
WSJ hears one thing from administration official, whereas the NYT heard something radically different--and still reads it as of Tuesday night--on Obama's "new" nuclear policy
ARTICLE: "U.S. Keeps First-Strike Strategy: Obama Narrows the Range of Possible Targets in New National Nuclear-Weapons Policy," by Jonathan Weisman and Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal, 6 April 2010.ARTICLE: "Obama's New Nuclear Strategy Is Intended as a Message to Iran and North Korea," by David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, New York Times, 6 April 2010.
By DAVID E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER
So I read the first Sanger-and-Baker piece in the NYT this ayem, get all pissed, write my post, and narrowly miss getting interviewed by a national magazine correspondent on the subject.
And I'm glad I guess it didn't happen--at least until this becomes more clear (as in, I read the actual document), because I go to bed tonight and read my hard-copy WSJ and there it sits--this article that seems to contradict the entire Sanger analysis.
But here's the trick: the WSJ piece doesn't mention any talk with Obama and instead just previews the report according to the anon admin official, whereas Sanger's piece had the words basically coming out of the President's mouth.
And again, the two pieces come about as close to making diametrically opposed interpretations as you can get, to wit:
Weisman and Spiegel:
. . . makes only modest changes to U.S. nuclear forces, leaving intact the longstanding threat to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear nations.
But Sanger and Baker say:
For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons or launched a crippling cyberattack.
So how can Sanger and Baker see a sharp departure and Bruce Blair say that the new policy is virtually identical to the old one?
Alas, the danger of the too rapid response post . . ..
So I'm not sure if I stand corrected or just sit confused at this point.
I will still write next week's column on the subject. I'm just glad I've got a few days to watch the huge-change-versus-no-change competing analyses unfold a bit.
Especially since, when I check the NYT site Tuesday night late, I see the Sanger-and-Shanker piece that makes the same damn argument again:
Mr. Obama's new strategy makes just about every nonnuclear state immune from any threat of nuclear retaliation by the United States . . . Nonnuclear states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would not be threatened with nuclear retaliation by the United States -- even if they conducted conventional, biological or cyber attacks.
And now I'm back to feeling like Obama's being too cute by half: we're saying to the world that nuclear retaliation is something we reserve the right to use on states that reach for nukes (the special exceptions of NorKo and Iran)? But if you don't reach for them, you can pretty much do anything short of that and feel safe?
Now I do feel like I get it to the point where both the NYT and Bruce Blair are correct: this is a radically inane change.
And here's where it gets truly odd, in my mind:
Mr. Obama, asked on Monday whether that episode harmed American credibility, said, "I don't think countries around the world are interested in testing our credibility when it comes to these issues.
"The message we're sending here," he said, was that countries that "actively pursue a proliferation agenda" would not be immune from any form of American retaliation, including nuclear.
The reality is more complex. If a backpack nuclear bomb went off in Times Square or on the Mall in Washington, the Pentagon and the Department of Energy would race to find the nuclear DNA of the weapon -- so that the country that was the source of the material could be punished. But the science of "nuclear attribution" is still sketchy. And without certain attribution, it is hard to seriously threaten retaliation.
Again, I don't see how this logic is an improvement: we're now willing to say--for all practical purposes--that nuclear attribution is sketchy, but we want to be crystal clear on what it takes to earn a U.S. retaliatory strike, declaring that cyber and biological and chemical attacks on the U.S. would elicit only a "devastating" conventional response?
Doesn't that sound like we transferring the decision-making freedom to others while narrowing our own choices?
So how does that exactly empower us while disempowering our enemies?
My sense for now: this too-clever bit comes under intense criticism and the counter-equivocating from the administration basically negates the original goal behind the so-called sharp departure.
But I'm still wracking my brain trying to figure out what audience is supposed to be satisfied or deeply moved by this change? I can't see how NorKo or Iran are impressed, nor China. Maybe the Europeans--in a completely useless achievement, but that's about it.
Somebody please enlighten me on the hidden brilliance here, because the more analysis I read, the more I find to dislike. And reading through the actual document tonight, I do find I'm more with Sanger's analysis than Blair's.
But--again--I'll try to think this through more fully before pursuing it any further on the blog. Indeed, I will try
For those interested, get the report here.