
WORLD NEWS: "China reprimanded by G20 leaders: Exchange rate cited in economic rebuke; Frustrations vented over slow progress," by Chris Giles and Alan Beattie, Financial Times, 31 March 2010.COMMENT: "Blaming China will not solve America's problem," by Stephen Roach, Financial Times, 30 March 2010.
WORLD NEWS: "Internal debate fails to alter official view: China shows little sign of softening its stance amid calls to let the renminbi appreciate," by Geoff Dyer, Financial Times, 25 March 2010.
BUSINESS DAY: "Chinese Leaders Divided on Whether to Let Currency Rise," by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, 26 March 2010.
OPINION: "U.S.-China Trade Is Win-Win Game," by Zhong Shan, Wall Street Journal, 26 March 2010.
WORLD NEWS: "Rare China Deficit Could Back Currency Plan," by Andrew Batson and Terence Poon, Wall Street Journal, 24 March 2010.
The correction regarding this recent storm of official anger in the Sino-American strategic relationship proceeds rather smoothly, in my mind.
Hu agreed to attend Obama's proliferation summit, and that timing suggests Treasury's decision to skip (or at least greatly delay) the unproductive step of naming China a currency manipulator was a quid pro quo, signaling that China will allow just that much more sanctioning of Iran to unfold--as meaningless as that effort will prove to be (especially if it's now Russia's turn to hold that line), and that it has already privately indicated to the U.S. that it will de-peg the yuan fairly soon and allow some measure of appreciation.
So clearly, and in its own way, China is responding to the growing friction its recent bout of perceived arrogance and intransigence created, but the real driver is the sense of a tipping point being reached in the domestic economy. In the grand scheme of things, the recent friction--as I said on the BBC last week--was no big whup. China just needed to realize that eventually enough of the G-20 would otherwise start ganging up on it, so Beijing's leadership convinced themselves that the domestic economic situation was providing them with sufficient signals to make the move anyway, so why not relieve the building pressure?
And frankly (Roach's point), it was better for such signaling to come from the G20 than just from the U.S. America's trade deficit issue is global and hardly China-centric (only 39% of our trade deficit sits with China, and let's remember how much of that is final-assembly trade, meaning it just summarizes our larger, wider trade deficit with the world--as in, with over 90 other countries!).
To Roach, a bilat solution here would have been deckchair-rearranging, plus it gets you unreasonable anger from the Chinese on the loss-of-face issue.
Better to keep the show multilateral, because remember, this allegedly "all-controlling" leadership in Beijing fears its public far more than the West, and with the generation change-over less than two years away, we're in full campaign swing over there, just like we're warming up over here, so posturing of all sorts is inevitable. Everyone must be seen as standing up for "Unhappy China," so the sense of a domestic trigger needed to appear for the appropriate face to be perceptibly maintained (a domestic consumption issue--politically speaking). Thus the crucial nature of China reporting its first monthly trade deficit in six years (to be reported 10 April--i.e., today).
The big change signalled? The rise of Chinese domestic demand.
Wen Jiabao's verdict?
To be honest with you, I am pretty happy about this development.
So you see, just as the issue reaching the apparent boiling point, the natural correcting resolution appeared. Thus the recent signaling from Beijing that the yuan pegging will soon end.
FYI: Zhong's point is that when you add in services and investment to the trading of goods, the balance of resource flows between China and America are far more balanced than realized.