Chivers on the competency of the Afghan police

C.J. Chivers story in NYT.

The disturbing lead:

Three months after arriving in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, a contingent of specialized Afghan police officers has logged a mediocre performance while being almost wholly dependent on American supervision and support, Westerners who work with the officers said.

The conduct of Marja’s interim police, from a unit American officials describe as the Interior Ministry’s most promising force, has been undercut by drug use, petty corruption and, at times, a lack of commitment in the face of the ordinary hardships and duties of uniformed life.

When the force first arrived in late winter, entire units refused to stand guard or clean their living areas, several Marines said, and in northern Marja, police shifts often still abandon checkpoints during the sweltering midday heat, disappearing for lunch breaks lasting hours. Some officers have deserted the force.

The police also seem unschooled in rules of engagement, which risks putting their behavior at cross-purposes with Western units trying to earn civilian support. Police officials themselves say they have inadequate equipment and face a complex, dangerous mission.

This early assessment, of a high-profile unit on a much publicized mission, underlined anew the difficulties in creating Afghan forces that can operate independently and be entrusted with the nation’s security — an essential step toward drawing down Western forces after nine years of war.

It also raises questions about any timetable for Afghan self-sufficiency. American officials and contractors say it will take much longer for the units to be nurtured to self-reliance and a higher level of skill. For now, the police in Marja perform limited duties. American units create the space in which they operate, and provide their logistical, medical and military support.

“They are not hopeless,” said Daniel M. Aguirre, a retired police officer from Amarillo, Tex., who works with the police. “But they are at the first or second rung on the ladder.”

Sounds like an honest assessment to me.  Iraq was a governed space before we got there--a brutal regime no doubt, but a governed space, meaning the capacity was there.

The same simply wasn't true of Afghanistan.

We didn't do right by the country for seven years, and now we're trying to cram-course the entire place in a matter of months. Why? Oldest reason in the book: our leadership fears our public.

The damage we do to the "nation" of Afghanistan--along with the region--is one thing.  The damage will do to ourselves globally is another.

But the damage we do to our military by pretending this is a legitimate full-on testing of COIN doctrine is bigger than both.

When, by discrediting U.S. power, you suggest that the world is ungovernable, you put globalization at risk.

Comments

[Ted O'Connor]

I believe that Afghanistan, the country, will reject us in the end like a body rejects an unfamiliar organ. I believe that we, like the Russians, will leave there someday and the dust from the last rotor blades will settle and we will just be a memory and another story told to the children. Like the British and the Russians and the Mongols and the rest who "Tried to hustle the East."

The land and the people will simply tire us out. They can wait...we cannot. I would not want to be the last man to die there.

[Georgia Bailey]

I've seen this movie before. It was called Vietnam.

You've talked a lot about the frontier, movies, and myth. This article reminds me of the difference between the movie Seven Samurai and the American western remake, The Magnificent Seven. In the former, the peasants finally rose up to help the embattled samurai, because they were inspired by their bravery, discipline and sacrifice.
In the latter, the peasants betrayed the Western gunslingers, who decided to fight on regardless, for their own sense of honor.
Globalization may be inevitable, but some regions don't seem to be buying. Yet. Perhaps because the Afghan population sees only sticks, and no carrots. Where is SysAdmin when you need it?

[louis Heberlein]

Queen Victoria was convinced England had a mission to globalize the world based on England's experience with the civilization process. The East India Company offered to be her 'bottoms up' agent, but gradually needed more military support in the parts of India that are now in the Afghanistan-Pakistan troubled tribal zones. There were lots of factual and fictional books covering the difficult experience of British players.

Over a century later, the Russians found they could not overcome and transform that tribal region culture into a useful client state.

I doubt if most of US government players really digested the insights of those earlier Afghan efforts beyond numbers, dates, military tactics & equipment, etc. A 'bottoms up' approach also has to start by gaining insight on the existing culture rather than on the modernization process.