The Sys Admin force and the dialectics of change

ìSpecial Warriors Have Growing Ranks and Growing Pains in Taking Key Antiterror Role,î by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, New York Times, 2 Aug, p. A6.

ìChina, Taiwan, U.S. Give Displays of Military Might: Exercises a Reminder of Potential for Conflict Over Island,î by Edward Cody, Washington Post 27 July, p. A18.

ìCould U.N. Fix Iraq? Word From Kosovo Isnít Encouraging: U.S. Ousted Tyrant There, Too; Now World Body Struggles With a Privatization Plan,î by Andrew Higgins, Wall Street Journal, 2 Aug, p. A1.

ìFive Months After Aristide, Mayhem Rules the Streets,î by Michael Kamber, NYT, 2 Aug, p. A4.

We are in a real historical moment of dialectical change inside of the Defense Department. We have strong forces pushing for a new force paradigm to fight this global war on terrorism, and Special Operations Command is the cannibalizing agent preferred by all, but as anyone at SOCOM will tell you, simply growing that command isnít the answer, just a solution looking for one. The reason why SOCOM is so attractive, is that it seems like the perfect fusion of the front half (trigger-pullers) and back half (civil affairs) forces, or what I call the Leviathan and Sys Admin forces. But to simply ìbiggerî SOCOM willóin the endósimply corrupt it. By focusing all our reform dreams on this one command, weíre simply putting off the inevitable, but far larger task of admitting the bifurcation that must occur within the force as a whole.

We donít want to do that in the Pentagon, because we still love to hold onto our Great Power War model, exemplified today by the Taiwan Straits scenario with China. So long as that hovers in our imagination as THE scenario worth planning against, weíll continue to dick around with SOCOM, pretending to ourselves that making the perfect mix of Leviathan and Sys Admin work there will win us the total GWOT. Simply put, that is thinking small for the U.S. and expecting too much from the UN, which shows in both Afghanistan and Haiti that it is not really up to the task of running much of anything thatís really hardómeaning thereís still a profound security element to be mastered before serious economic and political rehab can begin.

But have no fear, this trip Iím taking to Joint Force Command is all about thinking big for the U.S. military as a whole, and that means some serious re-imagining of what our ìother than warî military capabilities could eventually spawn in terms of a robust Sys Admin force that is so much more than just DoD-going-it-alone. Along those lines: hereís a bit from Zenpundit, whoís recently been giving serious thought to the differences between the Leviathan and Sys Admin forces:

Leviathan would be the composed of the core forces assembled to fight "the big one"ócarriers, armored divisions, strategic bombers and the like. A very large and dramatic iron fist designed to do one thingóswiftly crush an opponent completely and utterly.

By contrast, System Administrator would have to be good at many things traditionally done by peacetime governments while still retaining the organization and combat ability of a military force. The purpose here is "Connectivity" for struggling or failed states; the System Administrator comes in and helps these societies connect to the Core by alleviating multiple problems long enough for the Gap state to "catch it's breath" and stabilize. In other words, the System Administrator would have significant para-civilian program capabilities backed by military prowess. (Ö)

A System Administrator force is much more like an expedition than an invasion. Sure there are Special Operations guys to engage in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and training but the army engineer, the medical corpsman or the legal advisor might be, in a given situation, just as important to the success of the mission to "Shrink the Gap ". Flexibility, adaptability and creative engagement would be the watchwords of a hypothetical System Administration force.

Sort of the Alliance for Progress. . .. but with Apache helicopters for air support.

Neat bit from ZenPundit, reminding me of how I plotted out the section in PNM where I compared and contrasted the two forces. My point? This is a reproducible strategic concept (although my SOF trigger pullers will remain in the Leviathan) that others can instinctively reinvent and understand intrinsically on their own. Read ZenPunditís entire post @ zenpundit.blogspot.com/2004/07/thinking-about-pnm-leviathan-vs.html