Lots more press for the USA-USMC dual-designated COIN strategy

ARTICLE: "Military Hones A New Strategy On Insurgency," by Michael R. Gordon, New York Times, 5 October 2006, p. A1.

USMC PUBLICATION: "Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach," signed by Lt. Gen. J.N. Mattis, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 14 June 2006.

ARTICLE: "Spinning pop tunes to beat the Taliban," by Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 2006.

The new counter-insurgency doctrine is rolling out, catching more and more attention from the press.

I was privileged to have the manual briefed to me by Petraeus' people at Leavenworth when I was there lecturing the student body and doing interviews for the "Monks of War" piece last December. I liked what I saw then and I still like what I see now.

This is the Army and Marines really beginning to learn from Afghanistan and Iraq in a doctrinal sense. The more that operational experience piles up, the harder it will be to say no to them in budget battles.

The paradoxes of counterinsurgency listed in the NYT piece sounds like a Nine Commandments for the SysAdmin force:

1) The more you protect your force, the less secure you are (If military forces stay locked up in compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared and cede the initiative to insurgents.)

2) The more force used, the less effective it is (Using substantial force increases the risk of collateral damage and mistakes, and increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda.)

3) The more successful counterinsurgency is, the less force that can be used and the more risk that must be accepted (As the level of insurgent violence drops, the military must be used less, with stricter rules of engagement, and the police force used more.)

4) Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction (Often an insurgent carries out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of causing a reaction that can then be exploited.)

5) The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot (Often dollars and ballots have more impact than bombs and bullets.)

6) The host nation's doing something tolerably is better than our doing it well (Long-term success requires the establishment of viable indigenous leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant American support.)

7) If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next (Insurgents quickly adapt to successful counterinsurgency practices. The more effective a tactic is, the faster it becomes out of date.)

8) Tactical success guarantees nothing (Military actions by themselves cannot achieve success.)

9) Most of the important decisions are not made by generals (Successful counterinsurgency relies on the competence and judgment of soldiers and marines on all levels.)

You can see Petraeus and Mattis all over this document, with a lot of Nagl too. Actually you see T.E. Lawrence shining through them all, showing the time travel involved.

Yes, as Dennis Tighe of the Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth noted in the NYT piece, moving in the SysAdmin direction raises fears that the Army and Marines will lose their ability for high-end traditional warfare, but that's where the transformed Leviathan force matters. That force should have a small ground footprint and be dominated by air and sea power superiority. No one on the planet has that power projection capability, so let's keep it strong but reasonably sized vis-a-vis the SysAdmin, which, so long as it has the Marines, will still know how to fight high-intensity as required.

Mattis's little pub is a neat gem that explains the new approach nicely. My favorite quote:

Marines need to learn when to fight with weapons and when to fight with information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost toward good governance for the local people.

Thus the Maslowian diagram on page 6 (which looks just like the one in my brief that I use to explain the Development-in-a-Box concept that Steve DeAngelis and I work hard to spread the gospel on) that details the "six lines of operation" includes not just info ops and combat ops, but also governance, "train and employ" local forces, essential services and economic development.

The mottoes for each are great:

Governance = "for the people"

Information Operations = "nothing but the truth" (getting out there on that 5GW ledge, methinks)

Combat Operations = "war of the stiletto"

Train and Employ = "breathing room" (echoing Abizaid's dictum that the military only buys you time)

Essential Services = "stop the bleeding"

Economic Development = "toward a better life" (or perhaps a "future worth creating"!).

Good stuff that speaks to both new opportunities (like the story on spinning records for the Taliban) and new challenges implied.

Mattis' piece ends with a series of force development implications:

--better collaboration with the rest of the US government

--training Marines to be "both fighters and peace builders"

--train Marines in cultural intell, foreign languages, negotiation and dispute resolution

--long-term planning capacity for COIN

Sounds like Mattis is building the SysAdmin from the inside out, just like I expected (the bucks and bodies are found in DoD--so go figure!)

Thanks to readers and fellow bloggers for sending me the links.

Iraq videos on YouTube are not the morale threat they seem

ARTICLE: "Now on YouTube: Iraq Videos Of U.S. Troops Under Attack," by Edward Wyatt, New York Times, 6 October 2006, p. A1.

ARTICLE: "U.S. Casualties in Iraq Rise Sharply: Growing American Role in Staving Off Civil War Leads to Most Wounded Since 2004," by Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, 8 October 2006, p. A1.

ARTICLE: "G.O.P.’s Baker Hints Iraq Plan Needs Change, " by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 9 October 2006,

ARTICLE: "Rumsfeld Shift Lets Army Seek Larger Budget," by Thom Shanker and David S. Cloud, New York Times, 8 October 2006.

Our morale taking a hit on YouTube? Losing that 4GW venue?

I honestly don't think so. I think the nation needs to get a whole lot more honest and realistic about what this Long War will involve.

You can argue Iraq-or-not. But you can't argue that we won't face this battlespace time and time again in the future. The questions are locale and timing only.

So is it wrong to show our troops fighting and dying?

No.

We live in an age of hyper-reality, and people expect not to be shielded from anything. By letting the floodgates open on such images and video, we connect the American public to the sacrifices of the troops, and if those sacrifices seem like the result of too few troops, then so much the better. If a change in policy is needed (like more multilateralism on Iraq, as I'm sure Baker will advocate), then so much the better. If the Army needs a bigger budget, then so much the better.

Pretending you can insulate the American public from this knowledge gives our enemies the potential for 4GW victories over our morale. Continuing yesterday's post, by making all this far more transparent, we change the conditions of observation, making transparency our greatest asset.

Things need to change.

Transformation of American air power is consummated. The Leviathan is as slim as it needs to be. Rummy was right.

But the transformation of American ground power is embryonic at best. The SysAdmin is starved and neglected and isn't what it needs to be. Shinseki was right. Petraeus and Mattis and Abizaid and Schoomaker are right--and getting harder to ignore.

The need to find villians on our side for everything won't go away, but it should. This isn't about killing the Leviathan so the SysAdmin can live, but simply rebalancing the force for the Long War ahead.

A great quote from the Army budget story:

“Do we lower our strategy, or do we raise our resources?” said the official, who was given anonymity to discuss budget deliberations. “That’s where we’re at.”

The more honest we are with ourselves, the better.

This isn't about making the next war go better, but making sure we can manage the next opportunity for post-whatever peace.

In America, we love to confront our problems and our insecurities head-on. Some of it's Oprah, and some of it's "Law and Order" and "C.S.I." Making transparent that which scares us is good.

As with most things in life, it's all about getting there first. Here, it's the sense of being realistic about the road that lies ahead.

Lula, we hardly know ye

EDITORIAL: "Who leads Latin America? A champion of Brazil's poor, Lula has lost ground to corruption, economic torpor and his Venezuelan rival," The Economist, 30 September 2006, p. 11.

SPECIAL REPORT: "Love Lula if you're poor, worry if you're not," The Economist, 30 September 2006, p. 29.

Brazil is clearly the weakest of the BRIC pillars (Brazil, Russia, India and China), but it's also the most admirable in its attempts to lead on economic matters of justice and fair trade. That's why Chavez's apparent eclipsing of Lula as THE voice championing Latin America's poor and the Gap in general is disconcerting.

Chavez does little to improve his own country, as his economic strategy is similar to Ahmadinejad's in Iran (basically an eating-your-seed-corn populism that puts the nation's "wealth" [oil revenues] on the kitchen table while doing nothing to improve the economy's competitiveness over the long haul--zero-sum thinking at its best).

Chavez's push to get Latin America's seat on the UN Security Council (actually, he's trying to buy a seat with well-timed aid) demonstrates--yet again--what a waste of time it is to consider the UN's reform. Yet another reason why I put my hopes in a rising G-20 structure.

Lula hasn't done much during his stint to push further economic reforms in Brazil, living far too much off the work of his predecessor, Henrique Cardosa (a big point in the editorial). Brazil's percentage of population living below the poverty line has fallen from 35% to about 23% since 1990, and Lula's time has seen about a third of that drop. But he's also eschewed, primarily out of deference to his leftist supporters, cutting back on wasteful public spending habits, which continue to crowd out market development.

While I praise Lula's past efforts in venues like the WTO to champion Gap economic causes, I believe that, in the end, his time will be viewed as an interregnum--a period of caboose braking by the rural poor, a breather from needed reforms.

And that's too bad, because oil prices give Chavez his 15 minutes in the meantime, and his brand of economic nationalism will do nothing to lift Latin America's economic fortunes

The natural version of the hypoallergenic cat is a lot cheaper

ARTICLE: "Cat Lovers Lining Up for No-Sneeze Kitties," by Elisabeth Rosenthal, New York Times, 6 October 2006, p. A14.

Consider this a public service announcement.

A company in San Diego says it has genetically engineered cats which now lack the molecule in their spit that generates the allergic reaction in humans (the spit dries in their fur when they clean themselves, and the resulting "dander" is what enters the air you take in, giving you the allergic response). They want $4k and all sorts of up-front screening to own one of these cats.

What the article does not mention is that there is a breed that already naturally achieved this result: Siberian cats, which came to America only after the end of the USSR. Siberians run about $800-$1000. They naturally lack the molecule in question, making them normally non-allergenic. We know this, because we have two in a house where several people suffers cat allergies but have no problem with these two cats. We've also had plenty of guests around them, including overnight, with no response.

Plus, Siberians are very good looking, and the neatest, most dog-like cats you'll ever own. Very well tempered.

We got our two from a dealer in Georgia, near Atlanta. Both flew up on Delta flights. Worked like a charm.

This "breakthrough" reminds me of Temperpedic's marketing, pretending like they are the only company in the world that can get you a memory foam mattress, when actually any good mattress factory can build one for you custom at half the price. Ah, but Temperpedic's mattress is "endorsed" by NASA! Like you'd trust NASA on beds. Truth is, NASA had the technology developed but then never used it, because the material gets hard in the cold (you've never seen a more rock-hard mattress than a memory foam mattress delivered in the cold of winter).

Yes, I know. Not my usual stuff, but I like transparency.

Now when I start pontificating on musical theater, I'll really start giving a s--t what Mark Steyn thinks of my writing!

BTW, saw "The Departed" last night with wife and it was spectacular. Never has 141 minutes blown by so fast. The tension is unrelenting. Performances are fantastic from stem to stern and top to bottom.

But now I do want to see "Infernal Affairs," the Japanese original.

Fifth Generation (political) warfare

ARTICLE: "In Clips on YouTube, Politicians Reveal Their Unscripted Side: Rival Posts 'Gotcha' Videos In Tight Montana Race; Kevin O'Brien Vigils," by Amy Schatz, Wall Street Journal 9 October 2006, p. A1.

Constant observation of the foe. Unrelenting surveillance. Every gaffe exposed and then run ad nauseum on the web. His ability to orient himself as desired in the race is disrupted.

Conrad Burns, the incumbent, is trailed everywhere on the campaign by a young operative for the Dems who videotapes him non-stop every chance he gets, waiting for the screw-up.

Once found, it's run on YouTube.

Good enough for the state senator challenger to pull even or even a bit ahead the polls.

An interesting example of the 5th Generation Warfare discussion that ZenPundit and others lead.

I know everyone (including me in my NASCAR "yellow flag" notion) wonders about the war-without-knowledge scenario where the enemy wages but we're unaware anything's even going on. But to me, this scenario will be far more pervasive in our sensor-heavy future world (because that's all this operative is with his Sonycam--a sensor).

That's why extending the net is everything in the Long War, because ubiquitous transparency is our calling-card 5GW weapon.

Tom around the web

+ Pride of place this week goes to Primacy without a Plan? by Nathan Freier in the Autumn 2006 issue of Parameters (pp. 5-21) that opens with a quote from Tom. Thanks to Mark ZPS for sending this in.

+ nykrindc's post Islamic Banking- Innovation in Islam linked Time for America to grow up about the global connectivity of foreign direct investment and Islamism is what goes with globalization.

+ I don't believe I've linked Live from the FDNF before, who lists Tom in the right sidebar as an 'esteemed influence'.

+ Hundreds of Fathoms, Barry Eisler and ZenPundit linked to Intell agencies on Iraq.

+ Coming Anarchy, Villagers with Torches.

+ Argghhh and Draconian Observations linked No truces will be offered to us in the Long War.

+ Draconian Observations also links Tom's This fight heads south: here comes Africa Command, right on cue.

+ Chiasm linked Meanwhile, the 3-Sigma Chinese begin to outcompete the World Bank with their no-strings aid.

More in reserve for next time.

The sandwich generations-of-war strategy

DATELINE: after 18 holes with my boys (and my first two pars!), on the kitchen island, Indy, 8 October 2005

First off, let me apologize for the heavy coding of this post. This is just going to be a stream-of-consciousness exploration on my part (thinking as I type) and I don't care to disrupt the moment by explaining every reference and acronym (as annoying as all those shorthands are). But better to get it out while I think it (and play golf with my boys and keep my wife happy by not surrendering too much of my Sunday on this post).

So here goes:

RevG offered this comment in response to my post on Jim Ellsworth's USPEACECOM proposal, working off my SysAdmin force/Department of Everything Else concepts:

What occurs to me is that what is being suggested is a form of 5GW backed up by 3GW forces to contain and neutralize a 4GW force.

One reason why I never advocate getting rid of the Leviathan is because it keeps the door closed on Great Power War (essentially Third Generation, or WWII-style warfare).

Logically, nukes would have generated its own generation of warfare, but because of their overwhelming destructive power, they instead killed great power war (ending its generational evolution at three). As such, limited war rose to the top of the operational pile in the form of insurgencies, and the "victories" of 4GW (I say "victories," because I've yet see one generate a truly out-of-system outcome over the long haul, as yesterday's 4GW "victors" become today and tomorrow's "emerging markets") basically defined the low-end of the cost-benefit ratio for great powers in warfare (I will wage war by proxy, but not directly--and only if the cost doesn't get too bad).

So if nukes defined the high-end cost-benefit ratio for great powers (better dead than red gets us MAD), then 4GW defined the low-end cost-benefit ratio (if the peace costs too much, don't bother with the war). Coming out of Vietnam, our low-end definition was the "syndrome" itself, which begat the Weinberger Doctrine, then the Powell Doctrine, and then the pottery barn rule--all of which said in no uncertain terms, "we don't do windows" (aka, the postwar, counterinsurgency, peace, reconstruction, etc.).

Defensible in the go-go 90s, when globalization was going to do all the heavy lifting for us and didn't need a bodyguard (Friedman's high-end optimism), but no longer defensible in a Long War that pits us against the latest great resistance to the spread of market economies and all the other stuff they bring--like uppity women.

That overwhelming force concept found itself used in the post-Cold War era basically for collecting bad guys (get Noriega, decide to get Aideed and then fail and then pull out, go after Milosevic and company by causing Serbia enough pain so that the wanted guys are turned over [eventually leading to the natural pairing function to this U.S.-military-as-Core-marshall-development--the ICC], the two Haiti trips both revolved around the fall of bad leaders [first Baby Doc, and then his successor], targeting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and then the "deck of cards" in Iraq).

But just collecting bad guys without altering the conditions by which they arise inside the Gap basically plays into the 4GW strategies of Robb's global guerrillas, because keeping governments in the Gap sub-optimal is what gives 4GW warriors their chance for rule through chaos (i.e., no weak gov in Lebanon, no Hamas).

Now, the natural counter is simply to support authoritarian regimes across the Gap as the next best alternative, but that likewise favors the 4GW warrior over the long haul by creating horrible political and economic and social conditions that feed popular support for insurgencies and rebels and jihadists because--hey--how much worse could it get under them?

So the Leviathan-SysAdmin pairing represents a sandwiching-of-generations strategy.

So long as we keep the Leviathan, we maintain a high barrier of entry to the market of classic great power war, which has the key impact of insulating our military interventions inside the Gap from potential direct countering efforts by fellow Core powers (notice how no one from the Core even contemplates supporting our opposition in the Gap).

Then again, because we don't yet have the postwar capacity we need, fellow Core powers don't need to intervene on the other side's behalf to balance our efforts inside the Gap. In effect, our incompetency does the job for them.

But say we get the SysAdmin up and running, are we entering the realm of 5th Generation Warfare?

I would say yes.

This is essentially the same sort of thing I described in BFA with my NASCAR "yellow flag" scenario (one side is waging a bit o' war without anyone really knowing what happened), with my NASCAR example being somehow one of the drivers engineers a yellow flag situation in order to quietly alter his position in the race without anyone noticing (during yellow flag situations, the rule is you can't advance in position). What I was reaching for there was the same thing Dan was in his fascinating post where he maps the various generations of war by going progressively "upstream" on Boyd's OODA loop (so that 1GW basically worked on your enemy's ability to act, 2GW blasted him at decision points, 3GW disrupted the link from Orient to Decide, and 4GW basically keeps him disoriented, so that 5GW is assumed to win or lose the battle by manipulating your enemy's ability to observe--or, more to the point, be observed).

The key phrase from Dan's analysis that clicked it for me is that once you're observed doing your thing in 5GW, the gig is up, and that follows nicely with my NASCAR scenario (BTW, Art Cebrowski and I were going to set up a research project on this concept at the Naval War College, but our dual "falls" prevented that--his from disease, mine from whatever it was that got me fired).

But the natural counter to that (much like relying on authoritarian govs in the Gap as the natural counter to 4GW--although it's a long-time loser strategy) is the notion that you win by extreme transparency: you democratize "observe" for the world, for nations, for individuals.

Here is where the coming wave of ubiquitous sensing shoved through a SOA-enabled IT world gets really interesting (today it's my MySpace, but tomorrow it's AllSpace!).

So again, the Leviathan-SysAdmin combo seeks to contain 4GW from triggering either the high-end or the low-end cost-benefit calculations for America (as in, self-deterring calculations) as it leads the Core's efforts to shrink the Gap. Our Leviathan is so overwhelming that no fellow Core is intrigued by any sort of "rivarly" with us in the Gap a la the Sovs in the Cold War. It also means that, when needed, we can send in huge firepower to dislodge any dictator of our choosing inside the Gap.

But we can't contain 4GW by just firewalling it off from any connectivity to classic 3GW-style conflicts between great powers (although that's an important point of success for us, cause God knows Osama would love to trigger that sort of dynamic, especially over Iran--ironically enough).

So we need a toolkit of capabilities to firewall off transnational terror from advancing into 5GW (moving from killing today's morale to killing our belief in the future).

SysAdmin is just the immediate post-whatever enabler. It holds the ground.

The DoEE signals our intent to follow through consistently over the long haul.

The A-to-Z rule set for processing politically bankrupt states signals that the Core cannot be divided on this issue (we all recognize there's too much money to be made in the aftermarket).

Development-in-a-Box really gets you into 5GW because it alters the observed reality--pre-emptively--in a sort of bribe-the-proles mode that steals the thunder of the 4GW warrior of today in the same way that social welfare nets and trade unions stifled the rise of socialism in Europe.

So, in effect, DiB helps move the Core from the Horatio Alger phase of lecturing the Gap (just pick yourself up, dust yourself off, and try all over again!) to the seriously seductive phase of active recruitment.

China gives us one model of that seduction-by-development, but its model of infiltrating the Gap is totally bereft of any ambition beyond making sure Taiwan is not recognized diplomatically.

Still, it works, and it shows up much about what will work.

And that's why it seems only natural to me that we marry that Chinese model to something better like DiB, turning it from simple raw-material market-capture to serious jump-starting toward emerging market status (remember those hedge funds getting interested in Africa).

So a SysAdmin-DiB approach that strategically allies us with China and hits them where they ain't (yet strong) would see Core "bribe" Africa pre-emptively with connectivity-leading-to-development (and yes, ultimately pluralism in politics), and perhaps focus with some equal effort on SEAsia and Latin America.

What would we have then as a correlation of forces for the Long War?

The sort of transparency-on-steroids made possible by rule-set automation and enterprise/agency/national resilience (Steve DeAngelis' dream and self-made new industry) makes the Core too tough a venue for 4GWers to pull off anything more than occasional pinpricks.

The Leviathan-SysAdmin combo means we can handle serious threats and serious failures inside the Gap.

Development-in-a-Box (Steve's strategy plus Tom's vision) is how we work the Gap-to-Core journey.

That means we keep 3GW off-limits inside the Core and virtually impossible inside the Gap (you can try it, but we will come). It means we deny evolution toward 5GW in those parts of the Gap we deny to our enemies (if Chavezism is the worst we face, we've already won), and we contain the 4GW threat we now face in SWA to SWA, making clear to al Qaeda that it's now or never and to the authoritarian regimes of the region that they can no longer hope to export their troubles to other parts of the world (thus relieving them from dealing with them directly).

That, to me, is what's so revolutionary about the SysAdmin-DoEE-AtoZ-DiB toolkit: it says to the world that America's getting into the business of marketing its own catch-up strategy WRT globalization, instead of leaving that model's enunciation to either the radical left or right of the Gap (as we did with Marxism, Leninism, fascism, Stalinism, Maoism, Pol Pot-ism, and so on and so on).

[Sean, I'm driving my wife nuts on a Sunday afternoon typing away here after spending the morning playing 18 holes with my sons (yes, my six-year-old played 18 with his new youth clubs), so please add in all the relevant links to ZenPundit, and Coming Anarchy) as I either have a hot date tonight or a lot of explaining to do to the love of my life. Thanks to RevG for triggering this dump and to all the usual suspects for moving the pile so nicely in their various blogs.]

Relevant posts (in chronological order):

+ UNTO THE FIFTH GENERATION OF WAR

+ FIFTH GENERATION WAR IN THE OODA LOOP

+ 5GW

+ 5GW RELOADED: REFLECTING ON 5th GENERATION WAR CONCEPTS

+ Truly formless 5GW

Tom's column for KnoxNews today

Which way to the front in the Long War?

The latest national intelligence estimate is hardly a stunner: Our continuing military intervention in Iraq has become a cause celebre for al-Qaida's global network, swelling its ranks. Democrats naturally seize this as clear proof of President Bush's strategic mistake in toppling Saddam Hussein.

Is Iraq an unnecessary diversion in the Long War?

My answer is no. [read more]

Why is it so hard to get Washington interested in Africa?

ARTICLE: "Fertile Ground: Hedge Funds Travel to Africa: Investing Pools Pour in Money As Nations Get 'Houses in Order,' Other Emerging Markets Fade," by Alistair MacDonald, Wall Street Journal, 6 October 2006, p. C1.

You cannot get DC interested in Africa. The Hill doesn't want to hear about it, nor does the intell community nor the foreign policy intellectuals, nor the State Department, nor the White House.

Despite all the celebrity focus, despite all the rising financial focus, despite the Chinese focus, despite this Long War fight inevitably heading south, despite the Pentagon moving toward an AFRICOM command--despite it all, there is scant interest exhibited in political/civilian DC right now.

Bring it up, as I recently have at various USG, think tank and intell community venues, and you get blank stares. Seriously. It's the same old, same old: not "strategic," simply don't care, and yeah, they'll stipulate on all that suffering.

Africa is a violent wasteland, you are told, and there's no anticipated change.

Wall Street sees it differently, and its prep-the-battlefield forces, the hedge funds, naturally lead the way, signalling key data points that seem to go completely unnoticed in DC:

With stocks in more-traditional emerging markets like Brazil and Russia still close to historical highs, some hedge funds are turning to resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa for investments. The push reflects both the uptick in some of the region's economies and the growth of hedge funds--loosely regulated pools of private capital--and their search for new frontiers.

How to explain this blindspot in DC?

Events in the Mideast obviously dominate, so terrorism remains hot.

And there's the generational hangover in the analytic world: we're still stuffed with people who grew up on Europe and the Sovs.

But seriously, when you track both radical Islam and the global economy's search for that next great cheap labor pool (What a surprise! These two vectors bump into each other!), you're naturally drawn to Africa, not stuck on navel-gazing Europe.

But, to be most blunt, it's that white-guy (and yeah, we're talking a white-man world in DC and esp the intell community) fixation with Islam's apparent conquering of weak-willed Europe that seems to fascinate so many.

I know, I know, it's not a world war until Paris surrenders (and what about those riots?!?), but really, it's a big world out there, so DC might want start noticing some of the clues.

Addendum:

As you look at political risk map of Africa in WSJ hedge fund story (various local and outside sources), you note that the countries with the least risk are on the edges, the next most risk are a layer in from the coast, and that the greatest risk is found in the deepest interior, essentially making central Africa ground zero of the Gap.

Two points from BFA exemplified:

1) shrinking the Gap is marked by contiguous developments (no real leap-frogging in a real, security-based world), and

2) as we shrink the Gap, we walk the dog backwards in terms of the original spread of humanity outta Africa (as in, that's where the original globalization began, and that's where it will end).

Thus my new pet phrase: We're all going to Africa.

Except Washington, apparently.

No, you take them for now...

ARTICLE: "Moscow Trumps West in Battle For Clout in Former Soviet States," by Marc Champion and Guy Chazan, Wall Streeet Journal, 6 October 2006, p. A1.

The Baltics quickly--and expectedly--escaped to both NATO and the EU.

The GUAM gang (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) is on deck, but hasn't really gotten much time at bat in their desire to integrate with the West. But at least they're organizing themselves vis-a-vis Moscow.

But as far as Central Asia is concerned, Moscow's basically captured them all--save Turkemistan.

Are we to be surprised?

Just two years ago, this article notes, the U.S.'s influence seemed ascendant, what with those "temporary' mil bases (some far less so than others, we're finding) dottting the landscape, plus those colored revolutions.

But oil's rise and our military's tie-down in Iraq changes the correlation of forces, to employ an old Soviet strategic phrase.

No surprise that Moscow isn't interested in ceding its so-called near abroad.

But more to the point, nobody's that interested in inheriting the region's security management. Yes, the Chinese, Iranians and Turks are all also laying their tracks, but none really aspires to own (or prevent) the potential problem that is Central Asia.

So no, this fight ain't heading north. Too many countries interested in making sure that doesn't happen, with an implicit sub-contracting to Moscow for a security sphere of influence.

Is it our preferred outcome? No. But it's one we're choosing to live with in the Long War for now. Southwest Asia and South Asia are busy enough, and if we're not tapped by our ongoing portfolio, then this fight heading south into Africa won't make our life any easier as military superpower.

So no, some carping but no real response from the U.S. on Putin's increasing grip on the region. Bigger and more immediate fish to fry.

Georgia, as the piece notes, remains a potential flashpoint, and I see some utility in making our case on Saakashvilli's behalf (Georgia sits near that intersection of Turkey, Iraq and Iran--along with Azerbaijan and Armenia), but no, I don't see the U.S. (or anybody else) challenging Russia over its near abroad any time soon.

No one's really interested--nor should they be.

Good news about Pop!Tech

Pop!Tech will be broadcasting live video of their entire conference for free online!

So, mark your calendar for 9 am EDT on October 20th. Or surf over to the Pop!Tech page and leave yourself a reminder.

Of course, it's also possible that I'll be reminding you ;-)

Hopefully these videos will also be available after the talk as well...

Getting tough on Kim only matters in Beijing--and maybe Seoul

ARTICLE: "U.S. Discusses Giving Seoul Command of Combined Forces," by Norimitsu Onishi, New York Times, 5 October 2006, p. A8.

ARTICLE: "U.S. Sternly Warns North Korea Not to Conduct a Nuclear Test," by David E. Sanger and Jim Yardley, New York Times, 5 October 2006, p. A8.

U.S. moves ahead on giving South Korea wartime control of its own military. South Korea's timetable is 2012, but Washington's is more like 2009.

Seems right to me. South Korea's basically a bystander in the Long War, and it sports a top ten economy and a top ten defense budget. So why are we still there? No domino theory to worry about--just the opposite as China's making the region more capitalistic by the minute.

With Seoul's sunshine policy, they're saying "don't worry, be happy" on Kim's nukes, so let's locate the labor (South Korea) where the problem (North Korea) is and leave the peninsula.

The longer and the more we pretend Kim's our problem, the longer and the more the ROK and China will keep it that way, freeloading on us.

Meanwhile we're running outta Army and Marines and Reserves in Southwest Asia, to the point where Africa, where this fight heads next, is basically off-limits to us for manpower reasons, and somehow we've still got 30,000 troops on the peninsula.

This can't last, and the Bush administration is right to make that clear.

Keep the clock ticking, I say, on both South Korea and China. Neither will grow up on North Korea otherwise, and there's just no U.S.-leading-with-nobody-else-following military OR diplomatic solution on Kim.

Kim knows this, which is why the tougher Chris Hill talks, the more Pyongyang blows him off.

Jim Ellsworth's USPEACECOM proposal

LAND WARFARE PAPERS: SysAdmin: Toward Barnett's Stabilization and Reconstruction Force, by James B. Ellsworth, The Association of the United States Army/The Institute of Land Warfare, No. 57, September 2006, 13 pages.

Although I always welcome critiques of the SysAdmin force concept from experts in the field of musical theater, it's also cool when somebody with professional expertise examines it.

Jim Ellsworth is a former colleague of mine who's on the faculty at the Naval War College. He's got an Army intell background, with an interesting amount of joint perspective (faculty at NWC but also experience in the Air Force Auxiliary). At the college, he teaches the resident elective on the Future of Armed Conflict.

Jim presents the paper at a AUSA conference next week in DC, so it's a reasonably big deal in the professional military education world on two counts. Obviously, having someone of Jim's caliber take on one of your concepts in such a public way is very cool.

Some excerpts:

Foreward by Gordon R. Sullivan, General, United States Army Retired, President

While current operations have brought new emphasis to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, missions focused on these operations in their own right have likely received less attention than they did before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland--overpowered by immediate lessons and imperatives from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Yet as Thomas P.M. Barnett makes clear in his books The Pentagon's New Map and Blueprint for Action, power projection for humanitarian purposes is a potent extension of a time-honored military principle into the realm of grand strategy. To be effective, however, the forces engaged in these missions cannot merely be assembled ad hoc from units designed, equipped and trained for major combat.

This paper explores these issues, concluding that a force structure approach to this challenge is called for and--drawing on the example of USSOCOM--recommending creation of an independent joint command for SSTR.

In Jim's intro, he makes the case that SSTR ops have actually received less overall attention post-9/11 precisely because there's been such a huge uptick in postwar ops in Afghanistan and Iraq. That may seem counter-intuitive, but you have to realize that Jim's exploring SSTR writ large, to include all the usual crisis response and humanitarian disaster relief ops that always go on--year after year and in both war and peace--despite the current high-profile ops in southwest Asia.

Now, those operations have generated a load of interest and response, but Jim's right, attention to SSTR as a whole is down, primarily because of that huge sucking sound called Iraq--and, quite frankly, IEDs.

No argument in current priorities here, but rather an argument that our long-term force structure thinking needs to adjust to the overriding reality that says SSTR is no longer a niche concept, capability or force structure requirement.

I know, I know, it's inconceivable to the mainstream military, but as the operational experience piles up and the Petraeuses and Mattises of the Army and Marines move toward 4th stars, this argument becomes less fantastic because the historical record is clear to those who've spent the bulk of their operational careers in the post-Cold War reality of what I call the Gap.

Why focus on my articulation of concepts that have been around for a while? According to Jim:

Barnett's discussion is especially salient because his is among the most compelling strategic characterizations of the global conflict in which America and her coalition partners are now engaged--making the prominent role he gives SSTR operations (and his arguments for forces dedicated to them) worth careful consideration.

All right then...

Nevertheless, Barnett's focus on grand strategy naturally leaves many details of the road toward his SysAdmin force somewhat vague. What follows seeks to fill in some key blanks, where Barnett leaves them...

The horizontal meets the vertical--sounds good to me.

A good bit:

In theory, the types of interventions described above [postwar, post-strife, post-disaster] could be conducted by one of more civilian agencies, appropriately funded and equipped with an equivalent logistical capability--some would even argue at a significantly lower cost. Furthermore, the presence of the U.S. military in a country on the cusp between peacemaking and peacekeeping may actually inhibit the parties from reaching terms "under the gun," or worse, may weaken their perceived need to keep honoring those terms once that gun is removed.

Unfortunately, these arguments overlook the fact that motion along the spectrum of conflict is neither unidirectional nor predictable. The notion that the combat troops necessary to coerce opposing sides to the bargaining table should be replaced by nonmilitary peace forces once they're seated at it glosses over the opportunity--to tip the balance back toward war--that such transitions offer those who would never have bargained of their own accord. Perhaps more disturbing, having a civilian force--maybe lightly defended by attached military units--to oversee humanitarian missions risks a bloodbath (like that seen recently with United Nations relief workers in Africa) should that balance tip back too far in that direction, too quickly.

As for cost, it seems unlikely that significant savings would result from building new organizations that look like military combat support or combat service support units--instead of simply using those units that already exist.

Further:

Barnett's "pistol packin' Peace Corps" faces the same obstacles to its realization and effectiveness--obstacles including the fact that the joint culture and interoperable command and control structure SSTR operations demand currently exist only within DoD--where they required two decades of evolution under the transformative mandates of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Elsewhere across the federal government, "jointness" is far less advanced: the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)--likely the most ambitious and advanced effort to build a thoroughly interoperable capability--exists in a barely embryonic form today and has drawn its only significant funding via a special, congressionally-authorized transfer from DoD. Barnett himself acknowledges that "the SysAdmin force must grow within... the confines of the Defense Department, even while advocating its divestiture "in the not-too-distant future." His "Department of Everything Else" may in fact represent the desired end state--but the United States, and the world, require SysAdmin capabilities today.

Unfortunately, even the U.S. military--while possessing the capabilities for such operations--is generally not structured for them. Needing a brigade for SSTR, one could get part of what is required with an Army engineer battalion or a Navy construction battalion, but this force might require another unit to purify water, plus a couple of medical units, a military police unit or two, some civil affairs troops to help the populace reestablish civil governance--and maybe a few Marines in case things get ugly. Yet no such standing force structure exists. Most often, planners have taken that Marine unit or some Army infantry, bolstered it with a few of the other assets identified, and sent it out.

Sometimes, something has been forgotten--like some armor in Somalia--with disastrous results. Usually, planner shave muddled through, underutilizing the combat portions of the force for lack of actual combat and overworking the rest, to the point of having to regularly call on reservists--who then exit the ranks in droves because they, their families and their employers didn't anticipate their being gone so much when they signed up. When these units return, senior leaders, policymakers and the public are distressed to learn that they are not as proficient at their "real missions" anymore--and that extended operations in an environment have conditioned them to a degree of caution and second-guessing that is getting them killed in force-on-force exercises.

Such anecdotal reports are widely familiar and suggest that a structural transformation is necessary. The rationale is simple: the ad hoc approach of the past made sense when uniquely humanitarian missions were uncommon and SSTR was an emerging concept of uncertain relevance--but that concept is now proven and enshrined in doctrine. Even before 9/11, the military understood it held unique capabilities for such operations, and even critics of these missions saw that they would likely become more common and require specialized units.

Then Jim goes through a lot of historical evidence and studies from the post-Cold War era, where naturally Somalia and the Balkans loom large.

Jim then explores a number of force structure options, including the usual matricing of existing capabilities for rapid packaging (which he believes will accomplish little), my DoEE proposal (which he sees as too big an immediate leap), and then two intermediate concepts: the Joint Task Force model (a standing command with forces that can be obtained from other commands) and an independent joint command model (a USPEACECOM based on USSOCOM's model).

The latter two ideas are very similar, with the JTF being Jim's "cautious" approach and the PEACECOM being the "aggressive" one.

Me? I would expect a JTF before a PEACECOM and a PEACECOM before a DOEE, and I would see that evolution naturally unfolding over years--and much pain from failure mixed with rising confidence from initial-cut successes.

Jim then finishes with arguments about the reserve/active duty mixes of a PEACECOM.

The concluding para:

For a force that largely remains structured for great-power war, Barnett's challenge may appear daunting. But three years after the "shock and awe" of the major combat phase gave way to post-hostilities chaos in Iraq, and to an insurgency fueled by the difficulties that conventional U.S. forces had in dealing with that chaos, this seems a small price (and a wise investment) for the present--to say nothing of the future.

Here's the weirdest thing about the USPEACECOM proposal: people might assume it would be a massive waste of resources because you'd be stockpiling resources and people that wouldn't be used frequently enough, thus drawing resources from the Leviathan force. In truth, the exact opposite is virtually guaranteed (save for the war-with-China dreams of some), as it will be USPEACECOM that's operating round the clock while it's the traditionally-arrayed forces of the regional commands that will spend the bulk of their optempo doing exercises and standing ready.

As drill-downs go, this one just cracked the surface of the details of what's being proposed here, but these initial cuts are crucial because they take my 30,000-foot arguments and get them down to some bureaucratic and command and control realities. In effect, Jim's working to steer this debate to some very practical point-by-point discussions of where this is all going. As soon as you cross the threshold into force structure, you've past the skin and gotten much closer to bone.

That Jim has gotten this paper presented at the AUSA conference next week in DC is especially encouraging in this context.

I hope the paper will be posted in full somewhere online soon. If it is, we will link.

Racism in late 19th century America

Reading more Benjamin Friedman's "Moral consequences of Economic Growth" where he notes the Jim Crow laws and anti-immigrant laws that blossomed in the hard economic times of the 1880s and 1890s:

...prejudices were clearly a large part of the underlying mtoivation. Many Americans feared that new arrivals were diluting the racial purity of the country's (white, northern European) population, with deleterious consequences both physical and moral.

Sound familar?

Don't cry to me, Eurabia! You know I've always loathed you!

All totalitarian states are revisionist powers, because their existence is incompatible with reality

OP-ED: "Pyongyang Phooey," by Nicholas Eberstadt, Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2006, p. A20.

Nice piece that wells explains Kim's growing confidence vis-a-vis both Seoul and Washington and why dialogue with committed totalitarian regimes is a waste of time. Unlike merely authoritarian regimes, totalitarian ones cannot possibly allow connectivity to flourish with the outside world, because once the profound disconnect is lost, so too is lost the us-against-the-world mindset that justifies the regime's cruel existence.

I know what you're thinking, but fear not. In America we get to have a genuine election for the top job every four years.

Want sanctuary from the law? Head to the Gap

ARTICLE: "Figure in U.S. Options Case Is Granted Bail in Namibia," by John Grobler, New York Times, 4 Oct 2006, p. C6.

Ever notice that when somebody wants to escape the long arm of the law, they escape into the Gap?

Two sides of the same coin

Today's NYT with two full-page political ads on A17 and A18--front to back.

On 17 is "When all the bodies have been buried in Darfur, how will history judge us?"

Of course it argues for the toothless UN to step in with troops to relieve the toothless African Union troops already there. Oh, and it wants a no-fly zone.

The unspoken reality here is stunning: this ad really wants "war monger" Bush to deliver, but because he's so vilified for this kind of stuff from the same crowd of people, by and large (let's be honest), he's in no position to do squat.

Of course, Bill Clinton would be brave enough to do something now, but history judges you by what you actually do DURING your presidency, not the mea culpas afterwards.

Anyway, we're told to send Prez Bush a message... I dunno... Get off your ass and start throwing some military power around!

Ah, but then you turn the page to: "The world can't wait! Drive out the Bush regime!" The accompanying graphic shows the world on fire.

Just like the Darfur page, this one implies that silence equals complicity.

So which one is it, I ask?

You want a crippled presidency to stop the killing or a strong one to start the killing necessary to stop the killing?

We've got to get these people in the same room sometime to discuss the concept of sheer hypocrisy cause the Bush administration sure as hell doesn't have a monopoly right now.

When you're losing the peace, you don't get to celebrate the war

ARTICLE: "In Bill's Fine Print, $20 Million To Celebrate Victory in the War," by Thom Shanker, New York Times, 4 October 2006, p. A1.

Republicans stick a wedge in the Defense budget to celebrate V-I Day, and apparently they hope to blow that wad sometime in the next 12 months.

It's sad we never really were able to mark the tremendous victory that was Saddam's toppling, but that time came and went.

There will never be a great time to celebrate the very difficult postwar, because its conclusion will never be easily recognized--either over here or over there.

And that's too bad, because the vast bulk of our sacrifice came not in the war but the badly managed peace.

To get ready for the Fifth, the Fourth cleans out the Third

ARTICLE: “In Graft Inquiry, Chinese See a Coming Shake-up: Scope Suggest Purge of Officials Loyal to Former Leader,” by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 4 October 2006, p. A1.

Good piece by Kahn.

I’ve been waiting for the second shoe to drop on Jiang Zemin. He held on for so long to the Military Commission, somewhat refusing to fade from the scene and--by doing so--keeping Hu and Wen feeling a little less than secure in their leadership.

Now, the serious housecleaning of the Third Generation begins--apparently--just in time for the naming of the Fifth Generation. Taken in that light, I don’t find too much sinister in this--just the way of Chinese politics in this age. Hu and Wen want to feel secure as they set up the next round of leadership and pursue the agenda items they’ve come to believe will mark their legacy--to include better attention toward the environment.

China’s environmental awakening keeps chasing its economic boom

THE OUTLOOK: “How Weak Pollution Controls May Be Causing a Drag on China’s Economic Growth,” by Jane Spencer, Wall Street Journal, 2 October 2006. P. A2.

TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY: “Visions of ecopolis: China has ambitious plans to build a model ‘eco-city’ near Shanghai. How green will it be? The Economist, 23 September 2006, p. 20.

The Chinese government warms to the notion of “green accounting” that takes into account the externalities imposed by rapid development on the environment. This calculation reduces China’s 10% growth rate to more like 7%, when all the remediation and clean-up and damage to people and places is factored in.

The so-called green gross-domestic-product figures are part of a long-term Chinese government project aimed at quantifying the economic impact of pollution and may mark a shift in strategy for a regime that has promoted unbridled growth as the key to social stability.

Hu’s bought in, sounding the theme of “sustainable development” (an old USAID buzz phrase) in speeches this year.

In a country of 1.3 billion, 400k deaths each year from pollution matter only so much--until your economic development demands just enough development of your court system that people start trying to sue for damages.

Then there’s the problem of promoting local officials purely on how much their regions crank out in GDP--no matter what the environmental costs.

None of this is going to happen overnight, but with grassroots pressure building from below and new explicit acknowledgment of these costs from above, and you begin to see the solution set emerge.

A point I like to make (BFA, for example), and one that’s become a big Tom Friedman theme, is that China’s environmental problems are really an entrepreneurial opportunity that they will seize with a vengeance in coming years--in effect, creating the new rules (in my vernacular). Not only will they be newcomers to the market, but they’ll be amazingly incentivized newcomers, and necessity--as we know--is the mother of invention.

The second story on this model eco-city is a theme we’ve going to see time and time again with China in coming years. Insanely ambitious, but very much in line with where China stands in history right now, reminding me of America near the end of the 19th and start of the 20th century--this sort of singular belief in progress and national achievement.

It hasn’t been cool to be Chinese for a very long time, but it is again today. I think we’re going to see that sort of national confidence get expressed in a lot of interesting--and ultimately helpful--sort of ways.

Yes, all this development will be both aided and hindered by the CCP’s single-party rule, but China’s attempting to do so much simultaneously, and has so many people within its own nation that are desperately poor and needing economic connectivity in the worst way, that even among a lot of young, well-educated and ambitious Chinese you get this response on the subject of democracy: they say in effect that only a fool would advocate rapid transition to democracy in China right now--or somebody hoping to sabotage China’s rapid economic rise.

I know that patience with China is very hard for a lot of Westerners, because we see so much change economically and yet so little change politically and so much environmental damage piling up in the meantime. But people gotta eat before they’ll care about the environment, and they gotta walk (economic freedom) before they run (political freedom).

And no, that route’s not as different from America’s path as you might think--unless you were a white land-owning male from the get-go. But I guess that was just our version of learning to walk before you run--not that that explanation would satisfy those left out of that democracy, much less treated as property.

A good thing to remember with China is that, despite all its centuries, we’re watching a new country essentially grow up from the Year Zero that was the Cultural Revolution (Pol Pot’s great inspiration). So as we see this fantastic historical process unfold, keep in mind how fast China is passing through history.

There is much to be learned in this process, much that informs how we shrink the Gap. We can either hide behind our sense of civilizational superiority, or we can learn.

Me? I’m all for the mixing of the races, which is why I find globalization so gloriously subversive and revolutionary. Anything of ours that’s truly good will naturally survive the process. In my opinion, that’s a confidence worth having.