Lots more press for the USA-USMC dual-designated COIN strategy

ARTICLE: "Military Hones A New Strategy On Insurgency," by Michael R. Gordon, New York Times, 5 October 2006, p. A1.

USMC PUBLICATION: "Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach," signed by Lt. Gen. J.N. Mattis, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 14 June 2006.

ARTICLE: "Spinning pop tunes to beat the Taliban," by Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 2006.

The new counter-insurgency doctrine is rolling out, catching more and more attention from the press.

I was privileged to have the manual briefed to me by Petraeus' people at Leavenworth when I was there lecturing the student body and doing interviews for the "Monks of War" piece last December. I liked what I saw then and I still like what I see now.

This is the Army and Marines really beginning to learn from Afghanistan and Iraq in a doctrinal sense. The more that operational experience piles up, the harder it will be to say no to them in budget battles.

The paradoxes of counterinsurgency listed in the NYT piece sounds like a Nine Commandments for the SysAdmin force:

1) The more you protect your force, the less secure you are (If military forces stay locked up in compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared and cede the initiative to insurgents.)

2) The more force used, the less effective it is (Using substantial force increases the risk of collateral damage and mistakes, and increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda.)

3) The more successful counterinsurgency is, the less force that can be used and the more risk that must be accepted (As the level of insurgent violence drops, the military must be used less, with stricter rules of engagement, and the police force used more.)

4) Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction (Often an insurgent carries out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of causing a reaction that can then be exploited.)

5) The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot (Often dollars and ballots have more impact than bombs and bullets.)

6) The host nation's doing something tolerably is better than our doing it well (Long-term success requires the establishment of viable indigenous leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant American support.)

7) If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next (Insurgents quickly adapt to successful counterinsurgency practices. The more effective a tactic is, the faster it becomes out of date.)

8) Tactical success guarantees nothing (Military actions by themselves cannot achieve success.)

9) Most of the important decisions are not made by generals (Successful counterinsurgency relies on the competence and judgment of soldiers and marines on all levels.)

You can see Petraeus and Mattis all over this document, with a lot of Nagl too. Actually you see T.E. Lawrence shining through them all, showing the time travel involved.

Yes, as Dennis Tighe of the Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth noted in the NYT piece, moving in the SysAdmin direction raises fears that the Army and Marines will lose their ability for high-end traditional warfare, but that's where the transformed Leviathan force matters. That force should have a small ground footprint and be dominated by air and sea power superiority. No one on the planet has that power projection capability, so let's keep it strong but reasonably sized vis-a-vis the SysAdmin, which, so long as it has the Marines, will still know how to fight high-intensity as required.

Mattis's little pub is a neat gem that explains the new approach nicely. My favorite quote:

Marines need to learn when to fight with weapons and when to fight with information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost toward good governance for the local people.

Thus the Maslowian diagram on page 6 (which looks just like the one in my brief that I use to explain the Development-in-a-Box concept that Steve DeAngelis and I work hard to spread the gospel on) that details the "six lines of operation" includes not just info ops and combat ops, but also governance, "train and employ" local forces, essential services and economic development.

The mottoes for each are great:

Governance = "for the people"

Information Operations = "nothing but the truth" (getting out there on that 5GW ledge, methinks)

Combat Operations = "war of the stiletto"

Train and Employ = "breathing room" (echoing Abizaid's dictum that the military only buys you time)

Essential Services = "stop the bleeding"

Economic Development = "toward a better life" (or perhaps a "future worth creating"!).

Good stuff that speaks to both new opportunities (like the story on spinning records for the Taliban) and new challenges implied.

Mattis' piece ends with a series of force development implications:

--better collaboration with the rest of the US government

--training Marines to be "both fighters and peace builders"

--train Marines in cultural intell, foreign languages, negotiation and dispute resolution

--long-term planning capacity for COIN

Sounds like Mattis is building the SysAdmin from the inside out, just like I expected (the bucks and bodies are found in DoD--so go figure!)

Thanks to readers and fellow bloggers for sending me the links.

Comments

[Kevin]

-You can see Petraeus and Mattis all over this document, with a lot of Nagl too. Actually you see T.E. Lawrence shining through them all, showing the time travel involved.-

I see Bill Lind, John Poole, Col. Hammes, Dave Galula, Dave Galula, Dave Galula....

[CT]

Excellent. Progress is coming. Finally?

[Tom Barnett]

I definitely see a lot of Hammes too. Galula's book is required reading at Leavenworth now--for everybody.