C.J. Chivers story in NYT.
The disturbing lead:
Three months after arriving in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, a contingent of specialized Afghan police officers has logged a mediocre performance while being almost wholly dependent on American supervision and support, Westerners who work with the officers said.
The conduct of Marja’s interim police, from a unit American officials describe as the Interior Ministry’s most promising force, has been undercut by drug use, petty corruption and, at times, a lack of commitment in the face of the ordinary hardships and duties of uniformed life.
When the force first arrived in late winter, entire units refused to stand guard or clean their living areas, several Marines said, and in northern Marja, police shifts often still abandon checkpoints during the sweltering midday heat, disappearing for lunch breaks lasting hours. Some officers have deserted the force.
The police also seem unschooled in rules of engagement, which risks putting their behavior at cross-purposes with Western units trying to earn civilian support. Police officials themselves say they have inadequate equipment and face a complex, dangerous mission.
This early assessment, of a high-profile unit on a much publicized mission, underlined anew the difficulties in creating Afghan forces that can operate independently and be entrusted with the nation’s security — an essential step toward drawing down Western forces after nine years of war.
It also raises questions about any timetable for Afghan self-sufficiency. American officials and contractors say it will take much longer for the units to be nurtured to self-reliance and a higher level of skill. For now, the police in Marja perform limited duties. American units create the space in which they operate, and provide their logistical, medical and military support.
“They are not hopeless,” said Daniel M. Aguirre, a retired police officer from Amarillo, Tex., who works with the police. “But they are at the first or second rung on the ladder.”
Sounds like an honest assessment to me. Iraq was a governed space before we got there--a brutal regime no doubt, but a governed space, meaning the capacity was there.
The same simply wasn't true of Afghanistan.
We didn't do right by the country for seven years, and now we're trying to cram-course the entire place in a matter of months. Why? Oldest reason in the book: our leadership fears our public.
The damage we do to the "nation" of Afghanistan--along with the region--is one thing. The damage will do to ourselves globally is another.
But the damage we do to our military by pretending this is a legitimate full-on testing of COIN doctrine is bigger than both.
When, by discrediting U.S. power, you suggest that the world is ungovernable, you put globalization at risk.