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Entries from August 1, 2007 - August 31, 2007

5:06AM

Q&A: Goldwater-Nichols analogy?

Michael Brand wrote:


Just read James Dobbins piece in Foreign Affairs piece on Iraq. He paints the Iraq mostly as a system failure in that our interagency process is deficient to handle the new realities of the Long War. He refers that we need something like a Goldwater/Nichols bill to force interagency
collaboration the way G/N forced the military braches to work together.

Any thoughts about what that legislation would look like in a SysAdmin world?

Tom writes:


Bit of dream that's been around for while, but G-N analogy is no good.

G-N forced service cooperation by diminishing power of service secretaries within Defense Department and elevating Joint Staff. That's possible within a department but a whole different affair among departments. The NSC can't aspire to similar heights because full departmental-level secretaries and their agencies won't submit to a coordinating body the way service secretaries did in 1986, because they were already subordinate to SECDEF within an existing department.

So the analogy is a huge stretch: from establishing clear lines of authority within an existing department to establishing the same across them, trying to super-empower a non-budget-owning entity (NSC) to ride herd over them.

That's why I argue for a Department of Everything Else: no bureaucratic center of gravity that controls budget, no real power created.

4:00AM

Questioning the most sacred national interest

ARTICLE: “Backlash Over Book On Policy For Israel: Events featuring authors of a new work are canceled,” by Patricia Cohen, New York Times, 16 August 2007, p. B1.

NEWS ANALYSIS: “Events Prod U.S. to Make New Push for Mideast Deal,” by Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 17 August 2007, p. A5.

“The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” by those venerable, establishment realists, Stephen Walt of Harvard and John Mearsheimer of U. Chicago, is destined to be a bestseller because nothing sells like controversy, and this tome will come with a boatload.

The book is expected to elaborate on the previous article of the same theme the two published in the spring of 2006. That article created a big stir.

Now, as I know something about what it takes to crank a book, it’s clear they got a big book deal from Farrar as soon as their article became famous. That’s how you get a book out 15 months later with this sort of major PR effort lined up, so clearly they seek to capitalize on the original response, which was white-hot in intensity.

I wouldn’t expect new arguments per se, just lots of supporting evidence and examples, which will be fought tooth-and-nail in what should be a vociferous blowback. Indeed, an opposition research book will be released by Palgrave on the same day by Abraham Foxman (“Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control.”).

Man, I would hate to have a book coming out that week! Because not only are two slots gone on the NYT list (amazingly hard to crack), but the media time will be eaten up like crazy, crowding out anybody else trying to break in at the same time.

I am of two minds on the subject: when the article came out last year, I felt like it was the last, sad gasp of the realists playing the Jewish card to explain the complexities of a globalized world where their Newtonian logic no longer holds. [Realists discount globalization in general and economics in particular, preferring to measure power more traditionally, along with their super-abstraction, “national interests,” primarily in terms of military power and the balancing of that power among great powers. To the extent that economics matters, it’s primarily as a trigger for great power competition and warfare over resources and markets.]

So al-Qaeda, the radical Salafis, the war on terror and 9/11 … with none of these things easily explained in balance-of-power terms, we’re essentially treated to this subversion-from-within explanation that portrays how the world’s greatest power was led down this disastrous path of immense blowback (9/11) leading to miscalculations of imperial power (basically, Iraq). Like a Noam Chomsky or a Chalmers Johnson, villains must be found from inside our ranks because the more straight-forward explanations associated with globalization’s advance and traditional Islam’s negative response don’t exactly leave the usual targets to be blamed (corrupt, evil men sitting atop the system).

Arguments for deeper causality are thus refused, because scapegoats are more fun and fulfilling.

In a way, then, these books and their countering books belong to the same sort of 9/11 mythologizing/debunking genre, along with the traditional conspiracy peddlers that tell you the CIA planned 9/11 from start to finish, or that it was a Jewish conspiracy, or whatever. Simply put, people never want to hear that a dedicated small bunch of nuts can do that much damage--or that we’re really that vulnerable. Or that it’s finally time to fix the Middle East because globalization is going to f--k it up so bad in coming years that we have no choice.

No, they want to hear that it’s a vast conspiracy so beyond their everyman capacity to fight that it’s almost god-like, because then it becomes a fear beyond their powers to manage and they’re absolved from any real action beyond nurturing and/or harboring the fear itself. It’s like a religion for crisis freaks, and it’s the fastest growing one out there in this frantic day and age.

Again, to me, the realists are a fading school in crisis. I know, I know, it’s supposed to be the liberal interventionists in crisis because of Iraq’s many disappointments, but with so much of the national security community clearly moving in the direction of progressively solving that equation over time (Why? They can see the future writing on the wall.), the self-congratulatory crowing of the realists (“See! We told you Iraq would be hard! And you can’t fight a war against a tactic!”) sort of came and went with no real impact over the past couple of years.

Yeah, so it’s hard. So it’s complex. So it’s different from the past. What’s your fix for all that? Balancing China? Preparing for WWIII? More missile defense?

As the Middle East refuses to be a “blip” that allows our national security community to return to its past and desired focus on countering rising China, whose main threat now consists of diseased pigs and tainted toys and weird threats over bonds sales, that lengthening “blip” needs to be explained away. You’ve already heard plenty of the oil-Saudi-Syriana-Michael-Moore conspiracy stuff, so now let’s bring on Mel Brook’s “The Inquisition” (What a show!).

Indeed, what a show this will be come 4 September. Get out your race cards, folks...

But having said all that, I don’t find this discussion a bad one per se, despite the desperate motives on all sides. Anything that gets America to question its unquestionable “national interests” is good. If they’re worth defending, that will come out in the wash, but I say, let’s wash ‘em good.

We’re being sold a war right now with Iran that will likely prove the death knell for the Big Bang strategy and all the American lives so far sacrificed for that ambitious goal. And that’s a showstopper that need not occur, especially as dynamics in the region are finally gelling nicely toward the sort of movement I tried to depict in my Mideast-one-year-from-now-column (laid out nicely in the Erlanger piece, where he says “The Bush administration finally seems to understand, one American official said, that there is no sustainable status quo.” To which I reply, “Duh!” Wasn’t that the whole point of the Big Bang?!?!).

To the extent the Walt and Mearsheimer book weakens the go-to-war-with-Iran movement, which is highly fueled by the Israel lobby (I don’t know who could deny that), this will be a good thing. But the blowback such a debate may engender could likewise also get us the war we most surely do not need right now, primarily because it’s the fear of “rising Iran” that gets us so much of the regional potential for transformation.

Admittedly, there are a lot of ways for Big Bang fans to have their cake and eat it too, meaning pathways where we come very close to war with Iran and trigger the movement we want on a host of issues that would not otherwise come about without some shows of strength from our side. The problem is, of course, we’re talking about Bush and Cheney--especially the latter. These guys display no capacity for brinkmanship in that Nixon-Kissinger mode.

Still, the whole thing is gloriously ironic in the sense that Walt and Mearsheimer would never have gotten this sort of opportunity if not for the Big Bang strategy being pursued in the first place, thus opening the door for the full menu of reductionist theories to explain it all away.

Me? I stick with the same explanation I’ve had for years now: Bush the First Term was a lucky break from history, because here was a crowd ripe to rewrite the rules anyway, and 9/11 turned them from a pointless effort on China toward a well-targeted effort on the Persian Gulf. But Bush the Second Term was slated for disaster, for, as I explained in my 2004 call for Kerry, these guys might have been great for proposing new rulesets, they just weren’t the guys we needed to sell them to the rest of the world. In effect, Bush the Second Term is like the revolutionary first generation living too long in power: some guys are good for smashing the old order, but they’re never the ones you want for the rebuild of the next one.

In my grand strategy, then, the Israel lobby is like any other lobby, really: it can screw things up but it can never really make anything good happen on its own, so their sins are almost exclusively of commission in something like this Long War against radical extremism.

So again, if Walt and Mearsheimer weaken the Israel lobby’s current go-to-war-with-Iran effort, that could be a great example of the Big Bang’s many secondary and tertiary effects basically canceling each other out--for the better.

11:17AM

More Iran email

The same reader writes:

But consider the following conversations. Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of England, famously chatted with Mr. Hitler at Munich and thought he was delivering 'peace in our time' to England. Unfortunately, Mr. Hitler didn't really see it that way, and the next year, marched into Poland to begin WWII. While not so famous, Mr. Roosevelt is, I think reliably, reported to have sent emissaries to Mr. Hitler, no friend of course. The point was to see if even at that late date a major war could be avoided. You also know the result, of course.

Mr. Carter, I've read, tried diligently to have conversations with the Ayatollah Khomeini after the U. S. embassy in Tehran was seized. [I've read, I don't know how reliable this is, that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, current president of Iran, was one of the students involved in the embassy attack.] Anyway, the folks in the embassy were held for 444 days, being released on the day Mr. Reagan took the office of President. Bernard Lewis reports in The Crisis of Islam that the embassy folks were turned loose because Iran feared Mr. Reagan would behave like a cowboy.

Mr. Clinton worked diligently when he was President to formulate the Camp David accords between Israel and the Palestinians, represented by Mr. Arafat. Mr. Arafat was only kidding. Mr. Clinton's administration chatted extensively with North Korea, bribing Kim's reign with oil and, I seem to remember, nuclear help. North Korea is still a problem, seems to have ignored agreements -- or so I read.

Mr. Hussein's Iraq government made an agreement, under duress, to allow the United Nations to inspect his land for 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Continually, he put roadblocks in the way of the inspectors, and, finally, Mr. Bush decided that we would look for ourselves. No such weapons were found, but it is opined that the mother of all slight of hands' placed them elsewhere. Who knows?

And I don't really see strong evidence of your position that we aren't willing to talk. WSJ seems to differ with you.

Tom writes:

As soon as I hear the Chamberlain argument re: Iran, I know I'm being sold a bill of historical goods.

Think about the wisdom of selling Ahmadinejad as Hitler? Iran as Nazi Germany? The Iranian office of president as a fuhrer?

We all need to get smarter on Iran.

The rest of the historical cherry-picking comes off much like Michael Ledeen's book-hawking op-ed in the WSJ.

Yes, amazingly, Iran can be accurately portrayed as not being interested whatsoever in solving America's problems in the Middle East. Go figure! But then again, was Stalin ever interested? And yet we dealt with him. Was Mao? Did we ever get any "grand bargain" from the Sovs?

Or did we in each instance simply get what we could from these baddies when we were smart enough to see the overlapping strategic interests of the day?

But Iran doesn't want what we want in the region, we are told.

But didn't Iran want the Taliban gone? Didn't they offer to help, as Leverett reports?

Didn't Iran want Saddam gone? Ditto on various overtures across that timeline?

Is anyone stupid enough to think Shiia Iran favors Sunni-exclusive al Qaeda's vision for the future of the region?

And yet despite all these strategic overlaps, we decide to keep demonizing Iran despite their great ability to screw up our efforts in theater.

Ah, but Iran supports terrorism, we are told. The Sovs did the same on a far larger scale, but somehow we negotiated with them.

Ah, but Iran could get nukes and threaten our friends. The Sovs had plenty and threatened West Europe, but somehow we negotiated with them.

Ah, but Iran is crazy with religion and we all know now that the Sovs--heck, even Mao--were never crazy with ideology, despite all the tens of millions they killed in their various insane schemes. Looking back, the Cold War was just one giant rational exercise in great power balancing.

Christ, I miss the good old days.

No, the far more accurate historical analogy on Iran would be China 1972. Unfortunately, Cheney is no Nixon when it comes to smarts.

Also, remember this when you're being sold the 1938 Hitler-Chamberlain-appeasement model designed to reveal your essential cowardice: England appeased Hitler in the late 1930s because it was significantly weaker than Germany at that point.

That historical analogy just does not apply with Iran today, no matter who you cast as victim.

Not only is U.S. (cast as England) vastly more powerful (conventionally, strategically, and regionally) than the alleged Nazi Germany (Iran), but so is our alleged "Czechoslovakia." If the "Czechs" (Israelis) have 200 nukes this time around compared to our alleged "Hitler's" zero, then how are we or Israel somehow forced to "appease?"

If the argument is simply to get America to fight a pre-emptive war at Israel's bidding, then I fully understand the emotional targeting, but if the argument is focusing on America's strategic objectives in the region, then "Nixon goes to China" is a far more productive historical analogy, especially in terms of the moribund revolution and economy and regime fatigue over international isolation.

Americans really need to get out of the habit of seeing a "Hitler" in every rogue regime. The world is simply not that monotone. The analogy has become an intellectual straightjacket of sorts.

And that, to me, is truly ingenuous.

10:55AM

Teaching rulesets simply

Recalling my opening vignette re: Lambeau in PNM, here's what son Jerry and I work out during his first trip to last night's soggy tundra:

1) 4 tries to score
2) each time you get 10 yards, you get 4 more tries
3) TD gets you 6 points, then you kick ball between goalposts for 1 more
4) if close enough, kick ball through posts for 3 points
5) if you score or if you can't score, you kick to the other team
6) defense can steal the ball by catching a pass or grabbing the loose ball and can score 2 points with a tackle in the other team's endzone.

That's basically it.

Great game at 48-13. O looked okay, but D was fab and special teams rocked!

10:53AM

The elegance of simplicity

OP-ED: Seeing Is Believing, By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, New York Times, August 19, 2007

Cool piece that reminds us to look for the KISS principle in our nation's foreign and security policies.

Smart flags (admirals and generals) call it "the mother-in-law test": if you can't explain it simply and succinctly to her, it's probably too complicated--and too nonsensical--to work.

It's why I peddle what I call "reproducible strategic concepts": "elegant" to fans and "simplistic" to critics.

Thanks to Dan Hare for sending this.

10:44AM

Email: exception on Iran

Tom got this email:

Mr. Barnett:

Saturday's Wall Street Journal [08/18-19/2007, pg A7] had an op-ed piece, almost in response to your column in the Knoxville News Sentinel last Sunday [08/12/2007, pg. G5]. The WSJ article pointed out that "Tehran has no interest in resolving (our problems) at a conference table." It also pointed out a whole bunch of times we -- including the Bush administration -- had talked with Tehran.

Just advocating that we "go talk with our enemies" is a bit ingenuous, don't you think? Still, the column probably was a plus for Mr. Obama.

Tom writes:

We've consistently rejected Iran's serious overtures going back years, a policy well documented by former NSC desk hand Flynt Leverett (Google him) and then cite Iran's intransigence and rhetoric--in venues of our concocting--as evidence that no talks are warranted.

"Disingenuous" is a polite term for the sort of stubborn strategic stupidity that costs American lives each day in Iraq.

But when you elect people who disdain diplomacy, you get the enemies and the wars you deserve.

10:41AM

'And I think to myself...'

ARTICLE: Ireland Learns to Adapt to a Population Spurt, By EAMON QUINN, New York Times, August 19, 2007

Neat story on how Ireland copes with its globalization success.

You know, for a place that long joked--and ruefully so--that its people were the "niggers of Europe," it's truly stunning to see it become so attractive to outsiders that you can have a pic of a Nigerian priest baptizing one of the little people in Dublin.

As Louis Armstrong once sang, "what a wonderful world."

Thanks to Shiva Polefka for sending this.

10:36AM

China will be huge this century, America still number one

ARTICLE: A Chinese Century? Maybe It’s the Next One, By LESTER THUROW, New York Times, August 19, 2007

Great piece by Thurow, my wife's favorite economist (after Reich).

China's growth is stunning, especially considering the low initial base, but it's not as fantastic as Beijing presents or Washington wonks fear.

China will be huge this century, but America will remain number one.

Thanks to Bill Millan for sending this.

10:33AM

US should embrace SCO

POST: The New Great Game...Or Geopolitical Hype?

Good balanced piece.

As two great powers with one of the world's longest borders and a lot of shared strategic concerns in common adjacent areas, it's unremarkable that they cooperate in this truly modest fashion (6,000 troops). Since we want similar things for Central Asia, and aren't looking to sink more assets there, the U.S. should embrace the SCO, not fret about it like some pathetically paranoid superpower ("Are they plotting behind my back?").

As for "signals," both Russia and China say the same thing: we matter, our interests count, and we need to be considered part of any solution.

Absent the neocons' fantasies about "primacy," that's a beautiful world, assuming we remember that the Russians remain Russian and the Chinese remain Chinese.

Does this constitute a "great game"?

2:54AM

This week's column

Sovereign wealth funds: globalization's appetite for risk

As senior managing director of a rapidly growing high-tech company that was - until quite recently - overwhelmingly dependent on "angel" investors, I can readily attest to the joys of financial liquidity. When ordinary individuals accumulate wealth and can invest as they please, good things happen to ambitious entrepreneurs and their start-ups. Call it the wisdom of greedy crowds.

The same principle holds for the global economy: when the system is flush with cash and bursting with investors properly incentivized to spread it around, globalization tends to accelerate. When money is tight, that's historically when trade protectionism kicks in, along with anti-immigrant sentiment.

Simply put, rising income is a gift that keeps on giving, primarily because investment risk is more easily discounted. The more money I've got, the greater my appetite for risky business. Good things may come to those who wait, but even greater sums accrue to aggressive investors.

Read on at KnoxNews.
Read on at Scripps Howard.

Tom says:

A basic primer designed to present ground truth on a new element that some commentators inevitably describe in unnecessarily fear-mongering ways.

6:01PM

Fall begins


Photo_08.jpg

60 degrees and raining, but the 4 F-16s' flyover at the end of the anthem was impressive.

9:43AM

USCG is the protoSysAdmin

ARTICLE: U.S. collaborates on Pacific maritime network, By Richard Halloran, Washington Times, August 17, 2007

Good article on cool program.

To those who always said, "Your SysAdmin blend can never come about!" I've always replied, "It already does and it's called the Coast Guard!"

Part mil, part civilian.
Part cop, part warrior.
Bureaucratically multi-lingual.
Maximally coalitional.

One of my two articles in the Oct. Esquire describes a USN connectivity program that accomplishes similar goals in a revolutionary use of an existing technology.

Thanks to CitizenSAR for sending this.

9:39AM

Q&A: DoEE academy?

Tom got this email:

Tom,

I work in Air Force Space Command and USSTRATCOM doing "Space" stuff. I've been reading regularly for a couple of years, and enjoy trying to connect the "Space" stuff I do and its tech and apps, and the role(s) they would/could play in connecting us and the gap. I frequently get
headaches in these thought exercises. This is my first email.

Heard about this: http://uspublicserviceacademy.org/ on NPR a while back and wondered if it would be a good source of bodies for the DoEE or if you envisioned those bodies gaining experience in other branches of gov't or the private sector prior to "serving" in the DoEE, or some combination of both? Or have I completely missed the mark?

Looking forward to the book formerly known as Vol 3...

Best regards,

Capt. Z

Tom writes:

My guess is both. You'd want both a straight-on, boot-camp-like feeder of baseline bodies (tied to similar training regime for foreign counterparts), plus a finishing-school, advanced training for those coming from associated agencies/mil forces.

2:50AM

750K Chinese overseas

ARTICLE: Chinese flocking in numbers to a new frontier: Africa, By Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, International Herald Tribune, August 17, 2007

Great piece, underscoring a lot of my analysis. Plus a huge new factoid: estimate by China of 750,000 nationals overseas.

Previous estimates from Western news sources rarely went above 100k. I recently used 80k because that's what the Economist said.

Clearly this is much bigger than we realized.

Cool theme? Chinese have been going to frontiers for decades, so no big deal--this 750,000-person "global commute."

Thanks to Shiva Polefka and Bill Millan for sending this.

12:08PM

In the New Core, India will define how slow you can go and still grow fast enough

ARTICLE: "Economic Booms Fails to Generate Optimism in India: A cautious prime minister must bridge the rich-poor gulf," by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 16 August 2007, p. A3.

China's pretty much exploring how fast you can go without the wheels coming off, whereas democratic India, subject to the caboose-braking of the rural poor in free elections, has to play it safer.

Thus, far more than state-authoritarian China, India remains the bellwether of the globalization ball--at once one of its most "shining" examples and an example of how many remain left behind.

India's president Singh puts it well: "India cannot become a nation with islands of high growth and vast areas untouched by development, where the benefits of growth accrue only to a few."

Six decades after independence, almost one-third of India lives below its self-declared poverty line.

The biggest trick lying ahead is likewise highly indicative of the challenge of shrinking the Gap in general: "how to industrialize and move people out of the lagging agricultural sector."

Hmm, bring on the Wal-Mart ...

12:02PM

China and Russians and arms--oh my!

Watching Jack Cafferty on CNN taking emails on China and Russia having joint mil exercises. Most are highly alarmist, such as "worst case possible!"

A strange calculus: Russia's military collapses and is barely left standing after the Soviet Union falls (remembering that's the country that lost the Cold War). When it exercises with the PLA, the Russians come away deeply unimpressed.

This 2 + 2 = maybe 2.7 on a good day, and this is the worst case possible?

12:00PM

What comes next outta China

ARTICLE: "Virus Spreading Alarm and Deadly Pig Disease in China," by David Barboza, New York Times, 16 August 2007, p. C1.

So far no sign of threat to humans, but anything that can harm China's vast pig/pork population could be truly disastrous.

Yet another test for China's regs, legal system and overall transparency.

Bring on the Progressives!

9:06AM

Divvying up the Pacific?

ARTICLE: Inside the Ring, By Bill Gertz, Washington Times, August 17, 2007

I would agree with the Air Force general: such a proposal, while quite promising, feels like going all the way on the first date. It's just unrealistic for us to opt out of the Western Pacific (why lose the connectivity?), especially since the Chinese are nowhere near capable of filling our shoes in strategic terms. Simply put, their navy just couldn't pull it off and won't be able to for a significant historical learning curve. We just didn't step into this job one afternoon. It was decades in the learning/making.

Then there's just the trust factor: China's rebranding of its military is extremely embryonic at this point (arguably, non-existent). It's just nowhere near being trusted enough by locals to aspire to such a role, especially absent some East Asia NATO-like overlay.

So very nice to see as a proposal (to the extent it's not just a cynical ploy of overreaching Chinese military types), but we'd need years of coalition operations before that discussion-leading-to-a-proposal-such-as-this would make any sense. Our response should be to push such coalition ops.

So joint patrols, yes. But divvying up the Pacific? No way.

Thanks to Greg Lowe for sending this.

9:00AM

Clearer rule sets = more cofident investors

ARTICLE: A Potential Tool for Protecting Human Rights in the Third World, By Bart Mongoven, Stratfor, August 16, 2007

This is very good to see. I agree with the positive view of FDI presumed here, especially in relation to state-run alternatives. The great irony of socialism is that it accomplished exactly what Marx warned against: making the factory owner and political boss one-in-the-nasty-same. Marx figured safety in identicalness, but practice reveals a profound lack of checks and balances, especially in the form of a muzzled press and a captive judiciary.

By harnessing the positive potential of multinationals to force better delineation of individual rights versus those of the state as a result of investment choices and industrial development, this kind of outside pressure can help further the development of legal rule sets in developing economies. The clearer those rule sets become, the more confident other companies become about entering that market.

Thanks to Brad Lena for sending this.

8:50AM

Possibly good sign in Korea

ARTICLE: South Korea to send emergency aid to flood-hit North, By Jack Kim, Reuters, August 17, 2007

Another possibly positive sign of NK opening up slowly to SK's careful penetration. To the extent this happens, it's because China is successful convincing Kim that he must change to survive, and to the extent that process continues, the Bush administration gets some real credit for encouraging that dynamic.

Thanks to Matthew Garcia for sending this.

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