthermore, the Sevastopol energy-for-base arrangement is unlikely to serve as a precedent for similar deals elsewhere. Notwithstanding invitations from Venezuela and other friendly governments to establish bases on their territory, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described the Ukrainian package as a unique offer designed to restore good relations between two neighboring countries. "We have no need to build military bases around the world," Putin said. "I would ask our [energy] partners not to approach us with similar requests. The Crimea is a special case."

Well put, Richard.