ARTICLE: "Iran Chief Eclipses Clerics As He Consolidates Power: Increasing Influence of President Presents Difficult Diplomatic Choices for U.S.," by Michael Slackman, New York Times, 28 May 2006, p. A1.

First off, the title of this article, as so often is the case in newspapers, doesn't match the text or analysis very well. But different people (editors) write headlines, and so you suffer this disconnect often (most op-eds I've written, I've been very unhappy with the titles chosen or altered).

The reality here is that the diplomatic choices for the U.S. are made much more simple.

The biggest problem we've had in reaching any sort of understanding with Iran in the past, as the article so wonderfully points out, is that any agreement or breakthrough with the government is rather meaningless, because the mullahs truly rule. So it's been an Iran of several voices in any diplomatic engagement, making any sort of agreement almost impossible.

The article's title also overstates the "power grab" aspect of of Ahmadinejad's moves: he does not do this in opposition to Khamenei, but rather with his blessing for larger, regime-preserving reasons that suggest the state is far more fragile than we estimate (more good news for us).

Ahmadinejad is irrelevant on the nuclear issue. It began long before he took power and reflects a concerted ayatollah-led bid for both national prestige and protection from U.S. invasion. Ahmadinejad's agenda overlaps on that issue only to the extent that he discovered, early in his administration, that it's faltering stature could be instantly improved with a very impatient and demanding public, if he chose to align himself with that strategy. In this move, Ahmadinejad has proven himself to be a very clever politician and a superb propagandist who plays the Americans, and especially the American-Jewish community, like a banjo (he plucks, we sing).

Our myopic focus on that nuclear bid (still several years off, but no matter to the propagandists on their side or the Chicken-Littles on ours) has obscured what is truly powerful and useful about Ahmadinejad's administration. As this article argues very well, the mullahs realize that having themselves represent the nation abroad isn't working, thus the apparent compliance in letting Ahmadinejad move in the direction of creating a political party powerbase that is, despite his personal religion, basically secular and more traditional:

In this theocratic system, where appointed religious leaders hold ultimate power, the presidency is a relatively weak position. In the multiple layers of power that obscure the governance of Iran, no one knows for certain where the ultimate decisions are being made. But many of those watching in near disbelief at the speed and aggression with which the president is seeking to accumulate power assume that he is operating with the full support of Ayatollah Khamenei...

Mr. Ahmadinejad is pursuing a risky strategy that could offer him a shot at long-term influence over the direction of the country--or ruin. He appears motivated at least in part by a recognition that relying on clerics to serve as the public face of the government has undermined the credibility of both, analysts here said.

The changing nature of Iran's domestic political landscape has potentially far-reaching implications for the United States. While Iran has adopted a confrontational approach toward the West, it has also signaled--however clumsily--a desire to mend relations...

"If the U.S. had relations with Iran under the reform government, it would not have been a complete relationship," said Alireza Akhari, a retired general with the Revolutionary Guard and former depute defense minister, referring to Khatami's administration. "But if there can be a detente now, that means the whole country is behind relations with the West."

As the piece argues so well, Ahmadinejad is pursuing a revamp of both economics and politics in Iran that is of almost Gorbachevian-level ambitions. In effect, to save the theocratic regime, he believes a separate political party needs to be built outside of the mullahs for regime legitimacy: in effect, handing us, out of his sense of political desperation in the face of the "challenges buffeting Iran" ("economy is in shambles, unemployment is soaring, and the new president has so far failed to deliver on his promise of economic relief for the poor"; "Ethnic tensions are rising around the country, with protests and terrorist strikes in the north and the souhhd, and students have been staging protests at universities around the country"), that which we seek--the marginalization of the mullahs or de-theocratification of the regime.

In short, we're so much closer, due to Iran's internal problems, in achieving that which we need most to achieve with Iran, a development that would make the achievement of nuclear capacity irrelevant (Iran having nukes isn't the problem--we can deter; Iran giving nukes to terrorists is).

Many of Ahmadinejad's critics inside Iran believe he will fail. This article gives us real pause for hoping for that outcome. He may well end up being our "Nixon" who can, on the basis of his unassailable rhetoric and staunch, anti-Israel reputation, the exact tool we need for our strategic purposes.

Despite all his talk on religion, this article points out that he's "adopted an ideologically flexible strategy." He pushes for more conservative values but loosens their application, especially on gender issues:

If there is one consistent theme to his actions, it is the concept of seeking justice, reflecting a central characteristic of Shiite Islam. In more temporal terms, his strategy appears to be two-pronged: to reinforce his support among hard-liners with sharp attacks on Israel and the West, for example, while moving to appease a society weary of the social and economic challenges of live in the Islamic Republic.

Nixonian in strategy--indeed.

Again, to me, this is very welcome news. Hoping on a Khatami or a Rafsanjani seemed rather hopeless. The only guy who can lead serious change has to be so trusted by the mullahs that he convinces them that his rise and creation of a distinct power base is the only path toward preserving the Shiite revolutionary caste of the government, thus preserving the mullahs power. This is the early Russian tsar striking at the boyars who created his position in the first place, as a form of protection from the rising challenges of the outside world (thus the mullahs' tacit approval). Ahmadinejad can become a very useful Caesar in this manner.

Now, the idealists will say, "This is horrible. We trade the mullahs for a real strong man."

But first things first. We have to kill the revolution and that will a trusted agent (not by us, but by the mullahs). To survive this process, Ahmadinejad needs to deliver. And since we know what he needs to deliver, we finally have some real influence and power over the situation, when we have neither now. Knowing what he needs to survive and knowing it is within our power to grant that, we begin a dialogue that can serve our purposes in Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Riyadh, Islamabad--all over the dial.

With that analysis, now read the opening paragraphs of the piece and realize what a potentially powerful position we have been handed by events in Iran:

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is trying to consolidate power in the office of the presidency in a way never before seen in the 27-year history of the Islamic Republic, apparently with the tacit approval of Iran's supreme leader, according to government officials and political analysts here [notice how the best articles on Iran quote no U.S. experts on Iran!]

That rate unity of elected and religious leadership at the highest levels offers the United States an opportunity to talk to a government, however combative, that has often spoken with multiple voices at cross purposes.

But if the United States, which severed relations with Iran after the 1979 revolution, opened such a dialogue, it could boost the prestige of the Iranian president [just like Nixon was boosted by detente and going to China despite being so buffeted at the time by Vietnam and economic crisis and political disaster at home], who has pushed toward confrontation with the West.

Political analysts and people close to the government here say that Mr. Ahmadinejad and his allies are trying to buttress a system of conservative clerical rule that had lost credibility with the public. Their strategy hinges on [my italics] trying to win concessions from the West on Iran's nuclear program and opening direct, high-level talks with the United States, while easing social restrictions, cracking down on political dissent and building a new political class from outside the clergy.

And the fear-mongers on our side want to have you believe that Ahmadinejad is JUST a nutcase whose irrationality means we must pre-empt and pre-empt now.

We have consistently misread and underestimated the complexity of Iranian domestic politics.

In reality, we have Iran right where we want it and need it to be: needing help from us to survive. If we had any diplomats of Kissingerian brilliance, we'd seize this opportunity and dismantle the mullahs' rule by 2010 (my prediction going back to PNM). Our biggest problem right now is the lack of strategic imagination and skill among the senior ranks of this administration.

And that gets me back to my old whine in a new bottle: what a shame it is that Bush won a second term. He started so much excellent play and opportunity in the Middle East, but his administration seems incapable of taking any advantage. And that deficit right now is due largely to how we screwed up the Iraq peace, and that deficit is due primarily to not having that SysAdmin capacity, and that deficit is primarily caused by our persistent and preferred vision of war over the past decade and a half.

And that's why vision matters.

And that's why I keep writing.

Still, a very promising bit of analysis that convinces more than ever of the need to engage Iran and pursue the soft-kill option. Amazing work by Slackman, and again, notice how there's nothing from Western analysts!