My personal theory about the Packers

Dateline: Loews Coronado Bay Resort, San Diego CA, 20 September 2004

Here it is (and I don't care how self-absorbed it sounds): Whenever things are going well in my personal life, the Packers suck. But when things head south in my life, the Packers always come through.

I can cite data on this going back . . . uh . . . a while. No, this is not to imply a tortuous young childhood corresponding to the "glory years" of the Lombardi effort. I'm just saying that when things are going well for me, the Packers tend to screw the pooch, but when it feels like life is beating me down, the Packers win. To wit: my daughter gets cancer in 1994 and the Packers go to three straight NFC championships, two Super Bowls and win one NFL title (to bolster their league-leading total of 12). Then we move to Newport, my career takes off, and the Packers, despite having Brett Favre, can't seem to get back to the Super Bowl. That's not just a coincidence.

Do I feel responsible for this state of affairs? Life is life and I can't control many things. I just cite the observations as they come to me, and let the chips fall where they may. After having a bad week with new baby and the kids in school, the Pack beats Carolina in the opener. Then I decide to shake off my ennui regarding my fear that I'll be giving the same brief for the rest of my life and announce I'm going after the Son of PNM and . . . the Pack loses to the Bears at home.

I know what you're thinking . . . besides the part about delusions of grandeur and fanatical narcissism: I should have delayed my decision until afterwe played the Bears. I mean, if I done it this week and we lost to the Colts on the road, it would have seemed perfectly understandable. Now, in effect, the secret is out.

Here's the good news: we never should have won in Carolina. Those two quick turnovers at the beginning of the second half were just too good to be true, much like Ahman Green's fumble providing the Bears a 14-point turnaround just before halftime. So we won one we were supposed to lose and then lost one we were supposed to win: yin and yang and the season's only two weeks old. So fear not: homefield throughout the playoffs is still possible.

Yesterday son Kevin took first place in the male-under-13 category at a 5k road race in New Bedford MA. I was very proud of his effort, coaching him along the way. Kev and I have a lot of fun doing road races, and the time just to ourselves matters a whole lot to both of us. His time wasn't his best (31:26 versus best of 28:18), but he pulled out a first place running along the ocean into a stiff wind for almost two-thirds of the race, finally catching two older kids at the two-mile mark and then never looking back. I know he wouldn't have made anywhere near the same effort without me running alongside him, something the other boys didn't have, but that's why I do it: it's a teachable moment like few others. Kev got this funky heavy star trophy, all engraved and such and he was pretty thrilled. Me, I was just happy that he learned something about how much he could really give when he puts his mind to something, and how sacrifice in the short-term can often lead to satisfaction over the long haulósomething I think about as I gear up for Son of PNM.

I've now read through July in the weblog archives, and I am getting more optimistic by the minute about having enough material for Son of PNM. In many ways, that overstuffed book had far too much material for one volume. It easily could have been three or four books, something my brother-in-law Steve opined when we sent the monster off to Neil Nyren last fall. In short, there are so many strings to be pulled and so many explanations to be extended that not only with the book be a legitimate sequel to the original, it's likewise in danger of being overstuffed at 80k. But that's a good problem for me, because I like to write at a fairly fast-paced and conversational level, rather than drilling down too much on detail. So as I look at Son of PNM, I say to myself: PNM outlined the future worth creating, but its sequel is going to lay out how the story will end. If PNM started with a Pentagon-centric view of the world and history, then the Future Worth Creating sequel is going to expand its vision far beyond those narrow confines, hopefully bringing along all the same readers but likewise capturing that many more. And yeah, keeping it at 80k will be important, because the thicker the book, the harder the sale.

Flew into San Diego late last night, which is always surreal because you fly right over the downtown as you land at its very-much-in-the-middle-of-town airport.

You know that scene in "Kill Bill, Vol. 1" where the Bride is flying into Tokyo to do battle with O-ren? It's a lot like that landing in San Diego (and nothing like landing at Narita outside Tokyo): you seem impossibly close to all these high-rises and street scenes. Yes, it is mesmerizing and scary at the same time, because you know that the runways here are short so both the landing and take-off are far more dramatic in tone.

I'm here to kick off defense investors conference, giving the day-one luncheon keynote. I got talked into this months ago when my calendar for the fall seemed like it was going to be lite. I don't regret it too much now, since it's given me two long flights and some downtime at a fancy spa to do a lot of weblog reviewing (plus recover from the Packers' loss). To the extent that I feel like some government hack (trust me, I'm not the only Defense Department here speaking) being exploited by a private company to run an investor conference, that only makes me more determined to write Son of PNM for all it's worth. Why? Either I chart my own path or others chart it for me.

On that score, I have advice coming at me from all corners. I spent about three hours this afternoon with Bob Jacobsen, an interesting veteran of Silicon Valley who's become an informal adviser on what to do next with the unfolding phenomenon that is PNM. It was an eye-opening discussion about what's really possible right now in my career. Good stuff to know, because Wednesday I face a number of discussions at the Naval War College with superiors regarding my "talents" and how to make them fit within the culture that is the college.

Hard to complain one way or the other. PNM could have landed with a complete thud, which certainly would have simplified my life. Instead, it opened up just enough possibilities that I now face some real questions on what I want to do next, and with whom. I don't fear such questions: you have to ask yourself each and every year whether or not what you've got going right now still makes sense or not. If it does, you stay put. If not, you move along. Asking the question is not the problem, knowing the answer is.

Here a handful of stories from yesterday's Times and today's Times and Journal:

■Pentagon's low-balling the Sys Admin force in Iraq is backfiring, but a good call on Iraq's debt is in the works

■Hu's your daddy now in China?

■ Iran restores the hard-line on women

■Milosevic forging his own new rule set at ICC

■China is the engine driving global commodity train

Low-balling the Sys Admin force in Iraq is backfiring

■"Effort To Train New Iraqi Army Is Facing Delays: Key Posts Are Unfilled (Lag Is Laid to Complexity and Methodical Ways of the Pentagon)," by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 20 September 2004, p. A2.

■"U.S. and Europe Expect to Reach Pact on Iraq Debt by End of Year," by Michael Schroeder, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2004, p. A2.

A while back Central Command split the command structure in Iraq, basically going with one command that would focus on building up the provisional government's institutional capacity to restore order (the Sys Admin work) and a second that would focus on quelling the insurgency (the Leviathan job). The Sys Admin job is called the Multinational Security Transition Command (clear enough language, as far as I'm concerned), and the standing up of this body has been slow going from the start.

Three months into the effort, described by all as the highest priority task in Iraq right now (we've backed off from squelching the insurgency strongholds to gather our strength in this manner prior to a big December push preceding the hoped-for January elections), and less than half of the command's staff are in place. Who are they missing most? Lawyers and procurement experts. Here's what observers are saying:

Senior military officials in Washington and in the Persian Gulf region say the delay in filling the headquarters jobs stems from the Pentagon's methodicalósome say ploddingóapproach to establishing a new organization with the complex mission of preparing more than 250,000 members of the Iraqi police, border patrol, national guard and army for duty.

In short, the Pentagon is dragging its feet in yet another example of its general unease with the world of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), or what I call the "everything else" long orphaned by a U.S. military that prefers to plot the big one against some near-peer competitor.

So what has Lt. Gen. David Petraeus resorted to in his quest to stand up his command? He has begged, borrowed and stolen from military commands all over the world, tapping even West Point and the British in Iraq. Plus he's relied extensively on contractors.

Petraeus has the toughest row to how, because his own Army evinces the greatest amount of resistance to the concepts embodied by the Sys Admin force. Yes, I know I get a lot of emails from younger officers who cite all the change from below, but it's the resistance at the top that worries meónot Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker but all those generals around in the Pentagon, plus all the "gray beards," or retired flags who now operate in all those Beltway Bandit think tanks that perform studies and analyses.

This resistance is only natural, because the Army's evolution toward the Sys Admin force will be the most painful of the four services (although the Navy, if it ever catches on, will realize it places a close second). So when people ask me, "How long will it take for the Pentagon to move toward the Sys Admin force?" I reply simply, "The speed of advance will be a function of the pain and failures we encounter in ongoing operations like Iraq."

It's both that simple and that sad.

On a better note, Europe and the U.S. seem set to forgive Iraq's debts by the end of the year. Why should that take more than a year and a half for the "West" to agree to? Pretty much an asinine argument over the exact percentage to be cut. The U.S. wants 90%, Europe 80%, and Russia more like 65%. This sort of chintzy debate over percentage points shows how little intra-Core unity exists over the question of what it will take to integrate Iraq into the global economy after many years of sanctions. Holding up this decision has only scared off foreign direct investment immeasurably over the course of the occupation.

This is yet another huge example of why the A-to-Z rule set inside the Core on how to process politically-bankrupt states within the Gap is so crucial. Negotiating this on a case-by-case basis in hugely inefficient, leading to these sorts of idiotic fights over pennies on the dollar. Meanwhile Iraq burns and American personnel are losing their lives as the Core's "great powers" diddle over how the financial "pain" is spread.

Then again, if you're not going to fund the Sys Admin force sufficiently, I guess there's not much of a hurry to forgive the country's debts, because FDI can't flow until both the market and military sides of this tightly-wound nexus are accounted for.

China, Hu's your daddy?

■"Hu Takes Full Power in China As He Gains Control of Military: Orderly Transfer Gives Freedom to Maneuver," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 20 September 2004, p. A1.

Good news finally on the Chinese leadership front. When Jiang Zemin gave up his control over the military yesterday, the 3rd generation of leadership truly left the stage. Now, Hu Jintao has more control at an earlier age than any leader since Mao, which suggests that the 4th generation's run of leadership will be a vigorous one.

But don't see danger for the U.S. necessarily rising in this pathway, because remember that it's Hu who is pushing the theory of the "peacefully rising China." Indeed, most experts expect Hu to now be able to chart a more flexible course with Taiwan and Hong Kong since Jiang won't be around any more to trump him with calls of being a soft nationalist. You want a sense of who Hu is? Remember his response on SARS. China did the usual cover-up until Hu stepped forward and forced a level of transparency unseen before in Chinese history. Doesn't make him a perfect guy, but it means his instincts are good, such as his focus on the rural poor in China.

Overall, this is a very good sign for the future of the Core.

Iran restores the hard-line on women

■"Iran Moves To Roll Back Rights Won By Women: Hard-liners in the government are having their way, at least for now," by Nazila Fathi, New York Times, 19 September 2004, p. A13.

As I've said before, when we decided to do both Afghanistan and Iraq, we sacrificed the progress toward reform in Iran and any hopes for near-term rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. And no, don't tell me it was impossible because Iran supports terrorism in the region, because we managed to start dÈtente with the Soviets while they were doing the same all over the world.

But when the US took down both the Taliban and Saddam with ease (the occupations and reconstructions being another thing), it was only natural that Tehran would immediately experience a back-tracking effect in terms of the reforms put forth by the moderate president Mohammad Khatamióthe most promising would-be Gorbachev for Iran yet. And since women's rights are one of the few screws the mullahs can actually turn in their twisted universe (it's still quite legal under Iranian law for a man to marry up to four permanent wives and have an unlimited number of "temporary" onesóalthough most in society frown upon such things), we're watching yet another bit of blow back from the Bush Administration's efforts to transform the Middle East. Doesn't mean it was wrong to try this tack, it just means this scenario pathway will be full of slippery slopes leading in all directions.

Most of those directions are positive, however, even as they create tumult and anxiety locally, because that gets people debating the issues and forces them to make choices, rather than just accept the status quo oróworseólet the elites put the screws to them out of their fear that real reform and change is just around the corner, waiting to topple their repressive regimes. So you may see yet another example of the Big Bang strategy gone wrong, whereas I see a frightened Iranian leadership reaching for straws. They can piss all they want, the wind heading their direction is only growing in strength:

"It is very obvious that the new Parliament would like to impose a strict model of covering for women, but they will not succeed," said Ahmad Zeidabadi, a political scientist and journalist in Tehran. "The more they put pressure, the more they get a reaction because people simply do not think such restrictions can solve their more basic needs."

Imposing restrictings on women's dress has been a barometeróshowing how far the authorities are willing to go to allow social freedom and give more rights to women.

Nearly two-thirds of Iran's population is under 30, and more than 60 percent of university students are women. Women have become more vocal, and they demand equal rights. They want jobs and more legal rights within the family structure.

"The general trend in this country is moving towards reforms," said Haleh Anvari a political analyst in Tehran. "These restrictions are like putting a little stone in front of a huge storm that is going for reform," she added, referring to efforts made by the new Parliament.

It's because of signals like that and general demographic trends like those cited here that I argue for America's next effort being against North Korea vice an Iran. I think we've got enough stirring of the pot going on in the Middle East right now, and as that plot thickens, we'll need to free ourselves progressively from military commitments elsewhere. Europe is ready for this, but East Asia is not, and Kim is the culprit there.

So I'm sticking to my predictions that Iran is closer to a host of tipping points than many realize, meaning we do best by making Iraq a success story or at least enough of a tumult that Iran is sucked into the larger regional process of change it unleashes.

Milosevic forging his own new rule set at ICC

■"Lessons From a 'Textbook' War Crimes Trial: Milosevic Proves Adept at Throwing Wrenches Into the Works," by Marlise Simons, New York Times, 19 September 2004, p. A4.

Slobodan Milosevic's trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hauge was supposed to set a new gold standard, his being the first trial of a European leader for war crimes since Nuremburg and the Nazis. But surprise! He's not cooperating and his boycotting of his own defense is making it hard for the case to proceed. In effect, he's putting on much the same good show Herman Goering did back in Nuremburg, and for now, his back and forth over his blood pressure (he stops taking his meds) and his regular outbursts over the "joint criminal enterprise" of the ICC is just enough to keep the train from leaving the station.

Should it? Many legal experts say that to expect Milosevic to cooperate is sheer folly, so the ICC better get used to it and move on, otherwise it risks looking like a paper tiger, something that would give cheer to the Charles Taylors and Saddam Husseins of the world.

China is the engine driving global commodity train

■"Commodities Are Riding on China's Coattails," by Joshua Kurlantzick, New York Times, 19 September 2004, p. BU3.

It's almost hard to understand how important China is becoming for the global economy, but this article gives you a good sense. Here are two eye-popping stats: China now accounts for 30% of world coal consumption and 40% of steel. That burgeoning level of demand has commodities experts talking about a boom market that may well stretch a decade, which will translate into a lot of investment into those industries, because China's rise seems to have caught many there by surprise, so with demand outpacing supply in the shorter-run, prices are rising rapidly since 2001 and that will trigger new investment flows so that capacity catches up. Prior to China's rise, commodities were stuck in a 20-year Bear market, so capacity fell idle over time.

Here's the dig: many of these big global sources for commodities like energy and precious metals either lie deep inside the Gap or are key Seam States like Indonesia or South Africa, so China's rocketing demand is creating economic links between itself and the Gap in ways rather unimaginable not too long ago. So, again, will China need to become more interested in Gap stability and/or shrinking the Gap over time? You tell me.

The whims of human nature

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 19 September 2004

Rushing through another Sunday. Up to mow lawn, then Son #1 and I do 5k road race for ovarian cancer over in Mass. Then it's Packers versus Bears, listening over the Internet, while Kev and I get a start on a school project.

Spent last night watching movies with the kids and reading through more of the blog. Every time I do this, I get a lot more optimistic about Son of PNM, because I realize my gut instinct for pursuing this is dead on. There is so much material in those blogs: a couple of good cites, a couple of good analytic paras, and two killer lines each and every day. The trick will be organizing, but that's my strong suit, so the internal sense of momentum builds.

Actually, more than a few of the emails I receive on PNM II are pretty good with the suggestions. One yesterday reminded me of trick I did in Y2K report (crisis response load measure for US military worldwide), so keep 'em coming.

Did something very whimsical yesterday. Wife loves to roam Net looking for "best cities to live" and she left her browser sitting on Madison, WI, where we met at college, fell in love, got married, and where Daughter #2 will be baptized in October (same priest, same church).

So, on a whim, I surfed the University of Wisconsin-Madison site, found a job opening for Assistant Professor in poli sci (international relations), and put together an updated resume and cover letter. The package sits in my mailbox out front, waiting for the Monday pick-up.

Am I serious? Not really, I tell my wife. If requested, I'll interview simply for the practice.

Hmmm, she replies, that's what you said about interviewing at the Naval War College and six years later, we're still here.

Hmmm, I counter, and then slink off to the PC.

No news stories for today as I read the Sunday Times late, so two entries to clear some decks. First is Mark R. Anderson's intro to piece I wrote for his "strategic newsletter" series. His company is found at Strategic News Service. His "special issue" letters are considered very cool, so it was an honor to be asked to pen one. You get his service by subscription, and supposedly everybody who's anybody in information technology reads his stuff. I don't include my piece here, because it's an adaptation from the book (Preface and last chapter), so if you want to read that stuff, buy the book!

The second sub-post today is simply the draft of the entry on me for the Contemporary Authors series. I include it simply to get it in my database.

***SNS*** SPECIAL LETTER:THE GLOBAL FUTURE WORTH CREATING

Here's Mark R. Anderson's intro to my special letter:

Publisher's Note: I first picked up Tom Barnett's book, The Pentagon's New Map, before I'd been introduced to him, for the simple reason that it had a sense of inevitability about it: The Pentagon obviously was re-assessing its role in future U.S. global military policy, as we had heard from past Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Bill Owens, in his opening remarks to our first Future in Review Conference. While some generals continued to hold onto the old mentality of big ships and big bases, there was a strong new movement afoot to redesign the military for future engagements, which likely would be very different from those imagined during the Cold War (I recommend Bill's book on this, Lifting the Fog of War.

At first I suspected this book might be a War College-generated apology for the Pax Americana I have written about in the past, an intellectual afterthought to justify deploying the U.S. military everywhere. But a close reading of the book convinced me that not only does Barnett take issue with the Bush/Rumsfeld/Neocon plan (Barnett is not in favor of the Iraq War, at least not for any of the reasons deployed by Bush), but that his worldview allows for ultimately reduced U.S. policing based upon increasing Connectedness between what he calls the Core (developed countries) and the Gap.

In this sense, I believe he has assembled a new world view which is based upon economic realities, and which avoids old left/right word and strategy traps by using new, baggage-free terms to describe global issues. Because I also believe that providing Net connectivity is an inherently positive process which increases communications, trade, and ultimately peace between nations, I have found Tom's work compelling. I would advise SNSers to read it carefully, and to completion, before reacting too strongly; by the time you are finished, I think you'll tend to agree that this is a new way of thinking about the global map which should be discussed by everyone, and not just the Pentagon. Leaders in technology will find this thought process in close alignment with the benefits of a global broadband rollout. ñ mra.

COMMENTARY: Since a lot of my lingo and ideas spring from the world of IT, I felt Mark's intro to my summary of the book's main concepts was right on.

Contemporary Authors' draft entry on TPMB

Here it is with no comment from me (just an enter-it-into-the-record sort of thing):

BARNETT, Thomas P. M.

PERSONAL: Son of John E. (a lawyer) and Colleen (Clifford) Barnett; married; wife's name, Vonne; children: four. Education: University of Wisconsin, B.A. (honors); Harvard University, A.M., Ph.D.

ADDRESSES: Home--Portsmouth, RI. Office--Warfare Analysis and Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Code 39, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841. E-mail--tom@thomaspmbarnett.com.

CAREER: CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA, project director for Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Public Research, c. 1990-98; U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, professor and senior strategic researcher, 1998--; Barnett Consulting, Portsmouth, RI, owner, 1998--; Department of Defense, Year 2000 International Security Dimension Project, director; Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, assistant for strategic futures, 2001-03.

MEMBER: Phi Beta Kappa.

WRITINGS:

Romanian and East German Policies in the Third World: Comparing the Strategies of Ceausescu and Honecker, Praeger (Westport, CT), 1992.

The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century, Putnam (New York, NY), 2004.

Contributor of articles to Esquire, New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, and the Washington Post.

SIDELIGHTS:

Military theorist Thomas P. M. Barnett's second book, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century, "is a must read for people who are paid to be or are learning to be strategists," Alan L. Gropman wrote in the Washington Times: "it is packed with new and usually sound ideas." In order to reduce emerging threats to the United States, Barnett theorizes, the United States must concentrate on connecting the areas that have not yet been reached by economic development to the global economy. He terms the developed nations--the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Russia, China, Japan, Australia, Israel--the "core," and the undeveloped regions of Africa, Asia, and South America the "gap." Nearly all threats to the United States originate in the gap, so "shrinking the gap" should be an effective way to reduce those threats. In order to assist with integrating the gap into the core, Barnett suggests that the American military be restructured to make it better suited to peacekeeping and nation-building operations. Barnett's strategy is "clear and comprehensive," wrote Library Journal contributor Zachary T. Irwin. Reviewing the book in Business Week, Stan Crock called The Pentagon's New Map "provocative" and noted that "when describing the inner workings of the Pentagon, Barnett is insightful and often amusing." A Publishers Weekly reviewer also praised the book, commenting that "one of the book's most compelling aspects is its description of the negotiating, infighting and backbiting required to get a hearing for unconventional ideas in the national security establishment."

BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL SOURCES:

PERIODICALS

Booklist, April 15, 2004, Jay Freeman, review of The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century, p. 1408.

Business Week, May 17, 2004, Stan Crock, review of The Pentagon's New Map, p. 24.

Futurist, September-October, 2004, review of The Pentagon's New Map, p. 63.

Kirkus Reviews, February 15, 2004, review of The Pentagon's New Map, pp. 161-162.

Library Journal, June 15, 2004, Zachary T. Irwin, review of The Pentagon's New Map, p. 85.

Publishers Weekly, March 22, 2004, review of The Pentagon's New Map, p. 71.

Washington Times (Washington, DC), August 3, 2004, Alan L. Gropman, review of The Pentagon's New Map, section A, p. 15.

ONLINE

Thomas P. M. Barnett Home Page, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com (August 27, 2004).*

Reviewing the Reviews (Library Journal)

ïPolitical Science [section], Library Journal, 15 June 2004, p. 85.

This review came out a while ago, but I apparently missed it at the time. Caught it recently thanks to citation in Contemporary Authors draft entry sent to me for review. Here's the short review, followed by my commentary:

BARNETT, THOMAS P.M. The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. Putnam. 2004. c.402p. maps. ISBN 0-399-15175-3. $24.95 INT AFFAIRS

Barnett (U.S. Naval War Coll.) here proposes a clear and comprehensive strategy for the United States based on the distinction between "core" states integrated through the world economy and states in the nonintegrated "gap." Because threats to security emanate from states in the gap, the author seeks to shrink the gap by promoting altered "rule sets" governing the flow of people, energy, investment, and security. America's role is to export security and advance connections between the core and the diminishing gap. The author carefully explains why his approach differs from strategic thought aimed at subduing what he calls "arcs of crisis" or "the main enemy." He also makes a good case against those who advocate withdrawal from an "empire" or a "global-chaos strategy." Though he supports the war in Iraq, he criticizes the Bush administration for fostering an impression of vindictiveness rather than a "future worth creating." The reader must imagine how Barnett would deal with states that prefer to remain disconnected, but overall this is an important contribution to debates about globalization and U.S. military policy. Recommended for all academic and public libraries. [Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 1/04.].

--Zachary T. Irwin, Sch. Of Humanities and Social Science, Pennsylvania State Univ., Erie

COMMENTARY: Awfully well-done summary of the book, with quick judgments inserted concerning the argument. All accomplished in 177 words before the summary recommendation. Not sure where he got "the main enemy" or "global-chaos strategy," but I guess he generated those phrases on his own and felt the need to mark them with quotations are jargon, so to speak. Reviews like this are pretty important, because on this basis many libraries choose whether or not to buy a copy or two. That matters when there is a spurt of interest like that following the C-SPAN broadcasts of the brief over Labor Day weekend, because many book stores had already returned most of their unsold copies to Putnam by that time, so your choices were: back order, order online (which quickly became a back-order situation) or check it out of your local library (either directly or via inter-library loan). So a real gateway review I was grateful to receive, especially as it encouraged academic libraries to pick up a copy. Remembering my grad-school days at Harvard, I realize how blessed I was to be able to utilize a research library of Widener's quality, because decisions such as these can make a real difference in how easy it is for your average grad student (typically pretty hard up for money) to get his or her hands on a volume.

No grand jury yet on Iran and its nuke effort

ï"Nuclear Agency's Action on Iran Falls Short of U.S. Goal," by Craig S. Smith, New York Times, 18 September 2004, p. A3.

The U.S. fails again in its ongoing attempts to get the International Atomic Energy Agency to bump up its concerns to the next level: the "grand jury" that is the UN's Security Council. Instead the IAEA is going to issue more "calls" to Iran to stop enriching uranium and answer the agency's outstanding questions of where exactly it's going with its nuclear power programs.

For now, the Europeans favor this softer approach, because they fear having the matter put to a vote in the UNSC. Not a bad stand on their part, given the situation in Iraq and with North Korea. Only so much the system can handle at any one time, which makes Iran's purposefully move in this direction a good strategic call on their part.

There were always trade-offs with going into Iraq, and if you have to make a call on "who next?" it's definitely North Korea before Iran, simply to relieve the human suffering and repression there, which is far greater than in Brezhnev-era-like Iran, where the revolution is pretty much a faded relic of the past.

So, deciding to go into Iraq may well have bought us a nuclear Iran. How bad is that trade? Not as bad as you would think. Having two nuclear powers in the region (Israel and Iran) would probably trigger some movement toward a more permanent solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Authority stand-off. Why? Iran won't feel itself secure enough on regional security matters until it has nukes. Teheran has watched the U.S. dismember Afghanistan on its right and Iraq on its left, and so the mullahs are feeling mighty nervous right now, even as they plot their designs on the Shiite portion of the increasingly tripartite Iraq. They want the nukes because they believe it will make them serious security players in the regionósomebody who can either be ignored nor contained by external powers like the U.S. or the Europeans.

This scenario pathway is probably inescapable now, but that only means the U.S. will need to get back to some sort of dÈtente-like pathway with Teheran following our national election. This was in the works prior to 9/11, and it will likely have to be resurrected by whoever wins in November. Not because they would want to, per se, but because North Korea will probably take precedence and the system simply can't handle another big showdown in the Gulf so long as Iraq continues to burn.

NATO wants a winning hand before committing any more to Afghanistan

ï"NATO Runs Short of Troops to Expand Afghan Peacekeeping," by Craig S. Smith, New York Times, 18 September 2004, p. A3.

A year ago NATO committed to setting up provincial military bases around Afghanistan in order to extend the security rule of the governing coalition led by Karzai into the previously ungovernable hinterlands. As of today, almost nothing has happened. Right now it is estimated that 80% of all Afghans live in areas beyond the control of the Kabul-based central government, which makes the planned national elections pretty iffy. Because NATO is begging its members for troops and receiving little in return, it looks like most of the country will be without any external security forces helping maintain order during the elections.

This sort of half-assed effort by NATO is sending all the wrong signals. They have committedóon paperóto staying in Afghanistan at least through 2009, leaving behind a trained indigenous military of 70k men, but so far only about 15k have been trained and there isn't even enough NATO troops to make the upcoming national elections look like a sure thing.

Right now NATO has 27k peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo, but because the Sys Admin effort there has been equally weak (after all these years), European countries are wary of stealing from that Peter to pay this Paul.

What is holding up NATO is not the money or the manpower so much as the fear of failure. And watching the U.S. effort in Iraq does not give them any reason to suck it up any time soon, because it seems to say to Europe: If you do well anywhere, the U.S. will just rush ahead and create more jobs for you. In effect, the NATO reluctance to do more in Afghanistan is a no-confidence-vote for our occupation efforts to date in Iraq.

This is why I believe the generation of a truly robust Sys Admin-type force within the U.S. military is THE big bottleneck in this global war on terrorism. We will not move forward until we generate this capability and convince our allies throughout the Core (and not just Europe), that we mean business in shrinking the Gap. No winning hand, no coalition support. It's that simple.

You can't join the Core if your president is also your uniformed military leader

ï"Many See Musharraf Keeping Army Post to Cement Power," by David Rohde and Salman Masood, New York Times, 18 September 2004, p. A2.

A sure sign you are stuck in the Gap: your leader is both president and top general. If you are afraid to rule politically without direct, uniformed control over the military, then you are not running a stable national system, but one always just a few steps away from a military coup (which, of course, is how Musharraf came to power five years ago).

Military leaders have been "saving" republics like that going all the way back to Julius Caesar, and the historical record is very bleak indeed.

Reviewing the Reviews (Air & Space Power Journal)

■ Net Assessment, Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 2004, p. 110

The reviewer here, Col. Fullhart, apparently caught my brief earlier this year as part of the Air Force's Senior Leadership Orientation Course, or SLOC, that occurred at Arlie House out in rural VA last June. I've given my brief at the last two such SLOCs, which I love to participate in, because you're catching colonels just as they become generals (or one-star brigadier generals).

Hereís the complete review, followed by my commentary:

The Pentagonís New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

by Thomas P. M. Barnett. G. P. Putnamís Sons Publishers (http://www.penguinputnam.com), 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, 2004, 320 pages, $26.95 (hardcover).

Run, donít walk, to your local bookstore and buy this book or order it on your computer! Why? Let me explain. I first met Thomas Barnett in a briefing he gave to a group of recent brigadier-general selectees. At the beginning, some thought that this might be a square-filler lecture on world events. By the time he finished, however, much of the oxygen had left the room. I quickly followed up with a Web search (http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com), yielding an Esquire article on Barnett that outlined a new way of looking at where our future threats would come from and what implications they held for our military in generalóand the Air Force in particular. Needless to say, I was delighted when I heard that a forthcoming book of his would expand on the subject. It didnít disappoint.

In brief, The Pentagonís New Map outlines the demise of the nation-state as the principal model for future adversarial scenarios. Barnett provides some credible statistics and evidence of the relationship between "disconnected" parts of the worldóstretching in a band from parts of Africa, through the Middle East, and into Asiaóthat have recently served as a breeding ground for what we have collectively called terrorists. Dealing with such circumstances will challenge traditional military thinking, alter the types of programs and equipment needed, and expand the concept of jointnessóincluding a totally revised and energized interagency process. Such ideas are now regularly making the rounds in Washington, DC, and other arenas, even to the extent that we will need a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency process. Barnettís book gives as good an insight as any Iíve read into some of the thinking taking place throughout the Bush administration. It promises to help shape discussions and decisions that will determine the outcome of the next Quadrennial Defense Review, assessment of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, and changes contemplated for the Total Force. Thus, the answer to my question "Why do you need to buy The Pentagonís New Map?" is that it will help you understand the most likely world in which you will lead and the changes that world portends for our military.

Col Randal D. Fullhart, USAF

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

COMMENTARY: As reviews go, this one was more "both thumbs up!" than a summary of the main points. That's fine, because I appreciate what Fullhart was trying to do in this short space of words: get other officers to read the book. In that regard, he certainly gives it his all, meaning he uses all the right buzz phrases and gives all the right reasons why somebody moving up the ranks of the Air Force should really make the effort to read PNM. Throwing out the notion of a Goldwater-Nichols Act for interagency processes is a good one. G-N set the standard back in 1986 for the concept of inter-service jointness that defines the modern U.S. military's unprecedented prowess in warfighting. I agree that something equally profound needs to be written into law regarding the interagency process that must come to define our unprecedented prowess in waging peaceóif we're ever going to secure any lasting victories in this Global War on Terrorism. I look forward (hopefully) to meeting this guy when I brief at Air University in a few weeks.

The Pentagon's new long-term strategy

■"Shift From Traditional War Seen at Pentagon," by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 3 September 2004, p. A1.

An article describing a much-celebrated brief given to SECDEF Rumsfeld regarding "a new long-term strategy that shifts spending and resources away from large-scale warfare to build more agile, specialized forces for fighting guerrilla wars, confronting terrorism and handling less conventional threats."

According to the principal undersecretary for policy, Ryan Henry, who gave the brief:

The lesson learned in Iraqi Freedom is that in some areas, we have capabilities overmatch . . . We can't see many competitors that are coming at us in the traditional domain . . . In the business world, this is the equivalent of coming up with a new product in a new market.

Hmm. New product, new market. I like the lingo. It's almost like he's talking about the exporting of security!

Here's one key new idea in the mix: the "stretch goal" of "being able to invade a country, keep 200,000 troops there for five years, and be able to organize, train and equip a local military force of 100,000 troops in just six months."

Now, you have to wonder why there is such the huge rush to train the local troops in six months if the U.S. plans on staying five years. I mean, it's almost like they don't want to admit that the U.S. military is going to be administering a political and economic system for any length of time.

Hmm. Administering a system. I like that phrase as well!

Here's the best part of the article, though. Check out the graphics from the PowerPoint brief. The old view shows an almost Manthorpe Curve-like unity of purpose: focusing on the "big one" of conventional great power war. But the new view shows a force spread out unevenly toward the two ends of the spectrum, almost as if one is focused on big-time, catastrophic war and the other is focused on the "everything else," with less left over It's almost as if the force is being split in two in terms of capabilities!

Try this as you look at the slide: turn your head sideways by leaning to the right. Now substitute "individual" for "guerrilla and unconventional wars and counterterrorism," swap out "nation" for "conventional state-to-state wars," and plug in "system" for "weapons of mass destruction and new technological threats." Then, check out my diamond-vs-hour-glass capabilities slide from my brief and tell me we're not basically talking the same deal.

If only we had waited to invade! Saddam really wanted WMD, after all!

■"Iraq Study Finds Desire For Arms, But Not Capacity: No Large-Scale Program; Draft Is Said to Cite Intent by Hussein to Act if U.N. Eased Curbs," by Douglas Jehl, New York Times, 17 September 2004, p. A1.

This lengthy government report basically confirms what we've heard before: no evidence of any big WMD program in Iraq at the time of invasion. The new part is the assertion that Saddam displayed a clear intent to seek WMD if the UN ever lifted its sanctions.

Aha! Say some. That proves the sanctions worked.

Yes, they worked. They also probably killed a half-million Iraqis under the age of 5 because of lack of access to enough nutrition and medical care (don't believe me, ask UNICEF, which generated the estimate.

So we could have chosen to either keep on killing 50,000 Iraqi kids a year or let Saddam get back to his goal of WMD.

Or we could have stopped all those deaths, losing 1k of our own people in the process and triggering a deadly insurgency that has killed a mere fraction of that horrific number, AND removed Saddam from power along with the threat of his getting his hands on WMD.

Ah, but who cares about 50,000 Iraqi kids dying a year? I guess I missed that footage in Michael Moore's movie.

Don't tell me those brave American military personnel sacrificed their lives for nothing.

DHS: The Department of Agriculture for the Twenty-First Century!

■"Watch Out," Joseph S. Nye's Review of Fortress America by Matthew Brzezinski, Washington Post, 12 September 2004, p. 3 [Book World].

I have long predicted that the Department of Homeland Security will become the Department of Agriculture for the 21st century. What do I mean by that? The joke on Ag is that it now has something like two bureaucrats for every farmer in America. Well, this review notes that DHS has 186,000 employees, and most good estimates of global terrorism put the highest numbers of active players in the 10,000 range, with a potential for almost 100,000 more active sympathesizers or potential recruits. That means we already have one DHS employee for every terrorist on the planet and, with any luck (given the recent Republican flare for enlarging government), we'll pass the 2-for-1 mark within the second Bush Administration.

Best line in the book: Israeli security expert who says TSA stands for "thousands standing around."

A more optimistic view on Indonesia as a Seam State

■"In Vast Archipelago, Unlikely Force Gains Grip: Democracy; Muslim Nation Is Expected To Unseat Leader in Runoff; Undeterred by Bombings," by Timothy Mapes, Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2004, p. A1.

Yesterday I cited Seam States as where the bombs go off, like in Indonesia. But Seam States are also where you'll find the radical democrats standing up to radical terrorists, corrupt bureaucrats, and indifferent corporations:

Just six years after the bloody collapse of President Suharto's 32-year authoritarian regime, thousands of citizens groups have sprung up across the archipelago, fighting for everything from environmental protection to human rights, and challenging Indonesia's tradition of government by tiny elite. They have been aided by the blossoming of a free and aggressive local media after decades of suppression under Mr. Suharto.

The vertical shock of Suharto's stunning downfall unleashed a series of quiet horizontal scenarios:

While Indonesia's decentralization drive initially unleashed a wave of corruption, it also held the seeds for democratic reform. Undertaken to frustrate the ability of another dictator to take power, decentralization has given citizens the ability to make a difference and fight corruption in their local governments. Now, it's having an impact on the national stage.

Tradition yielding to new rules. An authoritarian regime yielding to democracy. A country opening up to the outside world, only to suffer corruption and terrorism and yetólife gets better as a result.

That's a Seam State in a nutshell. It's on the edge of both the Functioning Core and the Non-Integrating Gap. It's full of tumult and some real flashes of violence, but it's also full of hope and potential that needs to be nurtured by the Core's great powers.

Just about caught up to my life

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 16 September 2004

The time since we got back from China has been rather hellish in terms of scheduling. As I had expected, a ton of invitations for speaking engagements flowed into my email accounts while I was in China throughout most of August, and keeping track of what I said to whom got rather nightmarish as we kept switching cities every week. Then, when I got back to the office, there was the magnificent effort of trying to untangle all these dates, eventually saying no to a bunch of them and tying the rest up in bundles as best I could.

Then the C-SPAN broadcast hit and I spent a week doing almost nothing but email, right as my three oldest kids were getting back to school and we were adjusting to having a new baby in the house. Then, just as that cleared, a new wave of invitations started streaming in, both public and private (with the latter mostly being universities right now). Suffice it to say I am booking (both across the US and overseas) through April of '05 right now. Since I can't really rely on my admin guy at the college for help on anything beyond handling all my travel requirements, vouchers, etc., I am my own scheduler, which really makes me appreciate how nice it would be to have an assistant.

But, finally I am starting to get ahead of the curveójust a little bit. The yellow sticky notes around my screen in my office are slowly being reduced in number, and I've drastically cut down the number of times I've had to exclaim to my wife "Was I supposed to do that?" in recent days, so I'm starting to feel myself to be the master of my domain once again.

In general, I'm shifting away from the concerns of promoting the book (and all the media stuff that entails) and toward the promotion of the visionóor bureaucratic change that vision aspires to.

[BTW, right now I'm beating Niall Ferguson, Sam Huntington, and Bob Woodward on BarnesandNoble.com, and Lee Harris, John Lewis Gaddis and Walter Russell Mead on Amazon.com--not that I track the "comparables" obsessively or anything . . .]

I know, I know, so many reviews point out how "unrealistic" many of my ideas are, and yet somehow that doesn't stop various military commands, the Pentagon, the Joint Staff, the State Department, the national labs, and the intelligence community from issuing all these invitations for high-level briefs andóbetter yetódiscussions and informal advisory roles. As we planned with Putnam, the book is now just ripening in many policy and decision makers' minds as a serious road map for change during whatever transition emerges from this national election (to Bush II or Kerry I). So everybody who's inviting me across the USG is doing so with an eye to whatever strategic planning process they're currently working through. I don't pretend to have many answers (I didn't leave much out of the bookóthat was the whole point!), just a consistent framework for viewing the world and where U.S. national security policy should want to take that world.

Of course, having the capacity for real big-picture stuff not only puts you in high demand at moments like these, but it gets you all sorts of unwanted attention from those (like my TX admirer yesterday) who are more than certain that you're part of the global plot for . . . . somebody . . . . to rule the world. [I realize I should know who, but frankly, after you've been called all the names I've been called, you have a hard time remembering which side in this epic struggle you're supposed to be working forósigh!].

Good thing I handle ambivalence well . . .

Today I offer yet another review. This one is a second one from the Washington Times (no direct link to archives that charge). The first one was by Congressman Mac Thornberry (R-TX) back in early June, but apparently that wasn't considered either a formal review (although it listed the book title like one, it's actual title was "Rethinking Strategy") or the editors there decided that once was not enough. I know the author of this review vaguely, and his split verdict is typical of manyóbut not all, by any means--senior academics in the world of professional military education.

Following the review, hereís todayís catch:

■How Chechnya joined the GWOTóon the wrong side

■Iraq's new map

■The Gap is not a Muslim world (half-true)

■Russia's 9/11 (part 1) was just as ugly as ours

■When FDI comes a knockin' in the Gap

■Regime change in Japan: send in the lawyers!

Reviewing the Reviews (Alan Gropman in Washington Times)

■ "Minding 'the gap': Foreign policy in the present reality," by Alan L. Gropman, Washington Times, 3 August 2004, p. 15.

Gropman is a professor at National Defense University in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is, by and large, a supporter of my work, having arrangedófor exampleómy talk to the worldwide conference of civil affairs officers last June in Raleigh NC. But he's also a critic, which isn't a problem per se, except that his criticism is so absolutely "here and now" on a vision that purposely tries to extend itself over decades (check out his title). Despite that tendency toward obtuseness, it's an interesting enough read.

Hereís the complete review, followed by my commentary:

Minding 'the gap'
Foreign policy in the present reality
By Alan L. Gropman

[insert]

Political books

The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

Thomas P.M. Barnett

Putnam, $26.95, 435 pages (with front cover art)

Thomas Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" is a must read for people who are paid to be or are learning to be strategists, because it is packed with new and usually sound ideas. Its thrust is solid, if not all of its branches, and there is plenty of food for thought herein to drive constructive discussions in the Pentagon, at U.S. war colleges and in defense-oriented think tanks.

Thomas Barnett's concept is that the United States and the remainder of what he calls "the core"ómost of Europe, Northeast Asia and the Antipodesówill know no peace and will ultimately lose the war on terrorism unless it shrinks what the author calls "the gap"óthe rest of the world including nearly all of Africa, most of South America, Central Asia, the Middle East (excepting Israel), and most of Southeast and Southwest Asia.

The core is "connected"óthat is, it is globalizedóand it follows the rules acceptable to the market-oriented world, which induces a smooth flow of capital, people, energy and security.

The gap, on the other hand, has not been globalized, because it does not follow the rules, and this denies it the foreign direct investment that would lift it economically and psychologically.

The disconnected gap has become a base for smuggling of drugs and people, crime, money laundering and, most importantly, terrorists. The role of the United States is to lead the core in "shrinking the gap" by globalizing it. The author adopts a benign phrase for America's proper role: "System Administrator."

For America to become this, Mr. Barnett calls for a more enlightened foreign policy, an improved and reformed State Department, and a quite different military.

He also calls for an end to the Pentagon's obsession with a rising peer competitor (China) and its insistence on force-structuring for a war he believes we will never fight. He demands a vastly increased focus on military forces that can be useful in connecting the disconnected.

The author recognizes the necessity of maintaining a war-fighting force, albeit reduced, to deter any prospective adversary that might consider challenging the United States militarily. He then describes the rest of the military as a force trained and equipped to engage in peace operations.

Moreover, he recognizes that the Defense Department, through it has the potential to be infinitely useful in globalizing missions, must be much more closely integrated in interagency policies and activities, because improving the lot of the states and people in the gap is a prodigious task.

"The Pentagon's New Map" has shortcomings, however. The author has an astonishing unrealistic view of both international and domestic political realities. He seems to have no idea of how much negative baggage any U.S. president in the year 2004 carries as he tries to make the United States the "System Administrator."

These do not detract from the key thrusts of the book, but many of his proposed actions are idealistic and impractical as this country "shrinks the gap."

To begin with, the United States may be, as he argues, the greatest force for good in the world, but too many in the world do not see America that way and would too often see its "System Administrator" actions as self-serving and not done to benefit "the gap."

Has he missed the way most of the world views our war in Iraq? Were he to take his ideas overseas, he would find great skepticism about the United States. Mr. Barnett would hear distrust and cynicism, not only from current and previous challengers like Iran and North Korea, but also from allies like France and Germany.

He understands that shrinking the gap means that America must buy what is produced in the gap, for example agricultural products and textiles, but he ignores the power of agricultural and dairy lobbies in the United States. Taking an example that will stand for dozens: In the most recent free-trade agreement discussions with AustraliaóAmerica's most loyal ally in the Asia-Pacific regionóthe United States deliberately excluded sugar from the agreement, a commodity produced in great abundance Down Under.

Mr. Barnett also advocates the removal "of Kim Jong Il from power [f]ollowing the disposal of Saddam Hussein," without a word of explanation on how the People's Republic would view this.

These departures from reality, however, do not bar this reviewer's strong recommendation to strategic thinkers to read "The Pentagon's New Map."

Alan L. Gropman is the distinguished professor of national security policy at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. His views are his own.

COMMENTARY: Gropman does a nice review of the main points of the book, but then gets rather myopic in his view in terms of its "shortcomings." I don't advocate the Sys Admin force as something to be accomplished overnight by the incoming administration in January 2005. I am very clear in the book that this will be an evolution over several years. Gropman seems awfully caught up in the "present reality" of George Bush's administration. So yeah, this White House has pissed off a lot of people around the world, but restoring that reputation doesn't have to take any longer than it did to damage it: it's simply called electing somebody new and different to the White House.

Gropman also misses the arguments I make in the book about the Sys Admin force being highly multilateral. He makes it seem as though it's strictly a U.S. forceóagain filtering too much of his analysis through the "present reality." I mean, geez! I'm supposed to be surprised that Iran and North Korea won't like the book? I've briefed foreign militaries from all over the world on this subject, and have presented the brief in India, China, and the UK, with invitations coming from a host of other nations, to include Australia, and guess what? They all seem to get the concepts just fine. In fact, it was the Chinese themselves who said my "pragmatic idealism" would be too complex for most Western minds to comprehend (claiming, naturally, that only a sophisticated mindset like those possessed by the Chinese themselves could understand this pairing of Yin [Sys Admin] and Yang [Leviathan]) andóyou know what?óbased on this review I'm beginning to wonder if they're not right!

As for his trade examples, Gropman needs to pay more attention to the WTO Doha Development round negotiations, where the Old Core just gave up huge concessions on ag subsidies and tariffs, despite "the power of the agricultural and dairy lobbies" (Hey buddy! I'm from Wisconsin here! Donít tell me about the dairy lobby!).

Yes, he does tap me on not explaining in detail how I think Kim should go down in North Korea. Amazingly, I don't try to pull that one out of my ass whole-cloth in the book.

In the end, it's a typically academic review: likes the book but has to point out my many "departures from reality." Gropman's main failing in his inability to get out of his "present reality."