Overall, it continues to be good, even though I find he's imprecisely dismissive of the attractiveness right now of the Chinese Model inside the Gap.
For one, he says China's autocratic model of development can't work in ethnically diverse countries and works in China precisely because it's so homogeneous.
My problem with that is two-fold:
1) I don't find China particularly homogeneous, either culturally or linguistically (a sure sign). I think "uniform" China is a myth that land sells to itself to hold the place together despite the great differences (linguistically, for example, far greater than ethnically-divisive and long-time warring Europe). Indeed, China's history of kingdoms fighting kingdoms is longer and just as violent as anything Europe managed, and yet we call one a cauldron of nationalistic hatreds (until recently) and pretend the other is some homogeneous harmonious ethnic unity, when China's history says anything but that. I really feel we mislabel China a lot. To me, you compare China with Europe, not with France or Germany.
2) China's model is autocratic in politics but fairly wide open in economics (thus the corruption problem). So long as the political authoritarianism doesn't advantage one population over others, I'm not sure Collier's statement is as true as he imagines. But it's probably true, in more practical terms, than I care to admit.
Then again, if you describe China's model as single-party rule with state-directed capitalism, I think you're closer to describing a more portable model, so long as the party remains equally accessible by ethnic groups.
But here's what really triggered my post:
It is commonplace that the rich world wants to shift its dependence on oil away from the Middle East. That is where Africa and Central Asia come in. Yet it is also a commonplace that one reason why the Middle East is in such difficulties is that it has had such large oil revenues. Shifting our source of supply simply will not work as a security measure is the resource curse shifts with it. Becoming reliant upon the bottom billion for natural resources sounds to me like Middle East 2.
I have often cast the same argument in reverse: Want to see the Middle East with far less oil wealth? Look at Central Africa.
But it works both ways. The Middle East with substantial wealth (but not widespread development) gets us 9/11 and al Qaeda and the GWOT. Africa with far less resource wealth gets us millions of dead we don't have to care about. Reverse those situations and what do you achieve? Reversed situations and nothing more.
Second point to make on Collier's excellent observation: Guess who's making themselves increasingly dependent on bottom billion natural resources?
China.
Guess who doesn't have a military capable of dealing with that reality?
China.
If we press that vulnerability, are we likely to push China rapidly into democracy or something far worse?
Think about that for a minute.