Big war dinosaurs after the asteroid

ARTICLE: Can US Still Fight a 'Big-battle' War?, McClatchy Newspapers, September 16, 2008

Pike falls into the same category as Bacevich: they don't want a SysAdmin force because it will be used. If we keep the capacity stillborn, then we can focus on just fighting wars and losing the peace (which, in their mind either doesn't matter or shouldn't be sought in the first place through military intervention).

Here is the missing piece to this argument: America can impose its big-war willpower nicely with air power and air power alone. If we're not going to own the aftermath, then we can just bomb, bomb, bomb and not care about what comes next. I can do that with air assets from Navy and Air Force. If I'm not going to put my ground forces at risk in small wars, why the hell would I put them at maximal risk in big ones?

This is a diversionary argument. We are not fighting major land wars in Asia (f--king duh!) against Russia (which doesn't have the bodies), nor China and India (not as stupid as we often assume them to be). If we are going to fight high-end, then it'll be missiles and drones and high-altitude bombers and guided this and that. It will not be the Marines storming some beach en masse, nor Normandy with the Army.

In short, we can have our SysAdmin green force and use it too, while maintaining an appropriate lead in the blue Leviathan force. This is not as hard as Pike and Bacevich make it out to be. Again, their arguments are essentially trojan horse arguments against a SysAdmin force that's appropriate to the age we live in and therefore usable--for American "imperial" projects, in their minds.

Enough of guys who only know war within the context of war! These are dinosaurs still roaming the planet after the asteroid has hit.

We either adjust ourselves to this frontier-integrating age or we make America an irrelevant strategic power. Again, that's fine for the old-timers who know their Vietnam and nothing else, but it does not answer the future mail. They want to paint Nagl as out of touch with enduring realities, when it's their thinking (they know what they know and won't change their views no matter what the evidence piling up over the past several decades) that's gone way past expiration date.

(Thanks: Endre Lunde)

Comments

[Smitten Eagle]

I respectfully disagree with Barnett's idea of what "high-end" conflict looks like. He characterizes it as missiles and bombers conducting aerial bombardment with impunity. This is analogous to the largely ineffective cruise-missile warfighting methods of the Clinton administration, all of which were ineffectual.

Large numbers of ground troops create options that airpower alone cannot. Recall in Desert Storm the months of bombardment that would have been ineffectual were it not for the 100-hour ground war following it. Also, recall the three-week invasions of Iraq was highly reliant on the ground troops of I MEF, 3rd ID, and 101st Air Assault. The invasion's result would not have been decisive without the ground troops. Rather, the style of the fight would have been similar to the war in Kosovo: interminable, incessant, ineffective bombing.

Ground troops are indeed useful. As Mattis has claimed, ground troops can be used for both high-end warfighting and low-end SysAdmin work with the appropriate leadership and training.

SF, SE

[Tom Hommes]

Tom,Would be very interested in your top 10 "enduring realities".I've been focused on Joint Capabilities and JROC needs. But point well taken that we must start each day with a reality check.

[Sam Roggeveen]

Dr Barnett

I have some reservations about this argument, and a previous one you made against Bacevich. Please see here for more, at The Interpreter, blog of the Lowy Institute for International Policy:

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/10/Big-wars-or-small.aspx

[Agustin Mackinlay]

Where´s Tom now that we need him? The (financial) world is falling apart as we speak! Readers are anxiously awaiting Tom´s views on the matter, yet the blog dwells on totally irrelevant issues ... Arguably, what´s happening in the financial arena is much more relevant to the future of globalization!!!

Message from a loyal reader of the blog & the books: please watch CNBC and let us now your views. This is the stuff that matters now!

Thanks in advance,

[Anonymous]

Agustin: Tom wrote about this monday:

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/09/wall_streets_system_deeply_per.html

not writing beyond that shows he's not worried.

[Endre Lunde]

I think Dr. Barnett is right on the money on the conflicts of the future, although the scenario he lays out here is obviously simplified for the sake of argument - of course it will not "only" be "missiles and drones and high-altitude bombers and guided this and that" - the important part is that it will not be the "Marines storming some beach en masse, nor Normandy with the Army." Correct me if I am wrong, but I think the argument has never been that the Leviathan would not have any ground troops in it at all, rather, that these ground troops would instead be highly reliant on and integrated with the missiles, drones, high altitude bombers, etc. The SysAdmin part would instead be different, and their existence and activities would not make the job of the Leviathan any harder or less important. Again, what Pike and others in the "big war" crowd seem to be arguing is that we can only do one of the two, either big war or small war, and by preparing for and conducting smaller wars, we are destined to loose the big one, and I don't agree with that at all, and I think that was what Dr. Barnett was getting at here.

Also, for Sam Roggeveen's argument, I think part of the problem lies in us (including me) using the term small "wars" in this context, as it gives the impression that the SysAdmin force would actively seek out or even initiate wars and conflicts, when in my mind at least its job would mainly be to prevent them and maintain the sort of stability that would preclude wars or larger conflicts of any kind from arising in the first place. It is about maintaining presence, creating connectivity and being proactive about conflict as opposed to reactive, as has long been the norm. That is what the SysAdmin force is designed to do, while the Leviathan would handle those situations that truly deserve the term "wars, " which hopefully would be few, and largely, ideally, in understanding with other large core powers.