What history predicts regarding a revalued yuan

"Economics focus" column from The Economist.

Story is an old one:  US in the 1920s, West Germany in the late 1960s, Japan in the early 1970s, Asian tigers in late 1990s, and China today.

The description:

A big export-oriented economy is booming but its trading partners are livid. Year after year, they point out, it runs large current-account surpluses. The country regards itself as an export powerhouse whose goods are prized abroad. Others castigate it for mercantilism. Some argue that it subsidises its exports unfairly by giving exporters credit at cheap rates and by keeping its currency artificially undervalued. Pressure builds on the country to revalue its currency and boost domestic consumption, which makes up an unusually small share of its GDP.

Nor is the size of China's surplus unprecedented:  both Germany and Japan owned one-fifth of the world's export surplus in their day, just like China now.

All ended up revaluing their currencies, and as the charts show, China has little to fear by doing so:

The contribution of net exports to GDP will fall slightly, but growth not impacted much at all--in either direction.  The slack was picked up by private consumption and investment.

The fly in the ointment:  better to have pursued a monetary stimulus than just revaluing the currency.  If you only do the latter, then every 10% in appreciation takes a GDP growth point off.  When Taiwan and South Korea did the same, they proceeded to liberalize their financial markets--meaning China should continue to do the same now.

Classic example of connectivity driving code: you connect to globalization to enrich yourself, and you end up having to conform your internal rules to those of the global economy--or you get burned.