Kissinger's prescription on Afghanistan

Kissinger in WAPO a while back.  [Sorry, but recent travels have made it hard for me to work my inbox.]

For regular readers of the blog, many of whom sent me the piece, there is plenty of familiar logic.

The core arguments (underlined for emphasis by me):

Afghan strategy needs to be modified in four ways. The military effort should be conducted substantially on a provincial basis rather than in pursuit of a Western-style central government. The time scale for a political effort exceeds by a wide margin that available for military operations. We need a regional diplomatic framework for the next stage of Afghan strategy, whatever the military outcome. Artificial deadlines should be abandoned.

A regional diplomacy is desirable because our interests coincide substantially with those of many of the regional powers. All of them, from a strategic perspective, are more threatened than is the United States by an Afghanistan hospitable to terrorism. China in Sinkiang, Russia in its southern regions, India with respect to its Muslim minority of 160 million, Pakistan as to its political structure, and the smaller states in the region would face a major threat from an Afghanistan encouraging, or even tolerating, centers of terrorism. Regional diplomacy becomes all the more necessary to forestall a neocolonial struggle if reports about the prevalence of natural resources in Afghanistan prove accurate.

Afghanistan becomes an international issue whenever an outside power seeks to achieve unilateral dominance. Inevitably, this draws in other parties to establish a countervailing influence, driving events beyond rational calculation. A regional diplomacy should seek to establish a framework to insulate Afghanistan from the storms raging around it rather than allow the country to serve as their epicenter. It would also try to build Afghanistan into a regional development plan, perhaps encouraged by the Afghan economy's reported growth rate of 15 percent last year.

Military operations could be sustained and legitimized by such diplomacy. In evaluating our options, we must remember that every course will be difficult and that whatever strategy we pursue should be a nonpartisan undertaking. Above all, we need to do justice to all those who have sacrificed in the region, particularly the long-suffering Afghan people.

Nothing to add, except that I see little of this logic from Team Obama to date, although Petraeus gives every indication that he thinks along these lines.

Hitchens's "coalition of the digging" for Afghanistan

Slate piece by Christopher Hitchens by way of Our Man in Kabul.

I like the underlying logic:

This is at least a trillion-dollar national-resource treasure in a country that so far has had a GDP with scarcely any pulse. The governments of NATO—which include countries with vast experience in mining, from Germany to Canada and from Britain to the United States—have had almost no real work to do on the economic front except to distribute aid, itself often a cause of resentment, and waste time trying to "interdict" Afghanistan's only other existing resource, which is opium. Is it conceivable that such an alliance of earth-moving and digging powers could not at last find something genuinely constructive to do in a country where they already have a U.N. mandate for rebuilding and reconstruction? It is true that the Afghan parliament and government have no tradition of oversight, but the parliaments and press and NGOs of the alliance can be pushed to ensure that this is not a mere gouging exercise of the sort in which China likes to engage and that the Afghan people are the main beneficiaries. It seems too good an opportunity to pass up. It also seems like an opportunity far too important to be left in the tender hands of the Taliban.

Hitchens is awfully harsh on China's extractive industries inside the Gap, but his heart is in the right place. Left with little competition, China will do whatever it takes to get the resources out as cheaply as possible, justifying its greed on the basis of those hundreds of millions of impoverished rural folk back home who need a better life (or else!).

So he's basically saying, offer the competition, and use Afghanistan as an incubator of better approaches.

Me, I like this idea plenty, especially Hitchens' tendency to side with India. But I don't want Afghanistan to become an exercise in keeping the Chinese out, but instead make it one of bringing them in under better circumstances, with stronger outcomes.

And, as I've argued here in the past, I agree with the notion of seeing the minerals as a way to speed up regional economic integration as the ultimate means of creating stability vice a Taliban-focused COIN that I believe plays into the enemy's strengths.

Bringing Russian helos into the Af-Pak mix: a great move

pic here

WAPO story on US buying Russian helos to form the core of Afghan's military force structure in rotary aircraft.

In a turnabout from the Cold War, when the CIA gave Stinger missiles to Afghan rebels to shoot down Soviet helicopters, the Pentagon has spent $648 million to buy or refurbish 31 Russian Mi-17 transport helicopters for the Afghan National Army Air Corps. The Defense Department is seeking to buy 10 more of the Mi-17s next year, and had planned to buy dozens more over the next decade.

Congress pissed because it wants only US firms to provide, but I like us getting the Russians involved. The only way we win in Afghanistan is to get the entire neighborhood involved and incentivized economically.

Chart of the day: the surge in capital flight outta Afghanistan

WSJ story.  Not a pretty sight.  

More than $3b "openly flown out of Kabul International Airport in the past three years."  Our gov suspects our aid is simply being diverted by Afghan officials.  Duh!  Who else is getting their hands so quickly on $3B USD during the surge?

My God, they take the stuff out in pallets!  Since it's declared it's considered legal, but you have to wonder how the USG can't track, by frickin' serial number or something, its own aid money.  Ditto for NATO's money, which spent about $14B in Afghanistan last year alone.

Of course, some of this is opium money, but you know the bulk is simply corruption.

This is how well we track our SysAdmin spending almost a decade in.

A connectivity strategy based on infrastructure, transit, IT? Some crazy stuff, my friends.

I've been using this slide for two years in the brief, and made the argument in "Great Powers."

Similar minds reaching similar conclusions:  Central Asia hands at Johns Hopkins, as cited by David Ignatius in a recent WAPO column, sent on to me by Our Man in Kabul.

See if this sounds familiar:  a regionalization strategy that emphasizes economic connectivity over kinetics.

From Ignatius:

The most useful analysis I've seen recently is "The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy." It was prepared by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It also had major input from the U.S. Central Command, which oversees the war.

The Silk Road study tries to visualize the kind of Afghanistan that might exist after U.S. troops begin coming home in July 2011. Instead of being a lawless frontier, this post-conflict Afghanistan would be a transit route for Eurasia, providing trade corridors north and south, east and west.

To make this transport-led strategy work, Afghanistan would need to build more roads, railways and pipelines. A hypothetical railway map shows routes that connect Iran with India, Russia with Pakistan, China with the Arabian Sea. It knits together the rising powers of this region and makes Afghanistan a hub rather than a barrier.

I first heard discussion of this modern Silk Road idea from Ashraf Ghani, a former Afghan finance minister. He made a powerful analogy to America's own development: What secured our lawless Wild West frontier was the transcontinental railroad in 1869. With trade and economic growth came stability.

Comparing nation-building in Afghanistan to the settling of the American West?  Who comes up with such crazy stuff!

You know, when I first started briefing that Wild West stuff about five years ago, people just shook their heads like it was nonsense to compare the integration of the United States to the integration of globalization.  

Now it's the smartest analysis seen in a while by someone as astute at Ignatius.

I love the report from Johns Hopkins, which comes with a dedicating quote from Petraeus.  

I mean, check this out from the table of contents:

III. What the United States Should Do Now: An Initiative to Reconnect Afghanistan with East and West .............................................................................. 32 

Promoting Afghanistan‘s Role in Road Transit and Trade ........................ 33 

Connecting Afghanistan by Rail ................................................................... 37 

Connecting Afghanistan through Information Technology ..................... 40 

Reconnect east and west, promote road transit and trade, connect by rail, connect by IT.

Smart stuff indeed.  We can only hope Petraeus gets the freedom and resources and time to make it happen to whatever extent is possible.

Pakistan's active terror inside Afghanistan to stem Indian influence

NYT story simply makes clear what's been suspected by damn near everybody--and known by plenty--up to now:

A Pakistani-based militant group identified with attacks on Indian targets has expanded its operations in Afghanistan, inflicting casualties on Afghans and Indians alike, setting up training camps, and adding new volatility to relations between India and Pakistan.

The group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, is believed to have planned or executed three major attacks against Indian government employees and private workers in Afghanistan in recent months, according to Afghan and international intelligence officers and diplomats here. It continues to track Indian development workers and others for possible attack, they said.

Lashkar was behind the synchronized attacks on several civilian targets in Mumbai, India, in 2008, in which at least 163 people were killed. Its inroads in Afghanistan provide a fresh indication of its growing ambitions to confront India even beyond the disputed territory of Kashmir, for which Pakistan’s military and intelligence services created the group as a proxy force decades ago.

Officially, Pakistan says it no longer supports or finances the group. But Lashkar’s expanded activities in Afghanistan, particularly against Indian targets, prompt suspicions that it has become one of Pakistan’s proxies to counteract India’s influence in the country.

They provide yet another indicator of the extent to which Pakistani militants are working to shape the outcome of the Afghan war as the July 2011 deadline approaches to begin withdrawing American troops.

Recently retired Pakistani military officials are known to have directed the Mumbai attacks, and some Lashkar members have said only a thin line separates the group from its longtime bosses in the Pakistan security establishment.

How such behavior separates Pakistan from Iran is beyond me. They've got the bomb and they shared it indiscriminately for cash. They actively support terror groups that target our troops and our allies in a next-door war zone.  Worse, they take our money--and lots of it--to do it.

I bet Pakistan would love to see us get embroiled with Iran, but frankly, one of the reasons why I'm adamantly opposed to such logic is my sense that we eventually mix it up with Pakistan directly.

Because when the next 9/11 happens, that is where we will trace it to.

I choose India.

The army as the source of most problems in Pakistan

Banyan deconstructs the sins of the Pakistan military in The Economist.

The country is described as “economically backward, politically stunted and terrorized by religious extremists”—in effect, not much of a nation.

The “charge sheet” on the military?

One, too much adventurism on the “eastern front” (i.e., Kashmir).  Today, we are told, the army “remains wedded to the ‘India threat.’”  Meanwhile, the Indians focus on a growing middle class.  Guess who wins that contest?

Two, “endangering the state’s existence by making common cause with jihadism,” a strategy wholly tied to the first sin.  Why?  Better to make mischief against India, work the Kashmir fight, and keep the “strategic depth” that is Afghanistan (or at least the Pashtun south) deep enough.

Three stems naturally from 1 and 2:  the undermining of democratic institutions.  Why?  The fight with India must come first.

The optimistic note:  the military went back to the barracks in 2008 and civilians once again rule—to a certain extent.  Current political reform efforts seek to empower the parliament over the president.  Banyan’s fear:  checks and balances today become gridlock tomorrow in this scheme, thus getting the military back involved.

Hard to see any good way forward.  “Three score years” of nation-hood and this is all Pakistan has been able to manage—all foreign meddling aside.  Can Pakistan expect the rest of the world to wait on this lack of progress?  Hardly.

So expect all the more foreign “meddling.”  Aggressiveness to some, defensiveness to others.  Pakistan prefers to live in Friedman’s “olive tree” world, or what I call the Gap.  That willful disassociation used to work just fine, but the margin shrinks with each passing year that the global middle class grows in size and demands.  Soon enough, the country isn’t merely dismissed as the cranky nutty neighbor with guns.

The Afghanistan-as-Lebanon scenario seems real enough

Thoughtful but scary op-ed in WAPO from Daniel Serwer at the US Institute for Peace.

The worry expressed: Obama's West Point speech of two months ago didn't define any endstate.  Did so with Iraq but not Afghanistan.

The growing fear:  we can clear but the Afghans cannot hold and the Taliban are very effective in killing or terrorizing any builders, despite USAID's quadrupling of talent in-country over the last year (hmm, perhaps four times zero is still zero, but that sounds cruel).

Given those larger realities and the fact that the administration seems to have done nothing to truly regionalize the solution set whatsoever, we're all looking at an attempt to negotiate something that doesn't look too bad when we leave it, and Serwer offers Lebanon as the example:

Hezbollah controls large portions of the country, operates its own military forces and delivers services to large parts of the population, but the United States and other countries have embassies in Beirut, deal regularly with the government and parliament, and try to persuade Lebanese authorities to limit the sway and reach of Hezbollah.

In effect, we're back to remapping a fake state, dividing it between the unconquerable south (like Pakistan's unconquerable NW territories) and the rule-able north.  

Problem is, says Serwer, the Taliban show no signs of wanting to come to the table.

Why?  Again we're back to Obama's announced deadline of the summer of 2011, which no decent strategist (to include Kissinger) likes.

It will be interesting to see if Petraeus can yank on the rudder hard enough to effect a real course change.

Finding the exit from Afghanistan

NYT Week-in-Review analysis by Rob Nordland.

Start:

There’s no way we can kill our way out of Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the American commander, has said. By now, that’s become a mantra.

“One thing we are all hearing, especially between now and next year, is that there is no military solution to this conflict,” said Staffan de Mistura, the new special representative of the United Nations secretary general to Afghanistan. “The Taliban will never win the war, and on the other side, they’ll never win either.”

So everyone talks about peace, but so far no one is actually talking peace. The obstacles to doing so are profound and in many ways as daunting as the prospect of a military solution.

The recent, three-day jirga disappointed:  no insurgents invited and Karzai supporters stuffed in.

Bigger problems:

Both sides have red lines that make talks seemingly impossible. The Taliban’s official position is that all foreign forces must leave before any talks can begin, and constitutional change must be on the table. The government insists that the Afghan Taliban must first renounce connections with Al Qaeda and agree to accept the constitution. (By “constitution,” read women’s rights — anathema to the Taliban, and a prerequisite for Afghanistan’s Western supporters.)

The fear is that the situation only grows more hardline on the other side: aging Taliban leaders replaced by the nastier, less-prone-to-negotiate younger cadre.

More and more, officials and officers are describing Obama's summer 2011 deadline to start withdraws as fungible.

Good to hear.

If they're afraid to be seen with you, your COIN effort can only go so far

USA Today front-pager and Banyan column in Economist.

From the first:

Dur Mohammad doesn't walk a straight path to the school where he teaches. He takes a meandering route and then lingers in fields along the way to make it look as if he's a farmer tending his crops.

When U.S. Marines stop by the school, Mohammad begs them to be on their way.

"We cannot stand for a couple of minutes with you," he says. "If someone sees us, we'll be in trouble."

From Banyan:

The problem of knowing what Afghans think is an obstacle more generally. When World Bank workers attempt to take surveys, they have to memorise the questions and answers, since villagers speaking to strange folk with clipboards are at risk from insurgents. 

These anecdotes suggest a trust-building process unlikely to be much consummated by the summer of 2011. Obama will have to make a tough call:  stick with something that's working--but slowly, or cash in the Afghan people.

Mining co's: Exploitation of Afghan mineral resources years off

NYT's James Risen's second piece on the "miracle" find.  As the map (quickly Googled) above and left [click to enlarge] demonstrates, the notion of Afghanistan's mineral deposits not exactly a bolt from the blue.  Lack of security held up serious exploration in the past, and mining co's say the same is true today--go figure.

Given the high-risk, frontier environment, the most risk-tolerant explore first:

 A few high-risk investors are sufficiently intrigued by the country’s potential to take an early look. JP Morgan, for instance, has just sent a team of mining experts to Afghanistan to examine possible projects to develop.

“Afghanistan could be one of the leading producers of copper, gold, lithium and iron ore in the world,” said Ian Hannam, a London-based banker and mining expert with JP Morgan. “I believe this has the potential to be transforming for Afghanistan.”

But as for main-line efforts .  . . 

But executives with international mining firms said in interviews that while they believed that Afghanistan’s mineral deposits held great potential, their businesses were not planning to move into the country until the war was over and the country more stable.

“There are huge deposits there,” said David Beatty, chief executive of Rio-Novo Gold, a mining company based in Toronto. “But as chief executive, would I send a team to Kandahar?  And then call a guy's wife after he gets shot?  No."

After all the hype triggered by his original piece, which was obviously spoon-fed by the Administration's team for maximum effect, this Risen piece seems decidedly designed to reduce expectations and present a more realistic appraisal.  I do like the goofily Biblical "covet" in the headline, though.

It has long been known that Afghanistan had significant deposits of gemstones, copper and other minerals, but United States officials say they have discovered and documented major, previously unknown deposits, including copper, iron, gold and industrial metals like lithium.

A Pentagon team, working with geologists and other experts, has shared its data with the Afghan government, and is working with the Afghan Ministry of Mines to prepare information for potential investors in hopes of placing some mineral exploration rights up for auction within the next six months. On Thursday, Afghan officials said they believed that the American estimates of the value of the mineral deposits — nearly $1 trillion — were too conservative, and that they could be worth as much as $3 trillion . . .

At a news conference in Kabul, Wahidullah Shahrani, the mines minister, pledged to make the bidding and contracting of mining rights as transparent as possible to reduce the possibility of corruption. He said the ministry would post contracts on its Web site.

Mr. Shahrani and his advisers cautioned against overly high expectations, underscoring that development would take years and that there were many obstacles to overcome, not least of all the lack of security in some of the areas with the most minerals and the lack of a transportation infrastructure.

International mining officials and independent experts echoed that view. Jim Yeager, a Colorado-based geologist and former consultant to the Afghan mines ministry, said that poorly written mining regulations could also hamper future development.

Remember that NorKo has about $6T in minerals--for comparison's sake.

Will Pakistan uphold its end of the clear-and-hold effort?

Map here

Pakistani member of parliament via Times of India via Our Man in Kabul.

I quote at length:

There is a saying in Pakistan that if you can’t defeat your enemy, befriend him. This is particularly true in the tribal areas that border Afghanistan, where, in six agencies, there’s an unprecedented military offensive against militants. Despite many tactical alliances and ceasefire pacts in Waziristan, Pakistan has gone in with firepower backed by US drones. The cornerstone of the security policy here is to attack militants close to the al-Qaida, but spare armed syndicates that protect Pakistan’s flanks. 

The turbulence in the Af-Pak border zone has led Washington to put out strategic leaks about possible military intervention inside Pakistan. The heart of the problem is what could alter the dynamics of declining US-Nato successes in the Afghan theatre. North Waziristan agency (NWA), and what the Pakistan army is able to do there, seems to have become the litmus test for US-Pakistan relations. After Faisal Shahzad’s attempted bomb attack in Times Square, the pressure on Islamabad to act against anti-US Taliban in NWA has increased. Islamabad pleads capacity constraints; the US cites commitment gaps. 

The stakes are high. After failing to build institutional structures in Afghanistan, the test for Washington is linking US-Nato ground offensives in the south and Loya Paktiya to Pakistan’s push on the militant Haqqani-led groups from NWA. The Obama presidency needs a game-changer in a theatre where success is elusive despite a COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy that focuses on population safety. The expected Taliban reversals have not happened despite a massive offensive in Marjah. In Washington’s view, Pakistan is pulling its punches as it may need the Taliban when the US exits Afghanistan. 

For Pakistan, this is a battle for its stability and survival. Action is overdue against terrorist and sectarian groups in Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. There is a compelling need to act against extremist groups after the massacre of nearly a hundred Ahmadiyas in Lahore recently. The Punjab government needs to do a counter-terror sweep of its cities . . . 

The challenge in NWA is that Islamabad does not have the military or civilian capacity to open all fronts at the same time. Enmeshed in a blighted strategic endgame, with a growing terrorist threat, tanking economy and India posturing to the east, the military option in NWA cannot be a hair-trigger decision . . .  Islamabad’s fear is that if it shoves a fist into this hornet’s nest, maintaining the fragile consensus against terrorists at home would be difficult, as well as protecting its cities from further attacks. 

This can be no “shock and awe” exercise that can be switched off by remote control. Pakistan has already lost over 3,000 people in two years as a result of the terrorist backlash; the economy has taken a $35 billion hit. The question is, will the US be around to help hold down Pakistan’s fist when its army swoops on al-Qaida strongholds such as Mir Ali? The military’s tactic in any counterinsurgency initiative in mountainous terrain is ‘pincer and choke’ the enemies’ escape routes . . . If the NWA is grand central for terrorists, then the Afghan border provinces provide strategic depth. While the US-Nato forces in Afghanistan need to do their bit, Pakistan will have to step up border checks and review unwritten peace deals with tribal leaders who change sides too often. 

The other question is: how long can the Pakistani army stay in the agencies it has secured? Is there a civilian ‘build, hold and transition’ component to the project? Once again, before putting pressure Pakistan with an escalating war, huge governance commitments such as ROZ (reconstruction opportunity zones) assistance will have to roll off the US machine . . .

What will help is a phase-by-phase plan for securing the area, holding it until the tribes that have been terrorized by the Taliban are able to return and do business. Second, though the elites in Waziristan’s tribal areas have been marginalized by the Taliban, they will resist governance models that diminish their pre-Taliban political powers. The military will have to stay in Waziristan until the police and frontier corps in that area is strengthened, and the tribal leadership prepares for critical reforms and political activity by mainstream parties. FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform will only work if introduced incrementally, and the government’s recent announcements, if implemented, will be a brave start . . .

A glass-half-full take in the near-term, in the sense that Pakistan's serious efforts are acknowledged.  The usual doubts expressed about US staying power--sensible.

But what depresses is the realization that unless the two efforts match up, most of this will have been a complete waste of time--the same old, same old effort.

Most telling, none of this seems like it can credibly wrap up by the summer of 2011, when Obama wants to start leaving.

The Politics Blog: 10 Essential Truths of the Petraeus-McChrystal Switch

Well, well, well — where have we seen this before? The indiscreet U.S. commander whose tongue digs his own grave. The stunning resignation submitted within hours of the magazine's online posting of the story. And General David Petraeus — yet again — as the go-to choice as America's turnaround specialist. Amidst all the nonstop chatter from pundits, politicians, and former ambassadors, allow me to distance myself from the familiar situation I was in with Admiral William Fallon and sift through the tea leaves to look ahead at Petraeus's new gig. Because there are magazine stories, and then there is war. And because — who knows? — Afghanistan may be a lot better off, and Obama may have picked his replacement in more ways than one.

Read the full post at Esquire.com's The Politics Blog.

'It was my decision to die. I was getting beaten every day'

Brutal stuff from Japan Times via WPR's Media Roundup.

Picture found here, along with the quote above.

No surprise:  where you find the Taliban you find one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman. An old theme for me: given the choice, most women would prefer living in the Core to the Gap; hence, they welcome globalization's embrace far more than men inside the Gap, because it liberates them disproportionally.

The usual details on the plight of women in Afghanistan, but then this jumps out at you:

It is not surprising, then, that the average life expectancy for a woman in Afghanistan is only 44 years.

Women don't fare any better in education. It is estimated that 87 percent of Afghan women are illiterate. Many girls fear going to school for lack of security. Although some aspects of their lives have improved, women are still at a clear disadvantage with men.

"Women who try to advocate for their rights in public life are subject to violence and physical attacks," said Zia Moballegh, acting country director for the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

"Violence against women and girls is widespread and deeply rooted in society," Norah Niland, chief U.N. human rights officer in Afghanistan, said last year.

"Our field research finds that rape is under-reported and concealed, a huge problem in Afghanistan," Niland added. "It affects all parts of the country, all communities and all social groups."

It is estimated that one in three Afghan women experience physical, psychological or sexual violence at some point in their lives. Paradoxically, shame is usually associated with the attacks, and the victims often find themselves prosecuted for adultery rather than the perpetrators. While adultery is punishable by jail sentence, no provision in the Afghan penal code criminalizes rape.

A sad result of this oppressive atmosphere is that an increasing number of women in Afghanistan are choosing suicide as a way to escape the violence and abuse in their daily lives, according to a human rights report prepared by Canada's Foreign Affairs Department. "Self-immolation is being carried out by increasing numbers of Afghan women to escape their dire circumstances, and women constitute the majority of Afghan suicides," states a report completed at the end of 2009.

Something to remember as the Long War proceeds.

"Runaway general"? Hardly. Runaway mouths? Definitely

I just read the Rolling Stone piece and found the tone of disrespect somewhat stunning.  The media immediately references my piece on Fox Fallon from 2008, but I'm more impressed with the differences than similarities-- as in, Fallon disagreed with the president on substance while McChrystal's gripes strike me as stylistic (e.g., Obama struck him as uncomfortable before brass) and superficial.

Fallon never said anything disrespectful of his superiors in front of me, nor did his staff.  The admiral just fundamentally disagreed on the possibility of going to war with Iran and wasn't shy about sharing that opinion in the press, which he did repeatedly prior to my piece (which he later said misrepresented his views while quoting him accurately--to the tune of over 1,500 words).

Here, McChrystal does just the opposite:  never really disagreeing with his superiors while openly disrespecting them.  I say "openly" because he and his staff did it repeatedly in front of a reporter they knew was there to report on what he saw and heard--just like I did.  

Is that enough to get him fired?  That's Obama's call.  The fact that McChrystal is quoted both directly and in a secondary manner (through his staff) making truly derogatory remarks about so many principals (VP, NS adviser, our AMB in-country, Holbrooke) is problematic going forward, but firing the right guy for the right job when he agrees with your policy is likewise a hard choice for the president.

In the end, it all comes down to the relationship itself.  A magazine story can damage such a relationship but it cannot define it. Fallon was on thin ice with the White House when my story appeared, making it the final nail in the coffin. If Obama's relationship with McChrystal is solid, the Rolling Stone story won't be enough to trigger his sacking. But if it was already fragile/strained, then it may become the excuse.  But my guess is that McChrystal and Obama-Biden are on an entirely different trajectory over Af-Pak than Fallon and Bush-Cheney were over Iran.

Chivers on what Marja means--so far

NYT piece by the always astute C.J. Chivers.

As NATO and Afghan forces flow into neighboring Kandahar Province, where for the next many months the latest high-profile effort to undo the Taliban’s hold will unroll, the continuing fighting in Marja can be read as a sign of problems in the American-led surge. It can also be read as something less worrisome: a difficult period in a campaign always expected to be hard.

A prevailing assessment among officers on the ground is this: The outcome is too soon to call.

“Right now it’s gray,” said Maj. Lawrence Lohman, the operations officer for Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, which operates outposts in northern Marja.

Those who deem the Marja offensive a disappointment, or even a failure, point to the daily violence and to the signs that Afghans have been leaving the area, at least temporarily, to avoid the fighting. They also point to Taliban intimidation of residents, a still limited government presence, and the continued reliance of Afghan police officers and soldiers on American supervision and logistics. These, they say, are ill-boding signs.

But the signals are contradictory.

Most of Marja’s civilians returned after moving away ahead of the initial assault. Most of them remain. Compounds that were empty in February are inhabited. Roads once quiet are busy. Fields are thick with crops. Shops in some bazaars have reopened. Afghan units participate visibly in dangerous missions.

Lt. Col. Brian Christmas, the battalion’s commander, noted that some of Marja’s residents had begun providing information on the Taliban, including sharing the names and locations of fighters. Many civilians have been seeking aid and a few have sought contracts for small scale development projects, the early steps in engagement.

“I’ve seen good growth and good progress,” the colonel said. He added: “There is still a lot to be done.”

The Marines point to what they clearly hope is a Helmand pattern, apparent in other districts, including Nawa, where the Taliban were strong and fighting was initially intense. The pattern, they said, is this: With time and resources, the insurgents’ position erodes, villages become secure, and engagement and the Afghan government presence expand.

Pursuing this goal, Marine companies have been sending out constant small patrols.

Time and patience and skills, we seem to have a plenty--at least on the military's side.

More and more we hear generals voicing out loud their thought that Afghanistan will take longer--the implied follow-on being ". . . than President Obama wants."

Obama will reach a Bush moment on Afghanistan, and he will either fold or play on.

Karzai has already cast his lot with Pakistan

Subtitle of Guardian piece (via WPR Media Roundup) says it all:

Afghanistan's former head of intelligence says President Hamid Karzai is increasingly looking to Pakistan to end insurgency

Even with the evolution of our tactics, it's hard to blame Karzai for the choice. Obama gives him all indication of bailing before 2012, and the rushed effort in the south seems increasingly bogged down thanks to a very patient and brutal response from the Taliban.

There's been no effective regionalization of the solution set, leaving Pakistan the looming large neighbor of note, so what else do we expect of Karzai?

He's covering his bets.

Don't call it an "offensive"

NYT story that emphasizes the surge in the south is far more civilian than portrayed in the press:

The prospect of a robust military push in Kandahar Province, which had been widely expected to begin this month, has evolved into a strategy that puts civilian reconstruction efforts first and relegates military action to a supportive role.

The strategy, Afghan, American and NATO civilian and military officials said in interviews, was adopted because of opposition to military action from an unsympathetic local population and Afghan officials here and in Kabul.

There are also concerns that a frontal military approach has not worked as well as hoped in a much smaller area in Marja, in neighboring Helmand Province.

The goal that American planners originally outlined — often in briefings in which reporters agreed not to quote officials by name — emphasized the importance of a military offensive devised to bring all of the populous and Taliban-dominated south under effective control by the end of this summer. That would leave another year to consolidate gains before President Obama’s July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing combat troops.

In fact, there has been little new fighting in Kandahar so far, and the very word “offensive” has been banished.

“We cannot say the term offensive for Kandahar,” said the Afghan National Army officer in charge here, Gen. Sher Mohammad Zazai. “It is actually a partnership operation.”

The commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, insisted that there never was a planned offensive. “The media have chosen to use the term offensive,” he said. Instead, he said, “we have certainly talked about a military uplift, but there has been no military use of the term offensive.”

Whatever it is called, it is not happening this month. Views vary widely as to just when the military part will start. General Zazai says it will begin in July but take a break for Ramadan in mid-August and resume in mid-September. A person close to Tooryalai Wesa, the governor of Kandahar, says it will not commence until winter, or at least not until harvests end in October. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the press.

American officials, on the other hand, say it has already begun, not with a bang, but with a steady increase of experts from the United States Embassy and NATO and aid workers — a “civilian surge” — accompanied by a quiet increase in American troops to provide security for them. The Americans strongly deny that they planned an offensive they are now backing away from.

Whereas in Marja the plan was to carry out a military assault to oust the Taliban, followed by rapid delivery of government services, in Kandahar the approach is now the opposite. Civilian aid workers, protected by an increased military force, will try to provide those services first, before any major military action.

“This is not going to be a door-to-door military campaign,” said one American civilian official, who requested anonymity in line with his agency’s policy. “You’ll see more Afghan National Police checkpoints, but it’s not going to be an aggressive military campaign. They’ve looked at it and realized it wouldn’t work.”

That is some serious learning being applied.  Gratifying to see.

With all the reports coming back either glass-half-full or half-empty, it is hard to gain any comprehensive sense of what's possible, but you get the distinct feeling that both sides are pulling out all stops--just on opposite sides of the kinetic/non-kinetic divide (i.e., they kill civilians and we lead with them).

Hollowing out Afghanistan's local government

The governor of Kandahar--staying alive

NYT story that reminds us of the Taliban's grim determination to kill however many necessary to thwart any nation-building by NATO:

The Taliban have been stepping up a campaign of assassinations in recent months against officials and anyone else associated with local government in an attempt to undermine counterinsurgency operations in the south.

Government assassinations are nothing new as a Taliban tactic, but now the Taliban are taking aim at officials who are much more low-level, who often do not have the sort of bodyguards or other protection that top leaders do. Some of the victims have only the slimmest connections to the authorities. The most egregious example came Wednesday in Helmand Province, where according to Afghan officials the insurgents executed a 7-year-old boy as an informant.

As the coalition concentrates on trying to build up the Afghan government in the southern province of Kandahar, a big part of that strategy depends on recruiting capable Afghan government officials who can speed delivery of aid and services to undercut support for the Taliban. The insurgents have just as busily been trying to undermine that approach, by killing local officials and intimidating others into leaving their posts.

“They read the papers; they know what we are doing,” said a NATO official here, who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with his government’s policy. “It’s very much game on between the coalition and the Taliban.”

The assassinations have been effective in slowing recruitment of government officials, he said. “Am I going to live through the workweek? No one should have to ask that question.”

Just since March, according to reports compiled by The New York Times from the police, military sources, witnesses and local government officials, there have been at least 11 assassinations in Kandahar, mostly of low-level officials. These reports, which are not complete, do not include police officers or other officials killed in more indiscriminate attacks, like suicide bombings.

In John Robb's formulation, the Taliban are proving quite effective at "hollowing out" the local government, keeping Kabul's reach limited to the capital city--a classic failed-state situation.  Doesn't mean they will ever effectively rule the country, but they can prevent outsiders from trying to encourage the same with non-Taliban leadership/governance.

And that won't change any time soon, it would seem--unless overwhelming economic presence is achieved by regional elements.

And that's where the discovery of mineral wealth can be a game-accelerator. 

Turkey steps into the breach left by our lack of strategic imagination

World Bulletin piece via Our Man in Kabul.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said Monday the tripartite mechanism between Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan would make efforts to hold the Istanbul Forum meeting, one that involves businesspeople of the three countries, in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

Davutoglu held a tripartite meeting with Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul and Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi at Ciragan Palace in Istanbul as part of the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA). 

Speaking at a press conference following the tripartite meeting, Davutoglu said that they wanted to contribute to the "normalization process" in Afghanistan by showing that Kabul was not a city in which only security meetings took place but also a city in which economic meetings could take place. 

Turkey will indeed try our patience in its regional ambitions, but there is far more positive force than negative friction created by this push, so I say, bring it on in spades!

Regional powers stepping in to let Afghanistan know it's not on its own once NATO leaves is a very good thing. The more those signals are sent, especially from nations with established reputations of defending their regional interests vigorously, the faster we move the Taliban to a sense of inevitability--as in, the world is coming and it's never leaving, so get used to it.