Only Ahmadinejad can go to Washington
Monday, May 29, 2006 at 6:22AM ARTICLE: "Iran Chief Eclipses Clerics As He Consolidates Power: Increasing Influence of President Presents Difficult Diplomatic Choices for U.S.," by Michael Slackman, New York Times, 28 May 2006, p. A1.
First off, the title of this article, as so often is the case in newspapers, doesn't match the text or analysis very well. But different people (editors) write headlines, and so you suffer this disconnect often (most op-eds I've written, I've been very unhappy with the titles chosen or altered).
The reality here is that the diplomatic choices for the U.S. are made much more simple.
The biggest problem we've had in reaching any sort of understanding with Iran in the past, as the article so wonderfully points out, is that any agreement or breakthrough with the government is rather meaningless, because the mullahs truly rule. So it's been an Iran of several voices in any diplomatic engagement, making any sort of agreement almost impossible.
The article's title also overstates the "power grab" aspect of of Ahmadinejad's moves: he does not do this in opposition to Khamenei, but rather with his blessing for larger, regime-preserving reasons that suggest the state is far more fragile than we estimate (more good news for us).
Ahmadinejad is irrelevant on the nuclear issue. It began long before he took power and reflects a concerted ayatollah-led bid for both national prestige and protection from U.S. invasion. Ahmadinejad's agenda overlaps on that issue only to the extent that he discovered, early in his administration, that it's faltering stature could be instantly improved with a very impatient and demanding public, if he chose to align himself with that strategy. In this move, Ahmadinejad has proven himself to be a very clever politician and a superb propagandist who plays the Americans, and especially the American-Jewish community, like a banjo (he plucks, we sing).
Our myopic focus on that nuclear bid (still several years off, but no matter to the propagandists on their side or the Chicken-Littles on ours) has obscured what is truly powerful and useful about Ahmadinejad's administration. As this article argues very well, the mullahs realize that having themselves represent the nation abroad isn't working, thus the apparent compliance in letting Ahmadinejad move in the direction of creating a political party powerbase that is, despite his personal religion, basically secular and more traditional:
In this theocratic system, where appointed religious leaders hold ultimate power, the presidency is a relatively weak position. In the multiple layers of power that obscure the governance of Iran, no one knows for certain where the ultimate decisions are being made. But many of those watching in near disbelief at the speed and aggression with which the president is seeking to accumulate power assume that he is operating with the full support of Ayatollah Khamenei...Mr. Ahmadinejad is pursuing a risky strategy that could offer him a shot at long-term influence over the direction of the country--or ruin. He appears motivated at least in part by a recognition that relying on clerics to serve as the public face of the government has undermined the credibility of both, analysts here said.
The changing nature of Iran's domestic political landscape has potentially far-reaching implications for the United States. While Iran has adopted a confrontational approach toward the West, it has also signaled--however clumsily--a desire to mend relations...
"If the U.S. had relations with Iran under the reform government, it would not have been a complete relationship," said Alireza Akhari, a retired general with the Revolutionary Guard and former depute defense minister, referring to Khatami's administration. "But if there can be a detente now, that means the whole country is behind relations with the West."
As the piece argues so well, Ahmadinejad is pursuing a revamp of both economics and politics in Iran that is of almost Gorbachevian-level ambitions. In effect, to save the theocratic regime, he believes a separate political party needs to be built outside of the mullahs for regime legitimacy: in effect, handing us, out of his sense of political desperation in the face of the "challenges buffeting Iran" ("economy is in shambles, unemployment is soaring, and the new president has so far failed to deliver on his promise of economic relief for the poor"; "Ethnic tensions are rising around the country, with protests and terrorist strikes in the north and the souhhd, and students have been staging protests at universities around the country"), that which we seek--the marginalization of the mullahs or de-theocratification of the regime.
In short, we're so much closer, due to Iran's internal problems, in achieving that which we need most to achieve with Iran, a development that would make the achievement of nuclear capacity irrelevant (Iran having nukes isn't the problem--we can deter; Iran giving nukes to terrorists is).
Many of Ahmadinejad's critics inside Iran believe he will fail. This article gives us real pause for hoping for that outcome. He may well end up being our "Nixon" who can, on the basis of his unassailable rhetoric and staunch, anti-Israel reputation, the exact tool we need for our strategic purposes.
Despite all his talk on religion, this article points out that he's "adopted an ideologically flexible strategy." He pushes for more conservative values but loosens their application, especially on gender issues:
If there is one consistent theme to his actions, it is the concept of seeking justice, reflecting a central characteristic of Shiite Islam. In more temporal terms, his strategy appears to be two-pronged: to reinforce his support among hard-liners with sharp attacks on Israel and the West, for example, while moving to appease a society weary of the social and economic challenges of live in the Islamic Republic.
Nixonian in strategy--indeed.
Again, to me, this is very welcome news. Hoping on a Khatami or a Rafsanjani seemed rather hopeless. The only guy who can lead serious change has to be so trusted by the mullahs that he convinces them that his rise and creation of a distinct power base is the only path toward preserving the Shiite revolutionary caste of the government, thus preserving the mullahs power. This is the early Russian tsar striking at the boyars who created his position in the first place, as a form of protection from the rising challenges of the outside world (thus the mullahs' tacit approval). Ahmadinejad can become a very useful Caesar in this manner.
Now, the idealists will say, "This is horrible. We trade the mullahs for a real strong man."
But first things first. We have to kill the revolution and that will a trusted agent (not by us, but by the mullahs). To survive this process, Ahmadinejad needs to deliver. And since we know what he needs to deliver, we finally have some real influence and power over the situation, when we have neither now. Knowing what he needs to survive and knowing it is within our power to grant that, we begin a dialogue that can serve our purposes in Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Riyadh, Islamabad--all over the dial.
With that analysis, now read the opening paragraphs of the piece and realize what a potentially powerful position we have been handed by events in Iran:
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is trying to consolidate power in the office of the presidency in a way never before seen in the 27-year history of the Islamic Republic, apparently with the tacit approval of Iran's supreme leader, according to government officials and political analysts here [notice how the best articles on Iran quote no U.S. experts on Iran!]And the fear-mongers on our side want to have you believe that Ahmadinejad is JUST a nutcase whose irrationality means we must pre-empt and pre-empt now.That rate unity of elected and religious leadership at the highest levels offers the United States an opportunity to talk to a government, however combative, that has often spoken with multiple voices at cross purposes.
But if the United States, which severed relations with Iran after the 1979 revolution, opened such a dialogue, it could boost the prestige of the Iranian president [just like Nixon was boosted by detente and going to China despite being so buffeted at the time by Vietnam and economic crisis and political disaster at home], who has pushed toward confrontation with the West.
Political analysts and people close to the government here say that Mr. Ahmadinejad and his allies are trying to buttress a system of conservative clerical rule that had lost credibility with the public. Their strategy hinges on [my italics] trying to win concessions from the West on Iran's nuclear program and opening direct, high-level talks with the United States, while easing social restrictions, cracking down on political dissent and building a new political class from outside the clergy.
We have consistently misread and underestimated the complexity of Iranian domestic politics.
In reality, we have Iran right where we want it and need it to be: needing help from us to survive. If we had any diplomats of Kissingerian brilliance, we'd seize this opportunity and dismantle the mullahs' rule by 2010 (my prediction going back to PNM). Our biggest problem right now is the lack of strategic imagination and skill among the senior ranks of this administration.
And that gets me back to my old whine in a new bottle: what a shame it is that Bush won a second term. He started so much excellent play and opportunity in the Middle East, but his administration seems incapable of taking any advantage. And that deficit right now is due largely to how we screwed up the Iraq peace, and that deficit is due primarily to not having that SysAdmin capacity, and that deficit is primarily caused by our persistent and preferred vision of war over the past decade and a half.
And that's why vision matters.
And that's why I keep writing.
Still, a very promising bit of analysis that convinces more than ever of the need to engage Iran and pursue the soft-kill option. Amazing work by Slackman, and again, notice how there's nothing from Western analysts!
Reader Comments (7)
The larger picture, beyond Iran, is that the US realpolitik faction has to be weaned off of its historic love affair with "our bastards", dictators that can work to our short term advantage but undermine our long-term ability to shrink the Gap. The Bush administration apologized for this historic betrayal of our ideals and set off the big bang in Iraq and beyond. With Ahmadinejad not being able to even visit certain provinces (he promised to visit them all during his first year in office) due to unrest in a pretty lengthy list of them, there are two choices for the US, to stand with Ahmadinejad or to stand with the unrest, both persian and non-persian looking to replace the regime.
We don't have to roll divisions into Iran to stand with the insurgents but merely throw them enough of a lifeline that the external support received by the current regime's friends is neutralized. The regime is weak enough to fall absent that external support, or if that support is counterbalanced by external support from us. We struck a great blow against Tehran when we freed Kerbala and Najaf because they are greatly strengthening the religious insurgents of Qom against the current regime.
The argument against Khomeinism was always strong and now it is growing stronger. Ahmadinejad is going the Hitler route economically in burning up Iran's economic seed corn in order to provide some result today. That can only go so far, buying him a year or five until the shell game is discovered by the most short sighted of economists and everybody stops lending to Iran. At that point, the regime will fall because it cannot make payroll on its rent-a-thug foreign mercenary groups and enough of the army will refuse to shoot their own to preserve the regime.
Iran is desperately seeking alternative sources of money because Khomeinism cannot deliver enough economic progress and will never do so. That was Hitler's problem too. Eventually, he found his solution in aggressive expansion via Austria, the Sudetenland, and eventually Poland to fill the gaping hole in his economic needs. I think that road is mostly closed to Iran because our underemployed air force can turn the tide against Iran in any possible theater.
Iran is thus looking to get out from under our sanctions and looking for foreign aid to make up the hole in their corrupt economy. This is almost a tailor made scenario for the classic realists. But to do the deal, we're going to have to bury all the good parts of the Bush administration, the Big Bang, the apology for realpolitik, the commitment to support freedom movements (by not standing in their way if nothing else), it'll all have to go.
This is a very steep and unnecessary price to pay. Instead, why not just support the insurgency and turn Iran into another Japan, technically advanced and able to be go nuclear but choosing not to because it's more convenient to be guaranteed by other nuclear powers than to roll your own.
This post reminds me of that fine arcane art of the era referenced several times in the post: Kremlinology.
I don't disagree with Tom that this is the direction we hope to guide things towards.
I am skeptical that he has seen into Ahmadinejad's soul to discover his Inner Nixon. We'll see. I suppose I will practice the mystic arts of Kremlinology and assert that if Ahmadinejad *doesn't* make a Nixonian Swerve, people here will lay the blame mainly - if not exclusively - at America's feet.
In the end, anything Ahmadinejad says or does will be irrelevant. This administration has long claimed that Iran is part of the Axis of Evil, and nothing they do can change that. We could have worked with Iran to make Iraq go much smoother, but instead chose the more painful macho approach.
And as the latest Prospect article mentions, Iran has been trying to talk with the US since before 2001, and this administration just refuses to have any part of it. Instead, the opening position of the US is that Iran must surrender, before the US will start "negotiating." That sort of "negotiating" might be fun to watch on The Sopranos, but doesn't work at all in the Real World‚Ñ¢. Ahmadinejad hasn't recently discovered his "inner nixon," it is only apparent because the media in the US have only started paying attention to Iranian overtures.
Iran doesn't believe the US will attack because, like during the Reagan administration, the public rhetoric was loud and vicious, yet behind the scenes, deals went on. Iran-Contra was the fruit of that poisonous tree, and the current administration has rehired many of the Iran-Contra alumni to work in this administration, including using Manucher Ghorbanifar as a go-between yet again.
Meanwhile, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will probably try to create their own "Asian Core." And in about 2 weeks, they'll most likely add Iran as a member, along with Mongolia, India and Pakistan.
Iran can, and probably will, cripple the world economy by simply shutting off their oil exports. They'll take their bat and ball, and go home. They only export 5% of the world's oil, yet the last time they shut down their wells, in 1979, the world price of oil doubled. Since then, the world supplies have become even tighter, so there wouldn't be any available production to offset the loss. Tripling of gas prices would be a reasonable expectation in such a situation. We need them more than they need us. And our shortsighted energy policies bind us to them in an unpleasant fashion.Tangurena - My 6 year old can hold his breath until he turns blue but I can could outlast him, I think. He's never actually tried that tack with me. Since he has a vivid imagination, I expect it's because he's too smart to think it would work.
Iran's threat to withhold its oil looks impressive until you actually start looking at the state of Iranian finances. They seem remarkably opaque but what little I can divine points to a regime desperate for every penny. Even without shooting themselves financially with an oil shutoff things look bleak for the regime and though the current march of 10,000 protesters on Tehran will likely fail, one of these explosions is going to succeed.
I guarantee you that Lebanese Shia (even fanatics like Hezbollah) do not come to Iran to break protesters' heads for free. No money from oil means no money to pay these rent-a-thugs which means that a regime that is living on the financial cliff's edge as Iran is cannot afford to shut down its biggest source of hard currency.
It is simply incorrect that we need them more than they need us. A shutdown of oil exports would likely be quickly followed by a shutdown of gasoline imports. Percentage-wise, the world imports less of their oil than they import the world's gasoline. This was not the case in 1979 when they had enough refineries to create their own. The pain at the pump will be considerable on both sides of the divide and it will be a matter of will who blinks first. The relevant decision points will be Iran's army commanders who will have to decide every day whether they want to beat and kill their countrymen and western politicians, mostly american, who will face the voters as far as six years from now.
What concerns me greatly, in trying to undersand leaders like this and the future actions they may/may not take is this;
Over the last year or so I have read interviews with Putin (around the time of the Dan Rather scandal) and Ahmadinejad just today (Sterns on the Holocaust). Currently, they have vastly different relationships with the US but they still seem to have something in common.
In both cases the subject of the interview either completely assumes the press is controlled (Putin) and or flatly asks the reporter if the Western press can print what they like (Sterns, who says they can print what they believe is true). Considering the level of political poison in print today, I can’t imagine a head of a foreign government asking this question of western journalists. Yet, they both seem to believe state control of the press is the norm.
It seems to me predicting the future actions of either one is a major gamble as they are not capable of grasping what basic representative and democratic government is and or isn’t all about, the good and the bad.
Isnt globalization predicated upon a certain level of predictability? If they dont clearly understand and cannot predict us, their "enemy", how ever will they make the "right" decision?
Where is Sun Tsu when you need him? It seems to me they are more into reading Miamoto Musashi - one cut, one kill...today is a good day to die...
Robert
"We have consistently misread and underestimated the complexity of Iranian domestic politics."
Truer words cannot be found to better apply.
Much will become clearer after the elections of the Assembly of Experts in the Fall.
Bob Salsa - What, exactly has the Assembly of Experts ever done? So far as I can tell, they've never challenged a decision of the Supreme Leader, much less gotten rid of him. The Guardian Council will make sure to disqualify candidates that are going to rock the boat too hard. It's difficult to see how you'll get a working majority to make things better.