ARTICLE: Jim Gant, the Green Beret who could win the war in Afghanistan, By Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, January 17, 2010
PAPER: One Tribe at a Time, By Jim Gant, 2 December 2009
I received a copy of the "One Tribe at a Time" paper a while back and found it compelling and straightforward, but wanted to wait on blogging it until I got some context via a third party. It comes now in a great piece by Ann Scott Tyson, who wrote on me back in 2005.
I excerpt a chunk here, because it's so good:
It was the spring of 2003, and Capt. Jim Gant and his Special Forces team had just fought their way out of an insurgent ambush in Afghanistan's Konar province when they heard there was trouble in the nearby village of Mangwel. There, Gant had a conversation with a tribal chief -- a chance encounter that would redefine his mission in Afghanistan and that, more than six years later, could help salvage the faltering U.S. war effort.
Malik Noorafzhal, an 80-year-old tribal leader, told Gant that he had never spoken to an American before and asked why U.S. troops were in his country. Gant, whose only orders upon arriving in Afghanistan days earlier had been to "kill and capture anti-coalition members," responded by pulling out his laptop and showing Noorafzhal a video of the World Trade Center towers crumbling.
That sparked hours of conversation between the intense 35-year-old Green Beret and the elder in a tribe of 10,000. "I spent a lot of time just listening," Gant said. "I spoke only when I thought I understood what had been said."
In an unusual and unauthorized pact, Gant and his men were soon fighting alongside tribesmen in local disputes and against insurgents, at the same time learning ancient tribal codes of honor, loyalty and revenge -- codes that often conflicted with the sharia law that the insurgents sought to impose. But the U.S. military had no plans to leverage the Pashtun tribal networks against the insurgents, so Gant kept his alliances quiet.
No longer. In recent months, Gant, now a major, has won praise at the highest levels for his effort to radically deepen the U.S. military's involvement with Afghan tribes -- and is being sent back to Afghanistan to do just that. His 45-page paper, "One Tribe at a Time," published online last fall and circulating widely within the U.S. military, the Pentagon and Congress, lays out a strategy focused on empowering Afghanistan's ancient tribal system. Gant believes that with the central government still weak and corrupt, the tribes are the only enduring source of local authority and security in the country.
"We will be totally unable to protect the 'civilians' in the rural areas of Afghanistan until we partner with the tribes for the long haul," Gant wrote.
A decorated war veteran and Pashto speaker with multiple tours in Afghanistan, Gant had been assigned by the Army to deploy to Iraq in November. But with senior military and civilian leaders -- including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan; and Gen. David Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command -- expressing support for Gant's views, he was ordered instead to return to Afghanistan later this year to work on tribal issues.
"Maj. Jim Gant's paper is very impressive -- so impressive, in fact, that I shared it widely," Petraeus said, while McChrystal distributed it to all commanders in Afghanistan. One senior military official went so far as to call Gant "Lawrence of Afghanistan."
The abrupt about-face surprised the blunt-spoken major. "I couldn't believe it," Gant said in a recent interview, recalling how his orders were canceled just days before he was set to deploy to Iraq. "How do I know they are serious? They contacted me. I am not a very nice guy. I lead men in combat. I am not a Harvard guy. You don't want me on your think tank."
Gant, who sports tattoos on his right arm featuring Achilles and the Chinese characters for "fear no man," is clearly comfortable with the raw violence that is part of his job. An aggressive officer, he is known to carry triple the ammunition required for his missions. (One fellow soldier referred to this habit as a "Gantism.") But he is equally at ease playing for hours with Afghan children or walking hand-in-hand with tribesmen, as is their custom.
It is an old COIN lesson relearned time and again: you really have to connect with the locals if you want to fight alongside them instead of for them.
Gant seems like an amazing guy, but the U.S. military has a long and distinguished history of finding amazing people when it's absolutely needed.
A very gratifying story.
Gant's preamble in his paper gives you a sense of his direct tone:
I am not a professional writer. Any mistakes in formatting, spelling, quoting, etc. are mine alone.
I am not implying by writing this paper that anyone has "got it wrong" or that I have all the right answers. I don't.
I started writing this paper in January of '09 prior to the "New Afghanistan Plan." Much has changed since then. It is an extremely difficult and elusive situation in Afghanistan.
This paper is about tactical employment of small, well-trained units that, when combined with a larger effort, will have positive strategic implications.
As getting-into-the-weeds material goes, the paper is exceptionally easy to connect back to strategic considerations. It just has that very easily-accessed logic that's viral (the paper's motto is "fight tactically, think strategically").
Naturally, I find the "Sitting Bull" analogy fascinating.
Read through Gant's narrative and then remember that he had all his discovery and success working with just six U.S. personnel at his side.
(Via WPR's Media Roundup)