Slow Pentagon for a long war
Sunday, February 5, 2006 at 5:55PM ARTICLE: “Rumsfeld Offers Strategies for Current War: Pentagon to Release 20-Year Plan Today,” by Josh White and Scott Tyson, Washington Post, 3 February 2006, p. A8.
ARTICLE: “$120 Billion More Is Sought For Military in War Zones,” by David S. Cloud, New York Times, 3 February 2006, p. A12.
ARTICLE: “Another $120B sought for wars: Rebuilding is extra; more requests likely,” by Richard Wolf, USA Today, 3 February 2006, p. 1A.
ARTICLE: “Army Pledges No Cutbacks in National Guard: Recruiting Shortfalls Led To Proposed Reductions,” Washington Post, 3 February 2006, p. A8.
ARTICLE: “Abizaid Credited With Popularizing the Term ‘Long War,’” by Bradley Graham and Josh White, Washington Post, 3 February 2006, p. A8.
My opinion of the QDR is that, like all before it, it’s a snapshot in time of the correlation of forces within the Defense Department. I see a Big Peace force on the rise in the Army and Marines, who seem themselves in a Long War where they’ll be forced to win most of the time “non-kinetically.” I see a Big War force that’s holding on in the Navy and Air Force solely because, unless forced to, Cold Warrior Don Rumsfeld will both “transform” in the right direction but still try to love all his children equally.
Rumsfeld’s strategy works only in a world where the White House says anything goes budget-wise because we’re “in a war.” But that won’t last, so the Big War force will lose ground to the Ground Pounders come the next administration, no matter who wins. You can’t blow off such massive debt for the long haul, because the rest of the world (especially the Chinese) won’t pay for it forever.
The rest of the world wants a Long Peace and wants that Big Peace force funded.
So, for now, “A’s” all around with a huge “F” for sustainability. It is unsustainable to buy a Big War force in a Small War world. It is unsustainable to expect the Chinese to pay for a Big War force directed primarily against them. It is unsustainable to deny ourselves the aid of major allies, to include China most of all (that body shop of a military). It is unsustainable not to do a better job gaining acceptance of our new security rule sets in this Long War because we’re so highhanded and arrogant in our application.
Bush sets the right course. He just does it a way that’s completely unsustainable, and to me, in the end, that’s bad grand strategy. Bush begins the Long War but he and his crew need to exit stage right before we can get seriously prepared to win it.
The Army is serious about moving in this direction, as is Special Operations Command and the Marines. For now, because the White House indulges them, neither the Air Force or the Navy has gotten with the program. When the Navy brags how its huge destroyers are justified because they can also insert SEALs, you know strategic logic has left the building.
So while Rumsfeld may choose to love all his children (i.e., the services) equally, given the complete lack of fiscal responsibility from above (still want to have a “CEO government”?), the having-it-all approach of this QDR is exactly NOT what the strategic doctor ordered, because it is so incredibly unsustainable. Amazingly, the QDR fails most profoundly in that which it was exactly designed to achieve: the art of the long view.
My prediction?
Army and Marines will continue to lead, providing the best generals, the best strategists, the best trainers and doctrinal entrepreneurs. These two services, along with SOCOM, will produce the bulk of the best and brightest in coming years. These generals will become the great movers and shakers.
Much of this moving and shaking will center first and foremost on training and doctrine, and over time this operational accumulation of reality will overshadow the dreams of the Air Force and Navy for a future force that’s only useful in futures worth avoiding. Acquisition will change most slowly, but over time those expensive and poorly justified programs of record will have fewer and fewer operational experiences, field manuals, scenarios, etc. to point at, connect with, or generally engage.
So celebrate while you can, Big War crowd, because this was your last great gasp. Too many Marines and soldiers will die in the meantime, but that’s what happens when you choose machines over men, Big War over the Big Peace, Leviathan over SysAdmin, and “communist” China over China our inevitable strategic partner.
You can’t deal with the future unless you let go of the past. We have three more years of this mindset, but then it’s gone.
Reader Comments (11)
Here is a question. Should the Air Force be abolished as a separate service? Their toys are very expensive
Exactly right on sustainability. We are currently running deficits at a level normally reserved for deep recessions. When we do go into recession (which is inevitable), we could see debt balloon. Defense cuts will follow. I'm not sure how well next generation forces will fare against the big weapon systems that are tied to "good" jobs in congressional districts. How much confidence do you have in the political system to make the right choice?
Maybe the the Army, Navy and Marine Corps needs to give up all of their land based aircraft (A/C) to the Air Force. The Navy and the Corps maintain their carrier based aircraft. Heck, if the Army and the Corps are going to be part of the SysAdmin force then they will only need A/C on a scheduled basis.
Here is a question. Should the Air Force be abolished as a separate service? Their toys are very expensive
I wonder about that also. Lotsa duplication amongst the different air forces.
It's all about the benjamins - people need money therefore work - so what if the virginia class subs are imho useless - it gives people jobs in groton. Same with the big ticket weapon systems built by Lockheed Martin or Northrup. Jobs, Jobs. That's why the bases cannot be realigned to better meet the needs of reality. What needs to be done is less of a political oversight of the military. Need civilian but not political, because that's about short term thinking and winning elections. But its going to be difficult.
Its not about buying for one war while fighting another - its about maintaining a welfare state by introducing boogey men as opponents while dealing with reality.
Necessity is the mother of invention.
Because the course has been set and will be difficult to rudder into a good Grand Strategy, and because GWB is already moving into lameduck-ness, I'm compelled to hope for the future rather than weep for the past.
Anyone know the mindsets of the frontrunners for '08?
Personally, I don't believe we should abolish the service with the most expertise (my assumption) on aircraft dynamics and utilization. Rather, have the other force structures outsource their aircraft components to the Air Force as part of overall joint capabilities. In essence, the Air Force would employ VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) for all the force structures that had their own aircraft operations up to today.
The reach of this VMI strategy would be negotiated according to the military action being considered. For example, would the Air Force manage the planes and train another force's pilots? Or would it manage both the planes and lend its own pilots?
Tom,
If the Navy is heading in the wrong direction, what would that force look like in in support of the New Map? No CVNs, new fast attack subs, or DDX? Smaller CVs to support littoral ops? Conventional boommers?
You stated at the CSIS forum that the Navy doesn't control the seas now, since in order to do that it needs to know where everything is all the time. I disagree with your definition of what it means to control the seas. Why do we need to know where everything is all the time? We need to know, using all source intel, where the critical contacts of interest are, be able to track them, and have a plan to interdict them if necessary. The other ships at sea conducting routine business are of little importance if they are not carrying something or someone of interest. The maritime domain awareness problem in the future needs to be a combination of all maritime nations sharing information that is open source, sharing intelligence that is pertinent to threats to everyone's homeland, not just the U.S., and utilizing all Naval, USCG, and other DHS assets to intercept or neatralize threats at a time of our choosing.
Thanks for briefing at CSIS. It was a quick 2 hours! Dave Cheney
ugh, Shawn. in my day job, VMI pretty much stinks. are there good iterations of this?
David, problem is, some of those ships might not be conducting routine business. i like your open source intell idea.
Everyone wants the force structure specifics from me, when I'm not really the person to ask for that. Smart people inside both the Navy and Air Force know what a force more supportive of our efforts in the GWOT would look like--including one that would still provide the adequate hedge on China.
But in the current political climate inside the Pentagon, such voices cannot be heard.
Different administration, different Pentagon, different voices will be heard. And I am convinced that happens no matter which party wins in 08. Simply no choice otherwise,due to the lack of sustainability.
Having thus punted, the force structure I would advocate for the Navy is the same one Hank Gaffney and I came up with at CNA back in the early 1990s: preserve numbers, stay with existing technology, and--to adopt later interations--when you buy, buy the many and cheap and focus on tactics, not technology to win the GWOT.
Simple rule set, but the right one for know, I honestly believe.
What's your day job?
There are definitely good iterations of VMI, particularly in the retail sector. The relationships Walmart has worked out with P&G for example in managing retail space is pretty sophisticated. Other examples include the management of spare parts for manufacturers with significant investments in machinery. I think if there weren't enough good iterations of VMI, it would no longer exist as an employable strategy.
Perhaps in your day job it's the wrong strategy, it's not executed properly, or it's not configured properly. :D